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            <title><![CDATA[Strategic Communication as a Geopolitical Tool in Maritime Security: The Case of RMSA and the DCoC-JA in Western Indian Ocean]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.31374/sjms.417</link>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Maritime security cooperation in the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) has expanded in response to piracy, illicit trafficking, illegal fishing, and intensifying geopolitical competition. While existing literature largely focuses on capacity building, naval responses, and institutional development, the role of communication in shaping regional maritime governance and African agency remains insufficiently examined. This article examines how strategic communication contributes to regional maritime security governance through a qualitative comparative analysis of the Regional Maritime Security Architecture for Western Indian Ocean (RMSA) and the Djibouti Code of Conduct and its Jeddah Amendment (DCoC-JA). Strategic communication is conceptualized as a cumulative process through which narratives, information-sharing and institutional communication build shared understandings, legitimacy and coordination. The analysis shows an important asymmetry between the two frameworks: the RMSA has stronger links between communication and operational coordination but weaker external visibility, while the DCoC-JA has a more developed communication architecture and broader external reach but comparatively fewer consolidated operational outcomes. These differences suggest that strategic communication contributes to African agency not simply through external messaging, but by enabling actors to construct shared priorities, coordinate action, build legitimacy and engage external partners. The article argues that the WIO constitutes an arena in which a dynamic equilibrium is continuously negotiated between regional ownership and external support, diverse priorities and shared interests, and institutional ambition and capacity. Strategic communication can help sustain this equilibrium and strengthen the resilience and agency of African-led maritime security governance.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Research Is Not a Prompt: Introducing SJMS’s Policy on Generative AI]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.31374/sjms.649</link>
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            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[Deterring the Seabed: A Strategic-Theory Framework for Undersea-Infrastructure Defence in the Post-Accession Baltic]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.31374/sjms.650</link>
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            <pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Although the Baltic Sea has seen more suspected attacks on critical undersea infrastructure than any of the world’s other waters since 2022, the policy literature offers only incident chronologies rather than any strategic theory of how such acts might be deterred. This article supplies one. It argues that seabed coercion defeats the classical dyad of punishment and denial for three compounding reasons: the acts are deniable; they fall below the armed-attack threshold; and the target cannot be defended at scale. Drawing on maritime strategy and cyber and cross-domain deterrence scholarship, it adds detection, entanglement, and an emergent deterrence by legal-jurisdictional cost to the repertoire. It also isolates the central obstacle: deterrence by detection deters detection, not action, unless bound to a credible, pre-declared response. It then develops a layered posture for the post-accession Baltic and explains why no single instrument suffices.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Introduction: Maritime Security Governance in Africa and the Consequences of International Geopolitical Shifts]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.31374/sjms.513</link>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[This subsequent article introduces a special issue dedicated to exploring current African maritime governance structures and to investigating security threats, governance gaps, and regional responses in three selected African coastal regions: the Gulf of Guinea, Southern Africa, and the Horn of Africa. The article roughly sketches how the issue offers insights for academics, policymakers, and practitioners on strengthening Africa’s maritime governance, ensuring sustainable resource use, and addressing security vulnerabilities amid shifting geopolitical landscapes. It also presents the five principal articles contained within the Special Issue.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Where Are the Women? Dilemmas of Invisibility and Hypervisibility in the Canadian, Norwegian, and UK Armed Forces]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.31374/sjms.471</link>
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            <pubDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[As an institution, a nation’s military is responsible for training and educating its members in a number of areas. This education takes place in a specific cultural context according to unstated rules, premises, and assumptions – in short, what Geertz (1957, p. 33) described as “the fabric of meaning in terms of which human beings interpret their experience and guide their action.” The difference between formal rules and informal norms and conventions speaks to a difference between espoused ideals and everyday experience. While institutional ethos and formal learning relate to an ideal culture, informal learning can contribute to sustaining systemic issues such as sexual misconduct, discrimination, and exclusionary practices. In this article, we consider both invisible and hypervisible elements of military culture and how they contribute to preserving the military as a masculine domain. Drawing examples from Canada, Norway, and the United Kingdom, we question, first, how the military organizational culture contributes to the gendering of military personnel and, second, the extent to which military cultures contribute to and reinforce the gendering of the military subject. By considering the physical environment and photographic representations of women in uniform, we attempt to unravel and trace certain threads in the “fabric of meaning” that envelops gender discourses in the three military institutions.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Representing the Need for Intelligence Reform: The Intelligence Inquiry and Sweden’s New Foreign Intelligence Agency]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.31374/sjms.558</link>
