A Balancing Act: Towards a Conceptual Framework for the Governance of Buyer-Supplier Relationships in Defence Supply Chains

Defining defence logistics

Defence logistics is “the science of planning and carrying out movement and maintenance of forces”, including acquisition of services, forming supplier agreements, provision of medical and health support, and design, development and maintenance of materials and infrastructure (NATO, 2012, p. 20). It is ‘a discipline that encompasses the resources that are needed to keep the means of the military process (i.e., operation) going in order to achieve its desired outputs (i.e., objectives)’ (Kress, 2002, p. 7). Consequently, the capacity of logistic resources limits the size of armed forces that a nation can employ in operations (Erbel & Kinsey, 2018; Prebilič, 2006).

Following NATO’s definition, defence logistics covers several domains and functions beyond what is traditionally considered logistics (Yoho et al., 2013). NATO further distinguishes between production, in-service and operational logistics. Production (or acquisition) logistics concern research, design, development, and acceptance of material. On the other hand, operational (or consumer) logistics include storage, transport, maintenance, and providing support and services. Connecting these, in-service logistics concern procurement and the activities required to assure that weapon systems and equipment are available and ready for use (NATO, 2012). Acknowledging the overlapping nature of these domains, the remainder of this paper concerns operational and in-service logistics activities, and the terms “logistics” and “defence logistics” consequently refer only to these.

Dormant and active supply chains

The objectives of defence logistics and supply chains are dynamic. Although the primary goal is to support military forces in achieving operational outcomes (Yoho et al., 2013), the tax-funding regime and competing political priorities require defence organisations to pay close attention to their costs (Wilhite et al., 2014). Consequently, there remains a critical need to balance cost-efficiency with operational effectiveness, as defence supply chains must be cost-efficient in peacetime and agile and effective in times of crisis and war. In addition, they must possess the ability to transition between these states in a timely manner (Juntunen et al., 2012; Kovács & Tatham, 2009; Sharma & Kulkarni, 2016) through the activation and mobilisation of resources (Ekström et al., 2020).

Kovács and Tatham (2009) refer to this as the supply chain being in a “dormant” state between crises and wars and in an “active” state during crisis and war, as illustrated in Figure 2. This distinction, however, may not be clear-cut, as discussed earlier (Almäng, 2019; Hoffman, 2016; Larson, 2011; Sari, 2020). Regardless, shifting supply chain objectives necessitate an accordingly shifting approach to buyer-supplier relationships (Ekström et al., 2021). While defence organisations are notorious for employing preparedness strategies based on large in-house resource buffers and redundant capacities (Rietjens et al., 2007; Yoho et al., 2013), keeping an abundance of “just-in-case” resources for a single organisation is costly both financially and societally (Bygballe et al., 2023; Tunisini et al., 2023) and does not align well with defence budget restrictions (Cusumano, 2015). Defence organisations should therefore balance in-house preparedness strategies with interorganisational strategies and appropriate supplier relationships (Ekström et al., 2020; Larson, 2011).

Figure 2

Governance mechanisms

The importance of aligning supply chain strategies with product and market-related uncertainties is well-established in the supply chain literature (Christopher & Towill, 2002; Fisher, 1997; Lee, 2002). Because supply chains consist of multiple interdependent organisations (e.g., Mentzer et al., 2001), a fundamental issue in supply chain management is configuring the interfaces between buyers and suppliers to achieve coordination and subsequent desired outcomes (Ahlqvist et al., 2020; Simatupang & Sridharan, 2005). While various terms exist for the activities and practices employed to this end, the supply chain governance literature (Tachizawa & Wong, 2015; Bonatto et al., 2022; Gemente et al., 2024) distinguishes between contractual (or formal) and relational (or informal) governance mechanisms (e.g., Poppo & Zenger, 2002).

Governance is a high-level concept describing an organisational construction or institutional framework (Ahlqvist et al., 2020). It concerns establishing rules and norms for actors involved in collective problems to coordinate interorganisational efforts and mitigate opportunism (Dyer et al., 2018; Hufty, 2011; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Governance mechanisms, however, are the specific administrative tools and operative practices that “describe in detail how the required behaviour of the partner will become motivated, influenced, and established” (Hoetker & Mellewigt, 2009, p. 1027).

Contractual governance mechanisms refer to formal practices such as written clarification of terms, roles, incentives, and allocation of risk (Ahlqvist et al., 2020; Hoetker & Mellewigt, 2009; Huang et al., 2014). While contracts provide a structured framework fit for stable conditions and standardised processes, their inherent incompleteness creates limitations in the face of uncertainties and complexities (Davis, 2007; Grandia & Warsen, 2023; Williamson, 1979). On the other hand, relational mechanisms concern informal practices that guide and regulate relationships through, for instance, the development of trust, communication, adaptability, mutual understanding, and social norms (Dyer et al., 2018; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). These can be operationalised as activities involving information sharing, joint decision-making, and interorganisational teamwork (Ahlqvist et al., 2020; Hoetker & Mellewigt, 2009).

While relational mechanisms may entail additional costs in terms of time and resource allocation (Hoetker & Mellewigt, 2009; Poppo & Zenger, 2002), they offer a more flexible approach to governance, potentially reducing the need for detailed contracting and strengthening interorganisational coordination where contracts are unclear (Bygballe et al., 2018; Grandia & Warsen, 2023; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Thus, there is no “one size fits all” in the choice of governance mechanisms, as the fit is contingent on several contextual factors, both internal and external to a given relationship (Bonatto et al., 2022).

