Introduction
Institutionally, NATO understands interoperability as coherent collaboration between the allied actors forming the alliance: an operational framework affording greater operational efficiency, achieved through the standardization of practices and the execution of joint exercises and operations (NATO, 2019, p. 70; Paget, 2016). This approach is based on the view that capabilities produced and practiced jointly can be seamlessly transferred to active operations (Derleth, 2015; Møller, 2019). But such a view limits the discussion to a military-to-military framework, effectively excluding other organizations and stakeholders, along with their specific tasks and institutional logics, from the conversation. Furthermore, it assumes that interoperability functions in a vacuum, as if the conflict’s causes, dynamics, and socio-historical contexts were disconnected from the operation itself (Danielsson, 2022).
This article responds to the need to examine interoperability more broadly (Hill et al., 2023), emphasizing the multilateral and holistic nature of the concept. It aims to contribute to the theoretical development of the concept of interoperability and to enhance the understanding of new collaborative arrangements to respond to a wider spectrum of threats.
Below, the concept and meaning of interoperability are first discussed in the NATO context. A critical view of the concept is taken in order to form a more comprehensive perspective, extending beyond questions of military-to-military interoperability alone. After context and methodology have been set out, the findings are presented and then used to form a holistic view of interoperability as a mode of functioning arising from the intertwining of multidirectional and multilevel operations. The need for a deeper understanding of coordination and cooperation in the provision of security is highlighted here. In the conclusion, the findings of the study are linked to the current discussion about security; here, the focus is on understanding broad-based threats, civil-military relationships, and the efforts made by both the EU and NATO to change responses to the current security environment.
Interoperability as a Basis for Collaboration in the Allied Context
Interoperability is a critical capability in the coalition context (Santos & Freire, 2023, p. 500). NATO’s full capabilities correspond, simply, to the capabilities of its 32 member states, each of which seeks to defend its own national security according to its geopolitical position. To be able to respond to different threat scenarios, NATO synchronizes the capabilities of its member states, collectively directing them to strategic goals. These goals are given concrete form in the alliance’s joint defence plan – the implementation of which requires constant reconciliation of the members’ capabilities and the development of interoperability. Interoperability therefore both helps allies to act collectively and prepares them to respond to a range of threats in a complex world.
For NATO, interoperability is “the ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve Allied tactical, operational and strategic objectives” (NATO, 2019, p. 70; NATO, 2023a). Effective, coherent collaboration is achieved through joint exercises and operations and the standardizing of procedures, practices and terminology (Derleth, 2015; NATO, 2019, pp. 55, 82, 88).
Interoperability has mainly been examined from a technical point of view (Žotkevičiūtė-Banevičienė, 2022). Technical compatibility is a matter of technologies and systems permitting forces from different nations to work together seamlessly, with relevant data and information available and useful to those needing it (Morosoff et al., 2015). Challenges with communication and information systems (Danielsson, 2022; Goldenberg & Dean, 2017; Soeters, 2017; Yanakiev, 2021) complicate information sharing and the forming of situational awareness, consequently affecting operational efficiency and the coordination of action (Derleth, 2015; Møller, 2019). Information sharing enabled by technology is therefore a key issue in interoperability (Moon, Fewell & Reynolds, 2008) as it creates a shared understanding of operating practices, objectives, and the operation itself.
Studies have also highlighted non-technical or “soft” interoperability (Žotkevičiūtė-Banevičienė, 2022), comprising both human and procedural dimensions. The human dimension emphasizes activities such as the establishment of common values, language and terminology (Rinaldo et al., 2017), alongside education and training systems affording cohesive and effective cooperation beyond the merely technical (Derleth, 2015; Paananen, 2021; Yanakiev, 2021). Crucially, this involves understanding differences in military cultures, such as leadership styles and levels of autonomy, to build mutual confidence within a coalition (Rinaldo et al., 2017; Yanakiev 2021, p. 112). Conversely, the procedural dimension addresses the processes and practices that organize activities to foster shared understanding and unity of effort (Derleth 2015; Nisser 2022; Solli & Borrie 2025).
Modern threats, however, have expanded from the traditional threats concerning the military (Crombe & Nagl, 2023; Hackett & Nagl, 2023; Magula et al., 2022). Threats are not only associated with conventional warfare, nuclear weapons, and terrorism. States are obliged to shift their focus toward the deliberate undermining of the very functioning of society itself (Sadowski & Maj, 2022), protecting critical infrastructure, civilians, and the security of supply (the availability and mobility of goods and services) to maintain the vital functions of society in a state of prolonged crisis, conflict or war (Ångström & Ljungkvist, 2023). Cyber and hybrid threats are also aimed at identifying and testing a society’s vulnerabilities with strategic, long-term goals in mind – the undermining of democratic values, international order and social cohesion, for example, are conducted with the aim of weakening a state through destabilization (Sadowski & Maj, 2022).
