1 Introduction
As the ‘AI boom’ of the early 2020s detonated, many academic fields experienced a surge of scholarship on artificial intelligence (AI), with numerous researchers attempting to analyze, understand, and predict AI’s impact on their disciplines. Representative of these efforts is the 2022 issue of the humanities journal Daedalus devoted to AI, which contains essays from multiple scholarly perspectives; the contributors’ evaluations range from enthusiasm at the promise of AI’s sweeping transformative power to cautious assessment of the risks associated with the new technology’s possible effects on art, culture, society, politics, or daily life (Manyika, 2022). Without taking a stance on the benefits and detriments of particular AI uses, we note a rising anxiety in the creative professions (Newman et al., 2023; Wei, 2025), where work practices and financial relations are expected to radically change as AI adoption increases. Prominently vocal in this arena have been musical artists, perhaps most publicly in relation to the controversies over ‘deepfake’ hit singles like the AI‑assisted soundalike ‘Heart On My Sleeve’ that appeared in 2023. A host of concerns have arisen for practicing musicians, songwriters, producers, and composers, many of them clustering around the perception of a shifting relationship between creator and creation. Among these concerns are questions of how AI will affect the degree of control and sense of agency that musical artists have over their works and creative processes, as well as how increased access to musical tools and the incoming flood of new works with little to no human input governing them will alter the musical marketplace and the place of music in society and culture.
One of the main ways modern civilizations have responded to technologies that disrupt the creative professions is to adopt new laws and policies around those technologies in order to either encourage their dissemination or to restrain them so that their impact on creative industries is blunted (or, at least, so that the disruption emerges in a more gradual, controlled fashion). Intellectual property (IP) control, and, in particular, copyright, has been one of the key tools for scaffolding technological advancements around creative communities and markets. AI’s recent and sudden leaps forward have opened up new questions about legal practice relating to copyright and the arts, especially around AI‑assisted digital replicas, the copyrightability of AI‑created works, and the use of copyrighted works as prior matter for input into AI systems. Less remarked upon in this technosocial environment are the challenges these nascent AI tools might pose to the conceptual bases for IP. AI’s rise provides an opportunity to reconsider why and how IP controls exist and how the principles that undergird copyright law and policy might suggest particular paths for AI regulation, design, and use in the arts. We focus on the philosophical foundations of IP rather than specific copyright regimes, as the latter vary widely across regions and are subject to imminent change in response to the rapid pace of AI development. In contrast, the former have been developed and refined into loci of relative consensus, from which both legal policy and technological implementation can be structured.
Some discussion of the potential uses and impacts of AI has occurred within the music information retrieval (MIR) community—not only regarding practical applications for supporting MIR tasks, but also the social and cultural implications of integrating AI into the MIR field. For example, Morreale (2021) highlights ethical, cultural, and political ramifications of AI proliferation in the MIR community. Morreale argues that researchers and developers should see themselves as part of the regulatory apparatus, actively investigating broader cultural and ethical dimensions of AI in music creation and other MIR tasks. This growing interest has also led to work exploring human–AI music creation, including a special issue of TISMIR on this topic (Micchi et al., 2021; Morris et al., 2024; Newman et al., 2023; Ostermann et al., 2021; Rohrmeier, 2022), and some of the work examines the intersection of automation and copyright within the field (Yuan et al., 2023; Holzapfel et al., 2018; Cros Vila et al., 2025). Nevertheless, substantial inquiry into how creative AI might align with or challenge IP structures at fundamental levels has been scant.
With this in mind, we look into the philosophical bases of IP and apply them analytically to musical creation in the AI space. We investigate how three major justifications for IP structures—incentives‑based utilitarian, Lockean, and personality‑based (Moore, 2008)—implicate different approaches to the coming AI wave on the roles of artists, AI designers, and policymakers. Given the unstable and uncertain future of AI platforms, usages, and regulatory frameworks, it is timely to look to first principles to structure, guide, and interrogate. Such a consideration may have manifold downstream impacts, including on how to refashion (or leave unchanged) copyright law and policy, how to determine what is a valuable or meaningful creation deserving of credit, and what creative functions in AI tools may be most useful for fostering new modes of creativity.
AI tools are almost immediately being adopted in various ways into virtually all creative fields, and AI’s impact on music has been the subject of outsize reporting and speculation. Using music as a lens may yield instructive analogies broadly applicable to information retrieval and design applications in other affected fields, such as the visual arts and film and television.
