What makes a successful military operation? Some background
For military planners, this question has been, and still is, one of the most perplexing problems a military organisation can be confronted with. Many factors play into answering this question. Is it enough to have superior forces? Can a high fighting spirit ensure success? What role does information sharing have in planning?
The scientific research groups in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have attempted to construct a model on how to adopt the most optimal approach to command and control in military operations regardless of force composition and mission type.
The concept is called Command and Control Agility or C2 Agility for short. The purpose was to look at military operations from the level of decision-making perspective in order to design the most optimal approach to organisation, decision-making, communications, command and control for any military organisation.
The conceptual tool of Command and Control Agility have been used for planning and executing of military operations. (1), (2), (3), (4), (5)
The concept is defined as a conceptual tool to be adapted to any organisation (military or otherwise) engaged in a multitude of different tasks (not necessarily warfighting), and thus the concept may have been seen as a tool that may be valuable in specific cases but difficult to apply in a general manner.
However, the scientific basis of the NATO scientific task groups (SAS-065 and SAS-085 and SAS-104) has proven that the concept has merit in specific cases and scenarios as a tool to enhance the chance for a successful outcome in a military operation. However, these studies lack the statistical analysis required to answer whether the concept has merit as providing a statistical significance for a successful outcome in military operations.
The concept has been disseminated throughout most of the national militaries of NATO; however, it has not been adopted as universal doctrine nor is its correct application universally understood or indeed known by individual NATO officers and units. Part of this reason is that current research has lacked a significant statistical analysis on a data set with comparable cases to give a statistical significance of the concept’s importance in military operations.
Appendix B: Manoeuvre in the C2 Agility Space illustrated examples
Bibliography and Literature List
Does having the capability of having agility within command and control have a statistically significant contribution to success in joint military operations?
This paper will investigate whether C2 Agility has a statistical significance (6) on the successful outcome of a joint military operation. The concept of C2 Agility will allow a force to be more effective if it selects the most appropriate approach to Command and Control for the given mission and the changing circumstances.
The purpose is to determine the significance of C2 Agility in joint military operations by giving a mathematical statistical basis for its potentially added value and thus investigating if C2 is worth investing in instead of having a one-type fits all C2 approach.
Agility is an organisation’s ability to cope with and/or exploit changes and C2 Agility is the ability to do so with the selection of the most appropriate C2 approach, as well as the ability to change C2 approach if the current one is no longer appropriate.
While other factors will also influence outcomes, adopting the most appropriate C2 approach enables entities to effectively and efficiently employ the resources they have promptly in a variety of missions and circumstances. (7) As such, C2 is considered the overarching binding effort of all the sub-elements of a military operation, and this paper will investigate if C2 Agility theory, with its definition given above, has a statistical significance on the successful outcome of a joint military operation by using statistical analysis on historical case studies.
Whether C2 Agility has a statistical significance for a successful outcome will be investigated by conducting a controlled study of 43 historical cases, which will be selected by a set of criteria which in order to get a data set that is comparable with reduce selection bias but still based on real operational data.
Agility is an organisation’s ability to cope with and/or exploit changes and C2 Agility is the ability to do so with the selection of the most appropriate C2 approach, as well as the ability to change C2 approach if the current one is no longer appropriate.
While other factors will also influence outcomes, C2 Agility enables entities to effectively and efficiently employ the resources they have in a timely manner in a variety of missions and circumstances. (8) As such C2 is considered the overarching binding effort of all the sub-elements of a military operation.
The conceptual theory of C2 Agility has been a feature in planning and executing of military operations throughout military history. (9), (10), (11), (12), (13) The theory can be adapted to any organisation (military or otherwise) engaged in a multitude of different tasks (not necessarily warfighting).
The concept of C2 Agility is not written to describe military command and control (or indeed any type of command and control) in a time specific era or for specific scenarios. It is a concept that describes the characteristics of organisations that are optimised for specific tasks or missions under specific assumptions about the operating environment, including the threat.
Command and Control Agility as a concept has also been applied in emergency management (14), (15), (16), (17) during natural disasters around the world. In these scenarios, it has been easier to measure the tangible effect of its application however this paper will focus only on the military application of the concept.
Generally, in the literature it is recognised as being most relevant for the industrial age (mid or late 18th century) to the 21st century. (18) Further Agility within C2 is not a new or recently discovered capability or property of humans or collection of humans as cite in and the application of military C2 Agility predates its written papers. (19) To confirm this, the oldest case study featured in NATO SAS-104 final report was the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805.
The scientific basis of the theory has been the focus of the NATO scientific task groups (SAS-065 and SAS-085, SAS-104 and latest SAS-143), and these reports have also investigated the merit of the C2 Agility concept by using a combination of case studies and simulations.
The NATO-STO report SAS-143 approaches the same problem as this paper on how to adopt the most appropriate C2 approach for multi-domain operations. SAS-143 used five detailed historical case studies and then ran several simulations. SAS-143 tested C2 Agility through 480 simulation runs in the Experimental Laboratory for the Instigation of Information sharing, collaboration and Trust (ELICIT) ecosystem developed by the US DoD Command and Control Research Program (DoD CCRP) to explore the appropriateness of different approaches to command and control under a variety of circumstances, stresses and conditions. (20)
This method differs considerably from the method in this paper. This paper does not use simulated runs but instead uses 43 real operational cases set in authentic mission environments and using real scenarios and real operational frameworks. In short, this paper uses operational experience and historical operational performance when investigating the statistical significance of the C2 approach.
This paper does not use constructed or purposely designed scenarios in a controlled simulated environment. The data used for this paper is taken from actual operations with its associated records.