The new threats targeting societal functioning create complex defence challenges, requiring significant coordination for the realization of greater interoperability. This encourages a shift from a single focus on the military-to-military dimension (Ryan, 2009; Thomas, 2019) towards a more novel approach to the provision of security. Most empirical studies have focused on the technical, human or procedural dimensions of interoperability, overlooking non-military actors and organizations (government, private industry) and their broader coordination. Additionally, while recent studies have addressed interoperability at the tactical level (see Derleth, 2015; Moon et al., 2008), there is limited understanding of the wide spectrum of the levels of interoperability and their mutual influence on the enhancement of security.
Aiming to fill this gap, this study asks “What are the different dimensions and levels of interoperability? And how closely are they intertwined with the military dimension?”, contributing to the discussion of the technical, human, and procedural aspects of military-to-military interoperability (see Derleth, 2015; Moon et al., 2008). Developing a broader understanding of the concept as a phenomenon of cooperation and coordination in a multicentred network, the study uses the Afghanistan crisis management operation as an empirical case (Hill et al., 2023).
Method
This study adopts the case study method to enhance theoretical insight into the concept of interoperability (Yin, 2018). The case study method aims to answer the “why, how and what?” questions essential to the investigation of multifaceted and context-dependent issues (Alam, 2021). Case study research represents a robust methodological choice, particularly when the goal is to gain a deep and holistic understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. Focusing on a single case may provide insights that are not attainable through other methodological approaches. Moreover, case study research plays a crucial role in theory building, especially when existing theories or concepts are insufficient in comprehensively explaining the phenomenon being studied (Annamalah, 2024). In such instances, case studies can enrich, expand, and deepen the understanding of the phenomenon while contributing novel insights to the existing body of research knowledge.
As a case study, the Finnish crisis management operation in Afghanistan is significant in being a true operation. Interoperability is commonly examined in the course of exercises rather than genuine operational contexts, where it is an essential prerequisite for joint operations (Nisser, 2022). If genuine operations involve uncertainties and inherently unpredictable contingencies, the scenarios and learning objectives on which they are founded may not always foresee or take such factors into account (Paananen et al., 2022). The case is also significant in providing an excellent opportunity to study the significance of interoperability in crisis environments beyond the purely military (Stake, 1994).
Case: Finland’s Participation in the Afghanistan Operation
NATO’s Article 5 concerning collective defence has been invoked only once, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks (NATO, 2023b), with NATO assuming command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2003. ISAF had been established through the UN Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 1386/2001 (Ministry of Defence, 2022), and operated under the authorisations referred to in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
Finland’s actual participation in the operation began in 2002 when it sent a civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) unit to the operation. The operation was extended in 2003 as ISAF moved under the leadership of NATO. In 2015, ISAF was followed by the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) tasked with training and assisting the Afghan forces so they could assume responsibility for security. The RSM ended by June 2021, when the last Finnish troops returned home. Finland withdrew its troops when the defence ministers of the NATO member states decided in April of 2021 to end the operation (Ministry of Defence, 2022; Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2022).
Finland participated in the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan for almost 20 years, from 2001 to 2021. During this time, 2,466 Finnish soldiers and approximately 140 civilian experts, contributing to policing and as political, development policy and gender advisers, participated in the operation (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2022, p. 19).
Empirical Focus
As a case, the Finnish contribution in Afghanistan provides an opportunity to examine interoperability more holistically than a study addressing the phenomenon in a military-to-military context alone. Finland was not a NATO member during the operation; this brought strategic and practical differences in opportunities for sharing intelligence and implications for the country’s political influence and its participation in NATO’s military structures, ultimately affecting the country’s security policy, defense, and international relations. Finland’s policy on Afghanistan was based on a comprehensive approach (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2009) combining efforts to achieve political influence and development cooperation and the execution of humanitarian assistance and crisis management, both military and civilian (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2022, p. 11).
The comprehensive approach is linked to the idea that a crisis or a conflict cannot be solved by military operations alone and that stability is achieved through collaboration in many different domains. In brief, the objective of military crisis management, principally the responsibility of soldiers and security actors, is to create security and freedom of movement; civilian crisis management, meanwhile, mainly carried out by civilian experts, seeks to reinforce important institutions and government structures such as the rule of law, prisoner care, police, border and customs activities in the crisis area (Doty et al., 2023, p. 60). Development cooperation and humanitarian assistance serve societal stability through the support of citizens and the provision of services and development, so cultivating trust in the political system and government among locals (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2022, p. 22).
Both method and case are thus aligned with the theory-building effort (Yin, 2018) aimed at providing a broad, holistic view of interoperability as a concept.
Data
The Afghanistan operation lasted for almost 20 years, with the participating countries spending a great deal of financial, psychological and material resources. When it was brought to an end in summer 2021 under fairly chaotic circumstances, the participating countries felt a need to analyse the degree to which it was a success. Participating countries produced evaluation reports and studies on their role in the operation; this study, drawing on four such documents produced by institutions of the Finnish state, is thus a qualitative meta-analysis (Timulak, 2009; Timulak & Creaner, 2010).
