Polarized trust and democratic decline. Rethinking resilience in the V4 countries

Democratic backsliding has become a major concern, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, where institutions are under constant pressure. Visegrad countries – Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia – offer a compelling case for studying this unfortunate trend. On one hand, these countries share common historical and geopolitical backgrounds, as well as similarities in their integration within the European Union, but on the other hand, major differences are shown in their democratic developments. Hungary and Poland, for example, are declining in democratic rankings on various indexes, characterized by weakened judicial independence, restrictions on media freedom, and erosion of the rule of law. Contrary to them, Czechia and Slovakia maintained relatively robust democratic institutions.

In recent years, these countries faced some dramatic events that showed the challenges they face. In Hungary, for instance, the consolidation of power resulted in controversial constitutional and media reforms that have drawn domestic and international criticism. Poland, meanwhile, has been overwhelmed by debates over judicial reforms, with mass protests reflecting social divisions over the erosion of legal checks and balances. In Czechia, a series of political scandals periodically destabilized public confidence, revealing vulnerabilities in institutional transparency despite a generally robust democratic framework. Slovakia was shocked by the murder of investigative journalist Ján Kuciak, a tragedy that not only catalyzed widespread outcry and political protests but also forced anti-corruption measures. These events show that while the Visegrad countries share similar historical and geopolitical foundations, their responses to democratic challenges are as heterogeneous as the specific crises they encounter.

Research and international indexes demonstrate these democratic differences within the Visegrad countries. Freedom House’s Nations in Transit reports have consistently documented Hungary’s and Poland’s democratic backsliding, downgrading both from consolidated democracies to semi-consolidated at best due to weakened judicial independence, media restrictions, and executive overreach. The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) also shows a decline in their democratic quality, ranking Hungary as one of the most autocratizing countries in Europe. In contrast, Czechia and Slovakia maintain higher democratic scores in both V-Dem and the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, supported by a relatively independent judiciary, strong civil society, and more plural media.

These democratic differences have implications for political trust. High levels of trust in political institutions are generally seen as foundational to stability, fostering citizen engagement, strengthening social cohesion, and reducing support for authoritarian alternatives (Norris 2011; Putnam, Leonardi, Nonetti 1993). Within this framework, political trust is believed to enhance institutional legitimacy, which, in turn, lowers the risks of polarization and political volatility, thus providing a stable foundation for democratic governance. The Central and Eastern European context of postsocialist transitions has been widely discussed, Mishler, Rose (2001), for example, argue that political trust in these countries remains fragile, shaped by both institutional performance and the lingering legacies of authoritarian rule. Comparative studies, notably by Klingemann, Fuchs, Zielonka (2006), reveal how democratic consolidation in the region has been characterized by persistent volatility in trust toward institutions, often driven by corruption scandals, governance failures, or external pressures.

Even though political trust is widely considered a foundation of democracy, this article suggests that focusing on country-level averages may oversimplify the relationship between political trust and democratic stability by overlooking the effects of polarized trust – major differences in trust levels between government supporters and opposition voters. In highly polarized societies, political trust often becomes a partisan issue, undermining the legitimacy and accountability of the entire political system. This asymmetry of trust can hinder the quality of democracies that political trust is originally expected to support.

This article hypothesizes that a balanced distribution of trust across partisan groups – even at a lower level – may be more conducive to democratic stability than a higher average that is heavily polarized along partisan lines. By examining the trust gap between government and opposition voters, this article aims to reveal the role of balanced trust in sustaining democratic resilience, empirically testing the dynamics of trust polarization as a potential driver of democratic erosion. Although prior research broadly demonstrated the positive effects of political trust on democratic stability, less attention has been given to the consequences of partisan trust asymmetries in polarized environments. How is the polarization of political trust associated with democratic erosion?

By focusing on polarized trust as a factor shaping democratic quality, this article hopes to start a discourse that questions the universal benefits of political trust. It suggests that fostering institutional transparency, accountability, and fairness to reduce trust polarization may be more effective in strengthening democratic resilience than efforts aimed only at increasing overall trust levels. This reframing may encourage scholars and policymakers to re-evaluate assumptions about the relationship between trust and democracy, revealing the potential for balanced trust as a stabilizing force in politically polarized societies. By doing so, the article not only broadens theoretical understandings of democratic resilience but also advises for a strategic shift in democracy-support efforts, particularly within polarized countries.

For decades, researchers have focused on political trust and democratic quality, with many studies arguing that trust in political institutions is essential for a well-functioning democracy. In their influential work, The Civic Culture, Almond, Verba (1963) were among the first to demonstrate that political trust and civic engagement are integral for sustaining democracy. They argued that political systems are more resilient when citizens trust their institutions, as this trust fosters a civic culture that promotes stability and discourages authoritarian alternatives. Their research showed that democratic values and behaviors are most likely to emerge and flourish when citizens feel connected to and confident in their political institutions – a finding that has shaped much of the subsequent literature on political trust.

Building on this approach, Putnam, Leonardi, Nonetti’s Making Democracy Work (1993) further argued that political trust is essential for cultivating social capital – the networks, norms, and trust that bind society together and facilitate cooperation among citizens. Through a comparative analysis of Italian regions, they demonstrated that areas with higher levels of social capital tended to have more effective and resilient democratic governance. Their findings suggest that political trust not only strengthens interpersonal connections but also reinforces a shared commitment to democratic norms, fostering an environment in which democratic institutions are better equipped to withstand both internal and external pressures.