Forty-three cases are a smaller number of cases as opposed to 480 cases, but the applied mathematical statistical method selected for this paper takes the number of cases into consideration with appropriate validation test.
In addition to this SAS-143 featured five detailed case studies from recent actual operations. The method of case study for SAS-143 is the same as is used in this paper. However, the cases are presented with a summary and the findings only. It would be beyond the scope of this paper to feature a detailed study of each of the 43 cases.
It should be noted that the case studies presented so far in the literature of agility, including NATO STO-SAS-104 and NATO STO-SAS-143 have not been of a comparable nature with no uniformly defined common parameters and with a high risk of suffering from selecting bias. Thus, they are not suited, from a statistical point of view, to run a comparison statistical analysis.
This paper will use 43 case studies selected from a set of criteria that will ensure homogenous case selection. Each case will be studied in regard to if it was successful and if it employed the concept of C2 Agility. (21) It is important to note that this paper does not automatically assume that an appropriate C2 approach automatically guarantees success. It is also important to note that the case studies will be from the period 1940 to 1945.
The reason for selecting World War II (WWII) is that during the current Russo-Ukrainian war (initiated in February 2022), the question of C2 approach in a high-intensity warfare scenario against a near-peer opponent has again become highly relevant for the militaries of NATO.
Despite the different eras, high-intensity combat against near-peer adversaries today shares several fundamental similarities with the combat situations faced during WWII. Both contexts involve complex, multidimensional operations requiring integrated land, sea, air and electronic warfare, often in environments characterised by intense engagement and rapidly shifting situations. While some of these elements were also present in counterinsurgency operations such as Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, these types of operations had a several key components that differ considerably. As for NATO countries, the most recent prolonged (there are of course scenarios of shorter duration post-WWII) experience in high-intensity combat operations against a near-peer is WWII.
During WWII, campaigns featured extensive use of combined arms and joint operations including air, land and sea operations, airborne assaults, amphibious landings, irregular and Special Force operations all conducted jointly in a campaign integrated to achieve strategic and operational objectives. Most of these operational aspects were untried or in their infancy in 1940. The operations took place in an era of emergent technologies with the corresponding added complexity.
Similarly, modern near-peer conflicts, like the war in Ukraine involve synchronised operations across multiple domains: land, sea, air, cyberspace, Space and electromagnetic spectrum. With these new domains and new fighting technology being introduced, today’s operations are also in an era of emergent technologies with Drone warfare as a prime example.
The scale and complexity of coordinating such multi-domain operations remain comparable, demanding agile, flexible and adaptive command and control structures just like in 1940.
Technology has always been a decisive factor. WWII introduced strategic bombers, radar and radio communications on a large scale, transforming battlefield command and situational awareness. In today’s context, new technologies such as drones (UCAVs), hybrid warfare tactics, cyber operations and electronic warfare are challenging traditional doctrines. These innovations demand new operational concepts, just as radio, radar and air power did during WWII, forcing militaries to adapt rapidly to maintain technological superiority.
Radio communication played a crucial role in WWII for coordinating operations over vast distances. Today, the battlefield is even more dependent on secure, real-time digital communications, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum management. Both eras illustrate the importance of command-and-control infrastructure in high-intensity combat, with cyber and electronic warfare becoming the new front lines.
While technology and tactics have evolved, the core attributes of high-intensity warfare against a near-peer opponent with integrated multi-domain operations, complex coordination under threat and reliance on technological advantages remain fundamentally similar. Both WWII and modern conflicts demonstrate that adaptive, innovative thinking and robust command networks are vital for success in such challenging environments.
It is necessary to understand the key terminology by understanding what Agility is before we define what C2 Agility is.
Agility is the capability to successfully effect, cope with and/or exploit changes in circumstances. (22) While other factors will also influence outcomes, Agility enables entities to effectively and efficiently employ the resources they have on time. (23)
Successfully is defined as operating within acceptable bounds. This includes defining the significance of ‘out of bounds performance’ as a function of both magnitude (how far) and duration (how long).
Change in Circumstances, includes changes to the condition of the other entities and the environment and/or to the condition of oneself. These changes are not restricted to the physical domain, but also include changes to variables in the information, cognitive and social domains as well. Further, in this context, changes of circumstances include changes of mission, strategy, or objectives within them.
Effect implies being proactive and therefore able to bring about a change in circumstances in order to improve performance, effectiveness or efficiency.
Cope with implies dealing with one or more of the above changes in circumstances that, if not appropriately addressed, would adversely affect performance (effectiveness and efficiency). (24)
The aim is that increased C2 Agility contributes to mission success by enabling entities to adopt more appropriate approaches to C2 for the mission and to adjust their approaches as the mission and circumstances change. (25)
Having defined Agility, it is necessary to define C2 Agility, for while closely linked there are some differences. It is necessary to underline that C2 Agility definition is derived from Agility definition above.
C2 Agility is a function of C2 Approach Agility and C2 Manoeuvre Agility. (26)
C2 Approach Agility is about adopting the most suitable C2 approach regarding mission, resources, capabilities, mission environment and complexity in the endeavour space. It is where an entity/unit can operate successfully by employing a given C2 approach. (27) The multiple C2 approaches and the way they are defined are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 in the C2 approach space. No one approach will fit all missions and circumstances and the ability of an organisation to adopt the most appropriate C2 approach is a significant part of C2 Agility.
This figure shows the cases quantified by which case featured C2 Agility (at the coordinated, collaborated or edge approach) and which cases which did not feature C2 Agility. It also cross-references the cases in which were successful in achieving their objectives and which were unsuccessful.
