Rethinking strategic stability in space through technologically dynamic deterrence model

The outer space domain is no longer the exclusive purview of a few great powers. Over 90 countries operate satellites, and more than 70 private companies maintain orbital infrastructure, according to the 2024 State of Satellite Deployments report (Slingshot Aerospace 2024). This diversity undermines the dyadic structure that classical deterrence theory relies on. Moreover, the entry of non-state actors and commercial actors with strategic relevance (e.g., Starlink’s role in Ukraine) introduces unpredictability and complicates the attribution essential for deterrence to function.

In space, many systems serve both civilian and military functions – a satellite may simultaneously support commercial communications, military reconnaissance and navigation (Vlasic 1991). This dual-use ambiguity (Pražák 2021) blurs the distinction between legitimate targets and acts of aggression, challenging the assumptions of clarity and signalling embedded in deterrence logic (New Space Economy 2025). As noted in the Space Threat Assessment (Swope et al. 2024), the indistinguishability between a servicing satellite and a co-orbital ASAT system exemplifies this dilemma.

Traditional deterrence relies on the threat of punishment through highly destructive means (Kahan 1999). Yet many contemporary counterspace threats – such as cyberattacks, jamming, spoofing and dazzling – are non-kinetic, reversible and often deniable. These features lower the threshold for use and increase the challenge of attribution, undermining the escalatory clarity needed for deterrence to hold. As the Secure World Foundation’s 2024 Counterspace Capabilities Report illustrates, states are increasingly investing in capabilities designed to operate below the threshold of armed conflict – a domain in which classical models offer limited predictive power.

Emerging technologies – especially AI, machine-speed decision systems and autonomous spacecraft – drastically compress the decision-making window (Lucarelli et al. 2021). In classical theory, deterrence was predicated on deliberation, signalling and strategic calculus (Coletta 2023); in contrast, modern engagements may unfold at speeds that render traditional crisis management tools obsolete. A satellite-disabling event triggered by an AI-driven threat assessment algorithm may escalate faster than humans can respond or interpret, raising questions about the reliability of deterrence through rationality.

Unlike nuclear deterrence, which evolved alongside treaties such as strategic arms reduction treaty (START), treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear (NPT) and intermediate nuclear forces (INF), space deterrence operates in a largely ungoverned strategic domain (Lambakis 2022), relative to other domains such as nuclear or cyber. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (a.k.a OST – outer space treaty) prohibits the placement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in orbit but offers little guidance on conventional or non-kinetic counterspace capabilities. The absence of binding norms and confidence-building measures contributes to strategic opacity, arms racing and norm erosion, further weakening the classical deterrence framework (Hersman et al. 2022). The 2022 The Geneva Centre for Security Policy report on ‘Preventing Increased Militarisation of Outer Space’ (Al-Rodhan 2023) emphasises the urgent need for preventive diplomacy and norm entrepreneurship.

In sum, while deterrence remains a relevant strategic concept, its classical formulations must be reconceptualised to address the realities of technologically fluid, actor-dense and strategically ambiguous outer space operations. The next section of this article will therefore propose a novel framework for space deterrence, rooted in adaptability, technological foresight and empirically grounded performance metrics. This approach seeks to offer scholars and practitioners an actionable model better suited to the multi-domain, high-velocity nature of contemporary space competition.

The intellectual foundations of deterrence theory, developed during the Cold War, rest upon a set of stable assumptions concerning the nature of conflict, actors, weapons systems and strategic signalling (Gartzke and Lindsay 2024). These assumptions, however, are increasingly misaligned with the realities of the modern space domain.

Table 1 presents a structured comparison between classical deterrence theory, rooted in Cold War-era strategic thinking, and the emerging logic of space deterrence, shaped by contemporary geopolitical, technological and normative dynamics. Each dimension captures a critical point of divergence, illustrating why conventional deterrence models are insufficient for addressing the distinct challenges of the orbital domain.

The TDDM rests on five interlinked premises.