2 Background: AI Comes to Music—And for Music
The application of AI capabilities to music became a flashpoint in the 2020s as a number of contentious planned and actual uses came to light. One of the earliest involved the 2019 introduction of FN Meka, a virtual musical artist whose recordings were fashioned with the help of AI algorithms (Cirisano, 2021). FN Meka became a social media phenomenon by 2020 and was briefly ‘signed’ to major label Capitol Records in 2022 before being ‘dropped’ due to bad publicity over perceived racial stereotyping. The possibility of creating convincing star musicians whose recordings, performances, and public persona were all governed by algorithms soon fed into hopes (and fears) that dead musicians could also be digitally reanimated to a newly heightened degree of realism with these tools (Kessel, 2024). Attempts at this technology date back to at least 2012, when Tupac Shakur, who died in 1996, ‘performed’ at the Coachella festival. By the mid‑2020s, a burgeoning business of virtual hologram tours and posthumous ‘artist experiences’ had arisen, with one such major installation, fed by AI, devoted to Elvis Presley opening in London in 2025 (Visram, 2025). These uses primarily impact musical performance rather than composition, and because our analysis will focus on AI’s impacts on the creation of musical works and recordings, they fall largely out of scope of our inquiry; however, AI‑assisted performances have helped frame public perception of AI’s inroads into musical culture, and they indicate that unforeseen new concerns will continue to make the AI–music interface an area of enduring philosophical interest.
In a series of commentaries, the United States Copyright Office has identified three broad topics of conflict relating to AI, artistic creation, and legal/regulatory structures, which pertain beyond the US context; in the following three paragraphs, we will use them as scaffolds for our exploration. The first of the commentaries (Register of Copyrights, 2024) addresses the phenomenon of ‘deepfakes’ or digital replicas, which are creative works, built with or assisted by AI, that imitate or closely resemble the style of human creators. In music, this came to widespread attention through the single ‘Heart on My Sleeve’ in 2023 (Coscarelli, 2023), which had been produced using AI into a remarkably convincing imitation of the distinctive voices and compositional styles of R&B/hip‑hop superstars Drake and The Weeknd. The song, which, according to some commentators, compared favorably to the artistry of the imitated musicians (Veltman, 2023), racked up more than two million streams in the four days it was available before being taken down from streaming services over copyright claims (Stutz, 2023). Other projects soon followed, including a reconstruction of the 1990s‑era sound of the British rock band Oasis that was praised by the band’s lead singer for its impressive verisimilitude (Lewis, 2023). ‘Heart on My Sleeve,’ as the New York Times noted, ‘was the latest and loudest example of a gray‑area genre that has exploded in recent months: homemade tracks that use generative AI technology, in part or in full, to conjure familiar sounds that can be passed off as authentic, or at least close enough’ (Coscarelli, 2023). Concerns immediately surfaced over whether such songs could be used to effectively replace human artists artistically or in the marketplace; to what extent credit, and by extension remuneration, should be afforded for instances of AI approximations of already‑famous musicians; and whether policy should prohibit, or at least regulate, unauthorized imitations of the unique styles of famous musicmakers (Juzon, 2024; Register of Copyrights, 2024). Concomitantly, major labels were hard at work using similar techniques to create estate‑authorized imitations of dead musicians, including Edith Piaf and the deceased members of the Beatles (Robinson, 2023); a machine‑learning‑assisted Beatles song, ‘Now and Then,’ was released in 2023 to international chart success, and it garnered the first Grammy Award ever issued to an AI‑assisted song (Kelly, 2025).
The second area of conflict (Register of Copyrights, 2025a) relates to the copyrightability of works created partly or entirely with AI applications. Copyright—the legal protection of creative works as a type of property subject to exclusive rights—is in many nations granted only to works created, at least in part, by human beings, and only to those human beings or to collective associations thereof (rather than to entities such as animals, natural features, or algorithms). Only a few countries, such as the United Kingdom and China, assign copyright in AI‑generated works to users who arrange the creative output (Lemley, 2024). The latest generation of AI tools has provoked a range of responses from musical creatives; some, like Holly Herndon, Grimes, and Brian Eno, have (to varying extents) embraced the use of AI as a creative aid (Barshad, 2023), while others have shied away, disquieted by the possibilities of marketplace dilution, the loss of a human spark of creativity, and the uncertainty of legal protection for works created with artificial enhancement (Register of Copyrights, 2025a; Wong, 2024). A lack of clarity in US copyright law over how to assess royalties for licensing and streaming of AI‑assisted works has troubled commentators (Register of Copyrights, 2025a), and proposals to assign some or all of the copyright of algorithmically generated works to the software programmer, rather than the user (Kaminski, 2017; Naqvi, 2020), have also unsettled some observers. The issue of whether and how entirely AI‑generated works (or works with no meaningful human creative input) would be protected also loomed large, especially after the exposure of a massive AI‑generated corpus of royalty‑farming audio tracks on digital streaming platforms in 2024 (Levine, 2024). Even determining the status of AI generation, for purposes of royalty payment, in music uploaded to streaming services has proven difficult; a notable watershed arrived in June 2025 with the success of The Velvet Sundown, a supposed psychedelic‑folk revival band that accumulated high streaming numbers and a good deal of media attention. Journalists noted that the group’s output appeared to be at least AI‑assisted, if not wholly AI‑generated, and the reasons for its success, as well as who benefited financially from that success, proved unclear even after the Velvet Sundown account’s handlers admitted to AI usage (Hiatt, 2025).