Further advancing this idea, Rothstein, Stolle (2008) considered political trust as a mechanism for fostering compliance and social cohesion within democratic systems. They argued that trust in institutions strengthens democracy by encouraging citizens to adhere to democratic norms and legal frameworks. Their findings suggest that when institutions are perceived as fair and trustworthy, citizens are more likely to accept institutional authority, fostering social cohesion and reducing the risk of conflicts that could destabilize democratic structures. Thus, their research indicates that political trust contributes to democratic stability not only by promoting civic engagement but also by upholding democratic norms, even in times of political tension.

A more recent study by Norris (2011) expanded on the positive effects of political trust, highlighting its crucial role in stabilizing democracies on a broader scale. Norris found that when citizens trust political institutions, they are more likely to engage in democratic processes, comply with laws, and reject authoritarian alternatives. This trust strengthens the legitimacy of democratic governments, allowing institutions to implement policies that are perceived as credible and fair. The legitimacy rooted in political trust serves as a stabilizing force, as trustful citizens are less likely to pursue undemocratic paths or support extremist leaders. His study reinforced the prevailing consensus that high levels of political trust are essential for democratic stability, acting as a safeguard against political volatility and social fragmentation.

Table 1 summarizes relevant studies on the positive relationship between political trust and democracies. From foundational research by Levi, Stoker (2000) to more recent studies by Esaiasson et al. (2021), this collection demonstrates the broad scientific consensus on the role and the positive effects of political trust in sustaining democratic governance and resilience from case studies to international and even intercontinental comparative studies.

While the positive relationship between political trust and democracy is widely recognized, it is equally important to consider the challenges posed by distrust. Table 2 shifts the focus to the negative consequences of declining political trust, illustrating how distrust can erode stability, weaken institutions, and fuel democratic erosion.

While prevailing studies argue that political trust fosters democratic stability by strengthening social cohesion, institutional legitimacy, and civic participation, such approaches generally assume that this trust is evenly distributed across the political spectrum, or simply do not consider the relevance of its polarization. Foundational perspectives of Putnam, Leonardi, Nonetti (1993) and Norris (2011), for example, argue for the role of trust in democratic resilience but largely overlook how trust distribution along partisan lines might complicate this stabilizing effect. In highly polarized societies, however, trust frequently aligns with partisan affiliation, creating what this study terms polarized trust – where one group maintains high political trust, while the other expresses deep skepticism.

This article argues that a polarized distribution of political trust – where trust divides sharply along partisan lines – can disrupt democratic norms in ways that existing theories have not fully addressed and accounted for. Prior studies often emphasize the overall or average levels of political trust, assuming that high trust is inherently good for democracies. However, by overlooking partisan divides, these perspectives may overestimate political trust’s benefits. Contrary to that, this article proposes that polarized trust can actively contribute to democratic backsliding by weakening cross-partisan accountability, undermining checks and balances, and reducing the capacity of political opposition. From this perspective, political trust does not uniformly stabilize democracy, rather, it requires a balanced distribution across groups to prevent the repression of one group at the expense of democratic quality. Thus, the concept of polarized trust extends foundational theories, introducing an overlooked dimension that may explain cases where political trust destabilizes rather than strengthens democratic governance.

This article specifically suggests that high levels of political trust may not inherently benefit democratic stability if they are skewed toward one partisan group. When trust is heavily concentrated at either end of the political spectrum, it can facilitate power consolidation, limit the opposition’s effectiveness, and erode essential checks and balances, all of which are critical to democratic functioning. By accounting for the distribution of political trust, this research provides a framework for rethinking strategies to support democracy. This reframing challenges the conventional assumption that high political trust alone ensures democratic resilience, instead, it suggests that addressing partisan trust imbalances may be crucial for fostering stable democratic systems. Creating a political environment where all voters, regardless of affiliation, maintain moderate and constructive trust in institutions mitigates the risks of polarization and democratic erosion.

While this article emphasizes the importance of balanced political trust for democratic stability, trust itself is shaped by broader social, political, and institutional contexts, including affective polarization, elite manipulation, and media fragmentation (Hetherington, Rudolph 2015; Levitsky, Ziblatt 2018). As these forces deepen partisan loyalty, institutional trust becomes increasingly polarized, reflecting not only governmental performance but also identity-driven affiliations and media narratives (Iyengar, Westwood 2015; Jamieson, Cappella 2008). Understanding democratic resilience, therefore, requires examining how polarization, elite-driven narratives, and media influence public attitudes toward democratic institutions. This section focuses on how these dynamics contribute to democratic backsliding by transforming political trust from a stabilizing force into a divisive one (cf. McCoy, Somer 2019).

Affective polarization deepens the emotional and social divide between partisan groups, fueling negative perceptions and distrust toward the opposing side. This process is well-documented, as research shows that increased partisanship leads individuals to view opposing political groups not just as competitors but as fundamentally different social entities (Iyengar, Westwood 2015; Mason 2018a, 2018b). In highly polarized societies, political affiliations often become core aspects of personal identity, fostering an environment where political opponents are perceived as socially and morally antagonistic (Huddy, Mason, Aarøe 2015; Iyengar et al. 2019). This identity-driven loyalty shapes political trust, making individuals more likely to see institutions as biased, unreliable, or even illegitimate (Hetherington, Rudolph 2015). Consequently, affective polarization entrenches partisan divisions in trust, transforming political trust into a reflection of identity-based loyalty rather than an objective evaluation of institutional performance.

When elite manipulation and media fragmentation are added to this context, polarization intensifies further. Political elites play an important role by constructing narratives that deepen partisan loyalty and delegitimize the opposition, often portraying them even as threats while framing the government as a defender of national or cultural values (Albertson, Gadarian 2015). This framing strategy strengthens trust among loyal supporters of the ruling party while increasing distrust among opposition supporters. Media fragmentation makes this effect worse, as individuals may consume news from partisan sources that reinforce preexisting beliefs, creating echo chambers that closely align trust with group identity (Jamieson, Cappella 2008). With fewer opportunities to get balanced information, voters develop more intense negative perceptions of the opposition, polarizing trust and isolating partisan perspectives further (Sunstein 2018). The combined influence of elite manipulation and fragmented media landscapes thus drives affective polarization, embedding polarized trust even more deeply within the social fabric.