Public procurement in escalating conditions

Public procurement puts a high emphasis on cost-efficiency. Operating under restrictions derived from fixed budgets and regulations largely rooted in free-market philosophies where price mechanisms guarantee efficiency (Meehan et al., 2017; Waluszewski & Wagrell, 2013), decision-makers are encouraged to prioritise accordingly. As public organisations should create public value (Moore, 1997), that is, value from and for the public (Meynhardt, 2009), it is not for public procurers to “do as they please”. Instead, a myriad of stakeholders with heterogeneous and conflicting preferences, ranging from political leaders to taxpayers, are challenging the concept of value in public procurement (Meehan et al., 2017). To satisfy the various stakeholders, regulations should, in most cases, ensure transparent processes and fair competition among potential suppliers (Arlbjørn & Freytag, 2012).

During normal conditions, this often translates to competitive, price-focused tendering processes accompanied by rigid and time-restricted contracts to ensure regulatory compliance (Bygballe et al., 2018; Grandia & Warsen, 2023; Håkansson & Axelsson, 2020; Torvatn & De Boer, 2017). However, the legal landscape is typically altered when the security situation escalates across certain thresholds, consequently impacting how authorities approach the market and which governance mechanisms they employ (Grandia & Warsen, 2023). To support the “whole-of-society” principle, which often underpins how countries conceive of total defence (Berzina, 2020), the activation of emergency laws grants authorities greater freedom to accelerate procurement and asset requisitioning to ensure national security and effective crisis response (e.g., Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, 2024). This may result in a shift towards more informal and relational approaches in the procurement process, as demonstrated during the Covid-19 pandemic (Dube et al., 2022; Grandia & Warsen, 2023).

Step 1 – Sample retrieval

Initially, we conducted several unstructured pilot searches using additional databases and search engines to develop the review protocol (Tranfield et al., 2003). This included using Google Scholar and the semantic search engines Elicit.org and Semanticscholar.org to get a rough overview of the topic, identify and test keywords, and identify relevant journals not covered by the selected databases.

Our search strategy excluded seemingly relevant terms like “civil-military” and “governance” due to their broad, often non-military focus, despite high result counts in the databases. “Defence”, “defense”, and “military” were kept for their relevance, however, despite their varied use and meaning leading to high numbers of irrelevant papers. Thus, the search was limited to titles, abstracts, and keywords to ensure relevance and manageability.

Search strings were made up of categories of keywords on similar or related concepts in combination with defence-related keywords (i.e., “defence’, “defense” and “military’), further refined by adding specific keywords related to buyer-supplier relationships or logistics when the search string was considered too broad. Exact phrases were searched with quotation marks, while single words were not, allowing for variations in word form. The literature searches were conducted on 22 and 28 December 2023 for WoS and Scopus respectively, employing search strings as detailed in Table 1.

Step 2 – Screening and selection of papers

In this study, we included papers in which the unit of analysis concerned interorganisational matters where the defence organisations were the focal firm, excluding papers that concerned purely internal defence matters. We further included papers on in-service and operational logistics written in English, excluding papers on acquisitions and investment projects unless after-sales services or through-life management were involved. To ensure rigour, we excluded papers that lacked fundamental scholarly characteristics, such as academic references or a description of methods or methodology. We also excluded papers published in journals not meeting the Norwegian Register for Scientific Journals’ minimum requirements.

The reference management tool Zotero was used to support the screening process. After removing duplicates and non-academic papers, we adopted a two-step strategy to manage the sample size: first scanning titles and abstracts as needed, then scanning abstracts and full articles as needed. Zotero’s filters and keyword searches were used in the first step to allow us to focus on specific groups of papers. For instance, papers mentioning “civil defense” yielded numerous irrelevant results, as did papers from medical fields, identified by filtering journal names for medical or health-related terms. This process narrowed the selection to 223 papers for the second screening phase. Among those, 54 were read in full and assessed for eligibility, reducing the sample to 29 papers. Finally, we performed backward and forward “snowballing” using reference lists and Google Scholar citations. However, as the sample included a recent systematic literature review of performance-based logistics literature (Alqahtani et al., 2023), the final step was not performed on papers concerning this topic. This process resulted in a final sample of 31 papers, as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3

Step 3 – Coding and analysis

The final sample was coded by the main author using NVivo. Initially, pre-defined codes were used to categorise the papers based on elements such as research topic, research design, unit of analysis, and context-related characteristics, including the logistical tasks concerned, whether the paper addresses contractual or relational governance, the nationality of the investigated defence organisation, whether the paper deals with defence logistics in domestic or foreign contexts, and where the study fits on the security crisis spectrum. This last characteristic was classified in terms of peacetime logistics, crisis or war logistics, and logistics preparedness when the paper focuses on the mobilisation from peacetime to crisis or war. However, as all papers concerning crisis or war focus on armed conflicts and war-like scenarios, we employ the term “war” hereafter. This process resulted in six thematic clusters, as shown in Figure 4 and further described in Table 2.

Figure 4

Thereafter, two coding cycles were conducted to identify emerging themes and patterns across the clusters of papers. First, 10 randomly selected papers were coded inductively, resulting in numerous descriptive codes. These codes were then organised into thematic hierarchies of pattern codes to facilitate a more efficient, deductive coding approach for the remaining papers (Miles et al., 2014). This process resulted in four overreaching themes, constituting the main concepts of the proposed conceptual framework (Figure 5), namely strategic priorities, regulatory and legal frameworks, contractual governance, and relational governance. Figure 4 illustrates the connection between the clusters of papers and these overarching themes.