The research data consists of two studies and two reports evaluating the Afghanistan operation and its effectiveness from the perspective of different parties. The first study on Finland’s participation in the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan was commissioned by the Foreign Affairs Committee and conducted independently by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (Mustasilta et al., 2022). Here, primary data were derived from public official documents, semi-structured interviews and group discussions. The interviewees (N = 64; 21 women and 43 men) represented the areas of diplomacy, development cooperation, politics, civilian crisis management, military crisis management, and international partners. Three workshops were further organized, two of which were for Afghans living in Finland (N = 44) and one for crisis management experts who had lived in Afghanistan (N = 12).
The other research project sought to examine the effectiveness of Finland’s activities in the crisis management operation in Afghanistan and to develop methods for evaluating the effectiveness of future comprehensive crisis management measures (Doty et al., 2023). Its primary data consists of semi-structured interviews (N = 21), data produced by the three workshops, group discussions and documents (government reports and parliamentary documents). The informants were people who had worked in key crisis management positions, and officials with positions of responsibility in different administrative branches. Finally, the reports of both the Ministry of Defence (2022) and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2022) describe the Afghanistan operation from their specific perspectives. These studies and reports together provide a comprehensive perspective on the evaluation of the Afghanistan operation, relevant to the implementation of my research.
The research data may be critiqued for being based on material collected by others and oriented towards specific research tasks and questions (Weston et al., 2019). A core challenge this raises is the difficulty of interpreting the results of studies conducted by earlier researchers. This is particularly the case when attempting to engage with another researcher’s reflective analyses, given that qualitative researchers inevitably draw on their own personal knowledge, expertise, and experience in producing them (Corti & Thompson, 2007). From the start, my immersion in the research context was facilitated by my own long career in the military and my work as an expert in crisis management. According to Ybema and Kamsteeg (2009), gaining an understanding from within requires some degree of familiarity with the context. But while my previous experience allowed me to immerse myself in the research project, my position remains somewhat equivocal (Alvesson, 2009): while not a member of the original research teams, participation in joint seminars and access to confidential communication between researchers gave me sufficient grounding to understand the objectives and framing of the research topics as a whole.
Analysis
The study was based on abductive qualitative analysis, which typically begins from a surprise or tension arising from the meeting of existing knowledge and practical observations (van Hulst & Visser, 2025). For me as a researcher, this surprise emerged through my participation in the second research project (Doty et al., 2023), which revealed that effective participation in a crisis management operation requires the integration of military, civilian, and diplomatic dimensions into a coherent whole. At the same time, practitioners’ narratives highlighted tensions between strategic objectives and field-level realities, and pointed to coordinated leadership as a critical but underexamined factor. Shortly thereafter, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, targeting both conventional military assets and critical infrastructure, while Finland initiated its NATO membership application – developments that foregrounded questions of interoperability in both theory and practice. Together, these experiences and observations formed the prior knowledge needed to iterate from surprises and to develop new insights into the concept of interoperability (Langley, 1999; van Hulst & Visser, 2025).
The analysis followed an iterative back-and-forth process between the data, theoretical and conceptual literature, and prior knowledge (van Hulst & Visser, 2025). In theorizing the data, I first familiarized myself with the concept of interoperability; after that, I began to re-analyse the material from an interoperability perspective. To begin with, I identified first-order terms in the documents by asking myself questions such as “From what point of view have the documents been written?” and “What kind of matters do the documents highlight?” (Gioia et al., 2013, p. 20). Through the dynamic interplay between these reflections and theoretical literature, I was able to problematize the preliminary interpretations of interoperability from the military-to-military perspective (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011) and relate them to a more extended view.
Allowing me to identify dimensions and organizational levels related to interoperability (Table 1), this led to an expansion of my theoretical approach and a refinement of the research question: “What are the different dimensions and levels of interoperability – and how are they intertwined with the military dimension?” The four dimensions – military-to-military, non-military-to-military, political-to-coalition, political-to-military – became the units of the analysis (Langley 1999). With several iterative rounds, I created second-order aggregate dimensions of my data by analysing their significance in terms of interoperability (Gioia et al., 2013, p. 20). The reflexivity of these multi-perspective dimensions helped me to reach a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon (Gioia et al., 2010): holistically, as the intertwining of multidirectional and multilevel dimensions, with the military dimension, specifically, entangled with non-military actors and organizations.
Table 1
Table of the Analysis.
| FIRST-ORDER PERSPECTIVE: PHENOMENA | SECOND-ORDER PERSPECTIVE: LINK TO INTEROPERABILITY | HOLISTIC VIEW OF INTEROPERABILITY |
|---|---|---|
| MILITARY-TO-MILITARY Adaptivity Development of national defence | MILITARY-TO-MILITARY Joint military capabilities for operating together with the alliance in accordance with the principle of continuous learning | Interoperability as an intertwined phenomenon requiring multidimensional and multilevel coordination and cooperation. |
| POLITICAL-TO-COALITION Challenges with coordination and exchange of information Separate planning and evaluation processes | POLITICAL-TO-COALITION Reconciliation of political and coalition objectives to realise policy planning and evaluation | |
| NON-MILITARY-TO-MILITARY Large number of actors with different objectives, logics and operating practices Accountability within own siloed organization | NON-MILITARY-TO-MILITARY Definition of a shared objective, reconciliation of the objectives and operating logics of different actors to enable coordinated activities | |
| POLITICAL-TO-MILITARY Strategic and NATO/EU efforts to exert influence in foreign and security policy are intertwined with military activities | POLITICAL-TO-MILITARY Awareness of objectives at strategic level, increasing awareness of them to promote interoperability in line with strategic goals |
Findings
The findings are organized around four dimensions of interoperability: military-to-military, political-to-coalition, non-military-to-military, and political-to-military.
