Introduction
Conventional long-range strike weapons (LRS), alongside other precision-strike capabilities, have proliferated widely among state actors (Horowitz & Schwartz, 2025). In Europe, this trend is driven by several converging factors: Russia’s war against Ukraine has demonstrated the salience of conventional strike warfare (Watling, 2024); strained relations with the United States have raised doubts about the reliability of American security guarantees, which traditionally underpinned NATO’s conventional missile capabilities (Davidson, 2026); and a growing number of missile-producing states and manufacturers – including those of Europe, the United States, and South Korea – that have shown greater willingness to export relevant technologies.
These proliferation dynamics have enabled several small and medium-sized powers, not traditionally associated with advanced missile capabilities, to acquire robust sets of LRS arsenals. This is particularly evident in Europe, where these states have, at times, pursued LRS with greater urgency than many of the continent’s major powers (Barrie et al., 2025). For smaller states in particular, these systems offer a potential leap in military capabilities, including against major power adversaries. For the first time, they can credibly threaten targets at operational and strategic depth far beyond the adversary’s rear lines (Hoffmann, 2024). Moreover, due to their range, accuracy, and warhead lethality, LRS may present a credible threat not only to conventional targets but also to nuclear assets (Futter & Zala, 2019, 2021). This opens the possibility for small non-nuclear powers to play a more active role in affecting and shaping strategic stability in their neighborhoods than ever before (Pollack et al., 2020; Seitz & Ji, 2025).
Several authors have examined the role of LRS in the deterrence strategies of small states and medium powers, including their potential implications for strategic stability (Blagden, 2020; Bowers & Hiim, 2021; Kulesa, 2020; Salonius-Pasternak, 2020). However, key aspects of this debate remain underexplored. First, existing scholarship has not sufficiently addressed the rationales for acquiring LRS and their unintended consequences. In Europe, much as in the rest of the world, while acquisition rationales are primarily, if not exclusively, grounded in conventional warfighting needs, they remain deeply entangled with nuclear-related considerations due to the functional overlap present in the deployment of modern LRS. Second, the existing literature has focused on select nuclear-related missions of LRS with no provision, let alone integration, of any assessment of the broader conventional and nuclear mission sets that these weapons may service in modern war (Acton, 2015; Gormley, 2015; Zhao, 2011, 2020). Third, operational and political constraints on the employment of LRS remain underexplored, despite the important limitations they impose on state actors. This is especially the case for small states that lack arsenal depth and critical enablers, while confronting difficult political trade-offs when challenging major-power adversaries with LRS.
In this article, I ask how the acquisition of LRS shapes small-state warfighting and deterrence strategies, and what implications this has for strategic stability, defined here narrowly around crisis and arms race stability. “Crisis stability” refers to a situation in which neither side in a crisis perceives strong incentives to use nuclear weapons first (Schelling & Halperin, 1961, p. 10), while “arms race stability” refers to a condition in which states do not feel compelled to expand their nuclear arsenals in response to others’ capabilities (Gray, 1980, p. 135). Traditionally, strategic stability has been a concept primarily used in the nuclear strategy literature. As LRS proliferate and their characteristics evolve, the concept increasingly applies in the conventional missile domain as well (Hoffmann, 2024, pp. 987–989).
To answer the research question, I develop a theoretical framework outlining four intra- and cross-domain mission sets LRS arsenals can service in modern war, categorized according to two variables: (1) whether LRS are employed independently or as part of joint operations, and (2) whether their primary aim is to generate effects within the conventional or nuclear warfighting domains. I apply this framework to the LRS arsenals and doctrines of three Nordic states – Finland, Norway, and Sweden – whose advanced missile arsenals and geographic proximity to a nuclear-armed neighbor make them well-suited cases for examining both conventional and nuclear warfighting dynamics. The case study demonstrates that while growing LRS arsenals offer small states several pathways to generate deterrence benefits, operational and political constraints prevent them from fully realizing this potential. Arsenal depth, capability shortfalls, the absence of key enablers, and the escalation dominance of their major power adversaries collectively restrict the range of serviceable mission sets. Nordic LRS arsenals will therefore likely remain focused on a narrow but critically important set of joint conventional missions: operational interdiction, suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses, and counter-A2/AD.
From a strategic stability perspective, however, the constraints the Nordic states face in deploying these weapons are unlikely to reassure Russia. The cross-domain nature of these systems means Russia will continue to view them as a growing threat to an expanding array of targets, including strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. Previous research has highlighted receiving-end entanglement, where strikes on dual-use targets obscure the effects the attacker seeks to produce, creating inadvertent escalation pressures in conflict (Acton, 2018; Riqiang, 2025). The findings here point to a parallel sender-end entanglement: when a state fields LRS, observers cannot determine how or to what ends it intends to employ them, including whether deployment is aimed at tactical-operational or strategic-level effects, or at effects in the conventional or nuclear domains. As such, the proliferation of small-state LRS arsenals in the European context – and beyond – will continue to put pressure on strategic stability.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. First, I introduce my framework, outlining the diverse mission sets LRS can support in modern war. Second, I apply this framework to the Nordic states to illustrate the challenges small states face when considering the employment of LRS in the mission sets outlined in the framework. Third, I assess implications for strategic stability. I conclude by identifying broader lessons for theory and policy.
Theoretical Framework
How can states employ LRS to derive warfighting and deterrence benefits across the conventional and nuclear domains? This section introduces an analytical framework outlining four distinct mission sets that LRS can support in modern war. These mission sets, illustrating how states can use LRS to generate effects within and across the conventional domain to shape outcomes in the nuclear domain, are both intra- and cross-domain in nature.