This process is a serious threat to democratic accountability – when polarization is high, partisan loyalty often becomes more important than democratic norms, and institutional checks and balances are easily viewed as opposition tools designed to weaken legitimate power (Graham, Svolik 2020). This perception allows ruling parties to justify actions that may erode democratic accountability under the banner of defending their values and electoral mandate (Levitsky, Ziblatt 2018). Meanwhile, opposition supporters, feeling increasingly alienated, disengage further as they perceive institutions as biased and unrepresentative (Croke et al. 2016). The resulting feedback loop of polarization creates ideal conditions for democratic backsliding, as institutions struggle to maintain the legitimacy that democracy requires for stable governance (McCoy, Somer 2019; Norris 2017).

Building on the polarization framework, this article reinterprets democratic resilience from the perspective of balanced trust, viewing it as a potential countermeasure to democratic backsliding. Rather than holding high average trust as the ideal indicator of democratic quality, this framework suggests that a balanced level of trust – moderate and evenly distributed across partisan groups – is more conducive to democratic stability than a high average level that is polarized along partisan lines. Balanced trust, even if low, can protect democratic stability more effectively than polarized trust, which often increases divisions between government supporters and opposition groups. Such an equilibrium helps prevent the erosion of accountability and safeguards against the concentration of power within any one faction.

The top-left quadrant of the matrix, where both government and opposition voters have low levels of trust, might seem alarming, yet it can, counterintuitively, be beneficial for democratic stability. Many assume that declining trust in political institutions leads to civic disengagement and undermines the legitimacy required for effective governance. However, when distrust is evenly distributed across partisan lines, it fosters a form of balanced skepticism that strengthens accountability and responsiveness. For example, Norris (1999) argues that citizens who do not have blind trust are more vigilant and demand greater accountability from their leaders. More specifically, Ouattara, Van der Meer (2023) find that low and declining trust bolsters support for direct democratic decision-making and does not increase authoritarian tendencies. These findings challenge the conventional view that political distrust leads to alienation and systemic instability. Therefore, rather than posing a threat, balanced skepticism may serve as a stabilizing force that reinforces democratic resilience, even in the presence of relatively low trust levels.

In this scenario, the absence of democratic satisfaction encourages both sides to demand transparency, continuously pressuring political leaders to meet public expectations. This caution effectively subjects democratic institutions to rigorous scrutiny, reinforcing their resilience over time. Rather than reflecting blind faith in the system, this dynamic fosters a constructive level of critique that supports institutional integrity and democratic performance. Broad-based skepticism can promote accountability and drive institutional reforms without deepening social divides. Conversely, when both government and opposition voters have high levels of trust, stability manifests differently. High, balanced trust cultivates a democratic environment in which institutions are widely perceived as impartial and legitimate. This shared confidence facilitates the functioning of democratic processes, as institutions maintain credibility across political divides, providing a resilient foundation against democratic erosion.

However, imbalanced trust levels threaten democratic resilience. When trust aligns strongly with the ruling group’s interests, institutions may appear to favor the government, marginalizing opposition voices and reducing accountability. Such asymmetry allows governing parties to consolidate power with minimal oversight, while skepticism among opposition supporters undermines institutional legitimacy and social cohesion, potentially fostering authoritarian tendencies and deepening social divisions. In rare cases where opposition supporters maintain high political trust while government supporters do not, institutions risk becoming disconnected from a significant portion of the population. This misalignment complicates governance, as distrust among government supporters may lead to withdrawal from democratic processes or fuel a populist backlash, further weakening democratic structures. Ultimately, high trust becomes ineffective – or even dangerous – if concentrated within a single political group.

While the typology presented in Table 3 offers a useful framework, it should be acknowledged that many political systems – particularly those in well-established democracies – do not always fit neatly into predefined categories. In practice, voters from all around the political spectrum may have a moderate level of trust, a middle ground that does not fully align with either high or low trust benchmarks. In such cases, democratic dynamics tend to be more fluid, with political trust changing in ways that defy strict categorization. This suggests that Table 3 is best seen as a heuristic tool rather than a definitive model, emphasizing the crucial role of trust polarization in democratic erosion.

The dominant view in the literature argues that democratic backsliding leads to social and political polarization by undermining trust and deepening partisan divides (Bermeo 2016; Levitsky, Ziblatt 2018). However, this article offers an alternative causal framework, reframing polarization as a driver rather than a consequence of democratic backsliding. Trust asymmetries may erode consensus-building and the resilience of democratic systems, increasing their vulnerability to autocratization (cf. Graham, Svolik 2020). This article argues that preexisting polarization destabilizes institutions, highlighting the need to address its root causes to reinforce democratic resilience. Table 4 illustrates the established scholarly consensus on how democratic erosion leads to polarization.

This article challenges the prevailing argument that democratic backsliding generates polarization, instead proposing a reversed causality in which polarization catalyzes democratic erosion. By reframing polarization as a driver of autocratization, the analytical focus shifts to how preexisting divides in political trust and partisan alignment weaken institutional stability and hinder consensus-building. The next section applies this theoretical approach to the democratic trajectories of the Visegrad countries. Examining how polarization and trust dynamics have interacted with democratic quality in these cases provides empirical evidence to better understand the proposed causality.