Illustrates all cases in which Agility was observed divided by year.
The other significant part of C2 Agility is C2 Manoeuvre Agility. C2 Manoeuvre Agility is about having the capabilities to employ the most appropriate C2 approach in the face of changing circumstances. Manoeuvre Agility involves the following abilities.
Recognise and understand that a change in circumstances has occurred and that the current approach to C2 is no longer appropriate.
Identifying and understanding which C2 approach is now the most appropriate.
Transition to this approach, in a timely manner. (28)
Each case is assessed by two factors.
- a)
Was the organisation exposed to C2 Agility during the operation?
Exposure means that the organisation adopted an appropriate approach or was able to change to an appropriate approach to C2 as described in the concept of C2 Agility.
C2 Agility is quantifiable as confirmed, as it is defined as a capability. A capability is something an entity can have or not have. As previously explained, C2 Agility is about adopting the most appropriate C2 approach in relation to its mission/objective and associated requirements and being able to change C2 approach promptly. In the case studies, it is simple to quantify a change in C2 approach as it is evident in a changed chain of command, organisation, allocation of decision rights, sharing of information and level of cooperation between units. It is not based on an individual assessment of the effectiveness of the change, but just the fact that the C2 approach has changed. (29)
It is more difficult to assess if the chosen start C2 approach is appropriate or not for the case. The basic stand is that the organisation can exercise C2 functions over its entities/units or not. This can be simplified as a quantitative question of whether the commanders and their staff and HQ are able to exercise their influence and control over their units/entities or not during the operation.
If the answer is yes, it will be recorded with an A+.
If the organisation did not employ an appropriate approach, it will be recorded with an A−.
- b)
Was the operation a success according to the operational objectives?
Whether an operation was successful or not depends on the outcome of the operation’s closure compared with what was stated as operational objectives pre-mission along with other contemporary comments made of the desired objective of the operation. As such, we measure success as the level of performance displayed in each case with the required level of performance to make it quantifiable. By making, this comparison between required and achieved performance will give a measurement designed to reflect the successful accomplishment of the task or not. (30) To put it simply that success is the ability reach the pre-defined operational objectives or not.
Below are two detailed examples from two of the featured case studies.
The documentation is collected in most campaign accounts and studies published after the war. All relevant accounts are listed in the literature list at the end of the paper.
To give two examples:
The operational objective as stated by September 14th 1944 by Field-Marshal Montgomery’s directive was to secure crossings over the Rhine and Maas in the general area Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave by the use of Airborne troops and a rapid and violent thrust by Second Army: the army was then to establish itself in strength on a line between Zwollen and Arnhem, facing east with deep bridgeheads east of the Ijssel river. (31)
By the closure of the Market Garden operation on the 27th of September 1944, these objectives were not achieved in full. Only crossings over the Maas in the general area of Grave-Nijmegen had been achieved. Because of the outcome of the operation, it (and the corresponding case) is recorded as unsuccessful for the case studies.
Another example is Operation Plunder, the British Second Army crossing the river Rhine into Germany. This directive comes from 21st Army Group outlining the plan:
To cross the Rhine on a front of two armies between incl. Rheinberg and Rees, Ninth Army being on the right and Second Army being on the left.
To capture the communication centre of Wesel.
To expand the initial lodgment area on the east bank of the Rhine: (a) southwards for a sufficient distance to secure the road centre of Wesel from enemy ground action. (b) northwards to enable the river to be bridged at Emmerich and the road centre at that place to be used. (c) eastwards and north-east in order to secure rapidly a good and firm bridgehead from which further offensive operations can suitably be developed.
To position the three armies of the 21 Army Group east of the Rhine, and north of the Ruhr, so that further operations deeper into Germany can be developed quickly in any direction as may be ordered by Supreme H.Q. (32)
The action commenced on the 23rd of March 1945, and by the closure of Operation Plunder on the 27th of March 1945, all the objectives were achieved.
Because of this outcome of the operation, it (and the corresponding case) is recorded as successful for the case studies.
In short, if the operation achieved a successful mission outcome by achieving its stated objectives defined during the pre-operational planning phase. It is important to note that the capture of ground or the degrading of enemy combat units does not in itself constitute a successful outcome. The operation must achieve its mission objectives, and it must be of operational or strategic relevance.
If the operation achieved its stated objectives, it will be recorded as a success. If the operation did not achieve its main objectives, it will be recorded as a failure.
In essence, it is the success in achieving the defined operational objectives from a Joint HQ.
This paper will apply statistical analysis by using a 2 × 2 Chi Square Test (and Ficher’s Exact Test) to analyse quantitively on the case study findings. Each case is selected from a set of rigid criteria to ensure a comparable and unbiased data selection.
Admittedly the risk of mixing qualitative analysis with this method is present. Much care has been taken to define the criteria as quantitively as possible. The two major points of measure (Agility and success) has been detailed in the previously section on how these are approached as quantifiable as possible.
Referring to the records of the operations featured in the case studies, these can be confirmed or denied by this closed-ended question based on the historically reported capability. It does carry some of the same hazards as using surveys in quantitative studies. It runs the risk of misinterpretation of old records and actions, as well as inaccurate recall.
Biased response is also a risk may intentionally or unintentionally give inaccurate answers due to social desirability, embarrassment about a topic, or a desire to frame a certain narrative.
Different sources on the same operation are used to minimise this as much as possible, and the case selection criteria are set to minimise biased sampling.