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            <pubDate>Wed, 16 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[On 13 June 2025, a governmental inquiry into the Swedish intelligence and security services, headed by the former Prime and Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, presented its report A Reformed Intelligence Service (SOU 2025:78). Among its several proposals, the Inquiry advised that a new foreign intelligence agency should be established, inter alia, with reference to a failed warning process with the Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Agency (Must) in the run-up to the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022. This article critically reviews the Inquiry’s take on MUST’s role in this purported intelligence failure and concludes that its next-to exclusive focus on the bureaucratic level leaves several crucial questions about the political level unaddressed.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Contested Conditions for Informal Actors in Intelligence Oversight: The Case of Swedish Journalism]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.31374/sjms.543</link>
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            <pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Recent critical scholarship on intelligence emphasizes the role of informal actors in democratic oversight, encouraging increased attention to practices and struggles of accountability. Less probed are the fundamental conditions enabling the work of informal oversight actors and current struggles over such conditions. Drawing on Bourdieu’s (1991) concept of symbolic power and mobilizing insights from media sociology, this article turns to the case of Sweden, a top-ranking state in the press freedom index, to examine contemporary struggles surrounding the conditions for one critical informal actor in oversight: the media. Independent journalists can both scrutinize and legitimize intelligence work, thereby mediating between the intelligence services and the public. Journalists are however dependent on professional autonomy, access to information and epistemic trust to perform this key democratic function. Although Sweden represents a “least likely” case for declining conditions for journalistic work, the analysis identifies three interrelated sites of struggle shaping the conditions for journalistic oversight: struggles over press freedom in relation to national security; over source protection in the context of expanding state surveillance; and over epistemic trust driven by elite delegitimization of journalists. By examining public debates and legislation affecting journalistic scrutiny of intelligence and the implications for democratic accountability, the article speaks to broader debates on the current struggles of informal actors in democratic intelligence oversight – such as NGOs, civil society activists, academics, and journalists – in a context of rising geopolitical tensions and global democratic backsliding, generating increased external and internal pressures on liberal democratic states.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Identification with NATO Fosters Collective Defence Efficacy Beliefs and Willingness to Participate in National and Collective Defence]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.31374/sjms.536</link>
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            <pubDate>Thu, 27 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[While previous research has shown that groups can instil confidence in their members regarding their collective ability to accomplish various actions thereby increasing willingness to act on the group’s behalf, these social identity processes have not been examined in the context of international security organizations such as NATO. We therefore investigated how identification with NATO relates to a willingness to defend both one’s own country and other NATO member states, introducing the concept of collective defence efficacy – confidence in a collective ability to successfully defend the community in the event of an external attack – to capture this dynamic. Our data (N = 4,273) were collected from two groups with differing views on national defence in Finland: active reserve officers and civilian service transferees, the latter being individuals who have applied to transfer from the Finnish reserve to non-military service. A multigroup analysis showed that identification with NATO was positively associated with willingness to defend other NATO member states, both directly and indirectly via perceptions of NATO’s collective defence efficacy. Identification with NATO also had a positive indirect association with willingness to defend Finland. All associations were positive and significant for both groups. Our findings highlight the role of NATO-related social identity processes in shaping willingness to participate in both national and collective defence within a military alliance.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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            <title><![CDATA[Hawks in The High North: The emerging Nordic cluster in NATO]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.31374/sjms.506</link>