The framework captures the primary mission sets that these weapon systems can support in high-intensity land warfare scenarios. While the mission sets explain LRS employment to satisfy warfighting requirements, their utility can translate into deterrence benefits, either by convincing the adversary that aggression will not succeed (denial) or that the expected costs will outweigh the benefits (punishment) (G. H. Snyder, 1961, pp. 14–15). Of course, their deterrence value depends on credibility: denial requires LRS to reliably threaten military assets key to the adversary’s operational success, while punishment requires holding strategic or otherwise highly valued targets at risk to convince the adversary that the costs of aggression outweigh the benefits. The damage thresholds to do so may be correspondingly high. For this article, the term “conventional long-range strike weapon” refers to conventional weapon systems capable of engaging enemy land-based targets at operational and strategic depths (150-plus kilometer range) to produce militarily relevant effects.
The framework is presented as a two-by-two matrix organized around two variables. The first variable, “mission type”, designates how states employ LRS within the broader warfighting effort by distinguishing joint missions and independent missions. Mission sets are coded as “joint” if one or both of the following elements are present: first, LRS are employed in coordination with other forces (national and/or allied) and in support of the immediate area of operation; second, they contribute to joint efforts to generate tactical and/or operational-level advantages, often as part of broader warfighting concepts. Missions coded as “independent”, meanwhile, exhibit at least one of two characteristics: first, they aim to achieve standalone effects outside the immediate area of operation, often independent of other national and/or allied force elements. This does not imply they operate without any support. For instance, they still rely on air and space assets for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to enable targeting. However, in an independent employment context, their use does not directly support joint efforts across multiple warfighting domains (land, sea, air, space, cyberspace). Second, and relatedly, independent missions are not directly tied to outcomes at the tactical or operational levels; instead, they seek to shape outcomes and perceptions by striking targets deep in the adversary’s rear, often at strategic depth.
The second variable, “domain,” captures the physical and cognitive space in which these weapons are intended to generate effects. Specifically, it asks whether the primary objective is to shape outcomes and/or perceptions in the conventional or nuclear domain. Here, “perception” refers to the adversary’s interpretation of the environment, particularly how it assesses the other side’s intentions, capabilities, resolve, and the risks associated with further escalation (Jervis, 1976, pp. 48–67; Schelling, 1966, chaps. 2 and 3). Missions coded as “conventional” are directed at the adversary’s conventional forces and perceptions related to conventional warfighting efforts. This can entail attacks against fielded conventional forces, the enemy’s conventional force generation capacity (for example, by striking logistical, industrial, or command-and-control targets), and other high-value assets that influence the adversary’s perception of the ongoing conventional war effort. Correspondingly, missions coded as “nuclear” are aimed at the adversary’s nuclear forces and perceptions related to nuclear warfighting efforts, including calculations of whether to cross the nuclear threshold. Under some circumstances, this can include direct strikes on nuclear assets with LRS – but it can also involve attacks on a broader set of targets, including non-nuclear assets, to shape the adversary’s perception of nuclear use, particularly by influencing their assessment of the costs and benefits of nuclear employment. In this sense, nuclear missions supported by LRS carry a significant cross-domain dimension. Note that due to the entangled nature of some targets, most notably early-warning or national command-and-control infrastructure that can contribute to both conventional and nuclear warfighting, it may not always be clear in which domain the state employing LRS intends to achieve effects (Acton, 2018).
Together, the two variables provide a theoretical framework for assessing the mission sets that LRS can support in modern war. The framework yields four LRS mission sets (see Table 1). The section below outlines each mission set in more detail and examines how it can contribute to warfighting across the conventional and nuclear domains, as well as to deterrence against adversaries.
Table 1
Intra and Cross-Domain Mission Sets of LRS.
| MISSION TYPE | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| JOINT | INDEPENDENT | ||
| Domain | Conventional | Operational Interdiction, SEAD/DEAD, Counter-A2/AD | Strategic Interdiction, Countervalue |
| Nuclear | Counterforce (non-strategic), Counterforce (strategic) | Damage Limitation, Countervalue | |
Conventional Long-Range Strike Mission Sets
Joint conventional missions
The first mission set describes LRS missions conducted jointly with other forces in the immediate area of operation, aimed at shaping outcomes and perceptions in the conventional domain. Most importantly, this mission set includes operational interdiction, as well as suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD). Counter-A2/AD is another mission increasingly undertaken by LRS in this category.
Traditionally, joint conventional missions have been the main task of LRS forces. Operational interdiction involves the use of air power to disrupt, delay, or destroy enemy forces and logistics before they reach the frontline, typically by targeting supply lines, transportation networks, and reinforcements within the enemy’s operational depth (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016, chap. 1). For example, during the Cold War, U.S. military planners envisioned using conventional missiles to destroy Soviet logistics hubs, command posts, and bridges as part of the AirLand Battle and NATO’s Follow-On Forces Attack concept (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1987, pp. 7–16). Today, LRS remain postured to blunt enemy attacks and interrupt maneuver by striking operational-level targets (Cochran et al., 2024, pp. 13–15). SEAD missions aim to degrade or disrupt adversary air defense systems to reduce the threat to friendly aircraft, while DEAD missions seek to locate and physically destroy enemy air defense assets, including radars and missile launchers, to pave the way for air superiority (Bronk & Watling, 2025, pp. 3–8). Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. and Western coalition forces have usually opened larger campaigns with conventional long-range strikes targeting enemy early-warning radars and air defense sites (Lambeth, 2000). In today’s environment, counter-A2/AD operations designed to “penetrate and dis-integrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems” remain an important task of Western LRS to enable “freedom of strategic and operational maneuver,” for example, as part of the U.S. Army’s Multi-Domain Operations concept (U.S. Army, 2021, p. 25).