This section focuses on democratic developments in the Visegrad Group countries – Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia – addressing factors that shape political trust and contribute to polarization. These countries emerged from the collapse of the Soviet bloc with similar aspirations for democracy, yet, their current realities differ significantly, as in recent years, these Central and Eastern European countries experienced major changes in their democratic trajectories. Using the V-DEM LDI alongside the average levels of political trust, while also introducing contextual factors, this section reveals the trends of political trust, polarization, and democratic quality in the twenty-first century (Figures 1 and 2).

Figure 1

LDI of the V4 countries.

Figure 2

Political Trust of the V4 countries.

Since the early 2010s, Hungary’s democracy, under Viktor Orbán’s leadership, eroded gradually. The country is often portrayed and marked by the consolidation of power, restrictions on media freedom, and the weakening of judicial independence. This trend reflects broader changes in illiberal democracies, where elected leaders leverage democratic legitimacy to justify actions that ultimately undermine basic democratic principles (Zakaria 1997). Bozóki, Hegedűs (2018) argue that Orbán’s government has systematically dismantled checks and balances, concentrating power within the executive branch and eroding the independence of major democratic institutions. This transformation includes extensive constitutional and legal changes, such as electoral reforms and increased political control over the judiciary and media (Kornai 2015). These shifts kept the opposition from power and opportunities while strengthening the influence of Orbán’s ruling Fidesz party. Scholars suggest that these actions represent a deliberate reconfiguration of Hungary’s political landscape, steering it toward a more authoritarian model while preserving the appearance of a functioning democracy (Ágh 2016).

One of the most pronounced consequences of these changes is the intensified political polarization. Studies, such as Enyedi (2016), show the development of deep polarization where opposing groups view each other with distrust. Government supporters often see these changes as steps toward greater national sovereignty and stability, perceiving Orbán’s policies as protective measures against external pressures, especially those from the European Union, promoting liberal values that conflict with Hungarian identity and interests (Körösényi 2018; Lendvai-Bainton, Szelewa 2021). Conversely, opposition voters see these changes as direct threats to democratic values, expressing concern over the erosion of civil liberties and the rule of law. This polarization is reinforced by Hungary’s reshaped media landscape, where pro-government acquisitions significantly reduced independent journalism, deepened echo chambers, and limited access to balanced information (Bajomi-Lázár 2017; Bátorfy, Urbán 2020). As a result, each side increasingly consumes separate narratives about the government’s actions and intentions, further widening divisions and limiting shared understanding.

Hungary’s experience demonstrates how the erosion of democratic norms – through systematic attacks on media freedom, judicial independence, and institutional checks and balances – can strengthen polarization and the asymmetries of political trust. Interestingly, despite the democratic backsliding, there is no clear relationship between political trust and the V-DEM LDI. As Hungary’s democratic quality declines, political trust has paradoxically shown a weak but upward trend, suggesting a complex, perhaps counterintuitive relationship between average levels of trust and the level of democratic integrity, or simply a strong disparity of trust between government and opposition supporters (Figure 3).

Figure 3

LDI and Political Trust in Hungary.

Since the Law and Justice Party (PiS) assumed power in 2015, Poland’s democratic backsliding is following a path similar to Hungary’s in weakening institutional independence and democratic checks. Under PiS leadership, judicial reforms significantly compromised independence, expanding executive influence over the judiciary by reshaping the National Council of the Judiciary and politicizing judicial appointments (Koncewicz 2018). These reforms, combined with restrictions on media freedom and tighter controls on civil society, eroded Poland’s rule of law and democratic quality, drawing sharp criticism from international organizations, including the European Union, which launched Article 7 proceedings against Poland for breaching EU values (see Pech, Scheppele 2017).

Research already revealed the effect of the erosion on political polarization in Poland. Wojciech (2019) describes how PiS’s judicial and media reforms contributed to partisan divides, fostering a sense of discontent among opposition supporters who feel excluded from institutional representation and increasingly distrustful of the government’s intentions. On the contrary, trust remains relatively high among PiS supporters, who see these measures as essential for strengthening national sovereignty against perceived liberal and foreign interference (Jezierska 2018). This polarization of trust is shown by Fomina (2017), whose research states that PiS supporters and opponents increasingly get confined to separate information spheres. Government-aligned media amplified PiS narratives, limiting exposure to critical perspectives and reinforcing pro-government sentiment within its base. This media alignment further intensifies polarization and mutual distrust (Bayer, Bárd 2020).

This polarization is self-reinforcing – as trust among opposition supporters declines, they perceive institutions as fundamentally biased, while PiS supporters view opposition parties and independent media as threats to Poland’s stability (Markowski 2020). Poland’s case thus illustrates how government-led democratic backsliding can deepen social divides by transforming political and media systems to serve partisan ends. The Polish experience supports the broader argument that declining democratic quality – especially when driven by deliberate government actions to consolidate power – comes with political polarization, strengthening partisan distrust and reducing the potential for democratic restoration.

Poland’s case reflects a puzzling dynamic between democratic quality and political trust similar to Hungary. Despite the erosion of democratic standards, such as reduced judicial independence and constraints on civil liberties, there is no clear correlation between political trust and the LDI. As the democracy index declines, political trust has shown an unexpected resilience, even rising in some instances. Much like in Hungary, there is no straightforward alignment between these two trends – democratic quality diminishes, yet average levels of political trust appear largely unaffected (Figure 4).

Figure 4

LDI and Political Trust in Poland.

