Introduction
Debates about security in Europe took on new shape and urgency with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the nuclear threats associated with it. The developments set in motion by the invasion permanently changed the geopolitical map of Northern Europe. Finland became a member of NATO in 2023, with Sweden following suit in 2024: decisions reflecting a judgment on the part of these Nordic states that their non-aligned status left them vulnerable to similar aggression.
As part of the broader European trend towards militarization (Liang et al., 2025), Finland and Sweden have also joined efforts to boost allied military capabilities, dramatically increasing their defence spending since 2022. As Sweden’s foreign minister Maria Malmer Stenergard argued in June 2025, “supporting Ukraine combined with strengthening national defence capabilities is crucial to prevent Russia from regrouping and launching future attacks closer to Sweden” (Raufoglu, 2025).
Although the regional military balance still overwhelmingly favours NATO (Erästö, 2024), European threat perceptions are shaped by worst-case projections about Russia’s military potential, specifically the possibility of an attack against NATO within the next ten years (Saradzhyan, 2025). In particular, they reflect a fait accompli scenario in which Russia would seize NATO territory, notably in the Baltics, before allied forces could mobilize, and then threaten a limited nuclear strike to deter a counter-offensive (Shlapak, 2017).
This scenario provides a key rationale for NATO’s efforts to strengthen nuclear deterrence, chiefly by signalling readiness to control escalation by responding in kind to a potential limited nuclear strike by Russia. As part of such efforts, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden have all sent their fighter jets to NATO’s annual exercises simulating the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons. The idea of nuclear deterrence as the ultimate guarantee against further Russian aggression beyond Ukraine also explains the recent debates on potential European nuclear buildup in the context of an erosion of trust in U.S. commitment to European security.
The presence of non-strategic nuclear weapons and associated escalation control strategies on both sides highlights the risk of nuclear weapons use, including what Barry Posen (1991) terms the “inadvertent nuclear escalation” arising from miscalculation or accident. There are also inadvertent escalation risks linked to the presence of Russian strategic nuclear submarine (SSBN)1 bases on the Kola Peninsula. These assets now appear increasingly exposed to potential counterforce strikes: Finnish accession to NATO has contributed to new alliance operations in close proximity to the Peninsula, while allied investments in conventional deep-strike and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities raise further concerns among Russian strategists about the survivability of Russia’s second-strike capability. Taken together, these developments are undermining strategic stability in the bilateral U.S.-Russian nuclear deterrence relationship, which has traditionally rested on mutual vulnerability (Jervis, 1979/1980).
However, nuclear escalation risks in Northern Europe (defined here as the territories of the Nordic and Baltic states and the broader European Arctic and Baltic Sea region) are rarely discussed in contemporary academic or policy discourse. This paper seeks to address the gap. Noting that escalation risks in Northern Europe are already high and growing, the paper details how regional developments linked to the war in Ukraine may drive nuclear escalation, and offers answers to the question of the concrete measures Nordic countries might take to mitigate such risks. It also sheds light on the agency of small non-nuclear weapon states in the third nuclear age, making the case that Nordic states’ increasing involvement in nuclear deterrence dynamics calls for the need to operationalize nuclear risk reduction, which they vocally support at multilateral fora, in their own region.
Methodologically, this paper relies on a qualitative approach, with narrative analysis drawing on primary and secondary sources to capture current trends in regional militarization and the underlying security dilemma dynamics (Herz, 1950). The paper also engages literature on deterrence, inadvertent escalation, and Cold War-era arms control and risk reduction frameworks, with analysis also reflecting the authors’ insights gained through participation in various workshops and dialogue meetings on European security and nuclear risk reduction held in 2022–2026.
The section below highlights regional developments that seem particularly concerning from the point of view of escalation risk. Following this is a section on the state of risk reduction frameworks in Northern Europe, underscoring the links between their degradation and exacerbated security dilemma dynamics. After this comes a section outlining measures to prevent escalation drawing from existing proposals, calling for the need for related Track II dialogues and leadership role for Nordic countries in taking forward such an approach. The final section offers brief concluding thoughts.