In these types of missions, LRS perform the role of “joint fires” whose core task is to “create the conditions that provide the supported commander freedom of action” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019, pp. III–1). This means that operational interdiction, SEAD/DEAD, and counter-A2/AD missions are inherently joint in nature. They are not carried out to achieve standalone effects but to support tactical and operational-level efforts of other force elements, particularly ground-based maneuver forces. In addition, they are firmly rooted in the conventional domain. Their goal is to produce effects within the conventional domain that directly influence events on the ground or shape the enemy’s perception of conventional operations. For deterrence purposes, these missions focus on denial. That is, on preventing or complicating the success of the enemy’s military operations. Deploying and posturing LRS for joint operational purposes is thus intended to deter by convincing the adversary that the use of military force will not succeed.
Independent conventional missions
In the second mission set, LRS operate largely independently of other forces and aims to achieve effects in the adversary’s strategic depth, independent of ongoing warfighting efforts at the lower levels of warfare. The aim, however, remains to shape outcomes and perceptions in the conventional domain. This mission set includes strategic interdiction and countervalue missions.
Similar to operational interdiction, strategic interdiction aims to disrupt and delay enemy surface-based forces by striking critical targets. In contrast to operational interdiction, however, strategic interdiction does not focus on an adversary’s fielded forces. Instead, it aims to disrupt military capabilities at the deployment and pre-deployment stages, thereby reducing the overall volume of war materiel available to the adversary (Pape, 2014, pp. 71–72). Depending on whether a narrow or broad approach to strategic interdiction is adopted, this can involve strikes on a limited set of targets, notably industrial bottlenecks and critical manufactured goods, or a wider range of facilities tied to defense production, infrastructure, and logistics (Hoffmann, 2024, p. 975). Crucially, unlike operational interdiction targets, strategic interdiction targets are typically located deep behind the frontline (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016, p. I–4). Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. forces have repeatedly employed LRS for strategic interdiction early in a campaign, often targeting electricity infrastructure and key communication nodes to disrupt enemy defenses (Garden, 2003; Lambeth, 2000; Olsen, 2003).
Countervalue missions target sites that the adversary holds in high regard. This often includes critical civilian infrastructure, economic assets, and population centers; i.e., targets essential to society’s functioning. LRS can and have been used for such missions, particularly against critical infrastructure like power stations, transformer hubs, and water treatment facilities, most recently by Russia in its war against Ukraine (Kaushal & Suess, 2025, pp. 8–9). Population centers have similarly come under attack with conventional long-range weapons in recent conflicts (Alberque et al., 2023). The purpose of these strikes is typically coercive: to signal to the enemy’s leadership and population that continuing the overall resistance is not worth the cost and hence the warfighting effort should be abandoned (Pape, 2014, p. 59).
Similar to the missions included in the joint conventional mission set, strategic interdiction and countervalue missions are intended to generate effects and shape perceptions in the conventional domain. However, in these missions, LRS are used largely on their own, and the effects are no longer of “immediate operational and tactical concern to maneuver forces” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016, pp. I–4). As such, the use of LRS in these missions is classified as independent. For deterrence purposes, the threat of strategic interdiction missions serves primarily a denial function by holding at risk enemy production and logistics. Countervalue missions, by contrast, are mainly aimed at punishment. As such, posturing LRS for independent conventional missions deters by signaling that military objectives will not be achieved and that the costs of using force outweigh any potential gains.
Joint nuclear missions
The third category describes LRS missions conducted jointly with other forces and coordinated across different services with the aim of primarily shaping outcomes and perceptions in the nuclear domain. This mission set includes nuclear counterforce missions at both the non-strategic and strategic nuclear levels.
Nuclear counterforce missions, in narrow terms, aim to disrupt and destroy the enemy’s nuclear weapons and related infrastructure (Glaser et al., 2023). LRS can support this mission in various ways. In a non-strategic context, the same types of counter-A2/AD operations outlined in the joint conventional category can be used to go after nuclear launcher capabilities, notably mobile transporter erector launchers (TELs) or aircraft deployed in the theater (Durkalec, 2025, pp. 152–154; Zhao, 2011, pp. 206–211), though this remains difficult due to current limitations in locating and tracking mobile targets (MacDonald, 2025).
More feasibly, these weapons can be employed to suppress enemy air defenses, enabling fighter aircraft to penetrate contested airspace and use nuclear and non-nuclear direct-attack munitions to engage mobile TELs and other time-sensitive targets. Alternatively, LRS equipped with bunker-busting penetrator warheads can be used to target hardened nuclear warhead storage sites and other infrastructure supporting non-strategic nuclear operations, while missile defense systems are used to intercept projectiles that were not successfully preempted (Durkalec, 2025, pp. 154, 165).
In a strategic nuclear context, LRS can be used to support a large-scale counterforce strike by, for example, going after a nuclear weapon state’s early warning infrastructure, which can be vulnerable to conventional attack due to its “soft” nature (Zhao, 2020, p. 112). At the same time, LRS can be used to directly hold at risk certain types of strategic nuclear targets such as nuclear missile silos or strategic bombers (Sand, 2026; R. Snyder, 2024). To offer a reasonable chance of success in neutralizing the adversary state’s nuclear arsenal, however, these strikes would likely have to be integrated and coordinated with other types of forces. This type of mission is therefore particularly relevant to alliance contexts, where the LRS of non-nuclear weapon states can support and complement the non-strategic and strategic nuclear forces of an allied nuclear weapon state.