Figure 5

Key dimensions of the sample

Table 2 presents the key dimensions of the reviewed papers, divided into six thematic clusters: (1) outsourcing drivers and implications, (2) regulatory challenges in defence procurement, (3) defence supply chain design, (4) sourcing and contracting strategies, (5) collaboration and relationship dynamics, and a separate cluster for (6) outcome-based contracting.

Most papers use case study designs and qualitative analysis to investigate single or multiple dyadic relationship issues rather than issues across several supply chain tiers. Although all papers address interorganisational relationships, not all investigate the governance of the relationships, as indicated in the table. Furthermore, 22 papers investigate cases or issues in domestic contexts. Of these, 16 study the defence industry, implying suppliers and manufacturers of military technology, weapons, and equipment. This observation aligns with Erbel and Kinsey (2018), who argue that logistics research primarily studies the defence industry. Conversely, papers studying foreign operations focus on general logistics suppliers and service providers not directly linked to the defence industry. All papers in the review study European or NATO defence organisations.

Most of the reviewed papers address issues related to peacetime logistics, while four papers address several parts of the security crisis spectrum (Alqahtani et al., 2023; Ekström et al., 2020; Glas et al., 2013; Meershoek et al., 2023). In total, 10 have war logistics as primary focus. These investigate buyer-supplier collaborations (Listou, 2013; Tchokogué et al., 2015), supply chain design (Ekström et al., 2020), and sourcing and contracting strategies (Davids et al., 2013; Glas et al., 2013). Apart from Ekström et al. (2020), all address the governance of buyer-supplier relationships in foreign contexts. Additionally, five papers examine the role of commercial suppliers in war operations from a political science perspective (Cusumano, 2015; Erbel, 2017; Erbel & Kinsey, 2018; Kinsey, 2014; Moore, 2017).

While nearly half discuss or mention aspects regarding logistics preparedness, only eight papers have this as a primary focus. These address regulatory and legal prerequisites (Cusumano, 2015; Hellberg, 2023; Meershoek et al., 2023; Survila et al., 2016), supply chain design (Ekström et al., 2020), and sourcing and contracting considerations (Ekström et al., 2021; Glas et al., 2013; Juntunen et al., 2011). Of these, only Juntunen et al. (2011) provide empirical insight into some aspects of the governance of buyer-supplier relationships, while Glas et al. (2013) provide a conceptual discussion around contractual governance mechanisms. The remaining papers examine strategic priorities and legal issues related to preparedness.

Thematic cluster 1 – Outsourcing drivers and implications

The first cluster of papers explores the drivers for and strategic implications of utilising commercial suppliers in defence logistics, drawing on political and military science. These papers focus primarily on wartime logistics, revealing a complex interplay between strategic objectives, operational needs, and the political and geopolitical environment. Hence, this cluster primarily informs the concept of strategic priorities in our framework (Figure 5), highlighting tensions between cost-centric and operationally driven priorities.

The papers identify the core motivator for utilising commercial suppliers in defence logistics as the gap between military objectives and the resources available to achieve them, the bridging of which requires increased dependence on non-military actors (Erbel, 2017; Erbel & Kinsey, 2018). Budgetary pressures (Cusumano, 2015; Erbel, 2017; Kinsey, 2014), the technological complexity of modern military equipment (Erbel, 2017; Kinsey, 2014), and political constraints on mobilising military personnel (Cusumano, 2015; Erbel, 2017; Kinsey, 2014; Moore, 2017) further widen this gap. However, while the decision to use commercial suppliers is often justified as a pragmatic necessity, some suggest that ideological beliefs also contribute, including the desire to adopt private sector “best practices” (Erbel, 2017; Erbel & Kinsey, 2018) or favouring smaller governmental footprints (Cusumano, 2015). Thus, both practical and ideological considerations influence the decision to outsource logistical tasks to commercial suppliers.

Relying on external actors for logistical support has implications for military strategy and effectiveness, however. While enabling access to specialised expertise and potential cost savings, it raises concerns about the loss of autonomous military capability, accountability, and the ability to maintain operational effectiveness during prolonged operations (Cusumano, 2015; Kinsey, 2014). Additionally, the papers raise concerns about increased supply chain vulnerability and the security of civilian workers (Erbel & Kinsey, 2018; Kinsey, 2014; Moore, 2017).

Thematic cluster 2 – Regulatory challenges in defence procurement

This cluster examines how public procurement laws interact with the evolving demands defence organisations face across the security crisis spectrum. While it primarily informs regulatory and legal considerations in our framework (Figure 5), this cluster provides a comprehensive overview of how these considerations relate to the various governance mechanisms that defence organisations could or should employ across the security crisis spectrum.

The papers stress the importance of utilising commercial suppliers for preparedness. A common thread is the need for flexible regulations enabling rapid response and access to critical supplies and services (Hellberg, 2023; Meershoek et al., 2023; Survila et al., 2016). However, an overreaching concern is the tension between ensuring cost-efficiency through fair and competitive procurement practices in peacetime and the urgency demanded by wartime scenarios. Traditional public procurement procedures, which emphasise lowest-cost bidding, relatively short-term contracts, and contractual governance, might limit supplier collaboration and discourage the use of commercial suppliers for logistics preparedness (Hellberg, 2023; Meershoek et al., 2023).