A limitation on using the 2 × 2 chi-square is that it does not determine the strength or direction of the relationship. It does not measure effectiveness in any way and neither does it give any explanation on how to achieve Agility for the individual organisations. It is limited to determining if there is a relationship or not in the hypothesis.
The method of statistical probability will be used on a series of cases to answer the thesis question of this paper. Each case has to fulfil the same five criteria in order to make sure the cases are comparable and share the same conditions as much as possible to test the thesis in an environment that is as equivalent as possible.
As this paper uses 43 cases, there is no scope for a detailed or in-depth study of each individual case; instead, the paper uses a quantitative approach to achieve statistical results on a wide number of cases.
The case selection criteria are given below.
To use the method of statistical analysis, the cases must be of a homogeneous nature. All the cases must be selected from exactly the same criteria, and in order to reduce selection bias, all cases fulfilling the case requirements must be included in the study.
In order to achieve this, the following criteria for case selection have been defined.
Each case has been selected from the following criteria.
The case must be either British-led or have a significant British presence and influence in the Joint Headquarters.
The case must be dated between 1940 and 1945.
The case must feature three components from either land, sea and air forces or air, land and airborne forces.
In addition to the above, the land element must be of a battalion-sized force or larger.
The operation in the case must take place against organised resistance.
- 1.
The case must be either British-led or have a significant British presence and influence in the Joint Headquarters.
The operation featured in the case must be led by a senior British officer or have a significant British presence and influence on the planning and execution of the operation. Operations Overlord and Husky are both prime examples where representatives of the British armed forces had a significant influence in planning, organising and executing the operation in a joint headquarters.
Operations Avalanche and Shingle were operations that were more American-dominated, but both were ultimately supervised by a British theatre commander and provided substantially British units for the land, sea and air component.
For this paper, units from the British Commonwealth (33) are considered ‘British’ as they share the same organisation, doctrine and curriculum for training.
The reason for this restriction to British-centric operations is to have a uniformed basis in terms of organisation, culture, doctrine, training level and command/leadership style for comparison.
Naturally major changes took place within the British armed forces during the time period; however, the organisational culture, educational background, as well as staff working method remained comparable for the commanders, leading officers and the headquarters staff. This goes both for the purely led British operations and the joint operations with Americans and other partners. (34)
- 2.
The operation in the case must have been dated between 1940 and 1945
The timeframe is selected to include all active joint operations in the face of opposition during the Second World War. The timeframe has been selected to have all cases take place within a technological and cultural comparable period. The period was selected because of the high number of joint operations taking place by the British armed forces within a concentrated period of 5 years without a generation change (both age-related as well as years-in-service related).
- 3.
The operation must feature three components of land, sea and air forces or air, land and airborne forces.
The operation must feature three components, which can be either land, sea and air components or air, land and airborne forces. In the parlance of NATO, this type of operation is termed joint operations. (35) Joint is an adjective used to describe activities, operations, organisations in which elements of at least two services participate. This case study will focus on operations conducted by three service elements in a joint venture with a joint headquarters.
Between 1940 and 1945 these types of operations were often termed combined operations by the British armed forces and often included, but not exclusively, amphibious operations. This paper will use the term Joint Operations regarding tri-service operations with or without amphibious operations.
The terminology is not critical to the analysis or case selection. The presence of three services is critical to the selection, however.
Tri-service joint operations were at the infancy in 1940, and it was the first major conflict that used Joint operations on a larger tactical and operational scale. It was the most complex type of operations that could be conducted between 1940 and 1945 due to its inherited complexity by combining three different branches of services each with a distinct set of capabilities, organisations and experience.
This is also relevant for airborne operations. With no previous training, doctrine or field experience, these types of operations had to be learned while on active operations. The unique feature with airborne operations is that they feature a ground-based land component, an air component and airborne land component operating entirely separately in terms of command and control from the ground-based land component until a link-up could be established. In order to be successful, the operation had to create a synergy between these three components to fulfil the operational objective.
It is the development of these types of operations that is the prime interest of the case studies.
Note: the deep-penetration operations in Burma are not included in this case study as they operated, tactically and in some cases also operationally, separated from the ground-based land component. As such they are classified as bi-service operations and do not qualify for this criterion.
- 4.
In addition to the above, the land element must be of a battalion-sized force or larger.
The land component must be of battalion size or larger. There was a considerable number of smaller operations involving less than 100 troops in the land component and sometimes less than 10 troops. For the case studies to reach the desired level of complexity only larger joint operations with a battalion or larger in the land component will be studied because if a service element is too small it would not have a separate command it would become a bi-service or mono-service operation. With the land element to be of battalion size this would ensure all service elements would have their own command.
- 5.
The operation in the case must take place against organised resistance.
The operation must face organised resistance from a hostile force. The operation need not suffer heavy casualties but there must be organised resistance. This makes the complexity of the operation considerable higher because there is a disruptive force that can seriously test and sometimes break the chosen the command-and-control approach in the operation.
The key to assessing how well the organisation handled the disruptive forces is essential to establish if the chosen command and control approach was suited for the mission and task. Operations that took place unopposed will not be considered as the complexity will be as low as a standard military manoeuvre or exercise and the chosen command and control approach would not be sufficiently tested or stressed in order to assess its suitability for agile command and control.
In these cases, the opposition would be either German, Japanese, Italian or Vichy French.
Some operations did not receive an official codename before the action started, such as the defensive operation of Crete in 1941. Such actions have been included in the case studies as long as they fulfil the five criteria.
It is also highly relevant that these operations took place against one or more opponents that are in terms of technology, size and organisation on a comparable level as the conductors of the operations.