In contrast to Hungary and Poland, Czechia and Slovakia maintained relatively stable democratic practices in recent years, resulting in a lower degree of political polarization. Although Czechia faces challenges, such as political corruption and populist influences – particularly during the administration of former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš – the country showed resilience in its democratic practices. Compared to Hungary and Poland, Czechia upheld strong democratic institutions, including an independent judiciary, free media, and a fair electoral process, which together contribute to a healthier political climate (Krastev 2016). Hanley, Vachudova (2018) emphasize that this adherence to democratic norms played a key role in keeping higher levels of political trust among citizens, thereby reducing tendencies toward extreme polarization. While Babiš and other leaders used populist rhetoric, their influence has not resulted in the extensive democratic backsliding seen in neighboring countries.

Research by Linek (2016) suggests that Czechia’s political stability and low polarization levels are due in part to its tradition of coalition governance and political diversity, which temper the dominance of any single party or ideology. This pluralistic political structure ensures that a wider range of voices are represented in governance, supporting inclusive discourse and reducing polarization (Balík et al. 2017). Additionally, the independence of Czech public institutions and a media landscape that remains more pluralistic than those in Poland or Hungary have contributed to maintaining a less polarized environment (Roberts 2014). This media independence and institutional integrity allow opposition voices to retain legitimacy, promoting balanced political discourse and limiting confrontational politics.

The Czech case supports the argument that pluralistic governance, media independence, and institutional integrity can help mitigate polarization while sustaining democratic resilience. In line with this stability, both political trust and the LDI in Czechia have remained relatively steady, with minimal variance. Unlike the contrasting trends in Hungary and Poland, Czechia’s democratic resilience and consistent institutional integrity fostered a stable level of political trust and democratic quality (Figure 5).

Figure 5

LDI and Political Trust in Czechia.

Slovakia experienced major cases of political instability, corruption, and populism, yet it has generally managed to preserve a resilient democratic system. While populist leaders occasionally emerged, their influence has not led to significant erosion of democratic institutions, which remain relatively robust compared to those in Hungary and Poland. Buštíková, Guasti (2019) show that Slovakia’s political landscape remained pluralistic, maintaining institutional checks, and even when they faced challenges, they have proven adaptable under pressure.

The country experienced a major political crisis following the 2018 murder of investigative journalist Ján Kuciak, but it upheld democratic continuity through strong public mobilization, independent journalism, and transparent elections (Mesežnikov, Gyárfášová 2018). This crisis sparked widespread protests against corruption, ultimately leading to political change demonstrating the resilience of democratic norms even in the face of significant threats. Research indicates that this capacity for democratic mobilization fostered higher political trust and lower polarization compared to countries experiencing democratic backsliding, such as Hungary and Poland (Novakova 2020).

The Slovak experience illustrates that, even in contexts where corruption and populism are present, strong democratic institutions can counterbalance these forces and reduce polarization. The resilience of Slovakia’s democratic structures promotes political cohesion and a balanced political landscape, making extreme polarization less likely to take root. Similarly, to Czechia, both political trust levels and the LDI show little variance over recent years in Slovakia. This aligns more closely with Czechia than with the more volatile patterns observed in Hungary and Poland (Figure 6).

Figure 6

LDI and Political Trust in Slovakia.

This article suggests that while political trust is generally considered a stabilizing force in democratic governance, the effects of trust distribution – especially when polarized along partisan lines – complicate this relationship. The cases of Hungary, Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia collectively illustrate that political trust does not necessarily correlate strongly with democratic quality, fluctuations in one do not always bring out a direct response in the other. In Hungary and Poland, political trust has shown resilience or even an upward trend despite significant democratic backsliding, while in Czechia and Slovakia, both political trust and democratic indicators have remained relatively stable. These patterns suggest a complex, often non-linear relationship between political trust and democracy, where political trust levels may be independent of shifts in democratic quality. This dynamic complicates traditional assumptions about trust as a straightforward support mechanism for democracy, emphasizing the need for a more refined analysis of how trust distribution affects democratic resilience.

In contexts where trust is high among one group but low among the other, trust may not function as a universal stabilizer and instead act as a driver of democratic backsliding. This article therefore questions the traditional assumption that higher levels of political trust inherently strengthen democracies, proposing instead that balanced trust across partisan groups may be more critical for sustaining democratic resilience. Based on this framework, the article seeks to answer the research question: How does the polarization of political trust drive democratic erosion? This question focuses on whether partisan divides in trust levels are associated with indicators of democratic backsliding. The methodology outlined in the following section is designed to examine these dynamics by analyzing the relationship between trust distribution and democratic quality across the Visegrad countries. Through a combination of survey data, democratic quality indicators, and case-specific analysis, this article aims to empirically test whether trust asymmetry influences democratic backsliding in these politically diverse contexts.

This study combines a longitudinal comparative and a descriptive cross-national design focused on the Visegrad countries, aiming to reveal patterns in trust polarization and democratic quality over time and across cases, rather than to establish causal inference. The Visegrad countries were selected due to their shared postsocialist legacy, geographical proximity, and democratic challenges, allowing for comparison within a regionally bounded set of, in many aspects, similar cases. The analysis relies on two data sources, the V-Dem project and the ESS, focusing on the 2002–2023 period due to data limitations, as the ESS, despite providing a robust and valuable dataset, only became available with its first round conducted in 2002.

The analysis is based on three key variables: (1) the LDI, (2) political trust, and (3) the Trust Gap. The LDI, developed by the V-Dem project, combines two main dimensions of democracy, electoral democracy and liberal principles. The index evaluates, among other factors, the conduct of free and fair elections, universal suffrage, constraints on government authority, the protection of individual rights, the rule of law, and the independence of the judiciary. A value between 0 and 1 is assigned to each country, where 0 indicates the complete absence of liberal democracy and 1 represents its full realization.

