Figure 1
Conceptual model.
Note. Solid lines indicate the hypothesized relationships; the dashed line, a relationship expected to be non-significant.
Table 1
Descriptive and Correlational Analyses Among Reserve Officers and Civilian Service Transferees.
| M | SD | 1 | 2 | 3 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reserve officers (N = 3466) | |||||
| Identification with NATO | 4.50 | 1.24 | – | ||
| Collective defence efficacy | 6.32 | .86 | .451*** | – | |
| Willingness to defend Finland | 6.82 | .73 | .094*** | .153*** | – |
| Willingness to defend another NATO member state | 5.74 | 1.52 | .403*** | .339*** | .224*** |
| Civilian service transferees (N = 804) | |||||
| Identification with NATO | 2.08 | 1.33 | – | ||
| Collective defence efficacy | 3.65 | 2.27 | .571*** | – | |
| Willingness to defend Finland | 3.68 | 2.31 | .318*** | .394*** | – |
| Willingness to defend another NATO member state | 1.95 | 1.71 | .593*** | .550*** | .481*** |
[i] Note. N = 4,270. *** p < .001.
Table 2
Multigroup Mediation Analysis.
| Reserve officers (N = 3466) | CIVILIAN SERVICE TRANSFEREES (N = 804) | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| b | SE | 95% CI | β | b | SE | 95% CI | β | |
| Direct effects | ||||||||
| NATO identification ➔ willingness to defend Finland | .01 | .01 | [–.023, .033] | .01 | .01 | .01 | [–.023, .033] | .00 |
| NATO identification ➔ willingness to defend another NATO member state | .39*** | .03 | [.339, .445] | .32*** | .50*** | .06 | [.394, .614] | .39*** |
| NATO identification ➔ collective efficacy | .29*** | .02 | [.261, .326] | .43*** | .88*** | .06 | [.755, 1.008] | .51*** |
| Collective efficacy ➔ willingness to defend Finland | .07** | .03 | [.022, .119] | .08** | .37*** | .04 | [.294, .436] | .37*** |
| Collective efficacy ➔ willingness to defend another NATO member state | .34*** | .04 | [.260, .415] | .19*** | .24*** | .03 | [.183, .300] | .32*** |
| Indirect effects | ||||||||
| NATO identification ➔ collective efficacy ➔ willingness to defend Finland | .02** | .01 | [.006, .035] | .04** | .32*** | .04 | [.241, .402] | .19*** |
| NATO identification ➔ collective efficacy ➔ willingness to defend another NATO member state | .10*** | .01 | [.072, .126] | .08*** | .21*** | .03 | [.156, .270] | .16*** |
| Total effects | ||||||||
| Total effect on willingness to defend Finland | .03 | .01 | [–.002, .053] | .04 | .33*** | .04 | [.245, .408] | .19*** |
| Total effect on willingness to defend another NATO member state | .49*** | .03 | [.441, .540] | .40*** | .72*** | .05 | [.622, .812] | .55*** |
[i] Note. N = 4270. ** p < .01 *** p < .001.
Figure 2
Multigroup Mediation Model.
Note. N = 4270. Standardized coefficients reported separately for reserve officers (R, N = 3466) and civilian service transferees (T, N = 804). ** p < .01 *** p < .001.