A concrete manifestation of this model emerged in the early stages of the Russia–Ukraine war, where SpaceX’s Starlink constellation provided Ukraine with uninterrupted connectivity (Gurantz 2024), despite targeted jamming and cyber interference. Russia’s failure to disable the network – largely due to its decentralised, agile infrastructure and rapid software adaptation – served as an implicit deterrence signal. The episode illustrates how resilience, not retaliation, prevented the escalation of counterspace hostilities, and how private-sector capabilities can become embedded in a nation’s strategic deterrence posture.

This enhanced model does not seek to replace classical deterrence frameworks outright but to augment them with attributes and metrics suited for a post-linear, multi-domain and tech-intensive space environment. In the following section, the article will explore how this model can be applied to evaluate existing national space strategies and defence doctrines, and how policymakers might calibrate their deterrence postures accordingly.

Deterrence in the space domain requires more than theoretical reframing (Carey and McGillis 2024) – it demands operational metrics capable of capturing the effectiveness, stability and credibility of deterrent postures. The TDDM introduces a novel set of KPIs to serve as diagnostic and strategic tools for policymakers and defence planners. Table 2 introduces a structured set of KPIs that operationalise the abstract principles of deterrence within the complex and dynamic context of outer space. These KPIs reflect the core dimensions of the TDDM and are intended to serve as diagnostic, comparative and adaptive tools for policymakers, defence analysts and strategic planners.

Unlike conventional deterrence frameworks that rely heavily on declaratory posture or kinetic capability, this KPI-based approach enables a quantitative and qualitative assessment of how deterrence is structured, signalled and perceived in space.

The TDDM introduces a performance-based framework for assessing the health, credibility and adaptability of space deterrence postures. Central to this model is a suite of KPIs, each designed to capture a specific dimension of deterrence logic in the orbital domain.

These KPIs include the SAI, which measures the opaqueness of intent and capability in dual-use systems; the RRM, which evaluates system survivability and recovery speed; the TDSR, which identifies alignment between technological adoption and doctrinal integration; the EER, which gauges tolerance to ambiguous disruptions; and the CBES, which assesses an actor’s transparency and normative signalling behaviour.

Each of these indicators provides a distinct lens through which deterrence performance can be measured, compared and recalibrated. A more detailed explanation of these KPIs and their strategic utility is provided in the analytical commentary accompanying Table 2.

The SAI captures the degree to which an actor’s space capabilities, behaviours and deployments obscure the line between civilian and military intent. In an environment saturated with dual-use satellites and multi-mission platforms, ambiguity can be both a shield and a threat. High ambiguity may deter adversaries through uncertainty but also increases the risk of misinterpretation, escalation or inadvertent targeting. The SAI thus provides a metric for balancing deterrent opacity with signalling clarity.

The RRM evaluates a space system’s capacity to absorb disruption and maintain mission continuity. This includes architectural features such as proliferated constellations, autonomous recovery functions, hardened communications and redundancy pathways. High resilience reduces the strategic incentive for attack, reinforcing deterrence-by-denial. The RRM is particularly valuable in measuring non-escalatory deterrence, where survivability replaces retaliation as the dominant strategic message.

The TDSR assesses the alignment between an actor’s technological capabilities and its strategic doctrine or operational concept. In rapidly evolving space technology environments, there is often a temporal lag between capability acquisition and doctrinal adaptation. A low TDSR indicates a risk of underutilised assets or reactive postures, while a high TDSR reflects doctrinal agility and the capacity to strategically integrate new technologies – such as AI, cyber tools, or quantum communications – into deterrence planning.

The EER measures the threshold sensitivity of an actor to low-level or ambiguous space incidents. It captures how quickly a reversible action – such as jamming or shadowing – might escalate into a kinetic or political crisis. Actors with high EER are more likely to absorb minor infractions without triggering retaliatory responses, thereby enhancing strategic stability. Low EER, in contrast, reflects rigid doctrines or poor attribution mechanisms, increasing the risk of disproportionate reaction.

The CBES reflects the extent to which an actor engages in transparency, dialogue and norm-shaping initiatives in the space domain. High CBES values indicate proactive participation in confidence-building measures, including bilateral space security dialogues, shared SSA frameworks, or public declarations of intent. These actions strengthen deterrence by enhancing trust, reducing misperceptions and contributing to the emergence of shared behavioural expectations, especially in the absence of binding legal instruments.