These counterforce missions are inherently joint in nature. LRS can support these missions but operate in coordination with other force elements. Unlike previous mission sets, however, the use of conventional strike weapons in this context serves an explicit nuclear purpose. They are intended to influence outcomes in the nuclear domain and shape the adversary’s perception of events in that domain. For deterrence purposes, these missions aim to deny the adversary’s non-strategic and strategic nuclear forces, thereby preventing their successful use. LRS postured and deployed for joint nuclear missions therefore aim to deter by convincing the adversary that success in the nuclear domain is uncertain and can be denied.
Independent nuclear missions
The fourth category describes missions that, like the previous one, aim to shape outcomes and perceptions in the nuclear domain, in this case through the independent use of LRS. In this case, LRS are again employed largely as standalone assets to generate independent effects, though with an explicit cross-domain purpose. Two types of LRS missions fall under this category: damage limitation and countervalue.
“Damage limitation” refers to efforts aimed at reducing the consequences of an anticipated nuclear attack, typically through preemptive strikes on the adversary’s nuclear assets (Larsen, 2024, p. 450). Should a state assess that deterrence has failed and strategic nuclear use against its population centers or other vital targets is imminent, it can use LRS to target the adversary’s strategic nuclear assets even without broader support of other nuclear and non-nuclear forces (Bowers & Hiim, 2021, pp. 17–19). As stated above, LRS, provided the right types of munitions are used, can threaten some types of strategic and non-strategic nuclear targets to limit damage of an expected nuclear attack.1 Especially for non-nuclear weapon states exposed to the nuclear arsenal of an adversary, this type of employment may be an option of last resort. However, damage limitation, rather than counterforce, is the more accurate term in this case, as in most cases, such strikes would likely have little chance at denying the enemy’s nuclear attack outright but may reduce its impact. South Korea is currently the only country that postures its LRS for damage-limitation purposes at the strategic nuclear level (Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 2018, pp. 66–71).
In contrast, countervalue missions included in this category target conventional and non-nuclear infrastructure. They largely mirror the target sets associated with the independent conventional mission type, including critical infrastructure and other high-value assets. However, the domain-related purpose of striking these targets shifts toward influencing enemy perceptions of nuclear employment. For example, conventional countervalue strikes may be used in response to limited nuclear use by the adversary, primarily as a form of punishment to signal that critical thresholds have been crossed, in an effort to restore deterrence (Mount, 2025, pp. 95–97).
The missions in this category follow an independent logic, meaning LRS are primarily used to generate standalone effects rather than being integrated into joint force operations or broader warfighting concepts. However, their primary objective remains to shape outcomes and perceptions in and across the nuclear domain. This is done both by directly targeting nuclear and nuclear-related assets or by influencing the adversary’s perceptions of nuclear use. From a deterrence perspective, posturing LRS for damage limitation missions primarily serves a denial purpose by reducing the expected success of the adversary’s nuclear employment. In contrast, posturing LRS for countervalue missions primarily serves a punishment purpose by convincing the adversary that the expected costs outweigh the benefits of crossing the nuclear threshold.
Conventional Long-Range Strike Weapons in Small States
LRS can support a wide range of mission sets, including both joint and independent operations, as well as intra- and cross-domain missions. In principle, this allows states to adopt diverse employment strategies to both reinforce and expand their warfighting and deterrence horizons. It is therefore unsurprising that, since Russia invaded Ukraine, several European states have moved to bolster their LRS arsenals (Wright, 2024). This trend is also notable among several smaller European states, which have, at times, made disproportionately large investments in these capabilities relative to the size of their overall defense budgets, and compared to many medium and major European powers, which have lacked such investments (Barrie et al., 2025). The expansion of small-state LRS arsenals in Europe is therefore notable but remains so far underexplored.
The political science literature lacks an agreed-upon definition of what constitutes a small state (Baldacchino & Wivel, 2020, p. 3; Maass, 2009, pp. 66–68). While innate characteristics such as GDP, population size, and geographic area are relevant in defining small states, the concept is best understood as a “focusing device,” drawing attention to “security problems and foreign policy dilemmas” that smaller states in the international system share (Wivel et al., 2014, pp. 8–9). For their security and defense, one of the most pressing challenges – as also noted by Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer and Ian Bowers in this special issue – is their limited resources and capabilities, which translate into limited military strength (Bennett, 2018; Borg, 2020; Vaicekauskaitė, 2017; Wivel, 2021). This can prevent small states from effectively exerting power (Rickli, 2008, p. 309; Thorhallsson & Wivel, 2006, pp. 654–655), leaving them in the position of being the “weaker part in an asymmetric relationship” (Wivel et al., 2014, p. 9).
In an anarchic international system, being small comes with inherent disadvantages. First, limited capacity makes it harder to defend against larger, aggressive adversaries; second, small states typically lack the ability to meaningfully influence or alter others’ behavior (Rickli, 2008, pp. 308–311). As such, small state strategies are designed to compensate for their power deficit, often by adopting force structures providing niche capabilities and asymmetric advantages (Bennett, 2018, pp. 60–63; Steinsson & Thorhallsson, 2017, pp. 2–3).
In principle, LRS provide small states with a useful tool to achieve their warfighting and deterrence objectives. At the same time, small states, constrained by their lack of resources and position in the international system, are likely to face operational and political limitations not encountered by major or great powers. To understand the role of LRS in the warfighting and deterrence strategies of small states, I apply the framework to the LRS arsenals of three Nordic states – Finland, Norway, and Sweden – and assess their ability to service the mission sets outlined in the framework to derive deterrence and warfighting benefits vis-à-vis Russia.