The military-to-military dimension reflects a traditional but evolving view of interoperability, in which lessons learned feed into a national cycle of continuous improvement across education, training, competence, and organisational culture. The political-to-coalition dimension concerns the coordination of policy and coalition objectives to enable policy planning and evaluation. The non-military-to-military dimension emerges when a response to crisis is sought through a comprehensive framework that integrates the military with civilian actors and their respective roles. Finally, the political-to-military dimension captures how military activity serves the broader objectives of foreign and security policy at the strategic level.
Military-to-Military Dimension: Adaptation and National Development of Defence
In the NATO context, “interoperability”, developed through exercises and operations in collaboration with the coalition troops, is commonly understood as a question of adaptivity (Derleth, 2015). Shared practices are necessary for NATO’s collective functioning – thus, education and training, leadership and operating practices of the contributing countries are harmonized. From the military perspective, the Afghanistan operation can be understood as a field that developed both the capabilities to work in joint operations and enhanced the understanding of the operating models of different countries: it produced, in other words, learning.
Examples of such capabilities in interoperability have included the practice of planning operations and of competence in combat technology and tactics, which developed during the more demanding ISAF period (2009–2012) in particular (Doty et al., 2023, pp. 67–73).
Alongside the development of compatibility, the activities also build trust, here in the form of a deeper level of technical and tactical interoperability. The building of trust in partners’ capabilities, competence and preparedness, of a sense that others will provide support, is pursued with future operations in mind, laying a basis for later joint exercises and operations. It can also be used proactively to prepare for situations in which it is possible to reciprocally receive and develop international assistance in possible crisis situations (Doty et al., 2023, pp. 93–98, 101).
In addition to adaptive coordination, interoperability can also be understood as a dynamic and developing phenomenon. The competence Finland gained through participation in crisis management was merged into the national training system through two routes (Ministry of Defence, 2022). First, those who had served in the operation were recruited to train their successors: the competence gained in the operation was used immediately for the benefit of incoming troops to provide them with the best possible capabilities for collaboration and an up-to-date situational picture of the operation’s context; second, the competence gained in crisis management was made part of the system of training conscripts and reservists, to the benefit of personnel at large (Ministry of Defence, 2022). Interoperability can therefore be understood more comprehensively as part of the cycle of continuous improvement of training and competence. It does not intertwine only with exercises and training, as activities; it comes to form part of the contributing countries’ training systems and practices.
Political-to-Coalition Dimension: Challenges with Exchange of Information and Coordination
Compatibility was found to have adaptive and dynamic aspects in a military context, with notable challenges in the exchange of information and the coordination of policies at the international and national levels. From the national point of view, the objective stated for the operation in Finland’s official documents was the stabilization of the security situation in Afghanistan (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2022, p. 9). This objective, linking Finland to the international NATO coalition, was defined in the political decision-making process; more detailed stabilization objectives set for the Finnish troops were defined in the coalition’s strategic goals and its operative short-, medium- and long-term plans for achieving the operation’s principal goals. Implementation of the plans was the task of the command chain (Ministry of Defence, 2022).
The documents display a concern over the operation’s national objective. This objective was repeatedly highlighted for being so vague that assessment of participation in the operation, at the political level responsible for evaluating the reliability and credibility of the activities and their compliance with the objectives, was difficult (Mustasilta et al., 2022, p. 107; Qi & Ran, 2023, p. 2737). And certain complications were also encountered – how, for example, was Finland’s contribution to the stabilization of the security situation in Afghanistan to be measured given the limited available resources and the fact that Finnish troops operated as part of the international forces? (Ministry of Defence, 2022). From the broader interoperability viewpoint, the national and international planning and assessment processes were therefore separate, despite the fact that multinational alliances and their operations are constrained and guided by the legal frameworks of the involved nations (Møller, 2019; Yanakiev, 2021).
Non-Military-to-Military Dimension: Challenge of Coordinating Activities
In addition to stabilizing the security situation in Afghanistan, Finland’s official goals included promoting the reconstruction of Afghanistan, sustainable development, and human rights (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2022, p. 9). This was based on the so-called comprehensive approach, in which civilian crisis management, development cooperation and humanitarian assistance, in addition to military crisis management, were used to promote lasting societal stability (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2009).
The comprehensive approach brings a large number of new actors and their tasks to the operating environment. In the Afghanistan operation, military activities were performed to stabilize the security situation, which enabled other stakeholders to work for the development of a stable society. Civilian experts carried out police duties and served as advisers in matters related to policy, development, and gender (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2022, p. 19). In their tasks, they contributed to strengthening good governance, human rights, democracy and the rule of law, which was concretized in a project on police-prosecutor cooperation (EUPol) and in the training of female police officers. Development cooperation aimed to support the country’s democratization and reconstruction. Finland focused on strengthening equality in the social status of women and girls, a theme cross-cutting all its activities (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2022, pp. 9–10). This was apparent, especially, in launching the training of female police officers and supporting the school attendance of children and girls (Doty et al., 2023; Ministry of Defence, 2022).