The integration of these KPIs into strategic planning processes supports a more dynamic, data-informed and future-resilient approach to deterrence assessment. Rather than relying solely on threat-based calculus or symbolic declarations, decision-makers can track posture health in real time, identify gaps or imbalances and recalibrate their deterrence design accordingly.

Moreover, these KPIs allow for comparative posture mapping across actors – as demonstrated in this article’s application to the United States, China and NATO/EU – which can inform alliance coordination, doctrinal refinement and escalation prevention strategies.

In this way, Table 2 marks a conceptual and methodological shift toward strategic foresight and operational measurability, offering a scalable toolset for managing deterrence in a domain characterised by rapid change, multi-actor dynamics and deep uncertainty.

The TDDM posits that deterrence in the space domain must be understood as an evolving, multi-layered process – shaped not only by static capabilities or declaratory policies but also by the interaction of technological readiness, doctrinal coherence and systemic resilience under conditions of uncertainty.

At its core, the TDDM views deterrence as a strategic feedback system. It incorporates five interdependent dimensions – resilience, ambiguity, synchronisation, elasticity and confidence-building – that function dynamically over time. These dimensions do not operate in isolation; they intersect and co-evolve as actors respond to new threats, technologies and behaviours in the orbital domain.

For example, an actor may initially rely on ambiguity to deter aggression (high SAI), but in response to increasing counterspace risks, it may transition toward architectural resilience (high RRM) or greater transparency (high CBES). Similarly, as emerging technologies such as AI and quantum communications enter operational use, the TDSR becomes critical in determining whether such innovations strengthen or destabilise deterrence logic.

This model is inherently adaptive, and allows for strategic recalibration based on evolving threats and shifting environmental conditions. Unlike classical deterrence, which assumes a relatively stable balance of power, the TDDM accounts for rapid technological disruption, multipolar actor dynamics and legal-regulatory fragmentation, all of which redefine how deterrence must be measured and enacted in space.

As a framework, the TDDM is designed not only for theoretical modelling but also for policy application, allowing decision-makers to diagnose weaknesses in current posture, identify areas for investment or coordination and assess the long-term implications of deterrence behaviours across different orbital regimes.

The United States’ contemporary space posture reflects a shift from retaliatory doctrines toward resilience-centric deterrence, as exemplified by the operationalisation of PWSA under the U.S. Space Development Agency. This constellation of hundreds of LEO-based satellites is designed to ensure persistent sensing, secure communication and survivability in degraded or contested space environments.

In parallel, the U.S. has invested heavily in non-kinetic counterspace capabilities, such as cyber tools, directed energy weapons and jammers, as highlighted in the Space Threat Assessment (Swope et al. 2024). These tools increase its ability to retaliate in reversible and proportionate ways, thereby enhancing deterrence elasticity.

However, the integration of commercial actors into national deterrence strategy introduces a complex duality-generating both enhanced capability and strategic vulnerability. Systems such as Starlink, while enabling agility, redundancy and proliferated architectures, simultaneously introduce escalatory ambiguity, particularly in scenarios involving attacks on dual-use assets. From the perspective of the TDDM, the United States exhibits a medium-to-high SAI, reflecting the blurred distinction between civilian and military space functions. Its RRM is notably high, owing to investments in disaggregated constellations and hardened infrastructure. The TDSR is also high, as the integration of advanced technologies – such as AI-enabled SSA and manoeuvrable satellite platforms – has been consistently aligned with doctrinal evolution. Nevertheless, the EER remains moderate, suggesting that while the U.S. retains flexibility in escalation management, the involvement of commercial actors may constrain decision-making under crisis conditions. Similarly, the CBES is assessed as moderate, given that transparency efforts are often calibrated through strategic communication rather than formal arms control mechanisms or multilateral confidence-building regimes.