Legal frameworks must be proactively adapted to allow critical procurement actions to be taken within legal boundaries and to promote a timely selection and development of suppliers (Meershoek et al., 2023; Survila et al., 2016). Hellberg (2023) and Meershoek et al. (2023) advocate reassessing the application and interpretation of public procurement laws to better balance cost and operational needs. While exemptions from standard procurement procedures typically exist for purchases deemed essential for national security, these are usually reserved for military technology and equipment procured from the defence industry. Suppliers of general, non-military supplies and logistics services tend to fall short of such exemptions, despite their criticality in military operations (Hellberg, 2023; Meershoek et al., 2023). It is, however, important to note that procurement regulations vary across countries, limiting the potential for broad generalisations.

Thematic cluster 3 – Defence supply chain design

Cluster three addresses the complexities of designing effective defence supply chains, including the need for resilience, adaptability, and the ability to operate in both peacetime and wartime scenarios (Ekström et al., 2020; Wilhite et al., 2014). While commercial and defence supply chains share certain foundational principles, directly applying commercial principles to defence supply chains is not straightforward.

Wilhite et al. (2014) demonstrate the importance of incentivising suppliers to enter and stay in markets, as monopolistic markets negatively influence costs and supply risk. Ekström et al. (2020) explore the adaption of commercial strategies, highlighting the need for unique defence-specific strategies to ensure availability, preparedness, and sustainability across the security crisis spectrum. Hence, the papers reveal tensions between cost-conscious supply chain designs and the need for excess capacity and resources for unanticipated scenarios. While peacetime conditions benefit from streamlined, commercially focused supply chain designs (Ekström et al., 2020; Wilhite et al., 2014), preparedness and war require resilient and adaptable designs (Ekström et al., 2020). Thus, this cluster highlights the lack of a “one-size-fits-all” supply chain design for defence purposes.

Rather than delving into specific governance mechanisms, these papers inform our conceptual framework by emphasising how strategic priorities shift as the security situation evolves (Figure 5). The governance of buyer-supplier relationships should reflect these priorities. Peacetime environments may benefit from utilising multiple suppliers in competitive markets (Wilhite et al., 2014). To accommodate periods of heightened tension and war, governance mechanisms should support lead time reduction (Ekström et al., 2020) and incentivise suppliers to enter and stay in markets to ensure resource availability (Wilhite et al., 2014).

Thematic cluster 4 – Sourcing and contracting strategies

Cluster four investigates sourcing and contracting strategies, highlighting the need for context-specific approaches. A key focus lies in understanding how strategies must adapt to the demands of peacetime and wartime logistics, carefully balancing cost with availability and operational needs (Caldwell & Howard, 2014; Davids et al., 2013; Ekström et al., 2021; Juntunen et al., 2011; 2012; Parker & Hartley, 2003). Hence, this cluster informs the conceptual framework for understanding how strategic priorities and contractual governance shift across the security crisis spectrum (Figure 5).

The papers examine criteria used for sourcing decisions, including operational requirements (Ekström et al., 2021), service level (Juntunen et al., 2012), transaction costs (Parker & Hartley, 2003), supplier nationality (Juntunen et al., 2011), and contract type. This last criterion includes outcome-based contracting for efficiency and equipment availability (Caldwell & Howard, 2014) and framework agreements for rapid response and adaptability in war operations (Davids et al., 2013).

Peacetime logistics often involve long-term arrangements with a strategic focus on cost-efficiency (Caldwell & Howard, 2014; Juntunen et al., 2012; Parker & Hartley, 2003). High transaction costs from collaborative relationships can, however, offset efficiency gains (Juntunen et al., 2012; Parker & Hartley, 2003). Long-term relationships remain important during war operations or when sourcing critical services and supplies. However, priorities shift towards service level, operational performance, availability, and rapid response, accepting temporarily higher costs for immediate needs fulfilment (Davids et al., 2013; Ekström et al., 2021; Juntunen et al., 2011; 2012). Juntunen et al. (2011) further emphasie the role of defence organisations as major customers, suggesting that sourcing from domestic markets increases both domestic suppliers’ competitiveness and resource availability for the defence in case of a war.

Thematic cluster 5 – Collaboration and relationship dynamics

The fifth cluster explores the dynamics of collaborations and relationships between defence organisations and commercial suppliers, both in long-term peacetime relationships (Glas, 2017; Humphries & Wilding, 2004; Johnsen et al., 2009; Wilding & Humphries, 2006) and ad-hoc relationships during war operations (Listou, 2013; Tchokogué et al., 2015). A recurring theme is the emphasis on relational governance mechanisms for communication and trust-development, not just contracts, for successful collaborative relationships (Glas, 2017; Howard et al., 2016; Humphries & Wilding, 2004; Johnsen et al., 2009; Listou, 2013; Tchokogué et al., 2015; Wilding & Humphries, 2006). While contractual governance is discussed, this primarily informs the conceptual framework for understanding how strategic priorities and relational governance change across the security crisis spectrum (Figure 5).

The papers collectively reveal that buyer-supplier relationships have distinct dynamics and success factors in peace and war. Wartime fosters partnership-like relationships (Listou, 2013; Tchokogué et al., 2015). Conversely, peacetime logistics face tensions between transactional and collaborative approaches, driven by the lifespan of military equipment, limited defence markets, and cost-focus (Glas, 2017; Johnsen et al., 2009; Wilding & Humphries, 2006). Therefore, peacetime relationships rely on complex, sometimes long-term, contracts, which may serve as foundations for developing relational governance mechanisms (Humphries & Wilding, 2004). During war, relationships depend less on contracts and more on the adaptability and skills of individual personnel, accompanied by flexible governance mechanisms, to cope with the uncertainty of the operational environment (Listou, 2013; Tchokogué et al., 2015). The papers suggest that the urgency of war scenarios can overcome traditional barriers and facilitate rapid collaborations, fostering a focus on immediate needs over long-term strategic alignment. However, none of these papers addresses how to manage the shift between peacetime and wartime governance.