In the comprehensive approach, the role and responsibilities of the stakeholders are understood to be distinct but mutually complementary. While, ideally, each actor should contribute to the shared goal according to their specific capability, the data supports the view that the stakeholders did not necessarily have a common goal: the objectives were based on different command structures and their tasks, with NATO charged with military crisis management and the EU with civilian crisis management.
Civilian experts worked as soldiers did, under the leadership, mandate and rules of their own operation, within the framework of their national legislation and according to their specific job descriptions. The objectives of development cooperation were shaped as part of the shared objectives of international actors: the national objectives were vague, and the objectives could be promoted better as part of a larger actor (Doty et al., 2023, p. 35). Donors also had their own interests that they wanted to promote with their donations, with the recipients accountable to those who made them. Contributing countries in turn set their own national reservations for the use of the troops (Ministry of Defence, 2022).
The involvement of all these actors should ensure a more sustainable response to crisis, emphasizing the need for a comprehensive interoperability framework that includes both military and non-military stakeholders. But the achievement of interoperability in this context involves aligning the diverse goals and tasks of different command structures; the primary challenge lies in finding common objectives and harmonizing actions among various actors to ensure cohesive and effective operations.
Political-to-Military Dimension: Strategic and Political Influencing
At the strategic level, the military and the political dimensions inform each other closely; military crisis management, understandable as a continuation of national foreign and security policy, makes it possible to promote national goals linked to the international system. First, the data on the Afghanistan operation shows that commitment to the West and the coalition for the duration of the whole operation was, itself, one of Finland’s principal political goals. At the very outset, Finland made a political decision to participate in the Afghanistan operation to demonstrate solidarity with the United States and to declare itself a dependable partner for the wider coalition (Doty et al., 2023, p. 107; Ministry of Defence, 2022, p. 25; Mustasilta et al., 2022, p. 92). With this decision, Finland demonstrated a willingness and preparedness to assume international responsibilities and provide international security. It also enabled networking with those partners and partner countries sharing similar underlying values and goals (Doty et al., 2023, p. 88; Mustasilta et al., 2022, p. 166).
The data also shows how a continuing and evolving political process enables a deepening partnership as part of NATO and simultaneous development of interoperability. Crisis management operations have long been the focus of Finland’s NATO partnership, first on the Balkans in the Implementation Force (IFOR) and its successors, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR). Partnership in the Afghanistan operation allowed Finland’s cooperation with NATO to be maintained (Doty et al., 2023, pp. 101–107), including dialogue in high-level strategic meetings; this advanced the status of Enhanced Opportunities Partner (EOP), granted to Finland in 2014. The 2016 declaration of intent between Finland and the United States, aiming to develop bilateral cooperation and cohesion between their armed forces, was linked to this (Ministry of Defence, 2022). Furthermore, the partnership may have contributed to the speed of Finland’s NATO membership process and the positive decision on the membership application (Doty et al., 2023, p. 129; Mustasilta et al., 2022, p93, 114). In short, commitments at the strategic and policy level have extended the opportunities linked to the partnership with NATO; this process has in turn promoted a deepening development of compatibility with the organization.
Second, crisis management is an instrument for exerting international political and strategic influence. In the Afghanistan operation, both military and civilian crisis management served as instruments aimed at promoting and strengthening the EU’s common security and defence policy, the EU’s global status, and cooperation between the EU and NATO (Doty et al., 2023, p. 97). Crisis management is therefore linked to the reconciliation of the EU’s and NATO’s security and defence policies, in which an extended view on security has been promoted. All this was also aimed at stronger, rule-based, governance, adherence to international agreements, and compliance with the rule of law (Doty et al., 2023, p. 97) – things held to form the foundation of a stable and secure society.
The strategies and objectives of multinational operations, this is to say, are artefacts of the political will and policies of the participating nations and international organizations; interoperability entails navigation and alignment with the diverse political landscapes of the EU, NATO, and allied nations alike.
Discussion
The study aimed to answer the question: “What are the different dimensions and levels of interoperability and how are they intertwined with the military dimension?”
The findings identify the military-to-military, non-military-to-military, political-to-coalition, and political-to-military dimensions. Collectively, these provide a holistic view where interoperability is linked not only to the technical-tactical level but also to operational and strategic-political levels. This perspective examines the phenomenon from national, international, and alliance-wide points of view.
This extended view moves beyond traditional military-centric models to highlight the critical role of non-military stakeholders and the complex interdependencies and tensions between different systems. Consequently, interoperability emerges as an intertwined phenomenon of multidirectional and multilevel dimensions, underlining the need for a deeper understanding of multidimensional coordination and cooperation (see Wang & Ran, 2023).