These states are selected for three reasons. First, there is a consensus in the existing literature that they qualify as small states (Bjerga & Haaland, 2010; Borg, 2020; Vaicekauskaitė, 2017). Nevertheless, within the small state category, they possess advanced militaries and increasingly capable LRS arsenals. Second, although not alone in developing such capabilities within Europe and NATO, these states face geographic proximity to a major power threat. This exposes them to a particularly problematic security environment that other small states do not share (Wivel, 2021, p. 500). At the same time, their location places them near critical operational and strategic-level targets inside Russia, including nuclear sites, bringing several relevant targets within range (Wan & du Plessis, 2025). Third, the Nordic states face a nuclear-armed neighbor with access to substantial non-strategic and strategic nuclear capabilities that need to be deterred. This makes the case study suitable not only for understanding to what extent small states can employ and derive benefits from their LRS in conventional warfighting and deterrence strategies, but also for examining their role in the nuclear domain.
This section proceeds as follows. First, I outline the LRS arsenals of the three Nordic states, describing the types and numbers of systems they have access to. Second, I discuss the operational and political constraints they face in implementing the mission sets outlined in the previous section. While each state faces idiosyncratic challenges, the analysis offers generalizable insights into the capacity of small states to derive warfighting and deterrence benefits from their LRS arsenals. Third, I draw out implications for strategic stability in Europe.
Nordic Long-Range Strike
Over the past decades, Finland, Norway, and Sweden have built up credible LRS arsenals. Official documents in all three countries confirm the importance of conventional missile technologies in industrial and defense strategies, identifying them as a major priority for future development and procurement (Finnish Ministry of Defence, 2024, pp. 62–73; Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 2023, p. 4; Norwegian Ministry of Defence & Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, 2025, pp. 14–21; Swedish Ministry of Defence, 2019, pp. 4–5, 2021, p. 11). Analysts and officials in the Nordics have also publicly addressed the role of LRS in their military strategies and the types of missions they would serve. The debate is arguably most developed in Finland, where analysts have highlighted the need for such missiles in tactical-operational roles, particularly in counter-A2/AD missions (Pesonen, 2015), but also for potentially striking “economically and politically important enemy assets” deep behind the frontline (Salonius-Pasternak, 2012, p. 7).2 Sweden’s Chief of Defense Staff has publicly emphasized the importance of bringing the fight to enemy territory, specifically by targeting “logistics, assembly areas, and the like” with conventional missile capabilities (“Sweden to Acquire Long-Range Weapons Capable of Striking Russia,” 2025). Swedish analysts have also called for a capability to “impose strategically significant costs” onto an attacking adversary (Andrén, 2014, p. 12). Similarly, Norwegian analysts point to the importance of LRS in engaging high-value targets to generate “strategic effects not directly related to combat operations” (Tørrisplass, 2018, p. 25) and their potential role in a Norwegian deterrence-by-punishment posture by holding at risk enemy high-value strategic-level targets (Askvik, 2015, pp. 51–54). Importantly, individual statements and publications like these are not sufficient to draw firm conclusions about the wartime targeting policies of the Nordic states. Nonetheless, available statements and publications suggest ambitions and considerations towards an expanded mission set.
Today, Finland possesses the largest and most diverse LRS arsenal among the three. In March 2012, it procured up to 50 AGM-158 A JASSM land-attack cruise missiles, featuring a range of 340 kilometers and a powerful penetrator warhead (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense [Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics], 2023, p. 28). In 2018, Finland added an estimated 100 Gabriel Mk. 5 anti-ship cruise missiles, with ranges exceeding 200 kilometers (Vavasseur, 2019). While primarily designed for maritime targets, the system has land-attack capability. Finally, Finland has ordered an undisclosed number – likely between 100 and 200 – of AGM-158B JASSM-ER land-attack cruise missiles with a range of 1,000 kilometers, expected to enter service alongside the country’s F-35A Lightning II aircraft in the coming years (Jennings, 2024).
Norway’s LRS arsenal primarily consists of an estimated 200 to 300 Naval Strike Missiles ordered since 2007, a modern surface-launched anti-ship cruise missile with a range of roughly 200 kilometers that also has land-attack capability (Vavasseur, 2023). The Norwegian Air Force has recently begun taking delivery of an estimated 100 to 200 Joint Strike Missiles, an air-launched cruise missile with a maximum range of over 500 kilometers adapted for internal carriage in the F-35A’s weapons bay (Hill, 2025). Norway reportedly also ordered the 500-kilometer-range CTM-X ballistic missile (still under development) for its recently purchased K239 MLRS launchers in an unknown quantity, available from around 2030 onwards (Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 2026).
Finally, Sweden operates the smallest and arguably least capable LRS arsenal of the three, consisting of RBS-15 Mk.2 (currently undergoing modernization) and RBS-15 Mk.3/Mk.3+ anti-ship cruise missiles with land-attack capability, with ranges of over 100 and over 200 kilometers, respectively (Felstead, 2025). The exact number of missiles procured is unknown, but likely amounts to several hundred. Sweden’s 2024 defense report noted plans to procure the Taurus KEPD 350 missile, but no order has been confirmed (Swedish Armed Forces, 2025, p. 56).
In principle, these LRS arsenals allow Finland, Sweden, and Norway to service the mission sets outlined in the framework, though to varying degrees. Available analyses and statements from the Nordic states suggest that, at the very least, an expanded mission set beyond joint conventional missions is under consideration. However, in doing so, the Nordic states face significant operational and political constraints. The subsequent sections outline these in more detail.
Operational Constraints
In servicing the mission sets outlined above with their LRS arsenals, the Nordic states – alongside other small-state peers – face operational constraints. These refer to the practical limitations that restrict a military’s ability to plan, execute, and sustain missions across the full spectrum of modern missile warfare. Three types of operational constraints are common to Finland, Norway, and Sweden: limited arsenal size, limited capability and arsenal diversity, and limited access to adequate LRS enablers, notably ISR assets.
