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Rethinking strategic stability in space through technologically dynamic deterrence model

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Open Access
|Oct 2025

Figures & Tables

Comparative strategic postures through the TDDM lens

ActorSAIRRMTDSREERCBESNormative posture
United StatesMed–highHighHighModerateModerateStrategic resilience + response
ChinaVery highMediumModerateLowLowStrategic ambiguity + denial
NATO/EULowMediumLow–modHighHighNormative anchoring + diplomacy

Policy levers for adaptive space deterrence and their strategic functions

Policy leverPrimary deterrent effectStrategic function
Disaggregated satellite architecturesDeterrence-by-futilityEnhances resilience and redundancy
AI-enabled escalation predictionDeterrence-by-foresightSupports rapid, calibrated response
KPI-based posture monitoringDeterrence-by-adaptationEnables real-time risk assessment
Confidence-building mechanismsDeterrence-by-trustReduces ambiguity and misperception
Reversible weapon normsDeterrence-by-restraintClarifies acceptable operational boundaries
Public–private integration protocolsDeterrence-by-cohesionCloses attribution gaps and aligns priorities

Core structural contrasts between classical and space deterrence

DimensionClassical deterrenceContemporary space deterrence
Strategic domainTerrestrial (mainly land and sea)Multi-orbit space (LEO, MEO, GEO, cislunar)
Actor structureBipolar, state-centricMultipolar, including commercial actors
Weapons typeKinetic, high-yieldReversible, non-kinetic, dual-use
Escalation thresholdsHigh and visibleLow and ambiguous
AttributionGenerally clearOften uncertain or deniable
Strategic SignallingDeclarative, symbolic (e.g. nuclear tests)Embedded in orbital behaviour, capability ambiguity
Speed of decision-makingDeliberative, slowMachine-speed, algorithmic, real-time
Legal frameworkTreaty-rich, structuredFragmented, with large regulatory gaps

Operational KPIs for evaluating space deterrence performance

KPI nameDefinitionStrategic function
SAIDegree to which assets and behaviour obscure intent (e.g., dual-use systems)Assesses escalation risk & signalling clarity
RRMSystem’s ability to maintain or rapidly restore function post-interferenceEvaluates deterrence-by-survivability
TDSRAlignment between technological capabilities and operational doctrineDetects doctrinal lag or policy overstretch
EERProbability of escalation in response to a reversible or ambiguous attackMeasures stability margin in grey zones
CBESLevel of transparency, dialogue and norm promotion with other actorsIndicates soft deterrence through diplomacy
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/jms-2025-0006 | Journal eISSN: 1799-3350 | Journal ISSN: 2242-3524
Language: English
Submitted on: May 19, 2025
Accepted on: Aug 24, 2025
Published on: Oct 10, 2025
Published by: National Defense University
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 1 times per year

© 2025 Alper Ören, published by National Defense University
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

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