China has adopted a strategy of technological opacity combined with targeted signalling, maintaining ambiguity around its co-orbital, rendezvous-capable satellites (e.g., Shijian-21) and ground-based ASAT missile tests, while simultaneously advancing quantum communication satellites (e.g., Micius) and space-based situational awareness.

Beijing’s deterrence posture is characterised by a deliberate fusion of denial-centric capability development and sustained doctrinal ambiguity. While Chinese policy statements emphasise the peaceful use of outer space and advocate for non-weaponisation, its strategic behaviour reflects a parallel trajectory focused on counterspace preparedness. In times of crisis, this posture aims to undermine the C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) architectures of potential adversaries, thereby neutralising their decision-making advantage. According to the Secure World Foundation’s (2024) Global Counterspace Capabilities Report, China has developed a diverse and increasingly sophisticated suite of counterspace tools. These include high-power microwave systems capable of disrupting onboard electronics; co-orbital manoeuvring satellites designed for close-proximity operations; space-based laser dazzlers intended to temporarily blind or degrade optical sensors; and AI-enhanced tracking systems for improved targeting, monitoring and predictive modelling of both debris and active spacecraft. Together, these capabilities enhance China’s capacity for strategic denial while reinforcing a deterrence logic that is difficult to decipher and therefore inherently destabilising under ambiguous operational conditions.

This duality-diplomatic signalling on the international stage, juxtaposed with domestic preparedness for disruption-manifests as a form of layered ambiguity that fundamentally complicates the logic of deterrence by punishment. From the vantage point of the TDDM, China exhibits a very high SAI, stemming from its civil–military integration, limited doctrinal transparency and the strategic use of dual-use systems to obscure intent. The RRM is assessed as medium; while China has made measurable progress in redundancy planning and counterspace capability development, it still lacks publicly demonstrated, rapid-recovery architectures on par with those of its competitors. The TDSR is moderate, reflecting a gap between operational advancements – such as co-orbital proximity operations and kinetic ASAT capabilities – and the pace at which these are integrated into open doctrinal discourse. The EER is low, indicating a narrow tolerance for ambiguous or low-level space incidents and a strategic culture that leans toward preemption and coercive signalling. Finally, the CBES is also low, as China has largely refrained from substantive engagement in multilateral risk-reduction dialogues or the establishment of robust transparency mechanisms, thereby limiting its contribution to norm-building in the space domain.

Europe’s approach to space deterrence – particularly through NATO and ESA (European Space Agency) coordination – emphasises strategic stability through normative frameworks, multilateralism and institutional restraint. Rather than projecting deterrence through ambiguity or coercive capability, European actors position themselves as norm entrepreneurs, prioritising rule-based order and collective security over unilateral escalation. The EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence (Clapp and Evroux 2023) explicitly frames the prevention of space militarisation and armed conflict as a central strategic objective. This posture is operationalised through a set of key priorities, beginning with sustained investment in SSA and space traffic management (STM) capabilities-intended to improve transparency, reduce collision risks and enable early threat detection. In parallel, Europe has launched initiatives to expand its orbital resilience infrastructure, exemplified by projects such as IRIS² (Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite), the sovereign multi-orbit satellite constellation designed to secure communications and critical services. Finally, the EU promotes the codification of responsible behaviours, including voluntary transparency measures, open engagement in norm-setting dialogues, and advocacy for arms control mechanisms tailored to the unique characteristics of the space domain. Together, these priorities form a deterrence posture centred not on denial or ambiguity, but on predictability, institutional legitimacy and the proactive shaping of international space governance.

