Rethinking strategic stability in space through technologically dynamic deterrence model

As outer space emerges as a central domain of geopolitical contestation and technological disruption, the conceptual tools of classical deterrence are proving increasingly inadequate. Traditional models, grounded in nuclear-era assumptions of rational actors, dyadic competition and visible escalation thresholds, fail to capture the complexity of today’s contested orbital environment. This article addresses this theoretical shortfall by proposing a conceptually and operationally innovative deterrence architecture: Technologically dynamic deterrence model (TDDM). Integrating insights from strategic theory, space security and emerging technology studies, TDDM reconceptualises deterrence as a layered, adaptive and metrics-driven system tailored to the realities of the contemporary space domain. Through comparative analysis of U.S., Chinese and NATO space strategies, the article demonstrates the divergent logics of modern deterrence postures and highlights the growing risks of doctrinal misalignment and normative fragmentation. It concludes by offering a set of policy recommendations aimed at enhancing strategic stability through resilience, transparency and cross-domain integration. The study contributes to both theoretical innovation and practical guidance, offering a comprehensive pathway for deterrence thinking in the era of space militarisation and emerging technologies.