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Deterring the Seabed: A Strategic-Theory Framework for Undersea-Infrastructure Defence in the Post-Accession Baltic Cover

Deterring the Seabed: A Strategic-Theory Framework for Undersea-Infrastructure Defence in the Post-Accession Baltic

By:   
Open Access
|Oct 2026

References

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.31374/sjms.650 | Journal eISSN: 2596-3856
Language: English
Page range: 606 - 620
Submitted on: Jun 20, 2026
Accepted on: Sep 25, 2026
Published on: Oct 14, 2026
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services

© 2026 Göran Roos, published by Scandinavian Military Studies
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.