Thematic cluster 6 – Outcome-based contracting

The final cluster explores outcome-based contracting, referred to as performance-based logistics (PBL) for military equipment maintenance. The overreaching motivation for outcome-based contracting is to improve logistics operations by linking payment to performance through incentives and risk-sharing mechanisms (Alqahtani et al., 2023; Datta & Roy, 2013; Howard et al., 2016; Randall et al., 2015). In this cluster, only Häyhtiö (2016) studies non-defence industry suppliers. Apart from Glas et al. (2013), the papers mainly address peacetime operations in stable environments, as opposed to logistics preparedness or war operations. Alqahtani et al. (2023) discuss similar limitations in their review of the PBL literature. Consequently, this cluster primarily informs peacetime logistics and contractual governance in our conceptual framework (Figure 5).

A recurring challenge is the tension between the benefits of outcome-based contracting and the complexities of designing and managing such contracts. This includes balancing formal performance measures and incentive schemes with trust development, communication and cultural alignment (Alqahtani et al., 2023; Datta & Roy, 2013; Howard et al., 2016; Kleemann et al., 2012; Randall et al., 2015). These challenges are amplified by lengthy contracts and equipment lifespan, sometimes exceeding 30 years, necessitating revisions over time (Howard et al., 2016). On the other hand, contract length can also be limited by procurement regulations, further hindering development of trust-based supplier relationships. Thus, effective outcome-based contracting hinges on appropriate governance mechanisms and legal frameworks (Alqahtani et al., 2023; Kleemann et al., 2012).

Defining performance measures requires balancing cost reductions and efficiency gains (Häyhtiö, 2016; Kleemann et al., 2012) with equipment availability and operational readiness (Datta et al., 2013; Datta & Roy, 2011; Glas et al., 2013). These are context-dependent priorities, requiring assessment of both supply risks and demand-side factors, like operational requirements (Alqahtani et al., 2023; Glas et al., 2013). Peacetime logistics aligns with performance metrics and cost mechanisms that incentivise long-term efficiency. In contrast, the uncertainty of war scenarios requires metrics for responsiveness and availability, potentially with increased risk and cost acceptance (Alqahtani et al., 2023; Caldwell & Howard, 2014; Glas et al., 2013).

Navigating the security crisis spectrum

The governance of buyer-supplier relationships must navigate the changing environments, priorities, and regulatory constraints across the security crisis spectrum. Thus, we identify the security crisis spectrum as the key contextual factor influencing the governance of buyer-supplier relationships in the defence supply chains, mediated through changing strategic priorities and corresponding regulatory and legal frameworks. These strategic priorities refer to the overarching goals and considerations that guide defence logistics and supply chain management.

Peacetime logistics, characterised by stability and routine tasks with relatively low demand and uncertainty, emphasises cost-efficiency, lean strategies and commercial best practices (Ekström et al., 2020; Erbel, 2017). This aligns with laws and regulations ensuring fair competition and efficient and transparent use of public funds (Hellberg, 2023; Johnson et al., 2009; Meershoek et al., 2023; Survila et al., 2016). However, proactive adaption of regulatory and legal frameworks is necessary to accommodate a shift towards war. This includes exemptions for faster procurement and for relationship development with critical suppliers (Meershoek et al., 2023; Survila et al., 2016), potentially prioritising domestic suppliers to enable sensitive information sharing (Survila et al., 2016) and secure domestic capacity (Juntunen et al., 2011; Wilhite et al., 2014). Hence, preparedness priorities include resource availability and lead time reduction to enable rapid upscaling and mobilisation in case of war (Ekström et al., 2020).

War scenarios, in contrast, introduce increased supply and demand uncertainty, potentially with surging demand and limited supply. This necessitates a shift from cost-centric to operationally driven priorities, emphasising adaptability, resource availability, and rapid response, even at higher costs (Davids et al., 2013; Ekström et al., 2020; 2021; Glas et al., 2013; Juntunen et al., 2011; 2012). As peacetime laws and regulations are often too rigid, war operations are typically facilitated by emergency and war laws, allowing faster procurement processes or requisition, or obligating suppliers to deliver (Hellberg, 2023; Ekström et al., 2020; Meershoek et al., 2023).

Peacetime governance

Peacetime governance is associated with complex contracts with clearly defined and measurable performance metrics and incentives focused on cost-reduction and service levels (Alqahtani et al., 2023; Caldwell & Howard, 2014; Datta & Roy, 2011; Juntunen et al., 2012; Parker & Hartley, 2003). This includes formalised risk allocation, role clarification, and procedures for addressing disagreements (Alqahtani et al., 2023; Howard et al., 2016; Johnsen et al., 2009), often allocating financial risk to the supplier through fixed-price mechanisms (Caldwell & Howard, 2014; Glas et al., 2013) and penalty clauses (Datta & Roy, 2011). Contractual governance further ensures regulatory compliance, addressing public procurement stakeholder needs (Johnson et al., 2009).

While relational governance mechanisms complement contractual mechanisms, buyer-supplier relationships are often described as transactional (Glas, 2017; Hellberg, 2023; Johnsen et al., 2009). Hence, compliance with public procurement regulations may limit relational mechanisms like information sharing, as well as contract duration and renewal guarantees, hindering the development of trust (Hellberg, 2023; Kleemann et al., 2012; Survila et al., 2016). Collaborative relationships are typically reserved for defence industry suppliers (Alqahtani et al., 2023; Johnson et al., 2009; Hellberg, 2023; Parker & Hartley, 2003).