Assessing Escalation Drivers
This section explores regional trends and developments that can be seen as potential escalation drivers. Close encounters between Russian and NATO forces have already taken place, and more serious military incidents are possible – particularly given the context of ongoing militarization, high tensions, and a demonstrated willingness on both sides to assume risk.
Increased Militarization
The border between NATO and Russia, which was extended by 1,340 kilometres as Finland joined the alliance, is now the longest line of contact between the two sides. A reflection of the degree of tension, Finland closed its eastern border indefinitely in November 2023 in response to what it viewed as Russia’s hybrid tactics instrumentalizing migrants (Lavikainen, 2023). Militarization on both sides is increasing, even though the war on Ukraine continues to drain Russia’s armed forces, undermining its efforts to reinforce defences along the northwestern border.
Allied Investment in Conventional Military Forces
All Nordic and Baltic states are spending 2% or more of their GDP on defence, while NATO as an alliance in 2025 set the alliance-wide target as high as 5% (Tian et al., 2025). In addition to personnel costs and enhancement of interoperability, infrastructure and logistics, the Northern European allies are investing in advanced weapons systems, including F-35 fighter jets and long-range precision-strike missiles (see Lucas et al., 2023; Hoffman, 2026).
In the Baltic Sea region, since 2017, NATO has established multinational battlegroups to strengthen forward presence (NATO, 2025a). In response to incidents involving gas pipelines and undersea cables in January 2025, it also established Baltic Sentry – a task force conducting maritime patrols (Mahadzir, 2025) to protect critical undersea infrastructure (Finnish Ministry of Defence, 2025). Moreover, in response to the September 2025 drone incursions to Estonia, Poland, and Romania (Lukiv & Inwood, 2025), NATO established Operation Eastern Sentry to improve interoperability (NATO, 2025d).
In the Arctic, in 2025 NATO established multilateral Forward Land Forces in Finnish Lapland, the country’s northernmost region bordering Russia (Defence Industry Europe, 2025). Out of the 47 Nordic military bases to which the USA has gained access through the bilateral defence cooperation agreements (DCAs) with Nordic countries, roughly a third is located in the Arctic (Edvardsen, 2023, 2024; Holm, 2023; Norwegian Government, 2024; U.S. Department of State, 2025; Danish Ministry of Defence, 2023). The establishment of Arctic Sentry in February 2026 marked a further step in the militarisation of the High North, enhancing the coordination of allied military activities in the region (Boulègue, 2026).
Russian Responses and Reinforcement Plans
Russia views NATO’s increased presence in the Baltic as constraining its maritime connectivity, including access to the Kaliningrad enclave, which is now practically encircled by NATO (Samoškaitė, 2025; Aušra & Makaraitytė, 2024). Baltic Sentry is viewed by Russia as a provocation aimed at containing it and undermining freedom of navigation in the Baltic Sea (Russian Federation, 2025a).
Yet, Russia’s resource allocation for conventional forces remains mostly tied to the war effort in Ukraine (Watling & Danylyuk, 2025), and its naval reinforcements in the Baltic Sea are modest compared to those of NATO (Reuters, 2020; Van Lokeren, 2025a). As for Russia’s enhancements in the Arctic, these mainly seem to be linked to defending its strategic nuclear assets in the Kola Peninsula (Lukošius, 2025).
Russia nevertheless sees a long-term need for a broader military restructuring (Russian Federation, 2025b). In 2024 Russia re-established the Leningrad military district, which covers its entire north-western border region (Kukkola, 2024). While military infrastructure in the district is being strengthened (Mäkeläinen, 2025), there is no major Russian military presence near the border (Helsinki Times, 2025; Kukkola, 2024).
Russia’s long-term plans for military buildup will likely be limited by economic constraints. While constituting 7% of its GDP, Russia’s total military spending is dwarfed by NATO’s, with the alliance spending more than ten times as much on defence (Liang et al., 2025). Together with the asymmetry in military capabilities, this explains why Russia prioritizes its strategic nuclear forces as a deterrent against the alliance (Russian Federation, 2025b).