These findings expand the scope and practice of interoperability beyond the simple military-to-military dimension. In the NATO context, interoperability is typically understood as a means of reconciling and developing joint capabilities – a view supported by the results of this study. Furthermore, interoperability possesses a dynamic, evolutionary aspect: lessons learned are integrated into a national cycle of continuous improvement across education, training, competence, and organizational culture. Consequently, promoting interoperability extends beyond joint exercises, operations, and the standardization of practices (Derleth, 2015; Møller, 2019): it can be implemented as part of the entire training system and its continuous improvement. Similarly, the constituents and requirements of interoperability are not entirely predictable, unchanging artefacts of the military itself but are determined by the root causes, context, and characteristics of each conflict – something that potentially contributes to the store of collective knowledge.
Second, in the non-military-to military dimension, many other actors and stakeholders other than those of the military are involved in crises and conflicts, intertwining with and complementing the military dimension. For example, the actors identified in conflict areas are local armed forces, local police forces, international troops, military and political advisers, members of the local population, local authorities, local and international NGOs, international organizations and private companies (Durán & Calatrava, 2021). Military and civilian actors, both international and local, work together with the aim of facilitating system-wide coherence in security, diplomacy, governance and economic development efforts during the crisis (de Coning & Friis, 2011). In fact, in the pursuit of a stable and secure society, the findings point to a need for whole-of-government and whole-of-society interoperability in which the military dimension is entangled and interoperable with the other actors and their activities (see European Commission, 2025).
The findings show, however, that the activities were siloed and not necessarily guided by a shared, common understanding of the change, the strategy promoting it, and the implementation of the strategy (see de Coning & Friis, 2011). Multilateral cooperation introduces a diverse array of perspectives, objectives, and operating practices (see Kinder et al., 2021). Navigating this landscape requires an ability to integrate fragmented approaches into a common goal where individual efforts are mutually reinforcing. Furthermore, effectiveness in such complex environments cannot be measured through a single lens; it requires an expanded evaluation mechanism based on shared accountability. Under this framework, assessment focuses on both multidimensional outcomes and collective effort. Consequently, actors become accountable not only to their own internal hierarchies but also to the success of the collective mission and its shared objectives (Morçöl, 2023).
Thirdly, both the political-to-coalition and the political-to-military dimension show how the military dimension intertwines with political and strategic activities when these activities promote both national and transnational objectives linked to the EU and the security and defence policies of NATO and the EU. National objectives were linked, especially, to commitments that deepened the development of compatibility with NATO. These international strategic objectives sought to strengthen the EU’s internal security framework and its position on the world stage, while simultaneously reinforcing ties with NATO. In other words, the political will and policies of participating nations and international organizations shape the strategies and objectives of multinational operations. Interoperability, therefore, entails navigating and aligning with the diverse political landscapes of allied nations and large institutions.
The results of the study include signs that the planning, implementation and evaluation processes between the political and military or the coalition were not necessarily linked or were only loosely integrated. Interoperability would however be enabled and promoted by the sharing of policy objectives with others and by general awareness of the objectives (Santos & Freire, 2023, pp. 516–517). From the point of view of interoperability, it is also important how political objectives are operationalized, how they are integrated in the military planning process, and how their implementation can be evaluated and developed. This observation is supported by the findings of this study: awareness of the strategy-level political objectives does not imply that these objectives are compatible with the implementation; in other words, it is not a given that political objectives have been reflected on and implemented, their significance emphasized, or their achievement planned and evaluated in the long term (Santos & Freire, 2023, pp. 516–517).
Furthermore, neither the military-to-local dimension emphasizing the importance of the local context (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015) nor the link between the military and the local conditions were prominent in the study’s findings. As a whole, the long-term systematic stabilization of Afghanistan failed. A lack of understanding of the cultural, historical and social context and the social power structures and order have been stated as the main reasons for this failure, with efforts to import Western models, unsuited to the needs of the local community and ill-fitting with prevailing social structures, further undermining the mission (Giegerich & von Hlatky, 2020; King, 2023; Malkasian, 2021). In other words, interoperability also means adapting the planning of the operation and the military and political activities to local circumstances and local people (de Coning, 2020) – bearing in mind, however, that the local is not some homogenous whole, and includes many groups with distinct goals (Newby, 2016). Without sufficient knowledge of the cultural, historical and social context in which the operation is conducted, and without sufficient attention paid to factors that go beyond the military sphere, challenging the achievement of military objectives, the operation will be less efficient. Interoperability therefore necessitates the military-to-military perspective be expanded so that it accounts for locality (Autesserre, 2014), especially the historical and cultural context and the social structures and functions that collectively define it (Danielsson, 2022).
Finally, the results imply that, in addition to the technical-tactical level, interoperability is also linked to other levels. At the operational level, both the military and civilian actors linked with the security mission and their organizations had mutually complementary but quite separate roles, tasks and command structures – features of comprehensive interoperability (Hill et al., 2023). Regarding organizational interoperability (Santos & Freire, 2023), the military dimension intertwines with political and strategic efforts when those actions advance the security and defence policies of NATO and the EU. Together, these elements form a holistic view of interoperability, where diverse actors and organizations constitute a complex, interconnected whole. In such a landscape, effective coordination and communication must be precisely targeted at the appropriate actors, organizations, and levels.