Data on political trust are sourced from the ESS, which includes trust measures for key institutions such as parliament, the judiciary, politicians, and political parties, asking how much the respondent personally trusts each of them one by one on a 10-item Likert scale. For this analysis, political trust refers to the means of trust in the parliament, the politicians, the political parties, and the legal system. The selected variables are key national institutions that are generally designed to function independently from specific political actors, helping mitigate the direct influence of partisan bias. Unlike trust in the government, which fluctuates significantly depending on the ruling party, these institutions are expected to maintain continuity and stability regardless of electoral outcomes. By focusing on these broader institutions rather than individual political actors, this measure of political trust captures a more structural and long-term perspective, rather than short-term political sentiment. Political trust is calculated based on the following equation: Political Trust = ( Trust parliament + Trust politicians + Trust parties + Trust legal system ) / 4 . \text{Political}\hspace{.5em}\text{Trust}=({\text{Trust}}_{\text{parliament}}+{\text{Trust}}_{\text{politicians}}+{\text{Trust}}_{\text{parties}}+{\text{Trust}}_{\text{legal}\text{system}})/4.

The Trust Gap serves as a numeric indicator of political trust polarization, reflecting the degree to which political trust varies across partisan groups. This index provides a standardized measure of polarization, enabling cross-national comparisons as well as temporal analyses within each country. To quantify political trust polarization, the Trust Gap captures the difference in political trust between government supporters and opposition voters. Government supporters are defined as individuals who voted for the governing party – or one of the governing parties, in the case of a coalition government – in the most recent national parliamentary election at the time of the survey. Conversely, opposition supporters are those who voted for any other party not part of the actual government, while non-voters and those who did not answer were excluded from the analysis. The ESS explicitly asks respondents whether they participated in the last national parliamentary election and, if so, which party they voted for, allowing for the calculation of the mean political trust scores for both government and opposition voters. The Trust Gap is the absolute difference between the two groups, calculated using the following equation: Trust Gap i , t = ∣ Political Trust Gov , i , t − Political Trust Opp , i , t ∣ . \text{Trust}\hspace{.5em}{\text{Gap}}_{i,t}=| \text{Political}\hspace{.5em}{\text{Trust}}_{\text{Gov},i,t}-\text{Political}\hspace{.5em}{\text{Trust}}_{\text{Opp},i,t}| .

The Trust Gap _i,t shows the polarization for a specific country _i and year _t combination. Political Trust_Gov,i,t is the average political trust among government supporters, while Political Trust_Opp,i,t is the average political trust among opposition voters. Using the absolute value of the differences ensures that the gap is non-negative.

A key limitation of this study is its reliance on visual pattern identification in country-level data – through bar charts and scatter plots – rather than on inferential statistical methods such as correlation coefficients or regression analyses. Even though a correlation analysis is included for reference, these methods were intentionally excluded due to the small number of cases, which would render such calculations statistically unreliable. Given the exploratory aims and small-N nature of the dataset, visual and descriptive methods were employed as a pragmatic alternative. While causality cannot be definitively established, data visualization allows for the identification of non-linear dynamics and potential threshold effects that would require further analysis. As a result, the findings remain largely descriptive and exploratory, and establishing causal relationships or ruling out alternative explanations remains a challenge.

The limited scope of the dataset also constrains the generalizability of the findings, as the study focuses on a small set of countries rather than a broader sample that could offer more robust empirical findings. This exploratory approach was a necessary starting point given current data constraints, but future research should aim to expand the number of cases and apply more rigorous quantitative methods. Such developments would support a more comprehensive analysis of the relationship between political trust, its polarization, and democratic resilience – ultimately strengthening the conclusions of this study.

Finally, while the Trust Gap offers a useful proxy for political trust polarization, it relies on self-reported trust evaluation, which may be influenced by recall bias, social desirability, or short-term political influences. Additionally, the use of a composite average for political trust assumes equal weight across institutions, which may obscure differences in how citizens evaluate various branches of government. These limitations are partially mitigated by the consistent measurement framework of the ESS and the theoretical rationale for focusing on structural institutions as the foundation for measuring political trust.

5.1

Country-level trends of key variables

Previous sections of this article revealed the complex relationship between political trust and democratic quality in the V4 countries. Rather than showing a straightforward association, average levels of political trust appeared resilient or even increased in Hungary and Poland despite democratic backsliding, while both political trust and democratic indicators remained relatively stable in Czechia and Slovakia. These patterns suggest that the polarization of political trust – measured as the Trust Gap – may serve as a more accurate indicator of democratic resilience than country-level average trust. To test this assumption, this section focuses on the relationship of three key variables in each country of the analysis: (1) the LDI, (2) political trust, and (3) the Trust Gap.

One limitation of this analysis is the lack of political trust data for Poland and Czechia after 2020, as the 11th round of the ESS (2023) did not include these countries at the time of writing. While this data gap constrains the ability to analyze more recent trends, the findings remain relevant for understanding the broader relationship between political trust and democratic quality. Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic likely had significant effects on political trust, as previous research suggests that crises can both strengthen trust in government through a rally-around-the-flag effect or develop distrust due to governance failures and restrictions on civil liberties (cf. Falcone et al. 2020; Kestilä-Kekkonen, Koivula, Tiihonen 2022; Aassve et al. 2024). Given the complexity of these effects, a thorough examination of the pandemic’s impact on trust falls outside the scope of this study.

Line charts visualize the trends by plotting the three key variables for each country over the same period (Figure 7). To better understand the dynamics behind democratic erosion, the main question is whether the Trust Gap and the country-level average of political trust relate differently to the LDI. By examining whether increases in the Trust Gap coincide with decreases in the LDI – or vice versa – the figure indicates a possible relationship between trust polarization and democratic decline.

Figure 7

Country-level trends of key variables.