Also, all operations take place in a high-intensity conventional warfare scenario. (36)
The criteria have been chosen because this study will focus on the most complex cases in terms of command and control. The higher the level of complexity is, the higher stress there is on the chosen command and control approach and the higher the risk of failure in the operation. This study will look at the most complex cases in order to assess the optimal strength or weakness of the chosen C2 approach.
In military operations, there is an increased demand for a coordinated or collaborative command and control approach when several services are involved in the operation. In the period of 1940–1945, it was the joint operations with land, sea, air and airborne components that featured the most complex requirements for command and control because there had been very limited interservice training before 1940 and no coherent doctrine or practice existed prior to 1940. However, the most important operations could not be carried out without tri-service cooperation.
It was of necessity that the British armed forces and those of their allies learned and adapted while still in an operational environment. These are exactly the circumstances that require agility within command and control as per the theoretical concept of C2 Agility.
The need for the cases to feature organised resistance is also to ensure maximum complexity. Organised resistance would put the most severe stress on the chosen command and control approach and organisation as it is the most significant disrupting factor that would test the robustness and suitability of the chosen command and control approach. This could not be properly ascertained if there were no organised resistance.
There were other operations that did not involve all three services that also reach a very high level of disruption and complexity, but to ensure homogenous and consist of case selection this study has focused on the tri-service operations.
The period has been chosen for its high number of tri-service operations conducted within a compressed timeframe. Agility in command and control should be seen not only in the individual cases but also within the period of 1940–1945 as a whole. This is possible because this study is looking at the same parent organisation within the same generation that is based on the same level of the following parameters.
Doctrine
Education and training curriculum
Technology level
Organisational culture
It is within these parameters that the maturity and development of command and control can truly be studied on a qualitative scale. Something that is not possible with the framework for study was broader or more loosely defined.
43 cases met the criteria and are divided according to the figure below.
A confounder is a variable, which can influence the case conclusion, but which is not related to C2 approach. (37) It has been addressed as much as possible when setting the case selection criteria.
Selection bias is a systematic error caused by non-random sampling of cases. It may result in biased samples, which include publication bias. (38) Selection bias can seriously affect the type of cases selected for study, something which all collective case studies to this point in the C2 Agility literature is at high risk of suffering from. To reduce selection bias, all conflict cases included, were selected from a fixed time – period and of same composition (see the section of ‘case selection criteria’). The selection of C2 Agility exposure status was performed before the outcome was known.
Information bias is an error due to misclassification. (39) Hence, in order to reduce misclassification of C2 Agility exposure, case data for every conflict analysed were collected from published historical resources, detailed in the references. Data from these references were gathered by selection of cross-references for each case. None of the data was firsthand self-reported data. Outcome of conflicts (loose, win), were likewise gathered from the above resources. The quality of the data was relied upon by the authors and publishers.
The following section is not strictly related to the statistical analysis of the cases that use the 2 × 2 Chi Square. The section does offer a little more in-depth look at the trend that could be observed behind the cases when looking at them collectively. These observations are shared here.
Below are listed all cases that fulfil the case selection criteria. A+ means that agility was observed and A− means that Agility was not observed. S means operational success; objectives were achieved. F means operational
See Appendix A for more details on the individual cases.
While this paper will not offer a detailed study of each case, there are some points that are worth mentioning.
In 1940, there were two cases where Agility was not observed and were not successful. These were two joint operations in Norway and failure was not due to a lack of resources or technology but solely an inappropriate approach to C2. At Narvik, the C2 approach is changed during the operation to a more appropriate but it is not done in a timely manner. There was a failed naval evacuation as well.
The two cases where Agility was observed and which were successful were both Naval evacuations from France to the UK. Both operations featured a unified Naval command with Army and Air Force as subordinates. This was unlike in Norway, where the command structure was not unified with negative operational performance to follow.
| All cases | Year | A+/A− | S/F |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operation Sickle | 1940 | A− | F |
| Operation Rubert | 1940 | A− | S |
| Operation Dynamo | 1940 | A+ | S |
| Operation Cycle | 1940 | A− | S |
| Operation Aerial | 1940 | A+ | S |
| Operation Menace | 1941 | A− | F |
| Operation Abstention | 1941 | A− | F |
| Operations in Greece | 1941 | A− | F |
| Defense of Crete | 1941 | A+ | F |
| Operation Sabine | 1941 | A+ | S |
| Operation Exporter | 1941 | A+ | S |
| Litani River | 1941 | A+ | S |
| Operation Chronometer | 1941 | A+ | S |
| Operation Matador Malaya | 1941 | A− | F |
| Operation Archery | 1941 | A+ | S |
| Hong Kong | 1941 | A+ | F |
| Operation Chariot | 1942 | A+ | S |
| Operation Ironclad | 1942 | A+ | S |
| Operation Jubilee | 1942 | A− | F |
| Operation Agreement | 1942 | A− | F |
| Operations Stream, Line and Jane | 1942 | A+ | S |
| Operation Torch | 1942 | A− | S |
| Airborne Assault Beja | 1942 | A+ | S |
| Airborne Assault Oudna | 1942 | A− | F |
| Operation Husky | 1943 | A− | S |
| Operation Ladbroke | 1943 | A− | S |
| Operation Fustain | 1943 | A+ | F |
| Operation Slapstick | 1943 | A+ | F |
| Operation Avalanche | 1943 | A− | S |
| Operation Shingle | 1944 | A− | F |
| Operation Neptune | 1944 | A+ | S |
| Operations Tonga and Mallard | 1944 | A+ | S |
| Operation Rugby | 1944 | A− | S |
| Operation Market Garden | 1944 | A− | F |
| Operation Astonia | 1944 | A+ | F |
| Operation Manna | 1944 | A+ | S |
| Operation Switchback | 1944 | A+ | S |
| Operation Vitality | 1944 | A+ | S |
| Operation Infatuate | 1944 | A+ | S |
| Operation Romulus | 1945 | A+ | S |
| Operation Talon | 1945 | A+ | S |
| Operation Plunder | 1945 | A+ | S |
| Operation Varsity | 1945 | A+ | S |
Below is the list of cases in which Agility was not observed.