Building on the work of Fewell and Clark (2003), Santos and Freire (2023) identify layers of interoperability within combined or coalition operations. At these levels, interaction between organizations may be cooperative, collaborative, combined, or unified. The factors defining these levels – preparedness, comprehension, ethos, and command – manifest and develop interoperability in distinct ways. For instance, preparation for joint operations can range from general instructions and sporadic exercises to fully integrated, doctrine-guided daily cooperation.
While information exchange and the development of a collective understanding tend to be somewhat limited in lower-level cooperation, cooperation at the higher level involves the structural and operational integration of information, knowledge, and shared interpretations. In lower-level cooperation, reporting follows separate chains of command with coordination occurring only at the highest leadership levels. At higher levels, cooperation is characterized by integrated coordination structures and unified leadership styles; coordination structures and leadership styles appear to be relatively homogenous. Furthermore, the framework for cooperation is to a significant degree determined by the existence of a shared goal and the degree of commitment to the activities required for the attainment of that goal across the different levels.
Naturally, if there are few preparatory measures and little exchange of information and knowledge between different organizations with different command structures, and the extent to which they share a common goal is limited, then the organizations are mutually independent; their operations are separate. (Santos & Freire, 2023.) Activities at different levels may also include a complex range of relations: actors may have both hierarchical and non-hierarchical relationships; they may be autonomous but linked to one another; they may be united, or integrated to a lesser extent; they may cooperate and coordinate; they may coexist or even compete. Extended interoperability therefore requires awareness of both the limits of and the opportunities for coherent activity and the deeper challenges with the capability to coordinate it (de Coning & Friis, 2011; Morçöl, 2023, pp. 29–40; Qi & Ran, 2023).
In sum, the holistic view of interoperability describes a phenomenon constituted of intertwining multidirectional and multilevel dimensions. The view highlights the need for a deeper understanding of multidimensional and multilevel coordination and cooperation in the provision of security. In this perspective, the military dimension is entangled with other actors and local people in the conflict area, governmental and non-governmental organizations and large framework organizations. Ensuring interoperability necessitates an awareness of and an ability to navigate and integrate, a patchwork of objectives, approaches, and political and local landscapes. It is therefore a question of awareness of both the opportunities for, and the limits of, coherent activity: of practically acknowledging the deeply challenging nature of coordinating this activity among governmental agencies at the local, regional and national level, and at the level of international organizations – in this case the EU and NATO (de Coning & Friis, 2011; Guttieri & Franke, 2014; Hill et al., 2023; Morçöl, 2023, pp. 29–40; Qi & Ran, 2023).
Conclusion
Although the findings are contextualized in the limited and specific environment of crisis management environment, they can be transferred to different deployment contexts, current operating environments and general preparedness (Drisko, 2025). Given that the relationship between threat scenarios and defence is dynamic, constitutive and scalable, approaches to defence are determined by the understanding of threats. Before the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula, NATO’s activities were strongly focused on crisis management. The Russian invasion of Ukraine returned NATO’s focus to its traditional task: defence and deterrence (Magula, Rouland & Zwack, 2022). The war marked a shift in the operational environment. Beyond conventional military threats, it revealed a heightened focus on undermining the broader operational capacity of society.
I will now use the study’s findings to reflect on the current security debate, specifically concerning the understanding of broad-based threats and preparedness, civil-military relations, and the ongoing efforts by the EU and NATO to adapt their responses to the challenges of the modern security landscape.
The dangers of the current operating environment show how virtually any available resource can be used to create threats, chaos and instability (Sadowski & Maj, 2022). The integrated all-hazards approach, linking internal and external security, has now been employed in response (European Commission, 2025). In the face of the threat that a society’s vulnerabilities will be deliberately identified and tested, the provision of security is not the responsibility of the military alone; it is shared by the society. Every individual, from private citizen to public servant to those in business, should be aware of the different threats; all should be expected to exercise their agency when the infrastructure on which social functioning depends – communication, transport, energy supply and public health – is threatened. Specific awareness is also required at the strategic level, where politics, economy, religion, ethnicity and diplomacy are used as means of creating pressure, and where this pressure is increasingly aimed at forcing concessions.
Cyber mechanisms are employed to destabilize and disrupt the fundamental functions of the state such as finance and banking, security, and the trade and service sector (Sadowski & Maj, 2022; Wither, 2020). When security becomes a fundamentally shared task, society as a whole shares the burden of the security environment, with both military-civilian agency cooperation and interagency coordination necessary; relevant stakeholders, meanwhile, are required to find solutions to the increasingly complex and dynamic security challenges (Guttieri & Franke, 2014; Sadowski & Maj, 2022). The significance of these findings lies in the realization that comprehensive threats require more than a military response alone. They demand the development of both civilian defence awareness and supporting structures (Wither, 2020). Addressing these threats requires a reduction in “siloed” operating practices and, crucially, ensuring that military and civilian defence systems are compatible to foster seamless coordination and cooperation.