Increased Scale and Frequency of Military Exercises
In contrast to the past when Russian exercises exceeded NATO’s in scale (Brzezinski & Varangis, 2016), recent years have seen a marked expansion of allied military activity in Northern Europe.
NATO’s 2024 BALTOPS2 exercise was the largest naval exercise ever held in the Baltic Sea (Lithuanian Armed Forces, 2025), while Steadfast Defender 2024 – the alliance’s largest since the Cold War – included Nordic Response with 20,000 troops exercising in the Northern regions of Finland, Norway and Sweden (Pietralunga, 2024; Moregård, 2024). Additional exercises have focused on ASW, air-and missile defence, and air operations along the northern flank (Norwegian Armed Forces, 2024; NATO, 2025b, 2025c).
Russia has not held major land-based exercises in its northwest since Zapad-2021, which included 200,000 troops (Beznosiuk, 2025; Kabachynkyi, 2025); Zapad-2025 involved only 13,000 Russian and Belarusian troops (Ward Agius, 2025). Russia’s naval exercises have been more frequent, including Ocean-2024, described as the largest military exercise held in the Arctic (Komin & Hosa, 2025) – and Baltic drills simulating hijackings of civilian ships (Van Lokeren, 2025b; TFI Global News, 2025).
In addition to misperception, military exercises carry escalation risks through brinksmanship. Notably, British fighter jets were scrambled six times in six days during BALTOPS 2025 to intercept Russian planes – including after a Russian jet buzzed a U.S. Navy ship (Royal Air Force, 2025).
Risk Of Military Incidents in the Baltic Sea
Many close encounters between NATO and Russian forces in the Baltic Sea are related to the enforcement of the EU sanctions targeting Russian oil exports. To evade sanctions, Russia uses a “shadow fleet” of tankers that often lack adequate insurance, engage in “flag-hopping” or sail under no flag entirely (Brooks & Harris, 2025; Braw, 2024). NATO member states have stopped and seized several of these tankers, leading, for instance, to an incident in May 2025 in which Russia intervened by flying a fighter jet past the ship, crossing into Estonian airspace (Ataman, 2025).
European countries are seeking new ways to justify tanker inspections and seizures on legal grounds (Jack & Gavin, 2025), while Russia has said that it will respond “to wrongdoings by the NATO countries’ ships” (Russian Federation, 2025a, p. 16). The increasing frequency of naval incidents in the Baltic Sea points to the risk, particularly if an incident were to end up claiming casualties, of open conflict between NATO and Russia. Such local incidents may trigger a broader conflict in which nuclear risks could also be heightened (see below).
Crisis Instability in the European Arctic
From the point of view of nuclear risk, some of the most concerning developments are unfolding in the European Arctic. Most of Russia’s SSBN fleet is based in the Kola Peninsula and operates in Arctic waters. During the Cold War, Soviet concerns about the survivability of these assets created “use or lose” pressures that could in, the worst case, lead to a pre-emptive nuclear strike (Posen, 1982). Today, similar crisis instability has re-emerged and is being exacerbated by several new developments.
NATO’s Conventional Forces and Operations Near the Kola Peninsula
While the increased U.S. presence in the Arctic through DCA agreements is seen by allies as enhancing Nordic security, from the point of view of the bilateral Russian-US nuclear deterrence relationship this adds to US “damage limitation” options – meaning its potential ability to destroy Russian nuclear-armed missiles and related infrastructure (Abramowicz, 2022).
While likely not incorporated into U.S. nuclear war planning, allied military investments can be expected to add to Russia’s strategic threat perceptions, alongside already-existing U.S. strategic missile defence and conventional deep strike capabilities (Erästö, 2021; Snyder, 2024). For example, the precision-strike missiles carried by Norwegian and Finnish fighter jets would be able to reach deep into Russian territory (Satam, 2025; Defence Industry Europe, 2024).
Indeed, Russian experts have pointed to the possibility that Russia might respond to massive deployments of long-range precision-strike capabilities in Europe with a more pre-emptive nuclear doctrine (Bogdanov & Stefanovitz, 2024). Norway’s investments in new anti-submarine warfare capabilities are also likely to play into strategic threat perceptions as they could detect Russian SSBNs during patrols (Army Recognition Group, 2025).