Figure 7 reveals different trends between Slovakia and Czechia on one side, and Hungary and Poland on the other. In Slovakia and Czechia, both the LDI and the Trust Gap remain relatively stable over time, showing minimal variation. This stability suggests democratic resilience, where both the quality of democracy and the distribution of political trust remain steady, with no clear relationship between the two variables. In these cases, the lack of major changes in either LDI or the Trust Gap implies that a balanced distribution of trust may contribute to stability, regardless of fluctuations in democratic quality.

In Hungary and Poland, however, the figure reveals a contrasting trend. In these countries, the LDI and the Trust Gap show a clear negative relationship: as the LDI declines – indicating democratic backsliding – the Trust Gap widens, reflecting growing polarization in political trust between government supporters and opposition voters. This pattern suggests that as democratic quality weakens, trust polarization intensifies, consolidating high levels of trust among government supporters while deepening distrust among opposition voters.

While this analysis does not aim to establish causality, the timing of changes should be considered to understand whether rising trust polarization tends to precede or follow declines in democratic quality. A particularly interesting finding in Hungary and Poland is the sequence of these changes, where the rise in the Trust Gap precedes declines in the LDI. This suggests that an initial increase in trust polarization may contribute to subsequent democratic erosion. One possible explanation is that trust polarization weakens institutional legitimacy by making democratic institutions appear biased and partisan (Levitsky, Ziblatt 2018), while opposition voters become disengaged from formal democratic processes, reducing institutional accountability (Norris 2017). At the same time, ruling parties can exploit this growing divide to justify executive overreach, arguing that democratic institutions are already discredited and in need of reform (Lührmann, Lindberg 2019). The short time lag observed in Figure 7 between rising polarization and democratic decline is consistent with this mechanism, suggesting that when trust in democratic institutions is already fractured, public resistance to institutional weakening may be less effective.

This pattern challenges the assumption that polarization is simply a consequence of democratic erosion, instead, trust polarization may act as an early driver of democratic backsliding. As institutional credibility declines, opposition groups become less likely to view democratic norms – such as judicial independence or electoral oversight – as legitimate, making it easier for incumbents to consolidate power (Bermeo 2016). This dynamic creates a feedback loop in which trust polarization and democratic decline reinforce one another, accelerating the erosion of liberal democratic norms. Rather than treating trust polarization as a byproduct of autocratization, these findings suggest it plays an important role in undermining democracy by reshaping public perceptions of legitimacy and weakening constraints on executive power.

5.2

Polarized trust and democratic quality

For a better understanding of the association between democratic quality and political trust, a correlation analysis was conducted for reference, using SPSS software, between the LDI scores and the country-level averages of political trust, as well as between the LDI scores and the trust gaps (Table 5). While the correlations are statistically significant and reveal strong patterns, the relatively small sample size (N = 38) warrants caution. The findings should be viewed as indicative rather than conclusive, and further research with larger samples or alternative methods is needed to confirm these relationships.

Table 5

	Country-level average of trust	Trust gap
LDI	−0.539**	–0.856**

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).

Source: Author’s calculation.

Results from Table 5 reveal a major difference in the strength of associations. The Pearson correlation between the LDI and the Trust Gap is strong and negative (r = –0.856, p < 0.001), indicating that as the polarization of political trust between government and opposition voters increases, democratic quality tends to decline significantly. In contrast, the correlation between the LDI and country-level average political trust is more moderate, though still statistically significant (r = –0.539, p < 0.001). This suggests that democratic backsliding is more closely associated with the distribution of trust across political groups than with the overall level of political trust.

As a visual alternative, two scatter plots were created to further explore the association of key variables (Figures 8 and 9). Each dot in these plots represents a specific country-year combination (e.g., Hungary in 2004 or Slovakia in 2020), enabling a visual comparison of how different levels of trust polarization relate to LDI scores across the Visegrad countries. The first scatter plot examines the relationship between country-level averages of political trust and the LDI (Figure 8). Consistent with previous findings, it shows no strong relationship with democratic quality. Despite fluctuations in LDI, the variance in average political trust remains relatively constant, displaying no systematic pattern. This also demonstrates the limitations of average levels of political trust as an indicator of democratic quality, suggesting that it alone does not adequately capture the dynamics of democratic erosion.

Figure 8

LDI and country-level average of political trust.

Figure 9

LDI and trust gap.

In contrast to the first scatter plot, the second one shows a clear relationship between the Trust Gap and scores on the LDI (Figure 9). Lower levels of democratic quality are associated with greater trust polarization and a wider gap between government supporters and opposition voters. This pattern suggests that as the LDI declines – indicating democratic backsliding – the Trust Gap becomes more pronounced. The relationship supports the idea that trust polarization, rather than average trust levels, serves as a more reliable indicator of democratic erosion.

These scatter plots illustrate the conclusion that the distribution of political trust – particularly its polarization along partisan lines – plays an important role in the quality of democracy. Unlike country-level averages of political trust, which show moderate to no correlation with democratic quality, the Trust Gap demonstrates a strong relationship with democratic resilience. This suggests that increasing trust polarization is a reliable indicator of democratic backsliding. The data show that once a country’s LDI score falls below 0.7 on the X-axis, the Trust Gap tends to widen on the Y-axis as the LDI continues to decline.

Based on the scatter plot, a potential threshold in the Trust Gap can be identified, beyond which democratic quality begins to deteriorate rapidly. Specifically, the data suggest that when the Trust Gap reaches or exceeds a value of 1 on a scale of 10, democratic quality declines. However, when the Trust Gap remains below this threshold, democracies appear to remain stable, even in the face of minor fluctuations. This finding implies that a specific level of polarization may function as a tipping point, triggering or accelerating democratic erosion. Although a one-point gap may seem small at first, it represents the average difference in political trust between government supporters and opposition voters. In the context of political trust, even modest differences can reflect substantial polarization, given that trust is a sensitive indicator of citizens’ perceptions of institutional legitimacy and overall accountability.