First, the three Nordic states face a lack of depth in their arsenals. The Nordic states collectively deploy only a limited number of LRS, many of which are not optimized for land-attack roles. This limits their ability to support the full range of relevant missions, though the impact varies by mission type. Even limited arsenals may be sufficient to generate locally significant operational interdiction effects or to punch geographically limited holes in the adversary’s A2/AD network. However, they are likely insufficient to support broader mission sets, particularly those involving the independent employment of LRS. Evidence from Ukraine shows that while such strikes can produce important strategic-level effects, they often require large-scale, repeated salvos to achieve them (Jensen & Atalan, 2025). Even then, success is not assured, especially when the adversary fields missile defense systems and left-of-launch capabilities that introduce uncertainty regarding how many munitions would survive to reach their targets. In the European context, Russia’s air defense forces have sustained significant casualties in Ukraine but remain a threat to Nordic conventional long-range strike weapons. The ability to threaten and conduct counterforce and damage-limitation missions will similarly be constrained, as these will generally require engaging a large number of targets to be effective. That said, in an alliance context, even limited LRS arsenals can serve as enablers of broader counterforce or damage-limitation efforts, for example by suppressing air defenses or degrading early-warning systems. The constraint therefore lies less in an inability to contribute than in the inability to execute such missions independently.
Second, the limited capability and lack of diversity of existing LRS impose similar constraints. Range is a key limiting factor. Except for Finland, which will soon receive the 1,000-kilometer-range JASSM-ER, the reach of Nordic LRS remains restricted to several hundred kilometers. Some critical assets are still within reach, but targets at greater strategic depth, including major industrial and military sites, remain largely inaccessible. Missile lethality is also an issue. Swedish and Norwegian cruise missiles are equipped with 125 to 200-kilogram semi-armor-piercing warheads, which are generally insufficient to destroy heavily hardened infrastructure. Underground nuclear warhead storage sites or missile silos, while potentially within range, cannot be effectively targeted with these weapons. Only Finland’s JASSM and JASSM-ER missiles, equipped with 450-kilogram penetrator warheads, could service these target types effectively. Finally, time-sensitive targeting remains difficult because Nordic long-range strike weapons operate at subsonic speeds, taking tens of minutes or more to reach their targets. A ballistic missile capability could fill this gap, but until Norway receives the CTM-X, no such systems are in service in Nordic arsenals, and even then, likely only in very limited numbers. As a result, the ability to engage mobile and semi-mobile assets remains limited, constraining both joint conventional and nuclear missions that rely on speed and flexibility.
Third, limited sovereign access to space-based ISR remains an important operational constraint. At present, neither Finland, Norway, nor Sweden has access to robust national space-based ISR assets providing the high-resolution, rapid-revisit imagery needed to cue LRS in more complex engagements, though procurement is stated as a priority and ongoing (Finnish Ministry of Defence, 2025; Kongsberg, 2024; “Swedish Armed Forces Buying Finnish Satellites for Ultra-Precise Imaging of Ground Surfaces,” 2026; Swedish Ministry of Defence, 2025, p. 5). The three Nordic militaries therefore rely heavily on allied or commercial data for strike planning. This dependence is manageable for fixed targets, but becomes more challenging when targeting mobile assets that can relocate between collection passes. As NATO members, the Nordics may request intelligence products from Alliance space assets, but these are shared on a voluntary basis and availability cannot be taken for granted, especially for nationally-led operations (NATO, 2019). Until these nations field their own ISR satellites optimized for long-range strike targeting and possessed of the requisite processing capabilities and procedures, they will enter any high-end contingency without a proper kill chain. This may not always be a problem for fixed or nearby targets, but it complicates the ability to engage time-sensitive targets at greater operational and strategic depth.
Importantly, the Nordic states have taken steps to address their material shortcomings, including by deepening defense cooperation, as explored by Matti Pesu in this special issue. The integration of Nordic air forces, and likely at least partial integration of their air-launched LRS assets, is one such example (Saxi, 2025, p. 303). Capability shortfalls can also be mitigated through broader NATO-level cooperation, which may help address limitations related to arsenal depth, capability gaps, and sensor coverage, particularly for pre-planned and joint missions. Multinational integration does not, however, fully eliminate national constraints.
Of course, the Nordic countries are also not alone in confronting these challenges. Ongoing debates in the United States on missile arsenal depth and lethality illustrate that even major powers face similar shortfalls (Cancian et al., 2023; Edelman et al., 2022). However, small states are inherently less able to address them. From a deterrence perspective, these operational constraints render the denial and punishment effects of LRS operations more uncertain, thereby reducing the deterrence credibility of small-state arsenals, especially in the context of more complex, cross-domain deterrence missions.
Political Constraints
In addition to operational constraints, several political constraints prevent the Nordics, along with other small states, from employing their LRS arsenals to support broader mission sets. “Political constraints” here refers to the strategic and institutional limitations that inhibit small states from expanding or adapting the use of their military capabilities, even when operationally feasible. These include adversary escalation dominance and doctrinal limitations that prevent small states from embracing the mission sets outlined in the framework.
First, major powers often hold escalation dominance over small state adversaries – a situation in which one actor possesses the capability to prevail at every level of escalation, deterring adversaries by making clear that any attempt to escalate would leave them worse off (Radin et al., 2024, p. 3). Finland, Norway, and Sweden are conventionally inferior to Russia across most relevant metrics and are unable to compete at the nuclear level. NATO membership can offset some of these disadvantages by relying on allies’ conventional and nuclear forces, but dyadic escalation dominance will likely remain a limiting factor in decision-making among the Nordic states. For example, while deep strikes against countervalue targets as part of independent conventional missions appear in principle feasible, their practical utility may be perceived as limited. Major powers like Russia have a greater ability to absorb these kinds of attacks and can respond in kind, though potentially with far greater force, reducing the political attractiveness and utility of such conduct.