This emphasis on contractual governance contrasts with commercial supply chain practices (Dyer et al., 2018; Hellberg, 2023) but aligns with public procurement research. Peacetime defence logistics, like other areas of the public sector, faces regulatory and legal constraints that necessitate rigid and time-restricted contracts, limiting the ability to develop long-term collaborative supplier relationships (Håkansson & Axelsson, 2020; Torvatn & De Boer, 2017). Hence, we expect significant transferability between peacetime defence logistics and other areas of the public sector.

Preparedness governance

Although the reviewed papers provide little empirical evidence of the use of governance mechanisms for logistics preparedness, they do offer a basis for discussion. Prior to activating emergency or war laws, contractual governance can secure resource availability and reduce lead times (Glas et al., 2013; Juntunen et al., 2011). This involves incentivising domestic suppliers (Wilhite et al., 2014) and awarding contracts to them before escalation towards war (Hellberg, 2023; Juntunen et al., 2011; Meershoek et al., 2023). Contractual terms may include nationality requirements for security clearance (Survila et al., 2016). In free-trade areas like the EU, such criteria depend on a willingness to use exemptions grounded in national security interests (Meershoek et al., 2023). Proactively developing relationships and capacities echoes preparedness strategies in, for instance, the humanitarian logistics field. The emphasis on suppliers’ nationality does not, however, as humanitarian logistics often rely on international networks of various actors. Nevertheless, it relates to what humanitarian research may term local resilience (Hu et al., 2022; Jahre et al., 2016).

Financial risk could be shifted towards the defence organisation to incentivise suppliers to invest in preparedness capabilities and capacities (Glas et al., 2013; Meershoek et al., 2023). In line with supply chain governance literature (Huang et al., 2014; Poppo & Zenger, 2002), contractual mechanisms create a foundation for critical relational mechanisms (Humphries & Wilding, 2004; Survila et al., 2016). These include interorganisational training (Listou, 2013; Survila et al., 2016; Tchokogué et al., 2015) and sensitive information sharing (Hellberg, 2023; Survila et al., 2016), which further foster trust, cultural alignment, and shared situational awareness for efficient mobilisation in case of war (Juntunen et al., 2011; Listou, 2013; Survila et al., 2016; Tchokogué et al., 2015).

Wartime governance

As the situation escalates towards war, the emphasis shifts from rigid contractual mechanisms to flexible and relational governance mechanisms, similar to what has been observed about public procurement during crises (Grandia & Warsen, 2023). The papers highlight a need for on-demand procurement and framework agreements to accommodate emerging and urgent needs, given the difficulty of specifying contractual terms for such uncertain environments (Davids et al., 2013; Listou, 2013; Tchokogué et al., 2015). Hence, uncertainty generally challenges contractual governance (Davis, 2007; Williamson, 1979). However, evidence from war-like situations comes from case studies of foreign operations. While not explicitly discussed, the role of contracts may diminish when crossing the threshold of war in domestic contexts. Emergency or war laws can override contractual obligations and enable requisition. Therefore, contractual governance may be more critical prior to a domestic war for developing relationships and ensuring resource availability.

Increased emphasis on relational governance enables quicker decision-making and improvisation where formal procedures are too cumbersome and time-consuming. Hence, mechanisms promoting trust development, informal communication, and role awareness become critical for coordinating efforts, as do individuals’ adaptability and competence (Listou, 2013; Tchokogué et al., 2015). Co-locating defence and supplier personnel (Listou, 2013; Tchokogué et al., 2015), a practice also discussed in commercial contexts (Dyer et al., 2018; Hoetker & Mellewigt, 2009), exemplifies such mechanisms.

Various fields recognise the need to employ relational mechanisms alongside contracts in uncertain environments, including humanitarian logistics (e.g., Jahre et al., 2016), public sector procurement (e.g., Grandia & Warsen, 2023), and disruption management in commercial supply chains (e.g., Bygballe et al., 2023; Norrman & Wieland, 2020). However, balancing the relational mechanisms required for war with contractual mechanisms for regulatory and legal compliance in peace remains a key challenge for defence supply chains. This balance requires further investigation.

Research area 1 – Governance mechanisms for war operations

Research on civil-military relationships in crises has put a high emphasis on horizontal collaboration for civil emergencies, where the military supports other organisations. This differs from this review’s scope, where defence is the “focal firm”. Research on humanitarian logistics and other public sector areas has also been found to emphasise horizontal collaboration in crisis (e.g., Adsanver et al., 2023; Diehlmann et al., 2022; Nurmala et al., 2018), although exemptions exist. These include research from the Covid-19 pandemic (e.g., Dube et al., 2022; Grandia & Warsen, 2023; Vecchi et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2022), total defence–related research (e.g., Kaneberg, 2018), and a recent publication on public-private supply chain risk governance in critical infrastructure supply chains (Norrman & Eriksson-Ahre, 2024).

