Table 1
Results from the latent profile analysis models.
| NO. OF TRAJECTORIES | TECH 14 BLRTCHI 2 (DF) | BIC | SABIC | VLMR | LMR | ENTROPY | AVERAGE CLASS PROBABILITY | POSTERIOR PROBABILITY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | – | 1065780.153 | 1065460.375 | – | – | – | – | – |
| 2 | –53243.293*** | 93390.443 | 93339.597 | –53243.293*** | 13005.923*** | 0.831 | [0.96; 0.93] | [0.32; 0.68] |
| 3 | –46621.968*** | 90038.021 | 89968.108 | –46621.968*** | 3346.452*** | 0.800 | [0.93; 0.88] | [0.12; 0.50] |
| 4 | –44918.286*** | 88314.538 | 88225.558 | –44918.286*** | 1746.632*** | 0.768 | [0.91; 0.79] | [0.13; 0.43] |
| 5 | –44029.075*** | 87134.036 | 87025.989 | –44029.075* | 1213.357* | 0.773 | [0.91; 0.79] | [0.03; 0.38] |
| 6 | –43411.354*** | 86317.452 | 86190.338 | –43411.354 | 855.945 | 0.779 | [0.90; 0.78] | [0.03; 0.36] |
| 7 | –42975.591*** | 85743.624 | 85597.443 | –42975.591 | 617.529 | 0.795 | [0.92; 0.78] | [0.02; 0.34] |
[i] NOTE: *p < 0.005; ***p < 0.0001.
Figure 1
Final 4-profile solution. Grand mean centred values are plotted. Distributive justice is measured by effort-reward imbalance (ERI).
Table 2
Mean values for organisational justice dimensions for the different profiles (n = 9,478).
| MIN-MAX | OVERALL MEANS | PROFILE 1 ‘AVERAGE JUSTICE’ | PROFILE 2 ‘LOW PROCESS-FOCUSSED JUSTICE’ | PROFILE 3 ‘HIGH JUSTICE’ | PROFILE 4 ‘LOW JUSTICE’ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| n = 2769 | n = 1477 | n = 4040 | n = 1192 | |||
| MEAN | MEAN | MEAN | MEAN | MEAN | ||
| Overall justice | 1–7 | 5.25 | 5.06 | 4.57 | 6.15 | 3.56 |
| Procedural justice | 1–5 | 3.16 | 2.99 | 2.54 | 3.89 | 1.96 |
| Distributive justice | 0.25 –4 | 1.07 | 1.10 | 1.14 | 0.86 | 1.61 |
| Interpersonal justice | 1–4 | 3.07 | 2.62 | 3.40 | 3.58 | 1.92 |
| Informational justice | 1–4 | 3.33 | 2.95 | 3.61 | 3.75 | 2.38 |
[i] NOTE: Distributive justice was measured by effort-reward imbalance. Bonferroni adjusted comparisons (p < .05) showed significant differences between all justice dimensions over all profiles. Standard deviations are constant across classes due to equality constraints in the model: Overall justice = 0.80, procedural justice = 0.67, distributive justice = 0.35, interpersonal justice = 0.46, informational justice = 0.39.
Table 3
Demographic variables and work and health outcomes across profiles. Results (except for the Total) are based on the BCH procedure.