| A+ cases | Year | S/F |
|---|---|---|
| Operation Dynamo | 1940 | S |
| Operation Aerial | 1940 | S |
| Defence of Crete | 1941 | F |
| Operation Sabine | 1941 | S |
| Operation Exporter | 1941 | S |
| Litani River | 1941 | S |
| Operation Chronometer | 1941 | S |
| Operation Archery | 1941 | S |
| Hong Kong | 1941 | F |
| Operation Chariot | 1942 | S |
| Operation Ironclad | 1942 | S |
| Operations Stream, Line and Jane | 1942 | S |
| Airborne Assault Beja | 1942 | S |
| Operation Fustain | 1943 | F |
| Operation Slapstick | 1943 | F |
| Operation Neptune | 1944 | S |
| Operations Tonga and Mallard | 1944 | S |
| Operation Astonia | 1944 | F |
| Operation Manna | 1944 | S |
| Operation Switchback | 1944 | S |
| Operation Vitality | 1944 | S |
| Operation Infatuate | 1944 | S |
| Operation Romulus | 1945 | S |
| Operation Talon | 1945 | S |
| Operation Plunder | 1945 | S |
| Operation Varsity | 1945 | S |
And the following list all cases in which Agility was observed.
| A− Cases | Year | S/F |
|---|---|---|
| Operation Sickle | 1940 | F |
| Operation Rubert | 1940 | S |
| Operation Cycle | 1940 | S |
| Operation Menace | 1941 | F |
| Operation Abstention | 1941 | F |
| Operations in Greece | 1941 | F |
| Operation Matador Malaya | 1941 | F |
| Operation Jubilee | 1942 | F |
| Operation Agreement | 1942 | F |
| Operation Torch | 1942 | S |
| Airborne Assault Oudna | 1942 | F |
| Operation Husky | 1943 | S |
| Operation Ladbroke | 1943 | S |
| Operation Avalanche | 1943 | S |
| Operation Shingle | 1944 | F |
| Operation Rugby | 1944 | S |
| Operation Market Garden | 1944 | F |
In 1941, we see seven cases displaying Agility and four which do not. Of the seven cases displaying Agility there were a mix of raids (2), defence of isolated Islands (2 Crete and Hong Kong) and operations in the middle east (3). Despite a showing of Agility, all these cases were at the smaller end of the selection criteria, and this simplifies a lot of the practicalities of adopting an agile C2 approach as well as giving more room of freedom for the commanders and their staff. A prime example of this is the comparison between the defence of Singapore and Hong Kong. While both were failures, the defence of Hong Kong displayed a remarkable high level of Agility by changing the C2 approach as the situation dictated. The opposite happened in Singapore.
In 1942, there are mostly raids (5) and smaller-scale joint attacks (2) with Operation Torch as the one big operation. While successful, it was probably lucky that the opposition did not press the landing force harder, as there were a number of sub-optimal C2 arrangements that could have broken if under pressure.
The trend would continue into 1943, this time with larger and more ambitious joint operations, now featuring a multinational task force in the Mediterranean. This showed that the Allies were undergoing a steep learning curve at large-scale joint operations from Sicily to Salerno and beyond. The Allies were operating on a scale they had not tried before, and this put increased pressure on the C2 Approach, as was evident from the cases.
In 1944 and 1945, it is observed that the number of cases where Agility is displayed rises significantly, and so does the success rate in these operations, with seven cases displaying Agility in 1944 and four in 1945, opposite to three in 1944, which did not display Agility. This shows an increase in Agility displayed together with an increase in operational success in joint operations both in Europe and Asia.
The figure below shows the probability of the outcomes based on the case assessments. It gives a clear indication that by having the capability of Agility within C2 increases the organisation’s chances of successfully achieving their set operational objectives.
The Chi-square (χ2) statistic is a measure used in social science statistics to assess how well observed data fit an expected distribution (or behaviour) or to test for independence between categorical variables. It compares the observed frequencies in each category to the expected frequencies under a specific hypothesis.
In this paper, the Chi-square is used to test if the actual observed behavioural pattern matches an expected pattern and to examine whether two categorical variables are independent (test of independence).
The Chi-square method will statistically determine whether differences between observed and expected data are due to random chance or suggest a significant deviation.
It also provides a quantitative measure to support or refute hypotheses in categorical data analysis.
It is widely applicable because it requires only count data and does not assume the data are normally distributed.
The method is non-parametric. Does not require assumptions about the distribution of the data.
The statistical significance will be calculated with 95% certainty and 99% certainty to test the hypotheses. (40)
Still the 2 × 2 Chi-Square and Fisher’s Exact test are beneficial because it is a versatile, non-parametric methods for determining if there’s an association between two categorical variables with two levels each, and it is robust against non-normal data distributions.
The calculation is done using this online tool that calculates 2 × 2 Chi-square with raw data and it is available here Chi Square Calculator 2 × 2 (includes Yates correction) and used 17th of April 2025 and 8th of September 2025.