Due to this limitation, the first research area concerns governance mechanisms in buyer-supplier relationships during war operations. This focus is needed to provide additional insights and to allow comparison and establishment of best or good practices. Since all empirical studies on war-like scenarios are from foreign operations (Davids et al., 2013; Listou, 2013; Tchokogué et al., 2015), studying domestic contexts could be valuable. This could include research utilising live military exercises or wargaming to provide insights into how such relationships work in practice (e.g., Perla, 2022). The reviewed papers provide frameworks to build on, and several alternatives exist in the literature on humanitarian logistics (e.g., Adsanver et al., 2023), supply chain risk governance (Ahlqvist et al., 2020; Norrman & Eriksson-Ahre, 2024), and public-private collaborative governance in general (Emerson et al., 2012).

Further research should inform sourcing decisions and identify differentiated approaches to buyer-supplier relationships for war operations. This complex issue can potentially affect the competence and capacities defence organisations must keep in-house (Listou, 2013) and relates to the allocation of limited defence resources. We argue it requires considerations that go beyond traditional theoretical frameworks for commercial procurement and supply chain management.

One key issue is defining the acceptable boundaries between civilian and military execution of logistical tasks, balancing the need for civilian expertise and resources with legal and ethical considerations (Kinsey, 2014; Moore, 2017). While some argue that defence organisations will use in-house capacity near the frontline (Datta & Roy, 2011; Glas et al., 2013; Kleeman et al., 2012), this is not universal for all logistical services (e.g., Kinsey, 2014; Moore, 2017). A second issue is the need for differentiated approaches based on the operational requirements of the products and services, like criticality and supply characteristics (e.g., Ekström et al., 2021; Glas et al., 2013; Juntunen et al., 2012). This is critical not only for utilising suppliers during operations but also for logistics preparedness. The segmentation model of Ekström et al. (2021) offers a useful starting point for classifying products and services, which must then be matched with appropriate governance mechanisms. Overall, we expect the fit of various governance mechanisms to be contingent on where the supplier is positioned in the supply chain and what product or service the supplier provides.

Research area 2 – Governance mechanisms for logistics preparedness in domestic contexts

To move beyond a binary depiction of peacetime and wartime governance, research area two concerns governance mechanisms for logistics preparedness in domestic contexts. Recent events, like the Covid-19 pandemic, highlight the private sector’s importance during crises (e.g., Dube et al., 2022; Sodhi & Tang, 2021; Vecchi et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2022). However, research documenting proactive public-private crisis response efforts is scarce, not only in defence research (Diehlmann et al., 2022).

Research should address how to balance contractual governance and compliance with peacetime regulations with the flexible, relational governance mechanisms required for war. While our framework (Figure 5) illustrates potentially important mechanisms, as discussed in the reviewed papers, it lacks empirical evidence of their practical application and how the potentially opposing mechanisms of peace and war can co-exist in the preparedness phase. Similar gaps exist in the broader supply chain governance and risk literature. While Bonatto et al. (2022) call for research on the complementary and conflicting relationships between relational and contractual mechanisms, Ahlqvist et al. (2020) suggest investigating the fit of various mechanisms across normal situations and crisis situations, as well as in the transitions between these states. Our framework’s preparedness phase offers a valuable area for addressing such issues. Moreover, empirical studies should identify and analyse governance mechanisms in real-life buyer-supplier relationships with clear preparedness objectives. Key questions include how findings from foreign war operations translate to domestic contexts, including what form relationships should take between wars and in the lead-up to war. The current geopolitical situation in Europe likely creates valuable research opportunities for this, as countries are currently in, or moving into, a preparedness phase.

Studies could quantitatively assess the impact of various governance mechanisms on logistics preparedness, addressing calls for research into the effects of various collaborative practices (Listou, 2013). Research generally suggests that planning and training for the joint use of capacities enhance crisis response efficiency and effectiveness (e.g., Diehlmann et al., 2022; Jahre et al., 2016; Kaneberg, 2018), in line with findings from studies on foreign operations (Listou, 2013; Tchokogué et al., 2015). However, defence supply chains are rarely tested or required to operate at full capacity in relatively peaceful areas (Listou, 2015). Simulations, including system dynamics (Sterman, 2002), therefore offer a suitable approach for defence and security studies, particularly given the requested application of system dynamics in these areas (Anderson et al., 2023).

Finally, to better understand the transition between the phases in our framework, we suggest examining comparable transitions between phases in other public sector areas with more accessible data, such as the health sector’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic (e.g., Dube et al., 2022) or critical infrastructure supply chains (Norrman & Eriksson-Ahre, 2024). While defence logistics is often compared with humanitarian logistics (e.g., Kovács & Tatham, 2009; Larson, 2011), defence organisations also operate within the boundaries of public sector regulatory and legal frameworks. Identifying transferrable lessons from other areas of the public sector facing similar constraints could benefit defence supply chain management.

Research area 3- Implications of regulatory and legal frameworks on governance mechanisms for logistics preparedness

Research area three addresses the regulatory and legal landscape surrounding the governance of buyer-supplier relationships in defence supply chains. While the reviewed papers primarily address public procurement regulations, which require further investigation (Hellberg, 2023), the implications of other regulatory and legal frameworks must also be addressed.

Research should investigate how public procurement regulations impact the ability to develop preparedness relationships with general logistics suppliers, as opposed to suppliers of military technology, weapons and equipment from the defence industry. Several papers suggest that these regulations limit the development of relationships with suppliers of products and services not categorised as essential for national security (Hellberg, 2023; Kleemann et al., 2012; Meershoek et al., 2023). Similarly, Håkansson and Axelsson (2020) argue that public procurement faces a “relationship issue” as the public sector struggles to develop anything beyond what they label “standardised buyer-supplier interfaces”. For instance, while social constructs like trust and cultural alignment are expected to develop over time (Humphries & Wilding, 2004; Listou, 2013; Wilding & Humphries, 2006), public procurement frameworks normally limit contract duration and renewal guarantees (Kleemann et al., 2012; Torvatn & De Boer, 2017). The preparedness phase in the framework (Figure 5) is a critical area where such issues should be addressed. A key question is how procurement regulations hinder or support the development of relationships that theory from contexts, such as humanitarian logistics and foreign military operations, suggests are beneficial for crisis response and war. Further research could explore how public procurement regulations can ensure sufficient fairness and transparency while allowing appropriate governance mechanisms for preparedness relationships. Alternatively, research could investigate how best to develop preparedness relationships within existing public procurement regulations.