Second, compared with major and great powers, small states face more stringent constraints when adapting doctrine to support expanded LRS missions. In small state militaries, intellectual capital is a narrower bottleneck with only relatively few mid-career officers possessing the skills needed for target development, weaponeering, and post-strike assessment. Their expertise cannot be easily replaced or diverted. Commanders must therefore choose between suspending core operational functions to retrain these officers or preserving the existing targeting culture. Other factors, such as political preferences, compound these constraints. Conventional missions focused on denial have been central to NATO’s identity as a defensive alliance. Moving from a denial-only posture to one that includes punishment strikes into an adversary’s strategic depth involves personal and institutional risks that may be difficult to justify, particularly in peacetime. In practice, doctrinal change in small states therefore often depends on external pressure, typically from major-power allies (Bjerga & Haaland, 2010, p. 506).
As with operational constraints, these political constraints are not unique to small states. Escalation management and targeting restrictions, for instance, also shape U.S. missile targeting debates (Cochran et al., 2024, pp. 16–20; Rovner, 2017). Nor is doctrinal change ever easy, particularly in peacetime and without external shocks. Still, compared to small states in the Nordic region, larger powers appear somewhat insulated, both because they can absorb the costs of doctrinal change and enemy responses more easily and because they often already have more robust and expansive LRS doctrines than their small-state peers. From a deterrence perspective, political constraints can further erode the credibility of LRS arsenals in small states. Even if operational use is technically feasible, political considerations may render their employment in broader mission sets, including for punishment purposes or cross-domain benefits, unattractive or even counterproductive.
Small State Conventional Long-Range Strike Arsenals and Implications for Strategic Stability
Taking into account the operational and political constraints that small states face, does the proliferation of small-state LRS arsenals in Europe tangibly affect NATO-Russia strategic stability?
Strategic stability, narrowly defined, is the presence of crisis stability and arms race stability (Acton, 2013, p. 117). Crisis stability refers to the condition in which neither party to a confrontation perceives an advantage in striking first in a crisis, and arms race stability, the absence of strong incentives for states to expand their arsenals, either qualitatively or quantitatively (Schelling, 1990, pp. 207–230). Traditionally, strategic stability has been a concept central to and primarily used in the nuclear strategy literature. However, as LRS proliferate and their characteristics evolve, the key tenets of strategic stability increasingly apply in the conventional missile domain. Importantly, in a confrontation between NATO and Russia, decisions regarding nuclear use ultimately rest with the nuclear powers and are shaped by a broader set of factors beyond small-state LRS capabilities alone. This analysis therefore treats the nuclear deterrence regime dominated by major powers as a background condition that small states operate within but cannot fundamentally reshape. Small-state LRS arsenals are thus unlikely to be decisive in promoting or deterring nuclear use in isolation. Their relevance instead lies in how they shape crisis dynamics below the nuclear threshold and influence adversary perceptions that may feed into escalation risk.
In principle, the expansion of small-state LRS missions can affect strategic stability in two ways. First, if small states can employ their LRS arsenals against nuclear or nuclear-related targets, nuclear weapon states may perceive the survivability of their arsenals as degrading (Mount, 2025, pp. 100–101). This is especially true in a nuclear alliance context where a small state’s LRS may not appear highly threatening on their own but can be seen as complementing the nuclear capabilities of senior allies (Pollack et al., 2020; Seitz & Ji, 2025). This is arguably a key concern for Russian decision-makers monitoring the expansion of LRS among U.S. allies in Europe, as evidenced in official documents (Russian Federation, 2022, pp. 2–3; Russian Federation, 2023, p. 3). Eventually, this could incentivize Russia to take measures to reinforce arsenal survivability, including through a quantitative nuclear buildup, qualitative improvements to the arsenal, and operational measures such as adopting increasingly responsive launch postures, decreasing both crisis and arms race stability (Futter & Zala, 2021, pp. 270–271).
Second, small-state LRS arsenals can affect strategic stability beyond the immediate nuclear context. This is because of their (theoretically) offensive nature, which allows for the rapid infliction of harm, including at the adversary’s strategic depth. If Russia believes that homeland targets, including critical infrastructure, economic assets, and key industrial sites, could face large-scale conventional attacks from nearby small states early in a conflict, it may be incentivized to pre-empt the adversary’s missile assault where possible.3 Importantly, early and potentially large-scale use of LRS against military and non-military targets is already part of Russian doctrine, as also demonstrated by Russia’s conduct in Ukraine (Johnson, 2018, pp. 16–17). However, growing threat perception within Russia could incentivize Russia to maintain and double down on its posture and to enact further quantitative and qualitative upgrades to its LRS arsenal to hold at risk critical targets across Europe, including at strategic depth. As in the nuclear domain, both crisis stability and arms race stability may therefore be weakened in the conventional missile domain.
While LRS may affect strategic stability in Europe, their implications vary across material and cognitive dimensions. From a material perspective, these effects are likely to remain limited. On the one hand, LRS, including those fielded by small states, can in principle disrupt a dyadic balance when employed beyond joint conventional operations. As argued above, however, a range of operational factors constrain their effective use for such purposes, particularly in nuclear and nuclear-related missions. Finland, Norway, and Sweden, for example, neither deploy LRS in sufficient numbers nor field the appropriate types of systems, together with the necessary enablers, to reliably threaten relevant Russian nuclear targets at scale. In addition, political constraints are likely to constitute a substantial barrier to expanding the mission sets of LRS in small states, including toward independent conventional missions. In principle, the operational and political constraints these states face in expanding their mission sets may therefore reassure actors such as Russia that the disruptive effects of these systems will remain contained.