By entering the data from Figure 3 in the calculator (see link above) and setting the certainty to 95% (0.05 also known as the alpha level), the following result is obtained:
This figure illustrates all cases in which Agility was not observed divided by year.
The column percentage of the outcome. It shows that, based on the case findings, that when one achieves success in joint operations there is a 78.57% chance of achieving that success with an Agile approach to C2. Likewise, it shows that if one failed in joint operations, there was a 66.67% chance that one did not have an Agile approach to C2.
The chi-square statistic is 8.5554. The p-value is.003445. The result is statistically significant because p < 0.05. (41)
Translating the result into operational terms, the result is that with 95% certainty that adopting the most appropriate C2 approach and exercising agility within C2 is a statistically significant contributor to achieving operational objectives to a successful conclusion of a joint military operation.
This figure shows the cases quantified by which case featured C2 Agility (at the coordinated, collaborated or edge approach) and which cases which did not feature C2 Agility. It also cross-references the cases in which were successful in achieving their objectives and which were unsuccessful.
The Fisher’s exact test helps to determine whether there is a significant relationship between two categorical variables, especially when sample sizes are small. In this study it is used as an extra validation of the result.
Repeating this process with a 99% certainty (0.01 also known as the alpha level) and the following result is obtained.
The chi-square statistic is 8.5554. The p-value is .003445. The result is statistically significant because p < 0.01. (42)
Translating the result into operational terms, the result is that with 99% certainty that adopting the most appropriate C2 approach and exercising agility within C2 has a statistically significant contributor to achieve operational objectives to a successful conclusion of a joint military operation.
This paper conducted three different test to validate the mathematical results above. The conclusion from all three validation checks supports the result above. Please see Appendix A for further details.
Applying C2 Agility results in more success in operations, with a strong positive relation between C2 Agility exposure and success.
Fisher’s exact test is used to check and validate the results.
To determine if there was a significant association between C2 Agility exposure and Operational outcome, Fisher’s Exact Test for 2 × 2 tables was applied, instead of chi-square. This was chosen, since one observation was equal to 5 (note Yates’s correction for continuity was not applied, since the total sample size was >40 and none of the cells were <5). (43) Fisher’s exact test showed a two-tailed p-value of 0.007, which was significant at p < 0.050 and 0.010. Hence, the association between the two rows of C2 Agility and Operation was statistically significant.
Phi is a coefficient, specifically applied for measuring the relative strength of an association in 2 × 2 contingency tables. The phi coefficient was calculated to +0.50, indicating a strong positive association between C2 Agility exposure and success in operation.
This is another extra validation of the results that is used to check the outcome of the statistical analysis of the case studies.
Here, the relative risk (RR) index is used to compare the likelihood of Success in Operation in cases exposed to C2 Agility versus cases not exposed to C2 Agility. (44) Since this was a retrospective cohort study, data from the above 2 × 2 contingency table was best analysed using the RR and not the Odds Ratio. (45) The RR was calculated to 2.1728, with a 95% confidence interval (CI) of 1.6856–2.6600. Since the RR > 1, the risk, of the outcome of Success is increased by the exposure to C2 Agility.
It can be said with 99% certainty that having the capability of agility within C2 and the organisations’ ability to effectively employ C2 Agility is a statistically significant element to achieve success in joint military operations. There is a statistical significance link between having the capability of agility within C2 and operational success.
This conclusion is based on 43 historical case studies carefully selected from a set defined by criteria to ensure a homogenous and unbiased selection – which eliminated the case selection bias as much as possible which in turn allowed this statistical analysis to take place, which would not have been possible with the currently published case studies.
See Appendix A for further validation of the calculated result.
This study covers the significance at the macro level. At the individual case-level, the C2 approach must be tailored to each individual operation and organisation regardless of time and place, and this study does not give specifics, although the conceptual model of C2 Agility does give some general direction in Appendix B reproduced to reference.
Regardless of the individual cases, this study shows with statistical significance that by adopting the most appropriate C2 approach and to be able to change the C2 approach in a timely manner as per C2 Agility increases (but not guarantee) a successful outcome statistically significantly in joint tri-service military operations against organised resistance. As such, there can be real value in operationalising C2 Agility into current joint tri-service operations of today.
To end this paper, it can be confirmed that having the capability of agility within command and control provides a statistically significant contribution to success in joint military operations against a near-peer opposition.
NATO STO-TR-SAS-104. (2017). C2 Agility the Next Step.
Juhlin, J. A. The Agile Approach. In: International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium 8th of November 2017. This paper uses military operations in Northern Ireland and Afghanistan to conceptualize the effectiveness of Command and Control Agility in operational planning and execution.
Juhlin, J. A. (2016). Agility into Victory. Forsvarsakademiet Research Paper. This paper uses military operations from 1941–1945 to illustrated how the basic principals of Command and Control Agility has always been a deciding factor in strategic and operational planning of operations.
Mitchell, W. (2010). Agility and interoperability for 21st century command and control. The International C2 Journal, 4th November 2010.
Mitchell, W. Battlespace Agility 101: The Use of Target Network Modelling to Increase Shared Situational Awareness and Understanding. Royal Danish Defense College Publication House. This paper uses Command and Control Agility to assess operational performance in current military operations.
Statistical significance is a determination that a relationship between two or more variables is caused by something other than chance suggesting a real effect and relationship.
NATO STO-TR-SAS-085. (2013). “Command and Control Agility” Final Report on C2 Agility, O1-O-3.
NATO STO-TR-SAS-085. (2013). “Command and Control Agility” Final Report on C2 Agility, O1-O-3.