Further highlighting these vulnerabilities, the Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian strategic bombers and radars have demonstrated that non-nuclear weapon states may not be deterred from targeting such high-value assets during crisis (Collett-White et al., 2025).
Strategic Nuclear Signalling and the End of Reassurance in the European Arctic
Recent allied operations in the European Arctic have involved unprecedented nuclear signalling, including overflights and exercises by US B-52 bombers near the Russian border (Nilsen, 2024; Nilsen, 2025a). This represents a marked shift from the past, when allied activities in the area were restrained by Norway’s national guidelines, reflecting sensitivity to strategic stability considerations related to the proximity of Russian SSBNs (Forsvarskommisjonen, 2023).
Norway removed these long-standing guidelines in May of 2025 to allow NATO exercises in the easternmost parts of Finnmark for the first time, albeit on a case-by-case basis (Nilsen, 2025b). Together with the absence of any similar restrictions on the Finnish side, this suggests a clear shift from the previous policy of reassurance in the European Arctic (see Pesu, 2026).
The Dangerous Notion of Nuclear Escalation Control
Russian nuclear signalling in connection with its war on Ukraine has been primarily aimed at deterring NATO from directly intervening in the war. This has also had repercussions in Northern Europe, with simulated nuclear strikes forming part of military exercises in Kaliningrad in May 2022 (Pizzolo, 2024) and suggestions by the former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev that joining NATO membership has made Finland and Sweden “targets for our armed forces, including potential retaliatory strikes and even a nuclear component” (Reyes, 2025).
This has reinforced threat perceptions concerning the fait accompli scenario in the Baltic, contributing to the perceived need to counter the threat of limited nuclear weapon use by Russia through the strengthening of NATO’s non-strategic nuclear capabilities (U.S. Department of Defense, 2022; NATO, 2022; Weaver, 2023). It should be noted, however, that NATO’s increased presence in the Baltic has significantly undermined Russia’s local military advantage in that sub-region. From this perspective, the perceived threat of the use of Russian nuclear weapons in the context of aggression against NATO in the Baltic seems rather implausible.
That said, there are real risks associated with non-strategic nuclear weapons and the logic of escalation control that could drive escalation between NATO and Russia – particularly if the latter felt the need to offset its relative conventional weakness with nuclear weapons. These risks are related to the concept of limited nuclear war, which may foster an over-confidence in the ability to control or dominate nuclear escalation. There is, however, no guarantee that the first use of nuclear weapons would not trigger a nuclear response or that the resulting nuclear war could remain limited (see, for example, Post, 2024).
The concept of limited nuclear war is further called into question by technological and geopolitical developments that make it difficult to draw even a theoretical distinction between regional and strategic nuclear war. Given the long range and stealth of allied F-35 fighter jets, U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons could reach strategic targets deep within Russian territory, meaning that a regional nuclear war might quickly escalate to the strategic level.
Although there are currently no plans to certify the F-35s of Nordic states to carry nuclear weapons, this option has been floated in expert discussions (Alberque & Kacprzyk, 2024). The underlying idea here, as in the newly-announced French “forward deterrence” concept (see below), is to increase the survivability of allied nuclear assets through their wartime dispersal. In practice, such a strategy appears to heighten escalation risks, especially if additional allied nuclear assets are placed closer to Russia, potentially prompting the country to expand its nuclear targeting (Erästö, 2024).
Moreover, as nuclear-capable F-35s would carry the B-61-12 bombs in an internal bay, they might be confused with their conventionally-armed variants, creating payload ambiguity and entanglement risk during crises (see e.g. Acton, 2017; Roblin, 2024).
The Remaining Risk Reduction Frameworks
As suggested above, risk drivers in the current environment range from local military incidents and nuclear escalation control strategies to crisis instability in the European Arctic. Their effects are compounded by the collapse or weakening of arms control and risk reduction mechanisms created since the Cold War. This section examines what remains of these mechanisms as well as their relevance for addressing the above-discussed risks.