| TOTAL | PROFILE 1 ‘AVERAGE JUS.’ | PROFILE 2 ‘LOW PROCESS-FOCUSSED JUS.’ | PROFILE 3 ‘HIGH JUS.’ | PROFILE 4 ‘LOW JUS.’ | p | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N = 2769 | N = 1477 | N = 4040 | N = 1192 | |||
| % (n) | % (n) | % (n) | % (n) | % (n) | ||
| Women | 59.31 (5621) | 0.54 (1543) | 0.68 (973) | 0.58 (2370) | 0.62 (735) | 2>4>3>1 |
| > upper secondary education | 57.64 (5459) | 0.56 (1566) | 0.56 (838) | 0.60 (2416) | 0.53 (639) | 3>1,4 |
| Low SES | 38.09 (3500) | 0.40 (1074) | 0.42 (585) | 0.33 (1308) | 0.47 (533) | 4>2 |
| Part-time work | 22.00 (1894) | 0.21(543) | 0.26 (330) | 0.20 (768) | 0.24 (253) | 2>3,1 4>3 |
| Shift work | 15.65 (1460) | 0.15 (439) | 0.24 (315) | 0.10 (428) | 0.25 (278) | 4,2>1>3 |
| Private employer | 47.00 (4244) | 0.52 (1314) | 0.30 (491) | 0.51 (1936) | 0.44 (503) | 1,3>4>2 |
| MEAN (SE) | MEAN (SE) | MEAN (SE) | MEAN (SE) | MEAN (SE) | ||
| Age (mean, s.e.) | 52.22 (0.95) | 51.81 (0.22) | 52.49 (0.32) | 52.27 (0.16) | 52.59 (0.27) | 1<4 |
| Job satisfaction 2018 | 5.98 (0.02) | 5.69 (0.03) | 5.79 (0.05) | 6.80 (0.02) | 4.16 (0.05) | 4<1, 2<3 |
| Job satisfaction 2020 | 6.21 (0.02) | 5.98 (0.04) | 5.94 (0.06) | 6.74 (0.02) | 5.28 (0.07) | 4<1, 2<3 |
| Intentions to leave 2018 | 1.91 (0.01) | 2.06 (0.03) | 2.05 (0.04) | 1.34 (0.02) | 3.24 (0.05) | 3<1, 2<4 |
| Intentions to leave 2020 | 1.74 (0.01) | 1.88 (0.03) | 1.86 (0.05) | 1.43 (0.02) | 2.31 (0.06) | 3<1, 2<4 |
| General health 2018 | 3.96 (0.01) | 3.89 (0.02) | 3.85 (0.03) | 4.16 (0.01) | 3.59 (0.03) | 4<1, 2<3 |
| General health 2020 | 4.02 (0.01) | 3.96 (0.02) | 3.92 (0.03) | 4.17 (0.02) | 3.77 (0.03) | 4<1, 2<3 |
[i] NOTE: p < .05. Mean, s.e.; means are unadjusted (i.e., not controlling for baseline levels). See text for model-adjusted comparisons.
Appendix-Table A1
Results from confirmatory factor analyses comparing the factorial structure of organisational justice measures.
| CHI-SQ, DF | CFI | RMSEA | SMRM | ΔMODEL | Δχ2 (p) | Δ df | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Model 1 | 59820.621, 405 | 0.623 | 0.124 | 0.091 | |||
| Model 2 | 15152.651, 397 | 0.906 | 0.063 | 0.048 | 44668 | <0.00001 | 8 |
| Model 3 | 13533.882, 393 | 0.917 | 0.059 | 0.046 | 1619 | <0.00001 | 4 |
| Model 4 | 16361.319, 398 | 0.899 | 0.065 | 0.067 | 2827 | <0.00001 | 5 |
[i] NOTE: Model 1: all items load on one common factor, Model 2: overall justice, procedural justice, interactional justice, effort-reward imbalance (with the two factors effort and reward), all factors correlate freely; Model 3: as Model 2 separating interactional justice into interpersonal justice and informational justice; Model 4: factors as in Model 3, all factors load on one common factor g.
Appendix-Table A2
Correlations between the different justice measures. Means and standard deviations presented in diagonals (n = 9,478).