However, NATO’s counterspace capabilities remain largely dependent on U.S. assets, and Europe lacks significant offensive deterrence capacity, limiting its ability to deter through denial or punishment. Growing space congestion and sustainability challenges are of particular concern to European actors (European Space Agency 2025), reinforcing their emphasis on deterrence-by-norms and environmental stewardship. From the perspective of the TDDM, NATO and European partners collectively reflect a deterrence posture rooted in normative engagement and multilateral transparency, rather than coercive capability or strategic opacity. Their SAI is low, indicating a deliberate preference for separating civilian and military functions in space and for maintaining operational openness – an approach that promotes predictability but may limit deterrence-by-uncertainty. The RRM is moderate, owing to growing investments in satellite redundancy and shared situational awareness infrastructures, yet still constrained by dependence on allied systems – particularly those of the United States – for real-time resilience execution. The TDSR ranges from low to moderate, as doctrine tends to lag behind technological adoption across disparate member states, and cohesive alliance-wide strategic integration remains incomplete. In contrast, NATO/EU actors score high on the EER, reflecting a pronounced institutional inclination toward strategic restraint, de-escalation and multilateral consultation, particularly in response to ambiguous or low-intensity provocations. Their CBES is likewise high, as European space actors have consistently championed transparency initiatives, international legal frameworks and the development of soft deterrence norms through civil–military partnerships and cross-domain dialogue. Together, these indicators position NATO and the EU as normative stabilisers in the space domain, albeit with operational limitations in autonomous deterrence execution.

The complexity of space deterrence is not only technological but also strategic and cultural. Different actors interpret, construct and deploy deterrence logic in alignment with their unique national doctrines, governance architectures and operational capacities. To demonstrate the diagnostic utility of the TDDM, this section applies its core KPIs across three key strategic actors: the United States, China and NATO/European partners.

This comparative assessment highlights not only variations in posture but also divergent philosophies of deterrence, offering a cross-sectional view of how resilience, ambiguity, synchronisation, elasticity and normative engagement are distributed across the global deterrence landscape.

Table 3 operationalises the TDDM framework by mapping each actor’s deterrence posture across five performance dimensions. This comparative matrix illustrates how different strategic cultures and institutional logics prioritise specific components of deterrence, resulting in varying levels of strategic stability, escalation management and signalling effectiveness.

The SAI reflects the degree to which dual-use technologies and behavioural opacity are leveraged. The RRM captures architectural survivability and operational continuity. The TDSR assesses doctrinal responsiveness to emerging capabilities. The EER estimates tolerance for ambiguous incidents. Finally CBES captures soft deterrence through transparency and norm promotion.

The result is a multidimensional deterrence profile for each actor, revealing both strengths and vulnerabilities in posture configuration. Importantly, these differences reflect deeper structural choices: whether to pursue deterrence through capability denial, coercive uncertainty, or normative alignment.

The comparative application of the TDDM reveals a fragmented deterrence landscape marked by structural asymmetries, doctrinal divergence and strategic signalling inconsistencies. These differences are not merely artefacts of political ideology or resource disparity – they reflect fundamentally distinct deterrence philosophies shaping how actors assess threats, configure posture and manage escalation in the space domain.

The United States advances a deterrence architecture centred on resilience and flexible response, combining high levels of technical readiness with multi-domain doctrinal integration. Its ability to rapidly adapt to emergent threats through technological layering and mission assurance underscores a survivability-focused deterrent logic. However, its reliance on commercial dual-use infrastructure introduces ambiguity in attribution and escalatory thresholds.

China, in contrast, embraces a model of strategic ambiguity and calibrated opacity, where deterrence is achieved through unpredictability, low observability and anti-access denial strategies. This posture prioritises coercive flexibility while resisting normative constraints and formalised transparency. Although tactically advantageous, such opacity increases the risk of misperception and escalation mismanagement in crisis scenarios.

NATO and European partners articulate a normatively anchored deterrence paradigm, emphasising transparency, rule-of-law commitments and diplomatic signalling over kinetic denial. This posture promotes crisis stability and soft deterrence but suffers from fragmented doctrine and limited autonomous capability, which may constrain its ability to deter high-end coercion or respond rapidly in contested environments.

Taken together, these strategic variations pose significant risks for doctrinal misalignment, particularly in high-friction scenarios where the clarity of intent and attribution is obscured. Situations involving attribution-deficient incidents, such as electromagnetic interference, global positioning system (GPS) spoofing, or cyber intrusions, present substantial challenges to proportional response and escalation control. Similarly, the increasing prevalence of reversible grey-zone counterspace operations, including non-kinetic techniques like dazzling or jamming, blurs the threshold for what constitutes a hostile act, complicating deterrence signalling. Moreover, disruptions targeting civilian or commercial space infrastructure, especially dual-use satellite networks and privately operated constellations, further erode the boundary between national defence imperatives and economic security, amplifying the risk of inadvertent escalation or norm destabilisation.