Arms Control Treaties and Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs)
Since the expiry of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) on 5 February 2026, there have been no limits on Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear arsenals. The resulting uncertainty is likely to further undermine strategic stability by opening the door to uncontrollable nuclear buildup and by removing the transparency created by treaty-related verification mechanisms, thereby also impacting crisis instability in the Arctic. The non-strategic nuclear forces which Russia and the United States deploy in and around Europe have never been regulated by any arms control treaty – with the notable exception of the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty which eliminated a subset of non-strategic nuclear weapons (see below).
Nuclear proliferation among non-nuclear weapon states is prohibited by the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Nordic governments remain committed to the NPT despite recent arguments by commentators and newspaper editors in support of nuclear proliferation (see, for example, Dagens Nyheter, 2026; Kirkegaard, 2026).
NATO regards its practice of “nuclear sharing’, in which the United States deploys non-strategic nuclear weapons on allied territory, as being in line with the NPT. Hence, although there are no plans to expand existing nuclear sharing arrangements to new European countries, there are theoretically few legal obstacles preventing it. In Northern Europe, these consist of territorial prohibitions on nuclear weapons by the Finnish and Lithuanian national legislations (Finnish Ministry of Trade and Industry 1987; Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, 1992). In March 2026, the Finnish government proposed to rescind this ban (Finnish Government, 2026) and its proposal was approved by the Parliament in June 2026 (Nierenberg & Lemola, 2026); Denmark and Norway, and, more recently, Sweden, have national policies against the stationing and transit of nuclear weapons during peacetime (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017; Basel Peace Office, 2021; Government Offices of Sweden, 2023; see also Braut-Hegghammer & Hagstrom, 2026).
The most plausible scenario for new nuclear deployments in Northern Europe is related to the above-discussed plans for the wartime dispersal of U.S. non-strategic nuclear warheads to the territories of NATO member states that do not currently host such weapons. While this development already appears to be underway (Kristensen et al., 2023; Johns & Kristensen, 2025), there is no indication of such preparations in the Baltic or Nordic countries. However, President Macron’s 2026 announcement of France’s “forward deterrence” plans referred to “the temporary deployment of elements of our strategic air forces to allied countries” so that “the dispersal [of France’s strategic air forces] across European territory … will complicate the calculations of our adversaries” (Macron, 2026). Since these plans include Denmark and Sweden, the possibility of wartime deployments of both French and U.S. nuclear weapons in the region is raised.
When it comes to conventional military capabilities, the only effective limitations on European armaments currently consist of the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and 2008 Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. These are being partly removed: Finland and the three Baltic states have announced their withdrawal from the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention; in 2025, Lithuania announced its withdrawal from the Convention on Cluster munitions, to which Finland had never been party. The only countries bound by these conventions in the Nordic-Baltic region are Denmark, Sweden and Norway (Convention on Cluster Munitions, n.d.; United Nations Treaty Collection, n.d.).
In 2023 Russia withdrew from the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces (CFE) in Europe, prompting NATO member states to suspend their participation. The CFE treaty had restrained conventional armament by NATO and Russia to address fears of a potential surprise attack (Engval, 2019). In addition, restrictions on ground-launched intermediate-range missiles were removed in 2019 as Russia and the United States withdrew from the bilateral INF treaty, which had eliminated all such missiles, both conventional and nuclear, in the Soviet and U.S. arsenals (see, for example, Arms Control Association, 2019).
The impact of the INF treaty’s collapse is being felt retrospectively. In addition to Russian and U.S. deployments, European countries’ procurement of long-range conventional strike systems marks a departure from policies of self-restraint that characterized the era of the treaty’s observation (Wan & du Plessis, 2025).
The collapse of the CFE and INF treaties also removed their extensive verification and consultative mechanisms, with the former having formed a key part of post-Cold War European TCBM architecture (Kimball, 2023). Even before Russia’s withdrawal from the CFE treaty, the United States and Russia had withdrawn from the Treaty on Open Skies, which had complemented CFE treaty verification and contributed to more general confidence-building efforts in and beyond Europe (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2025; Drell & Stubbs, 2011).