When the Trust Gap remains below the threshold, the distribution of political trust is relatively balanced, with both government supporters and opposition voters displaying comparable levels of confidence or skepticism toward democratic institutions. This equilibrium seems to reinforce democratic stability, as it likely reflects a political environment where institutions are perceived as legitimate across partisan lines, maintaining checks and balances that mitigate the risk of concentrated power. Once the Trust Gap surpasses this threshold, the dynamics can shift dramatically, as polarization becomes deeply concerning – government supporters show significantly higher institutional trust, while opposition voters display profound distrust. This divide suggests that institutions are increasingly perceived as partisan, prompting opposition groups to view democratic mechanisms as biased or compromised. As a result, institutional credibility and accountability erode, fostering an environment where ruling parties can consolidate power with minimal resistance from institutional checks or public consensus.

The findings of this article challenge conventional assumptions about political trust and democratic quality, suggesting that the relationship is more complex than previously thought. While most of the literature, from foundational studies by Levi, Stoker (2000) to more recent works by Esaiasson et al. (2021), frame trust as inherently positive – arguing that higher trust in political institutions supports democratic quality and resilience – data suggest that the benefits of political trust depend more on its distribution rather than its average level. In the cases of Czechia and Slovakia, for example, a moderate but balanced level of trust across government and opposition supporters appears to strengthen democratic quality, while the polarized trust in Hungary and Poland – where trust is heavily skewed toward the government supporters – may actively contribute to democratic erosion, even when the average level is roughly the same. These results suggest that, contrary to the conventional assumption that higher average trust is beneficial by nature, the balance of trust is key, thus extending previous works that have largely overlooked this partisan dimension.

A particularly important result is that the rise in the Trust Gap precedes declines in the LDI. This order of events suggests that increased trust polarization may actively contribute to democratic erosion, with rising levels of polarization potentially serving as an early indicator of democratic decline. This challenges the conventional assumptions that democratic backsliding first erodes institutional integrity, which then leads to social polarization (cf. Bermeo 2016; Levitsky, Ziblatt 2018; Pappas 2019). Instead, the findings indicate that trust polarization itself may act as a driver of democratic erosion. As the trust gap widens, democratic norms like checks and balances lose credibility among opposition groups, allowing ruling parties to consolidate power with lower resistance.

Another relevant finding of this article is the identification of a critical threshold in the polarization of political trust, beyond which democratic erosion gains momentum. This threshold reflects a tipping point – when the gap in political trust between government supporters and opposition groups reaches a specific level, democratic stability begins to break down rapidly. The existence of this threshold suggests that polarized trust leads not only to wider political divisions but also to systemic dysfunction, where institutions lose their capacity to mediate conflict or foster consensus. If a specific threshold marks a critical point beyond which democratic decline accelerates, then monitoring the Trust Gap could function as an early warning system for democratic erosion. Policymakers and scholars could use this metric to identify democracies at risk of backsliding before major declines occur, enabling timely interventions to reduce polarization in political trust.

Declining democracies and polarizing societies, however, are by no means limited to Central and Eastern Europe. We are witnessing a rising skepticism toward institutions globally, with trust increasingly fractured along partisan lines. This trend undermines the foundations of democracy, affecting everything from the ability to agree on basic facts to the capacity for constructive debates. Understanding the V4 countries, therefore, can reveal the broader dynamics that threaten democratic resilience in various contexts. Rather than focusing only on average levels of political trust, it becomes essential to consider trust polarization and the underlying reasons for these divides. This perspective provides a more comprehensive understanding of democratic quality and serves as an early warning system for identifying potential crises before they fully materialize.

While understanding the problem is important, the bigger question remains: How can the trust gap be bridged, and whose responsibility is it? Reducing the gap – ensuring that institutions are perceived as trustworthy across the political spectrum – requires a system that is fair, transparent, and accountable to all, regardless of political affiliation. Institutional reforms play a major role in this process, including strengthening judicial independence, fostering media pluralism, and ensuring free and fair elections. However, structural reforms alone are not enough. Political leaders also have responsibilities in bridging this gap. Divisive rhetoric that demonizes and delegitimizes opponents deepens distrust and fuels polarization. Rebuilding trust, therefore, is not only a matter of institutional change, it also depends on everyday actions and decisions that demonstrate a genuine commitment to fairness and democratic principles.

However, the responsibility to bridge the trust gap extends beyond governments, leaders, and institutions – it must be a collective social effort driven by the willingness of all citizens. The ways we interact with one another, consume and share information, and engage in political discussions all play a role in either strengthening or undermining trust. In an era of misinformation and partisan media, individuals have a responsibility to critically evaluate sources, seek diverse perspectives, and engage respectfully with those holding opposing views. By promoting critical thinking and encouraging dialogue, societies can build a more inclusive civic culture where trust is built not only institutionally but also interpersonally, transcending political divides.

Democracy thrives on active engagement, a willingness to listen, a commitment to fairness, and a shared duty to hold leaders accountable. For policymakers, this means prioritizing reforms that balance trust across the entire political spectrum rather than increasing average trust levels skewed heavily toward one group. For citizens, it means active and responsible participation in democratic processes, reinforcing the idea that a better future is built together. These combined efforts create an environment where trust is recognized as a shared responsibility, forming the cornerstone of democracies. The V4 experience suggests that the key to democratic resilience lies not in broadly raising trust levels, but in fostering an environment where trust is distributed evenly across society.

Author states no funding involved.

The author confirms the sole responsibility for the conception of the study, presented results and manuscript preparation.

Author states no conflict of interest.