The absence of a shared deterrence grammar – both conceptually and operationally creates a volatile ecosystem in which intentions are unclear, red lines are ambiguous and escalation dynamics are difficult to predict or manage.

In this context, the TDDM offers more than a diagnostic lens; it provides a conceptual foundation for strategic convergence. By establishing shared performance dimensions – resilience, ambiguity management, doctrinal synchronisation, escalation elasticity and confidence-building offers decision-makers a common evaluative language through which to compare postures, identify risk asymmetries and promote deterrence harmonisation across actor types.

Moreover, the application of TDDM across geopolitical blocs opens space for minilateral collaboration, including joint posture audits, resilience benchmarking and KPI-based transparency protocols. These initiatives can bridge the current doctrinal gaps and mitigate the risk of inadvertent escalation by fostering a functional dialogue on space deterrence design-even in the absence of comprehensive treaty-based governance.

Thus, the strategic implication of this framework is both analytical and normative: deterrence in the space domain must evolve as a pluralistic, adaptive ecosystem capable of absorbing divergence while steering towards a baseline of shared strategic logic.

Although Russia remains a key actor in the evolving military space landscape, this study deliberately excludes it from the core comparative framework, focusing instead on the United States, China and NATO/European partners. This decision was not based on a dismissal of Russia’s counterspace capabilities or strategic relevance, but rather on analytical considerations that support conceptual clarity.

First, Russia’s deterrence posture in space exhibits significant thematic overlap with China’s model of strategic opacity, reversible counterspace operations and non-declaratory doctrine. Including both actors in a tripolar matrix may have introduced analytical redundancy, particularly in the context of KPIs like SAI or TDSR, where both states exhibit high scores with limited doctrinal transparency.

Second, Russia’s public articulation of space deterrence remains highly classified, often reactive, and difficult to assess through open-source strategic materials. Unlike the United States’ published strategies or NATO’s space declarations, Russian doctrine is embedded in legacy deterrence rhetoric, typically situated within broader nuclear and electronic warfare frameworks. This doctrinal opacity restricts the granularity needed for comparative KPI analysis without introducing speculative assumptions.

Third, the ongoing war in Ukraine has substantially affected Russia’s space posture, both in terms of resource reallocation and operational risk behaviour. Russia has reportedly increased electronic warfare activity in the orbital domain, yet also exhibited a growing dependence on external actors, particularly China, for launch services and technological support. In this volatile and transitional context, Russia’s deterrence model remains in flux, and may be more appropriately analysed in a dedicated case study or future research effort.

Nevertheless, future iterations of this framework would benefit from incorporating Russia as a distinct deterrence archetype, particularly to explore how post-Soviet strategic thinking adapts (or fails to adapt) to the technological and normative complexities of contemporary spacepower competition.

In the absence of a comprehensive global treaty regime capable of regulating the increasingly complex landscape of space security, minilateral platforms – such as the G7, G20 and regional constellations like the Quad or AUKUS – emerge as pragmatic arenas for advancing deterrence-oriented governance. While these platforms lack the universal legitimacy of United Nations-based mechanisms, they offer speed, flexibility and political cohesion that are often absent in broader multilateral negotiations.

These groups are uniquely positioned to act as deterrence anchors-coalitions of technologically advanced and strategically aligned states that can pilot new norms, coordinate defensive architectures and promote mutual understanding among spacefaring powers. Their relative institutional agility allows them to respond quickly to the normative and technological disruptions that characterise the contemporary orbital environment.

One core opportunity lies in the establishment of space strategic stability dialogues (SSSDs) under the auspices of such platforms. These dialogues could serve as semi-formal but structured venues for discussing red lines, escalation management protocols and best practices in dual-use satellite transparency. Unlike formal treaty negotiations, SSSDs could accommodate divergence and uncertainty while still building shared vocabulary and doctrinal literacy among peers.