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            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[How have Nordic states adapted their allied postures following Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine and fears of U.S. retrenchment from Europe? This paper analyses a Nordic transformation from dovish origins towards more hawkish postures. We argue that shifting elite–public alignment is a potent driver of policy change in states with a tradition of consensus in foreign and security policy. Drawing on elite interviews, shifts in public opinion, and speech evidence from Nordic decision-makers, we examine how Nordic countries have adapted their allied postures. Our findings offer new insights about allied posture transformation, the domestic drivers of nuclear choices, and intra-protégé dynamics. We find strong support for our argument that elite–public alignment is a key driver of Nordic posture adjustments following external security shocks. We also identify a “contagion effect,” whereby surges in popular demand for allied protection spill over into neighbouring states.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Small State Conventional Long-Range Strike Arsenals and Strategic Stability in Europe]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.31374/sjms.498</link>
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            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[How does the acquisition of conventional long-range strike weapons (LRS) shape small state warfighting and deterrence strategies, and what implications does this hold for strategic stability? While LRS offer small states new capabilities to threaten high-value targets at operational and strategic depth, including nuclear assets, key dimensions of their role in contemporary small-state warfighting and deterrence strategies remain underexplored. In this article, I develop a theoretical framework that categorizes four mission sets of LRS based on whether strike assets are employed independently or as part of joint operations, and whether they are aimed at shaping perceptions and outcomes in the conventional or nuclear domain. Applying this framework to the cases of Finland, Norway, and Sweden, I find that while these states have invested in advanced conventional missile arsenals, their capacity to exploit the full spectrum of mission sets theoretically enabled by their LRS remains constrained. Nevertheless, the functional overlaps introduced by these weapon systems generate an intense threat perception. As such, even limited LRS in the hands of small states can affect strategic stability, though less through realized capability than through perceived intent and potential.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Security Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: Towards Risk Reduction in Northern Europe]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.31374/sjms.505</link>
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            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Policy and expert communities in Nordic and Baltic states largely agree that the threat posed by Russia to European NATO member states requires a stronger deterrence posture – a view reflecting the broader European response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the increasingly overt nuclear signalling it has adopted. But more aggressive deterrence signalling and militarization, including investment in advanced conventional capabilities, perpetuate action-reaction dynamics and raise the spectre of nuclear escalation alongside the risk of conventional war. This paper identifies potential sources of escalation risks in Northern Europe, arguing that increased tensions and ongoing militarization in the region are contributing to escalation risks, including crisis instability involving strategic nuclear forces. Making the case for regional risk reduction, the paper draws from existing proposals to outline some practical measures to prevent escalation and highlights the potential leadership role for Nordic countries in taking forward such an approach in the contemporary geopolitical environment.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Small States and the Third Nuclear Age: An Introduction]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.31374/sjms.508</link>
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            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[What is the role of small states in extended nuclear deterrence? In this introductory article we examine how smaller states participate in extended nuclear deterrence arrangements in the Third Nuclear Age. We argue that the Third Nuclear Age, defined by profound and rapid political, strategic and technological change, presents an opportunity for smaller states to redefine their integration and participation in extended deterrence relationships. This article specifies key features of small states that inform their participation in extended deterrence including their relative bargaining power, their geographic features, and the strategic potential of their conventional capabilities. We also identify how smaller states seek to enhance their influence and participation in extended nuclear deterrence arrangements to overcome these constraints through several adaptive measures, including novel internal and external balancing strategies and clustering with other small states to increase their influence and bargaining power.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Nuclear Matryoshka: Russia’s Nuclear Deployment to Belarus]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.31374/sjms.497</link>
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            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[In 2021, Russia announced its intention to deploy nuclear weapons to Belarus. While the presence of nuclear delivery vehicles is confirmed, it remains unclear whether nuclear warheads followed. Scholars have debated the motivations behind the deployments, often relying on conceptual frameworks and deriving plausible explanations from historical evidence. Yet, the existing work has paid less attention to the empirical limitations of this case. This article adopts a different approach. Given the absence of high-quality data such as archival records, memoirs, or original interviews, we employ congruence analysis to systematically compare observable evidence to competing theoretical explanations. While this method does not establish causality, it enables an evaluation of the relative plausibility of each motive. Drawing on an original dataset, first used in this article, of official statements related to the deployment of nuclear weaponry to Belarus, we find strong alignment with the extended deterrence motive, as both states frequently highlight the protection of Belarus as justifications. We also find considerable support for power projection, supported by statements embedding the deployments in the greater conflict between Russia and NATO. By contrast, the assurance motive receives less empirical backing. These findings carry important policy implications, as each theoretical rationale suggests a different response from NATO.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[NATO’s Spearhead in the European Arctic: The Rise of a Nordic Deterrence Cluster]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.31374/sjms.502</link>
