Produktverknüpfung bei Softwareangeboten – ökonomische Einordnung am Beispiel Microsoft

Markus Reisinger; Stefan Wagner

doi:10.2478/wd-2023-0055

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Produktverknüpfung bei Softwareangeboten – ökonomische Einordnung am Beispiel Microsoft

Wirtschaftsdienst

Volume 103 (2023): Issue 3 (March 2023)

By: Markus Reisinger and Stefan Wagner

Open Access

|Mar 2023

Abstract

Microsoft has a dominant position in the software market but competes with other firms in the adjacent market of cloud computing. Microsoft is using its dominant position in the software market to gain competitive advantages in cloud computing services and discriminates against certain cloud-computing providers. This behaviour leads to higher prices and fewer choices for customers. It also reduces the incentives for innovation for competing cloud providers.

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Articles in this issue

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/wd-2023-0055 | Journal eISSN: 1613-978X | Journal ISSN: 0043-6275

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Language: German

Page range: 211 - 216

Published on: Mar 27, 2023

Published by: ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft

In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services

Publication frequency: 12 issues per year

Keywords:

K21,

L12,

L41

Related subjects:

Business and economics,

Political economics,

Microeconomics,

Macroeconomics,

Public finance and fiscal theory,

Economic policy

© 2023 Markus Reisinger, Stefan Wagner, published by ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

Volume 103 (2023): Issue 3 (March 2023)