NATO STO-TR-SAS-104. (2017). C2 Agility the Next Step.
Juhlin, J. A. The Agile Approach. International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium 8th of November 2017. This paper uses military operations in Northern Ireland and Afghanistan to conceptualize the effectiveness of Command and Control Agility in operational planning and execution.
Juhlin, J. A. (2016). Agility into Victory. Forsvarsakademiet Research Paper. This paper uses military operations from 1941–1945 to illustrated how the basic principals of Command and Control Agility has always been a deciding factor in strategic and operational planning of operations.
Mitchell, W. (2010). Agility and interoperability for 21st century command and control. The International C2 Journal, 4th November, 2010.
Mitchell, W. Battlespace Agility 101: The Use of Target Network Modelling to Increase Shared Situational Awareness and Understanding. Royal Danish Defense College Publication House. This paper uses Command and Control Agility to assess operational performance in current military operations.
Johansson, B., Jiri, T., & Peter, B. (2016). A Case Study of C2 Agility in the 2014 Västmanland Forest Fire, Technical Report, FOI March 2016. This paper is using the Swedish forest fire in 2014 as case study.
Paul, Jr., W. P. (2016). Pakistan Earthquake 2005 and 2015 Case Comparison Study. MANIAC Consulting, March 2016. This paper uses the Pakistan Earthquake in 2005 and 2015 as case studies.
Earle, C. R. (2018). C2 agility for emergency management: Examining the Katrina and Sandy responses. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 15(4). 11 October, 2018. This paper uses the hurricanes Sandy and Katrina and the US response as basis for the case study.
Berggren, P., Johansson, B. J. E., & Trnka, J. (2015). Findings from a literature review on agility and C2 agility in relation to crisis response and emergency management. In: 12th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management (ISCRAM 2015).
Alberts, D. S. (2003). Power to the Edge, p. 126. In this section examples are given from WWII, Vietnam and The American War of Independence.
Alberts, D. S. (2011). The Agility Advantage, pp. 29–30.
NATO-STO SAS-143. Final Report. 8–1 – 8–2.
Referring to the definition of the key terms of Agility and C2 Agility, these are defined as capabilities. According to the Oxford Language dictionary, a capability is the power or ability to do something, which means that you can also not have the ability or power to do something. This paper will take the stand that in each case the organization either had the capabilities to be Agile in an effective manner or did not have the capabilities in an effective manner. This paper recognizes it can be seen as a simplification of Agility and the level of Agility or degree of Agility is not bought up here, but this approach either or approach is supported in the definition.
The definition is first given in Alberts, D. The Agility Advantage, p. 190. And appears again word for word in NATO SAS-085. Final Report. pp. 3–2.
NATO SAS-085. Final Report. p. 20.
NATO SAS-085. Final Report. p. 54.
NATO SAS-085. Final Report. pp. 20–21.
NATO STO-SAS-085. Final Report. pp. 4–6.
NCW to C2 Agility: The Evolution of Networked Enabled C2 Concepts and the Challenges Remaining, Dr. David S Alberts Institute for Defense Analyses prepared for UK MoD C2 Symposium 2015.
NATO STO-SAS-085. Final Report. pp. 4–5.
Alberts, D. The Agility Advantage, pp. 260–261, and p. 420.
Alberts, D. S. (2011). The Agility Advantage, pp. 273–274.
Victory in the West: The Defeat of Germany. The Arnhem Operation, Naval and Military Press, p. 29.
Victory in the West: The Defeat of Germany. The Crossing of the Rhine, Naval and Military Press, p. 285.
The relevant Commonwealth countries are India, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.
Martin S. (2019). Piercing the Fog of War – The Theory and Practice of Command in the British and German Armies, 1918–1940. Helion & Company Limited, pp. 68–73.
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Belgium. (2013). Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Planning Directive COPD. Joint is an adjective used to describe activities, operations, organisations in which elements of at least two services participate. 4 October, 2013.
Definition is refered in the Oxford Reference. Available at https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095636560;jsessionid=718AC2D5C5E27EA7FA47767D4FBB17CA?rskey=bbqjD0&result=16 [retrieved 24 August, 2023.
Shelly, A. C., Detton, J. R., & Brodt, E. (2012). Confounding: The importance of considering confounding. Science in Spine, 3, pp. 9–12. Issuet.
Tripepi, G., Jager, K. J., Dekker, F. W., & Zoccali, C. (2010). Selection bias and information bias in clinical research. Nephron Clinical Practice, 115, pp. C94–C99.
Tripepi, G., Jager, K. J., Dekker, F. W., & Zoccali, C. (2010). Selection bias and information bias in clinical research. Nephron Clinical Practice, 115, pp. C94–C99. (same as above with focus on information bias)
Healey, J. F. (2010). Statics: A Tool for Social Research, 9th edn. Wadsworth Cengage Learning, pp. 272–274.
Healey, J. F. (2010). Statics: A Tool for Social Research, 9th edn. Wadsworth Cengage Learning, pp. 275–277 + Appendix C.
Healey, J. F. (2010). Statics: A Tool for Social Research, 9th edn. Wadsworth Cengage Learning. – Appendix C.
(2013). Fishers exact test: Analyzing 2x2 contingency tables: Which test is best? Clinical and Experimental Pharmacology and Physiology, 40, pp. 177–180.
Andrade, C. (2015). Relative risk: Understanding relative risk, odds ratio, and related terms. As simple as it can get. The Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 76(7), pp. e857–e861.
Sirhin, R. M. Phi Coefficient: Statistics for the Social Sciences, 3rd edn, pp. 365–367.