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            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO have transformed the security landscape of the European Arctic. This article conceptualizes the region as a subcomplex within the broader European security system and argues that the nature of the regional security milieu has shifted from cooperation-based to deterrence-based stability. Whereas the High North was previously primarily characterized by restraint, institutional cooperation, and relatively low tensions, it is now increasingly managed through deterrence measures. To capture the evolving allied dynamics in the region, the article further develops the concept of the Nordic deterrence cluster, presented in the introduction to this special issue, as a key driver of NATO’s emerging Arctic posture. This cluster performs both an external role, by signalling credible deterrence to Russia, and an internal role, by shaping NATO’s strategic planning. The article further contends that the cluster’s effectiveness depends on achieving deterrence cohesion, defined as a complementary division of labour, aligned threat perceptions, and a unified approach to deterrence implementation, including nuclear deterrence and escalation management. The article concludes with two policy recommendations: first, that the Nordic allies should strengthen synchronized defence planning; and, second, that they should further enhance strategic dialogue in order to reinforce cohesion across NATO’s northern flank.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Situational Awareness in the Third Nuclear Age]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.31374/sjms.489</link>
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            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[How do the defining features of the third nuclear age shape requirements for strategic situational awareness? As states navigate contemporary escalation dynamics, they increasingly prioritize situational awareness to adapt to evolving technology and geopolitical conditions. This is especially true for small states that employ it in the pursuit of their alliance commitments. However, existing definitions of “situational awareness” are conceptually inconsistent. Because situational awareness often draws on sensitive security information, actors treat it as a “black box” in public discourse and scholarship. I argue that recent technostrategic developments shed light on this black box, offering important insights for situational awareness. In this article, I develop an analytical framework of situational awareness for states operating in military security environments. I model it as a process of observation, interpretation, and operationalization. Drawing on open-source evidence and elite interviews from a Norwegian case study, I conduct a plausibility probe to evaluate my framework. My proposed framework accurately explains the requirements for situational awareness, showing how it has adapted to the third nuclear age by emphasizing digital data developments, hybrid threats, and alliance engagement. More broadly, this article lays the groundwork for future empirical investigations seeking to understand evolving threat environments.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[NATO’s Nuclear Types: Vulnerability, Defense Investment, and Alliance Strategy Preferences]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.31374/sjms.509</link>
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            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Members of nuclear alliances face myriad and complex demands. They must ensure that their nuclear-armed patron maintains adequate capabilities and resolve, while avoiding entrapment and entanglement. How, then, do states manage these competing needs? To address this question, we develop a typological theory of nuclear alliance members. We argue that a state’s vulnerability to a nuclear adversary and relative military spending/capacity ultimately determine its position within security alliances. This heterogeneity affects which deterrence and assurance needs various states will prioritize. Consequently, based on their type, alliance members will choose different strategies for managing their nuclear threat environment. Such choices range from hedging between their nuclear-armed patron and their adversary to seeking independent capabilities to influence their patron’s posture. We test these arguments using a public opinion survey conducted in ten current NATO member countries, fielded during a period of heightened nuclear salience in the Russo–Ukrainian War. The results reveal strong cross-national variation in public preferences regarding nuclear alliance management, thereby demonstrating the value of our typology in understanding dynamics within NATO.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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            <title><![CDATA[Allied with Constraints: U.S. Adaptive Integration of Nuclear-Constrained Allies]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.31374/sjms.494</link>
