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Reviewing “Interlocking Directorates”: Clarifying the construct to understand the effect discrepancies across interlock studies Cover

Reviewing “Interlocking Directorates”: Clarifying the construct to understand the effect discrepancies across interlock studies

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|Oct 2026
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References

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.21307/connections-2026-0002 | Journal eISSN: 2816-4245 (formerly 0226-1766) | Journal ISSN: 0226-1766
Language: English
Page range: 39 - 68
Submitted on: Jan 18, 2026
Accepted on: Aug 7, 2026
Published on: Oct 5, 2026
Published by: International Network for Social Network Analysis (INSNA)
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 1 issue per year

© 2026 Majsa Stina Grosen, published by International Network for Social Network Analysis (INSNA)
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