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Small State Conventional Long-Range Strike Arsenals and Strategic Stability in Europe Cover

Small State Conventional Long-Range Strike Arsenals and Strategic Stability in Europe

Open Access
|Jul 2026

References

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.31374/sjms.498 | Journal eISSN: 2596-3856
Language: English
Page range: 489 - 505
Submitted on: Oct 22, 2025
Accepted on: Apr 16, 2026
Published on: Jul 15, 2026
Published by: Scandinavian Military Studies
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services

© 2026 Fabian R. Hoffmann, published by Scandinavian Military Studies
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.