Both the CFE and the Open Skies Treaty initially emerged from the framework of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), instituted in 1975 and which had laid the foundations for European security architecture through commitment to shared principles and confidence-building. This framework, which became the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 1995, also gave rise to the 1990 Vienna Document, which seeks to promote regional stability through politically binding TCBMs such as information exchange, notifications, and inspections.
The Vienna Document has also been weakened; in 2023 Russia stopped exchanging data on its military forces and exercises under the instrument (Rosa-Hernández, 2023). While this and the decision-making paralysis related to the Ukraine conflict have significantly undermined the OSCE, the organization still exists, constituting the only forum for NATO and Russian officials to meet regularly (Ohanjayan et al., 2025).
Yet another mechanism impacted negatively by Russia’s war on Ukraine is the NATO-Russia Council, established in 2002 to foster dialogue between the two sides on security issues (Lunn, 2013). All meetings of the council were suspended in response to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In connection with its ceasefire proposal in 2025, the Trump administration reportedly raised the possibility of reviving the council (Drozdial, 2025).
Subregional Fora
A number of subregional arrangements specific to Northern Europe founded in the late 1990s have also fallen into dysfunction. Following the annexation of Crimea, for example, Russia was excluded from the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR) in 2014, while the annual meeting of the Arctic Chiefs of Defence was suspended between 2014 until 2022, only resuming without Russian participation (Bye, 2021, 2022). These platforms had facilitated dialogue and cooperation on regional security and stability, regularly convening senior military leaders to discuss maritime domain awareness, hybrid threats, and other issues of mutual interest. The seven member states of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, established in 2015, also suspended their activities in 2022; they have subsequently recommenced without Russia (Government of Canada, 2023; Arctic Coast Guard Forum, 2025).
A majority of subregional forums – the 1992 Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the 1993 Barents Euro-Arctic Council, the 1996 Arctic Council, and the 1999 Northern Dimension policy – have focused on “softer” cross-border priorities, including search and rescue and environmental protection. While outside the realm of hard security, these have enabled regular dialogue, joint action, and confidence-building (Saari & Lavikainen, 2022). While engagement with Russia in such forums also ended in 2022, in the case of the Arctic Council all eight member states have convened virtually since 2024 (The Arctic Council, 2024).
Bilateral Mechanisms
While some NATO member states maintain bilateral risk reduction mechanisms with Russia, it is difficult to assess the extent to which these have been impacted by the general deterioration of diplomatic relations since 2022. Of all the Baltic and Nordic states, Norway appears to be the only one having such mechanisms in place.
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Portugal, the UK, and the United States each have a bilateral arrangement with Russia on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas (INCSEA). These agreements detail naval restraint to prevent dangerous activities (Kulesa et al., 2016). Norway and Russia updated their 1990 INCSEA agreement in 2021 in response to technological developments and increased military activity in the High North (O’Dwyer, 2021).
To address potential confrontations over land and in territorial waters, the United States and Russia also have in place the 1989 Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (DMA), which outlines procedures for when their armed forces are operating in geographic proximity. Only three other states, none of which are Baltic or Nordic countries – have DMA agreements with Russia (Kearns & Raynova, 2016).
Russia and the United States have maintained hotlines since the 1963 Cuban missile crisis (U.S. Department of State, 1963). The Norwegian Joint Headquarters also has a hotline with the Russian Northern Fleet Headquarters which appears to have been maintained even after 2022 (Bye, 2023). Moreover, Norwegian and Russian coast guards and border authorities from the two sides have reportedly met after 2022 “to discuss challenges and agree on common objectives and necessary measures regarding border cooperation, rescue cooperation, and fisheries management” (Reuters, 2023).
Taking Forward Risk Reduction
The dwindling number of platforms for arms control and regular exchange between NATO and Russia are exacerbating the current security dilemma dynamics alongside militarization and worst-case assumptions about the intentions of the other side. Such assumptions may, particularly in the midst of a crisis, lead to fatal misperceptions and miscalculations. This section calls for efforts to reduce related risks, outlining potential avenues for reviving existing conflict-prevention and management tools and for creating new ones. Acknowledging the formidable political obstacles for revisiting cooperative solutions, it highlights the need for longer-term thinking, as regional security based solely on deterrence is unsustainable. Given that Nordic states have profiled themselves as champions of risk reduction in multilateral fora, it suggests that they take the initiative in operationalizing this approach in their own region.