| RANGE | 1. | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. | 6. | 7. | 8. | 9. | 10. | 11. | 12. | 13. | 14. | 15. | 16. | 17. | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Overall justice | 1–7 | 5.25 ± 1.20 | |||||||||||||||||
| 2. Procedural justice | 1–6 | 0.66 | 3.16 ± 0.96 | ||||||||||||||||
| 3. Distributive injustice (ERI) | 0.25–3.99 | –0.50 | –0.42 | 1.07 ± 0.42 | |||||||||||||||
| 4. Interpersonal justice | 1–4 | 0.50 | 0.45 | –0.44 | 3.07 ± 0.75 | ||||||||||||||
| 5. Informational justice | 1–4 | 0.47 | 0.47 | –0.37 | 0.71 | 3.32 ± 0.63 | |||||||||||||
| 6. Sex (female) | 0 vs1 | –0.06 | –0.03 | 0.11 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.59 ± 0.49 | ||||||||||||
| 7. Age | 24–79 | –0.05 | 0.02 | –0.04 | –0.03 | 0.07 | –0.03 | 52.22 ± 9.22 | |||||||||||
| 8. Education | 0 vs1 | 0.08 | 0.00n.s. | –0.00n.s. | 0.05 | –0.01n.s. | 0.12 | –0.17 | 0.58 ± 0.49 | ||||||||||
| 9. Low SES | 0 vs 1 | –0.13 | –0.06 | 0.01n.s. | –0.09 | –0.02n.s. | –0.05 | 0.11 | –0.61 | 0.38 ± 0.48 | |||||||||
| 10. Part-time work | 0 vs1 | –0.02n.s. | –0.03 | –0.00n.s. | –0.01 | 0.01n.s. | 0.24 | 0.06 | 0.00n.s. | 0.06 | 0.22 ± 0.41 | ||||||||
| 11. Shift work | 0 vs1 | –0.15 | –0.12 | 0.08 | –0.10 | –0.02n.s. | 0.04 | 0.02n.s. | –0.20 | 0.32 | 0.13 | 0.16 ± 0.36 | |||||||
| 12. Private employer | 0 vs1 | 0.11 | 0.09 | –0.08 | –0.01n.s. | –0.05 | –0.34 | –0.11 | –0.20 | 0.14 | –0.14 | –0.07 | 0.47 ± 0.50 | ||||||
| 13. Intentions to leave 2018 | 1–5 | –0.40 | –0.35 | 0.46 | –0.37 | –0.36 | 0.02n.s. | –0.10 | 0.04 | –0.00n.s. | 0.00n.s. | 0.04 | 0.02n.s. | 1.91 ± 1.24 | |||||
| 14. Intentions to leave 2020 | 1–5 | –0.22 | –0.21 | 0.23 | –0.18 | –0.20 | 0.00n.s. | –0.09 | 0.03n.s. | –0.00n.s. | 0.00n.s. | –0.00n.s. | –0.00n.s. | 0.34 | 1.74 ± 1.14 | ||||
| 15. Job satisfaction 2018 | 1–8 | 0.50 | 0.42 | –0.50 | 0.46 | 0.42 | 0.01n.s. | 0.05 | 0.01n.s. | –0.06 | –.01n.s. | –0.06 | –.02n.s. | –0.60 | –0.30 | 5.98 ± 10.49 | |||
| 16. Job satisfaction 2020 | 1–8 | 0.32 | 0.29 | –0.31 | 0.26 | 0.26 | 0.01n.s. | 0.06 | 0.02n.s. | –0.08 | –0.01n.s. | –0.05 | –0.00n.s. | –0.32 | –0.58 | 0.50 | 6.21 ± 1.38 | ||
| 17. General health 2018 | 1–5 | 0.22 | 0.18 | –0.26 | 0.17 | 0.16 | 0.00n.s. | –0.01n.s. | 0.06 | –0.08 | –0.07 | –0.04 | 0.00n.s. | –0.20 | –0.16 | 0.32 | 0.26 | 3.96 ± .80 | |
| 18. General health 2020 | 1–5 | 0.17 | 0.14 | –0.18 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.02n.s. | 0.00n.s. | 0.08 | –0.09 | –0.04 | –0.04 | 0.00n.s. | –0.11 | –0.16 | 0.21 | .30 | 0.60 | 4.02 ± .79 |
[i] NOTE: The diagonals show means and standard deviations. All correlations are significant on p < 0.01 level if not otherwise indicated, n.s. indicates p > 0.01.
Appendix Figure F1
Elbow plot of the bayesian information criterion (BIC).