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            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[How does the United States manage alliance integration over time with strategically vital but politically constrained allies? Focusing on Norway and Denmark – two small Nordic states central to U.S. and NATO nuclear strategy but with strong restrictions on peacetime nuclear basing – I examine how Washington, as the patron, adapted its approach to sustain allied integration. Drawing on Cold War empirical records, I develop a descriptive typology on how the United States managed integration with the two allies across three key phases: NATO’s formation and consolidation (1949–1957), the shift from the doctrine of massive retaliation to that of flexible response (1961–1963), and the late Cold War (1980s). Although not without a degree of discontent, given the allies’ geostrategic importance, the United States adjusted its ideal expectations to accommodate the domestic constraints of the allies by encouraging participation through differentiated integration. Rather than risking the effects of coercion over nuclear hardware contributions or abandoning the two allies, Washington’s modus vivendi was the adaptive strategy of strengthening operationally meaningful differentiated participation: software integration. This strategy centered on four key domains: intelligence and early warning; training, exercises, and consultations; contingency logistics and infrastructure; and institutional voice. The approach endures in the contemporary context, albeit with shifts reflecting sharper conditions and demands from the United States. The research speaks to broader debates on managing alliance integration with strategically vital but cautious small states – an increasingly relevant issue for extended deterrence arrangements.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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            <title><![CDATA[Mobilizing to Retain: Three Mechanisms Suppressing Specialist Retention in the Norwegian Armed Forces]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.31374/sjms.520</link>
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            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The Norwegian Armed Forces (NAF) face a retention paradox: successfully recruiting personnel with vital civilian-acquired expertise while struggling to retain them. This article argues that this challenge may partly stem from a structural misfit between the NAF’s generalist-oriented career system and the professional motivations of officers with specialist competence. Drawing on qualitative interviews with officers from the one-year programme, the lens of perceived competence mobilization (PCM) is employed to examine their early-career experiences. The analysis identifies a triad of mechanisms suppressing PCM: a “broken promise” of misaligned initial postings, an “autonomy-feedback gap” in leadership, and a “generalist-specialist dilemma” of cultural recognition. These mechanisms suggest how aspects of the current system may underutilize and demotivate specialist talent. The findings resonate with international research, consistent with broader structural challenges documented in military organizations. Rather than proposing radical reform, modest, targeted interventions including professionally relevant first postings, strengthened developmental conversations, and light-touch competence mapping are discussed, addressing the identified mechanisms while remaining compatible with operational requirements. For the NAF and similar military organizations, addressing these systemic barriers represents not merely a human resource challenge, but a strategic imperative for building future capability.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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            <title><![CDATA[Forms of Knowledge and Interoperability in EU Peace Operations]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.31374/sjms.335</link>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 23 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Building on a pragmatist framework, this article explores forms of knowledge supporting military interoperability in peace operations conducted by the European Union. While interoperability is essential to the success of missions under the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the taxonomy of knowledge that military officers draw upon to develop effective interoperability remains insufficiently explored and theorized in existing literature. Based on primary EU institutional documents, including training and qualification documents, and secondary academic literature, the article examines four forms of knowledge derived from Lundvall’s taxonomy and analyzed across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels: know-what, know-how, know-why, and know-who (Lundvall &amp; Johnson, 1994). It also incorporates comparative insights from previous research on U.S. stabilization operations, highlighting similarities and contrasts with the EU context. By focusing on EU peace operations, the article seeks to advance theoretical understanding and inform practical approaches to interoperability in peacekeeping and stability operations.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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            <title><![CDATA[Co-Production of Intelligence: Engagement of Civil Society in Scandinavian Counterespionage]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.31374/sjms.533</link>
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            <pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[In this article, we argue that co-production of intelligence has been taken up by Scandinavian intelligence services. Thus, Scandinavian services increasingly align with a traditional U.S./UK approach to intelligence communication, where civil society actors are envisioned as central actors in intelligence matters. Additionally, we argue that this approach is applied in the context of Scandinavian counterespionage, not only counterterrorism as in the US/UK cases, along with the current focus on total defence, societal security, and whole-of-society approaches to security matters. Furthermore, we provide three concepts and examples of the co-production of counterintelligence in Scandinavia: ad hoc chipping-in; formalized networks; and institutionalized partnerships. Finally, we discuss three types of potential implications of intelligence co-production which will need further attention: new visions and ideals of knowledge in the intelligence context; increased responsibilization of civil society actors and a subsequent risk of turning civil society into security policy actors; and a move toward even more blurry accountability mechanisms in the context of intelligence.]]></description>
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