Overcoming Political Obstacles
Russia’s involvement is a prerequisite if cooperative risk reduction efforts in Europe are to have meaning. In contrast to the United States, which has maintained bilateral crisis communication channels with Russia, most European countries, including the Nordic states, have been reluctant to engage with Russia in the current environment (Brodén et al., 2025).
While withholding such engagement appears justified on moral grounds, it might not serve European security interests. This is because the tensions that now define the NATO-Russia border are assuming dynamics of their own unlikely to go away even should peace in Ukraine be achieved. Arguably, both sides have an interest in establishing some guardrails to prevent dangerous escalation.
One obstacle here is the assumption, widely shared in the West, that Russia is not interested in risk reduction but seeks, rather, to manipulate risks, as it has done in Ukraine, to further open-ended revisionist ambitions in Europe. But NATO’s overwhelming military superiority should prompt a reconsideration of this assumption. In the interest of not prematurely closing the door on risk reduction, it is worthwhile asking what Russia might expect to gain from attacking the alliance under these circumstances. More, there is also a difference between Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine and its posture in Northern Europe, with the latter appearing to focus on maintaining the status quo rather than changing borders (Pedersen & Steinveg, 2024).
Risk reduction might begin at an expert level, through Track II dialogues among European and Russian experts examining how related tools could advance each side’s core interests. Insofar as these dialogues would find there to be a mutual interest in risk reduction, Nordic countries could take the initiative in taking forward such an approach.
Norway would be particularly well placed to take the lead here, given its bilateral consultation mechanisms with Russia. While Finland and Sweden seem to have renounced much of their previous role as bridge-builders, they continue to champion risk reduction in multilateral fora, notably the conferences for states parties to the NPT. For example, in a recent NPT working paper on reducing the risk of nuclear conflict, Finland and Sweden, along with 16 other states, noted that “there would be value in expanding engagement in risk reduction in regional and subregional settings” (Preparatory Committee, 2025).
Non-Military Dialogue in the Arctic: Paving the Way for Military TCBMs
The Western re-engagement with Russia in the framework of the Arctic Council in 2024 can be seen as an opening for sub-regional dialogue on “softer” security issues (Hansen, 2025). This could also plant the seeds for resuming and expanding dialogue on hard security issues outside of the council.
One framework for such dialogue could be the Arctic Chiefs of Defence. Russia signalled openness to returning to this framework in 2021 (Danilov, 2021), despite the reluctance of other Arctic countries. According to some experts, their reluctance reflects “political risk aversion rather than strategic logic”, noting dialogue to be “a pragmatic necessity for Arctic stability” (Burke et al., 2025).
Others have proposed specific TCBMs for the Arctic, including prior notification of military exercises, a communication platform for emergency deconfliction, and commitments “to refrain from escalatory activities like GPS jamming or buzzing commercial vessels” (Paul, 2024). Additional ideas might include the development of non-binding naval rules of the road, comparable to the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) drafted by the Western Pacific Naval Symposium – of which both Russia and the United States are part (Erästö et al., 2024). This could mitigate the potential for incidents associated with the opening of new shipping lanes and climate change, which will likely be accompanied by more frequent naval patrols as states seek to ensure freedom of navigation and preserve strategic interests.
Yet another potential objective related to long-term risk reduction efforts could be the pursuit of DMAs, which, as noted above, none of the Northern European countries have concluded with Russia. The broad scope of such agreements could also be a way to generalize risk reduction measures across sub-regions and multiple military domains, including cyber and outer space activities. Indeed, similar measures as discussed above – and more broadly, the revival of key principles of the Vienna Document – would arguably be needed throughout the NATO-Russia border, including the Arctic and the Baltic Sea region. However, the Arctic might be the best place to start, given the already-existing consultative mechanisms and lower tensions compared to the Baltic Sea region.