If the complexity of extended threats requires the close coordination of several sectors for an effective response, the boundaries between military and civilian become blurred through interdependence. A number of concepts have formed to structure this relationship (civil-military relations, civil-military interaction, civil-military cooperation); the specific nature of the scope and functioning varies according to the form taken by the cooperation, whether– co-existence, coordination, or integration (Garbino et al., 2024). Studies have identified challenges related to cooperation, such as views on the objectives and interests, the importance of reconciling loyalty towards one’s own organization and responsibility for the shared objective, and different strategies and tactics for dealing with shared problems (Wang & Ran, 2023). The theoretical structuring of the civilian-military relationship also describes the tension in the relationship and the balance resulting from it (Berndtsson et al., 2023; Feaver, 1999; Jenny, 2001).
From the point of view of extended interoperability, future research should be focused on those concrete processes, logics, challenges, encouragements and legal aspects that become intertwined with collective cooperation and decision-making (Kapucu et al., 2024; Wang & Ran, 2023). Furthermore, research data on COVID-19 has shown that the multidisciplinary nature of crises requires interconnectedness of systems – official institutions, unofficial networks between individuals and groups, and communities. Crises necessitate both better coordination between stakeholders and communities and intergovernmental cooperation at local, regional and national level if preparedness and effective responses are to be achieved (Kapucu et al., 2024). This also requires a shared understanding of both the implications of interoperability (Santos & Freire, 2023, p. 518) and how it applies to each actor and level in both the civilian and the military sector.
COVID-19 and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine have strengthened the role of the EU and NATO in solving shared crises. The EU has traditionally focused on civilian crisis management and NATO on military crisis management, with operations principally conducted outside Europe (Garbino et al., 2024). With European crises modifying the roles and models of cooperation in crisis management, the EU has now come to assume a stronger role in security and defence (Håkansson, 2023), creating preconditions for a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to promote comprehensive preparedness by combining both military and civilian defence preparations (Niinistö, 2024). The EU integrates preparedness into cooperation with NATO (European Commission, 2025); NATO, meanwhile, has seven requirements that civil society must meet if the organization’s operations are to be successful (CCOE, 2018). Extremely significant from the point of view of the functional capacity of the military in a crisis situation, these changes reveal a change of mindset in which defence becomes a shared concern and responsibility.
Like NATO, the EU is now seeking a stronger role in coordinating and supporting its member states and supplementing their national resources and arrangements (European Commission, 2025). As international umbrella organizations, NATO and the EU provide the framework for the management of crises; the comprehensive nature of the threats requires organizations and national operating practices to be consonant. This means testing compatibility, decision-making processes, coordination, and operational responses, and the identification of vulnerabilities – things requiring the development of links between national and international institutions through dialogue, cross-briefing and exercises (see European Commission, 2025).
After reflecting on the research findings, it is reasonable to ask whether the concept of interoperability should be expanded beyond the military-to-military dimension to include all entities responsible for responding to extended threats (see Sadowski & Maj, 2022). We are similarly obliged to ask whether the examination of interoperability might usefully be extended beyond the technical-tactical level to both the operational and the strategic-political levels, as described above, from the national, international, and alliance perspectives? This multilevel and holistic approach to interoperability could yield profound and detailed insights into the phenomenon’s nature and development.
Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Future Research
This study is subject to several limitations that impact its quality. First, case studies are often criticized for the limited generalizability of their findings. As a methodology, case study research focuses deeply on exploring the phenomenon under investigation, which inherently produces context-specific information. However, for Stake (1994), a proponent of the constructivist paradigm (Sibbald et al., 2021), the value of case study research lies more in what can be learned from the case itself than the extent to which the findings can be generalized. The key contribution of this study is the expansion of the concept of interoperability and its significance in coordination and cooperation with relevant stakeholders in context-specific settings. Second, due to the inherently subjective nature of case studies, the researcher’s knowledge and experience often influence the results (Annamalah, 2024). To address this, I have reflected on my position as a researcher in the methodology section and made the research process transparent for the reader to evaluate. Furthermore, case studies may remain descriptive in nature. To overcome this, I have grounded the study within the concept of interoperability.
In the future, noteworthy research topics could include, first, how interoperability becomes significant at the local, regional, and national levels, the relationship between national and international levels, such as NATO and the EU, and in the coordination between these levels. This would require exercises involving both NATO and the EU, where planning, decision-making, and implementation processes, as well as their coordination, are evaluated and developed.
Another important area of research would be to explore what interoperability means and how it is facilitated in various comprehensive threat scenarios. Central themes could focus on the forms of cooperation and coordination, as well as the mechanisms by which interoperability can be achieved and developed. It would be significant to delve into factors such as legislation, leadership, or practices held to be prerequisite for successful interoperability. A particularly intriguing area of study could involve understanding the cognitive and operational logics of representatives from different professions, which is crucial to ensure that their actions are aligned toward common objectives and that actors do not work against each other (Chaturvedi & Nambudiri, 2025; Noordegraaf, 2020). These studies could provide further insight into the broader concept of interoperability, potentially shedding light on whether interoperability can also be understood as a flexible and scalable concept.
Competing Interests
The author has no competing interests to declare.