The subjective element of stalking: is the intent to intimidate a necessary constituent element of the offence?

In 2017, the Criminal Law of the Republic of Latvia was amended by the inclusion of a new Section 132.¹, which provides for criminal liability for stalking. There is no dispute, either in legal theory or in judicial practice, that this offence can only be committed intentionally. However, differing opinions have been expressed as to whether the intention to cause fear in the victim constitutes a necessary subjective element of the offence.

In 2021, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Latvia issued an opinion in which, referring to the explanatory notes to the legislative amendments, it stated that the intention to instil fear in the victim is a mandatory element of the offence of stalking. In 2025, the Legal Affairs Committee of the Latvian Parliament conducted several consultations aimed at developing a unified understanding of the subjective elements of this offence.

By applying historical, teleological, and other methods of interpretation, this study explores the essence of the issue and sets out the author’s view that there are no reasons for requiring a specific intent to instil fear as a precondition for the application of Section 132.¹, nor for interpreting the provision in an unduly narrow manner.