Preventing Dangerous Military Incidents, with a Focus on the Baltic Sea
As noted above, Norway is the only Northern European country, and Germany the only country on the Baltic Sea, having an INCSEA agreement with Russia. It would make sense for other Northern European states to seek similar bilateral agreements – or a multilateral NATO-Russia INCSEA-agreement (Paul, 2024). In practice, however, the current confrontational dynamics in the Baltic Sea, with readiness for risk-taking on both sides, seem to go against the logic of risk reduction underlying such agreements. Indeed, as illustrated by the German seizure of a Russian shadow fleet tanker in January 2025, INCSEA agreements cannot remove such dynamics. Hence any new INCSEA agreement, placing responsibility for de-escalation on lower-level military officers, would need to be accompanied with efforts to address escalation drivers at the political level (SIPRI Online Roundtable, 2025). This seems realistic only following the end of the Ukraine war and the lifting of the related EU sanctions on Russian oil exports.
Meanwhile, the countries surrounding the Baltic Sea could seek to minimize potential misperceptions by clearly communicating their intentions before approaching foreign commercial or military vessels or when entering another nation’s territorial waters or airspace (SIPRI Online Roundtable, 2025). This points to the need for military-to-military channels between NATO members and Russia. While it can be assumed that Germany and Russia have such channels based on their INCSEA agreements, there is no available information of similar mechanisms being maintained by other countries surrounding the Baltic Sea. Their absence calls for the need for clearly stated policy positions – for example when boarding and inspecting foreign vessels – as part of an effort to reduce misunderstandings.
Measures to Promote Strategic Stability in the European Arctic
Given the escalation risks related to the combination of Russia’s strategic assets and allied military capabilities in the European Arctic, Nordic states, and other countries operating in the region, would benefit from cooperative mechanisms to promote crisis stability. While confidence-building measures regarding ASW capabilities would be difficult given the stealth of modern submarines (Regehr, 2018; MacDonald, 2024), U.S. allies could consider the strategic implications of joint ASW exercises in the European Arctic and reconsider their involvement on that basis.
Finland and Norway could also jointly assess the deterrence benefits of nuclear signalling involving U.S. strategic bomber overflights and exercises near the Russian border, weighing them against the associated risks. On this basis, they could consider restricting the U.S. strategic bomber presence in their territories – bearing in mind the 2025 statement by Norwegian defence minister Tore Sandvik stressing Norway’s continued commitment “to preserving stability and low tension in the High North” despite adjustments to the country’s national guidelines (News in English, 2025).
There is a need to redefine what reassurance in the Arctic means in light of contemporary technological developments. Long-range precision-strike weapons have dramatically reduced the significance of distance in assessments of the survivability of Russia’s strategic assets in the region. Rather than restrictions on allied activities near the border, a more effective response to related concerns in today’s context would likely be arms control covering these categories of weapons. NATO and Russia might find shared interest in a new treaty on intermediate-range missiles – one encompassing not only land-based systems but also sea- and air-launched missiles. This seems all the more necessary given current European debates envisioning a role for emerging precision-strike capabilities in holding “high-value strategic level targets” in Russia at risk (see Hoffman, 2026).
Final Remarks
Escalation risks in Northern Europe are closely linked to broader tensions – those arising from the war in Ukraine, of course, but also the long-standing arms control deadlock between Russia and the United States. The continuation of that war and the stagnation of U.S.-Russian strategic dialogue should not prevent regional actors from taking concrete steps to improve their immediate security environment. These steps might ultimately also enhance strategic stability in the broader U.S.-Russian nuclear deterrence relationship. While the rift with the United States under the Trump administration has driven home the message that European countries must take greater responsibility for their own security, this realization has yet to move beyond boosting military power. A deeper sense of responsibility for strategic stability among non-nuclear weapon states must begin with ensuring that the pursuit of national security does not come at the cost of increased nuclear risk. Although much of the arms control and de-escalation toolkit relevant to Northern Europe has been lost, threads remain. All states in the region have an interest in ensuring these are preserved and strengthened. Otherwise, the worrisome regional trends will continue, perpetuating action-reaction dynamics that threaten long-term stability.