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Scenario-Level Scoring Justification Matrix (Architecture-Level Assessment)
| Attack Scenario | Architecture | AS | AC | LM | Architectural Justification |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sensor Spoofing | Traditional IoT | 8 | 7 | 8 | Broad internal reachability following initial access corresponds to the 6-8 AS anchor band defined in Section 5; primarily static device authentication with implicit post-entry trust corresponds to the 6-8 AC anchor band; weak internal containment and multi-component exposure correspond to the 6-8 LM anchor band. |
| Zero-Trust IoT | 3 | 2 | 3 | Logical segmentation limiting cross-layer exposure corresponds to the 3-5 AS anchor band; continuous device identity verification and least-privilege enforcement correspond to the 0-2 AC anchor band; restricted traversal enforced by repeated authorization checks corresponds to the 0-2 LM anchor band. | |
| Edge Node Compromise | Traditional IoT | 9 | 8 | 8 | Elevated privilege potential combined with weak segmentation corresponds to the 9-10 AS anchor band; coarse-grained access control and static authentication correspond to the 6-8 AC anchor band; limited containment once compromise occurs corresponds to the 6-8 LM anchor band. |
| Zero-Trust IoT | 4 | 3 | 4 | Controlled segmentation boundaries and policy-enforced isolation correspond to the 3-5 AS anchor band; context-aware authorization corresponds to the 3-5 AC anchor band; limited cross-segment propagation under enforced policies corresponds to the 3-5 LM anchor band. | |
| Insider Attack | Traditional IoT | 7 | 7 | 8 | Implicit internal trust relationships correspond to the 6-8 AS anchor band; primarily static authentication with broad internal privileges corresponds to the 6-8 AC anchor band; extensive internal traversal capability corresponds to the 6-8 LM anchor band. |
| Zero-Trust IoT | 3 | 2 | 3 | Segmentation that restricts domain-level exposure corresponds to the 3-5 AS anchor band; continuous verification of user and device identity corresponds to the 0-2 AC anchor band; constrained lateral movement enforced through micro-segmentation corresponds to the 0-2 LM anchor band. | |
| Lateral Movement | Traditional IoT | 9 | 8 | 9 | Flat or weakly segmented topology corresponds to the 9-10 AS anchor band; static trust after entry corresponds to the 6-8 AC anchor band; unrestricted internal propagation pathways correspond to the 9-10 LM anchor band. |
| Zero-Trust IoT | 2 | 2 | 2 | Micro-segmentation restricting reachable components corresponds to the 0-2 AS anchor band; continuous authentication and least-privilege enforcement correspond to the 0-2 AC anchor band; repeated authorization checks that prevent cross-domain traversal correspond to the 0-2 LM anchor band. | |
| Data Injection | Traditional IoT | 8 | 7 | 8 | Limited validation controls and broad system connectivity correspond to the 6-8 AS anchor band; primarily static access enforcement corresponds to the 6-8 AC anchor band; weak containment once malicious data is introduced corresponds to the 6-8 LM anchor band. |
| Zero-Trust IoT | 3 | 3 | 3 | Segmented communication pathways correspond to the 3-5 AS anchor band; identity-bound communication policies correspond to the 3-5 AC anchor band; restricted cross-segment propagation corresponds to the 3-5 LM anchor band. | |
| Unauthorized Device Access | Traditional IoT | 9 | 8 | 9 | Weak device identity validation and broad internal exposure correspond to the 9-10 AS anchor band; static authentication mechanisms correspond to the 6-8 AC anchor band; extensive internal traversal capability corresponds to the 9-10 LM anchor band. |
| Zero-Trust IoT | 2 | 2 | 2 | Strong device identity enforcement limiting reachable components corresponds to the 0-2 AS anchor band; continuous authentication and strict least-privilege access correspond to the 0-2 AC anchor band; segmentation-enforced traversal constraints correspond to the 0-2 LM anchor band. |
Alternative Weighting Verification (AS=0_4, AC=0_3, LM=0_3)
| Attack Scenario | Traditional IoT | Zero-Trust IoT | Comparative Ordering |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sensor Spoofing | 7.9 | 2.8 | Unchanged |
| Edge Node Compromise | 8.7 | 3.7 | Unchanged |
| Insider Attack | 7.3 | 2.8 | Unchanged |
| Lateral Movement | 8.9 | 2.0 | Unchanged |
| Data Injection | 7.9 | 3.0 | Unchanged |
| Unauthorized Device Access | 8.9 | 2.0 | Unchanged |
Architectural Attack Surface Comparison Between Traditional and Zero-Trust IoT Models
| Architecture | Exposed Nodes* | Authentication Model | Lateral Movement Possible | Estimated Recovery Interval (hrs)** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Traditional IoT | 120 | Static / Perimeter-Based | Yes | 10-15 |
| Zero-Trust IoT | 45 | Continuous / Identity-Based | No (restricted by segmentation) | 2-5 |
Security Risk Evaluation Across Defence IoT Attack Scenarios
| Attack Scenario | Traditional IoT Risk Score | Zero-Trust IoT Risk Score | Risk Reduction (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sensor Spoofing | 8 | 3 | 62.50 |
| Edge Node Compromise | 9 | 4 | 55.56 |
| Insider Attack | 7 | 3 | 57.14 |
| Lateral Movement | 9 | 2 | 77.78 |
| Data Injection | 8 | 3 | 62.50 |
| Unauthorized Device Access | 9 | 2 | 77.78 |