A second mechanism involves the development of minimum transparency protocols (MTPs) – a practical, non-binding framework encouraging members to disclose limited operational data such as satellite purpose, orbital behaviour anomalies, or the existence of proximity operations. These protocols would not constrain sovereign freedom of action but would serve to reduce ambiguity-driven escalation and demonstrate responsible stewardship.

Furthermore, minilateral platforms can play a catalytic role in shaping public–private threat-sharing frameworks, particularly given the increasing entanglement of commercial actors in critical space infrastructure. By encouraging standardised reporting mechanisms, incident attribution collaboration and resilience co-investment models, these coalitions can foster greater coherence across national security and commercial deterrence postures.

In essence, minilateral groupings provide a strategic middle ground-more dynamic than global regimes, yet more inclusive and transparent than bilateral security arrangements. They serve as bridging institutions, capable of harmonising fragmented deterrence doctrines while offering an incubator for scalable policy innovation in a rapidly evolving space order.

Table 4 consolidates the care policy levers proposed in this section and situates them within the broader logic of adaptive deterrence. Each lever represents a practical pathway for states to enhance their space deterrence posture, aligned with the principles of the TDDM. The corresponding deterrent effects and strategic functions are not discrete, but interlinked and mutually reinforcing, enabling a layered deterrence ecosystem that is dynamic, resilient and strategically coherent.

Each policy lever is elaborated below to demonstrate how it contributes to deterrence not through traditional force projection, but by altering the cost–benefit calculus, increasing system survivability and managing strategic perceptions in a contested orbital environment.

‘Disaggregated Satellite Architectures’ reflect a shift from monolithic, high-value assets to distributed constellations that enhance redundancy, complicate targeting and ensure continuity of operations under threat. By rendering adversary attacks operationally futile, this architecture enacts a form of deterrence-by-futility, disincentivising aggression due to the low probability of decisive gains.

‘AI-Enabled Escalation Prediction’ tools enable states to detect early indicators of grey-zone activity, model adversary behaviour and forecast escalation pathways with increased precision. This supports deterrence-by-foresight, allowing for timely and proportionate signalling while reducing the likelihood of inadvertent or premature escalation. When paired with human oversight and doctrinal integration, AI becomes a force multiplier for strategic stability.

‘KPI-Based Posture Monitoring’, as outlined in the TDDM, introduces a quantitative layer to strategic decision-making. By tracking metrics such as the SAI or RRM, states can engage in deterrence-by-adaptation – dynamically recalibrating posture based on evolving threat environments and internal performance thresholds.

‘Confidence-Building Mechanisms’ serve to reduce misinterpretation and lower the risks associated with attribution uncertainty. Initiatives such as behavioural transparency, cooperative SSA, or declaratory policies support deterrence-by-trust, where the probability of crisis miscalculation is minimised through clear and credible signalling of intent.

‘Reversible Weapon Norms’ introduce behavioural boundaries around tools such as jamming, dazzling, or cyber interference – capabilities often favoured for their non-kinetic and deniable characteristics. Establishing norms of restraint around such actions contributes to deterrence-by-restraint, preserving escalation elasticity while preventing strategic ambiguity from undermining stability.

‘Public–Private Integration Protocols’ acknowledge the increasing entanglement of commercial actors in national space security ecosystems. By institutionalising communication channels, joint attribution procedures, and shared risk doctrines, states can enact deterrence-by-cohesion. This ensures that public and private interests are strategically aligned, thereby reducing exploitable gaps in deterrence architecture that is not only technically resilient but also strategically modular and normatively grounded.

Taken together, these policy levers offer a holistic toolkit for constructing a deterrence posture that is not only technically resilient and strategically agile, but also normatively grounded and diplomatically credible. Their layered deployment reinforces the core logic of TDDM: that space deterrence in the 21st century must be dynamic, multidimensional and co-evolved with the technologies and actors that shape the domain.

While this article provides a foundational model and comparative framework, it also reveals critical knowledge gaps and invites deeper scholarly exploration across multiple dimensions. Key avenues for future research include: