Figure 1
Theoretical framework for assessing the dike-pond system management (Adapted from Ostrom, 2007a; Brodrechtova et al., 2018; Chowdhury & Behera, 2022).
Table 1
Descriptions of Ostrom’s Design Principles (DPs) (Ostrom 1990).
| DESIGN PRINCIPLES (DPs) | DESCRIPTION |
|---|---|
| 1. Clearly defined boundaries | Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the common pool resource (CPR) must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself. |
| 2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions | Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource units are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring labor, material, and/or money. |
| 3. Collective-choice arrangements | Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules. |
| 4. Monitoring | Monitors who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behavior are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators. |
| 5. Graduated sanctions | Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be subjected to graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) by other appropriators, by officials accountable to the appropriators, or by both. |
| 6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms | Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials. |
| 7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize | The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities. |
| 8. Nested enterprises | Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises. |
Figure 2
Location of the study area in the Pearl River Delta (The red color indicates the Pearl River Delta area and the black dot indicates the location of the study area).
Figure 3
Overview of the governance setting of the dike-pond system.
Table 2
Characterization of the cooperatives in Ruxi village, 2020.
| VARIABLE | SITUATION IN THE COOPERATIVES |
|---|---|
| Average pond area of a single cooperative (excluding the dike area, which is not counted) | 19.5 ha |
| Average area of a single pond | 0.3 ha |
| Average rent (per ha/year) | 7180 € |
| Average number of members | 342 (ranging from 200 to 650) |
| Members’ link to fish farming | Members are strongly dependent on intensive fish farming |
| Motivation of management | Monetary benefits; maintaining resource conditions |
| Attributes of fish species | High-value species: catfish, eel, largemouth bass |
| Ownership of farming equipment | Machinery, fish, and facility built by farmers are private property; infrastructure built by cooperatives and government (such as channels, electric facilities, sheds) are common property |
| Use of collective profits | Most gains are divided among cooperative members; joint investments are made for maintaining resources |
| Legal form | Cooperatives |
Figure 4
Comparison of the dike-pond system in the Pearl River Delta between the 1980s and 2020s. Left: Photo obtained from the Southern Silk Capital Museum in Shunde. Right: Photo taken by the first author.
(In the 1980s, the ponds were managed under low intensity and integrated with crops on the dikes. Since the start of the 2020s, the dike-pond system has been intensively managed, and many dikes have been abandoned).
Figure 5
Linkages between institutional arrangements and landscape simplification of the dike-pond system, and interlinkages among institutional arrangements.