From a cognitive perspective, worst-case assumptions will likely prevail. This relates to two types of functional overlaps present in the deployment of LRS, creating what might be termed a “double dual-capability”. First, the same weapon systems that can be deployed for tactical and operational purposes can, in theory, support mission sets aimed at disrupting or destroying strategic-level targets within the enemy homeland. I call this functional overlap “tactical-operational/strategic dual capability”. States confronting an adversary deploying LRS cannot be certain whether these systems only promote denial objectives in the theater, or whether broader warfighting objectives are pursued. Second, the same weapon systems employed to strike conventional targets across the battlespace can theoretically go after nuclear and nuclear-related targets, provided they fulfill minimum requirements to do so. I refer to this functional overlap as “conventional/nuclear dual capability.” States confronting an adversary deploying LRS ostensibly for conventional purposes cannot be certain that it is indeed only pursuing conventional objectives. Both functional overlaps introduce significant uncertainty regarding how other states will employ their LRS forces and what effects they may achieve. In fact, given the fluid dynamics of war, these states may not even know themselves how their LRS will ultimately be used once the fighting begins.
More broadly, this indicates a distinct entanglement dynamic. Existing work has highlighted receiving-end entanglement, where strikes on dual-use targets obscure the effects the attacker seeks to produce, creating inadvertent escalation pressures in conflict (Acton, 2018).4 The analysis here clarifies an analytically distinct but related mechanism, which can be termed “sender-end entanglement”: when a state fields LRS, observers cannot determine how or to what ends it intends to employ them, including whether deployment is aimed at threatening tactical-operational or strategic-level targets, or at generating effects in the conventional or nuclear domain. Overall, this means it is difficult, if not impossible, to reassure adversaries of the deploying state’s intent, despite significant operational and political constraints in deploying LRS in small-state arsenals. Given that the threat perception of a weapon system is ultimately co-extensive with its capabilities, states have to assume the worst-case, especially about states they consider hostile (Jervis, 1976, pp. 64–68). As a result, the proliferation of LRS into small-state arsenals is likely to put pressure on strategic stability in Europe and beyond.
An important upper-bound case emerges when considering the integration of small-state LRS into allied conventional-nuclear operations. In practice, Nordic capabilities would most likely not be employed in isolation but as part of joint operations drawing on allied enablers – ISR, targeting support, and command-and-control – under the shadow of U.S., British, and French nuclear forces. This integration can partially mitigate operational and political constraints, but amplifies strategic stability risks. From an adversary’s viewpoint, these capabilities may appear not as discrete national assets but as elements of a coordinated alliance strike complex, blurring the boundary between conventional and nuclear campaigns and reinforcing worst-case assumptions. Even limited Nordic capabilities may thus heighten crisis instability and generate pressures for further force buildup.
Conclusion
LRS can service a range of mission sets, from joint conventional missions, traditionally perceived as most relevant, to independent conventional missions and joint and independent nuclear missions. In a regional context, the proliferation of LRS can have destabilizing effects, largely due to the functional overlap these weapons introduce into warfighting and deterrence strategies, putting pressure on strategic stability even when states have no intention of using them for broader mission sets and face substantial operational and political constraints in their employment. These findings point to three broader implications.
First, from a theoretical perspective, this analysis further challenges assumptions in deterrence theory that small states are passive recipients of strategic stability dynamics. The findings suggest that small states can become active, if constrained, shapers of regional deterrence architectures. Second, the findings highlight the need to integrate cognitive and perceptual dynamics more fully into strategic stability frameworks. Even materially limited capabilities can have outsized effects due to adversary threat perception and worst-case planning. Third, this article highlights the relevance of conventional-nuclear entanglement beyond the major-power context. The fact that small-state conventional capabilities can produce nuclear-related effects, intended or otherwise, suggests a need to reassess the global scope of cross-domain deterrence debates and the growing salience of functional ambiguity in missile technology.
From a policy perspective, the proliferation of LRS points to a complex future, particularly in Europe. For states preparing for a possible confrontation, such as the Nordics, increased investment in conventional missile capabilities is warranted. From a strategic stability perspective, however, the destabilizing pressures associated with small-state LRS deployments are likely to grow in the near term. Over the medium to long term, arms control agreements addressing the functional overlap of these systems may be feasible, though their viability will depend on broader easing of political and military tensions.
Notes
[1] SSBNs can theoretically also be targeted by conventional long-range strike weapons if surfaced or docked, prior to strategic force generation. Russia has reportedly maintained a pier-side launch capability, which could render them more vulnerable in this regard (Trevithick, 2020).
[2] On Finnish conventional long-range strike doctrine, see also Salonius-Pasternak (2020, pp. 64–70).
[3] This mirrors the surprise-attack problem known from the nuclear domain, where both sides are incentivized to strike first out of fear of being preempted (Schelling, 1959).
[4] The war in Ukraine, in which Ukraine has openly struck entangled Russian military capabilities, including early-warning and strategic aviation infrastructure, without provoking nuclear escalation, raises important questions about the continued validity of the receiving-end entanglement concept. At a minimum, the concept may need to be reconsidered in light of scope conditions, including asymmetries in nuclear capabilities, perceptions of escalation risk, and the political objectives of the actors involved.
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful for comments from Henrik Hiim, Ian Bowers, Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Matti Pesu, and the anonymous reviewers. The manuscript benefited from discussion in workshops organized by the Oslo Nuclear Project, the Hertie School, and the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt.