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Deterring the Seabed: A Strategic-Theory Framework for Undersea-Infrastructure Defence in the Post-Accession Baltic Cover

Deterring the Seabed: A Strategic-Theory Framework for Undersea-Infrastructure Defence in the Post-Accession Baltic

By:   
Open Access
|Oct 2026

Figures & Tables

Table 1

Principal suspected and confirmed attacks on undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, 2022–2026.

DATEINFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGEDVESSEL (FLAG)DELIBERATE ACT?STATUS AT 24 SEPTEMBER 2026
26 Sep 2022Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelinesAlleged: chartered sailing yachtYes: sabotageGerman prosecutors charged a Ukrainian national in June 2026, alleging he acted on the orders of Ukrainian state agencies; Kyiv denies state involvement (Federal Public Prosecutor General, 2026; Krychkovska-Bogdanova & Tyshchenko, 2026; Neal, 2026).
7–8 Oct 2023Balticconnector gas pipeline and telecommunications cablesNewnew Polar Bear (Hong Kong)Not establishedFinnish police traced the pipeline damage to the vessel’s anchor. Its master, charged in Hong Kong, has pleaded not guilty; trial pending (The Maritime Executive, 2026; National Bureau of Investigation, 2025).
17–18 Nov 2024BCS East–West Interlink (Lithuania–Sweden) and C-Lion1 (Finland–Germany) telecommunications cablesYi Peng 3 (China)Not establishedBoarded only under Chinese supervision; Swedish accident investigators could not determine intent. No charges announced (Braw, 2025; Statenshaverikommission, 2025).
25 Dec 2024Estlink 2 power cable and four telecommunications cables (Finnish EEZ)Eagle S (Cook Islands)Not establishedBoarded and seized by Finland; three officers charged. The Helsinki District Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction; the Helsinki Court of Appeal found that Finland had jurisdiction (27 August 2026; not final) and remitted the case to the District Court (Braw, 2025; Helsingin hovioikeus, 2026; The Maritime Executive, 2026).
26 Jan 2025Latvia–Sweden telecommunications cable off Gotland (Swedish EEZ)Vezhen (Malta)No: accidentSeized by Sweden and released. The prosecutor attributed the damage to heavy weather, defective anchor-securing arrangements, and suspected poor seamanship, and closed the Swedish case in October 2025 (Åklagarmyndigheten, 2025; Braw, 2025).
31 Dec 2025Two Finland–Estonia telecommunications cables (Estonian EEZ and Finnish territorial sea)Fitburg (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines)Not establishedMaster and boatswain charged with aggravated sabotage and aggravated interference with telecommunications; trial opened at Helsinki District Court on 8 September 2026; both deny the charges and dispute Finnish jurisdiction (Yle News, 2026).
2 Jan 2026Lithuania–Latvia telecommunications cable off Liepāja (Latvian EEZ)None linked; the suspect vessel was clearedNot establishedLatvian criminal investigation opened; police noted that a storm may have caused the damage (TV Kurzeme, 2026).

[i] Note: Incidents since 2022 investigated as possibly deliberate, in which a vessel was boarded or detained, or suspects were charged. Linking a vessel to the damage, establishing deliberate conduct, and establishing state direction are distinct findings; inclusion here does not imply attribution. EEZ = exclusive economic zone.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.31374/sjms.650 | Journal eISSN: 2596-3856
Language: English
Page range: 606 - 620
Submitted on: Jun 20, 2026
Accepted on: Sep 25, 2026
Published on: Oct 14, 2026
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services

© 2026 Göran Roos, published by Scandinavian Military Studies
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.