Regulatory and legal frameworks outside public procurement also require further investigation. While often overlooked in the defence logistics and supply chain literature, war laws and other legal issues associated with severe crises or wars add complexity to defence supply chain management. Key challenges include determining the boundaries between the civilian and military parts of the supply chain (as mentioned in research area one) and the role of pre-established relationships when crossing legal thresholds across the security crisis spectrum. For instance, we have questioned the role of contracts in war due to the activation of emergency or war laws, which may override contractual obligations. This likely depends on the timing of military mobilisation relative to legal thresholds, which is further complicated by unclear lines between peace and war (Almäng, 2019; Hoffman, 2016; Sari, 2020). Moreover, the nature of the crisis (e.g., non-military versus military crisis) potentially introduces higher-level governance and cross-sectoral coordination issues (Kaneberg et al., 2023), challenging suppliers’ obligations to the defence sector.

Adhering to the laws of war, including principles of distinction, humanity, and military necessity, further complicates supplier selection, training, and involvement (Schmitt, 2004). Additionally, restrictions on sharing sensitive defence information can hinder communication and planning (Survila et al., 2016), consequently limiting relational mechanisms required for preparedness and war (Hellberg, 2023; Meershoek et al., 2023; Survila et al., 2016).

Overall, we suggest that the aforementioned “relationship issue” (Håkansson & Axelsson, 2020) should not be limited to public procurement regulations when considering defence procurement. We believe there is a great potential to explore how various regulatory and legal challenges beyond public procurement regulations impact how defence organisations can utilise suppliers for preparedness purposes. Echoing Hellberg (2023), comparative studies of how countries navigate the regulatory and legal landscape could be valuable in driving change by identifying best or contemporary practices and areas for reform.

Research area 4 – Supply chain strategies and incentive alignment for logistics preparedness

While the first three research areas lend themselves to studies of buyer-supplier dyads, the fourth calls for a broader supply chain perspective. While defence organisations might desire preparedness-focused supply chain strategies (Ekström et al., 2020), a persistent concern is that individual organisations prioritise their own objectives over the overall supply chain objective (Norrman & Naslund, 2019). Thus, research should investigate incentive structures that encourage preparedness investments by suppliers and sub-suppliers.

Interorganisational incentive alignment is critical to ensure adherence to the overreaching supply chain strategy (Norrman & Naslund, 2019; Simatupang & Sridharan, 2005). Drawing on the PBL literature, incentives must be tailored to whether suppliers support peacetime, preparedness, or war objectives (Alqahtani et al., 2023; Glas et al., 2013). However, research on incentives spanning beyond first-tier suppliers is limited (Norrman & Naslund, 2019), including in the PBL literature (Alqahtani et al., 2023). The reviewed papers discuss the importance of making defence organisations a preferred customer (Glas, 2017), incentivising suppliers (Glas et al., 2013; Wilhite et al., 2014), and awarding contracts prior to war (Hellberg, 2023; Juntunen et al., 2011; Meershoek et al., 2023) to secure resource availability and shorten lead times. Empirical evidence of how this is done in practice, however, remains scarce (Alqahtani et al., 2023). Future research could examine the applicability of outcome-based contracting for non-maintenance supplies and services, focusing on resource availability, strategic stocks, and postponement strategies in defence supply chains, including sub-suppliers.

Applying general supply chain management theories, especially those related to disruption management, could be valuable for the study of defence supply chains. This aligns with the view expressed in several of the reviewed papers (e.g., Ekström et al., 2020; Tchokogué et al., 2015). The current geopolitical situation in Europe, alongside recent years’ extreme supply chain disruptions, has highlighted vulnerabilities in modern supply chains, resulting in longer lead times and resource scarcity (Christopher & Peck, 2004; Duong & Chong, 2020; Friday et al., 2018; Norrman & Jansson, 2004). Hence, the uncertainty inherent in defence contexts has increasingly been reflected in commercial supply chains (Yoho et al., 2013). Consequently, supply chain risk management and resilience are of growing interest in the supply chain literature (Bygballe et al., 2023). For at least two decades, scholars have recognised interorganisational collaboration as essential for managing disruptions (e.g., Norrman & Wieland, 2020). Thus, applying and contextualising theories from commercial fields offers a valuable approach to advance our knowledge of how to improve and manage defence supply chains.

Limitations

The scarcity of literature both limits the possibility of making broad statistical generalisations and raises concern about critical issues, for instance, due to missing various actors’ perspectives. All the reviewed papers study NATO and European defence organisations, and thus possibly miss perspectives of countries outside the Western world. Furthermore, while suppliers were interviewed or surveyed for 14 of the 31 reviewed papers, other relevant actors could offer valuable insights. None of the papers address non-military crises, which may present additional governance and coordination issues not captured in our framework. Additionally, literature retrieval was limited to two databases (Scopus and WoS) using specific search strings, potentially omitting relevant studies that did not match the search query.