The third nexus of concern (Register of Copyrights, 2025b) relates to the training of AI models using datasets containing copyrighted material. Many legal jurisdictions worldwide do not have clear regulations that lay out whether and how copyrighted material may be fed into AI systems (Sag and Yu, 2025) and how the output works would be tied to the input works through, e.g., attribution, licensing, or royalties. High‑profile lawsuits in the United States and Europe, initiated in 2024 and 2025 by music trade organizations and performing rights societies, accused AI companies of infringement via the use of copyrighted musical materials in their databases (Levine, 2025; Robinson, 2024). It is unclear whether AI firms, and, by extension, their users, can make use of copyright exceptions, such as the fair use/fair dealing provisions in the laws of many nations (Saw, 2023; Schurz, 2025), as a legal protection for inadvertent or black‑boxed use of elements from copyrighted works that are in the AI databases. Conversely, musicians with creative works in the databases have reacted skeptically to proposals that would make AI databasing of creative works easier; more than 1,000 of them voiced their disapproval of one such proposal in the United Kingdom via a protest album, released to streaming services in February 2025 and consisting of silent or ambient room‑sound tracks (Katz, 2025).
3 IP and Human Creativity: Three Primary Approaches
The advancement of AI technologies has opened, or reopened anew, debates that reflect competing visions of the proper balance between technology, creativity, and policy. The chief mechanism for establishing that balance in the modern world—first in Europe and North America, and subsequently worldwide—has been the implementation of IP controls. For musical works (including compositions, song lyrics, produced recordings, and live performances), the applicable IP control is copyright, the concept for creative works; other controls, such as patents, trademarks, and trade secrets, also fall under the umbrella of IP. Alongside copyright, many nations provide a related species of IP known as ‘neighboring rights,’ particularly to musical performers; since our primary concern is AI‑fed creation of musical works and musical recordings, rather than live performances, we will focus our debate on copyright per se (though neighboring rights may also be implicated in, e.g., AI‑assisted recordings of cover songs). Copyright is now a protection afforded in nearly all independent nations, but the rationale for its deployment, and the specific contours of its protections, vary by nation‑state and may stem from several different animating principles. Philosophical and legal debate over the value of IP structures primarily clusters around three standard justifications (Moore, 2008): the incentives‑based utilitarian argument, the Lockean property‑based argument, and the personality‑based argument.
Certainly, these do not exhaust the universe of possible rationales. Alternate defenses based in theories of distributive justice (Hughes and Merges, 2016) or the advancement of democratic principles (Netanel, 1996) have also been proposed, as have critiques of IP schema from, e.g., socialist, postmodern, or ecological viewpoints (Menell, 2000) and from non‑Western philosophical bases (Roy, 2008). We will limit our analysis to three approaches to IP theory that have had broad and lasting impact on lawmaking and/or have attracted robust and enduring scholarly analysis (Himma, 2008; Hettinger, 1989; Kretschmer and Kawohl, 2004; Menell, 2000; Merges, 2011; Moore, 2008).
3.1 Incentives‑based utilitarian argument
The incentives‑based argument for IP controls is built on the principles of utilitarianism, generally stemming from the formulation developed by J. S. Mill (Mill, 1863). In its most well‑defended modern line of reasoning, utilitarianism advocates courses of action that lead to the greatest positive impact on human flourishing. This suggests an initial presumption against protections on intellectual creations, because these would serve as barriers to understanding and to new creation; locking up culture hinders education and access to ideas, which are essential to utility and progress. However, insufficient incentive could reduce the amount or quality of creative generation in a society, which would impede utility or flourishing, and so some sort of legal mechanism to encourage or reward useful creativity can be justified (Moore, 2008). Economic analyses of IP’s effects (Landes and Posner, 1989) typically proceed from an implicitly incentives‑based utilitarian standpoint. IP systems based in utilitarianism would, in principle, govern with a light touch. They would offer limited controls over the works and for limited time periods, protecting only enough to encourage creation but not so much as to hamper the dissemination of knowledge and culture for the improvement of society in general (Vaidhyanathan, 2001). This rationale undergirds much of the Anglo‑American IP tradition (Goold and Simon, 2024); for instance, the US Constitution explicitly states that copyright and patent controls are to be implemented ‘to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’ However, the large‑scale expansion of copyright controls worldwide since the 1970s has tended to cut against this bedrock principle, and some theorists have used versions of the incentives‑based argument to argue that many legal regimes now overprotect creative works to the detriment of society (Lessig, 2004).
3.2 Lockean property‑based argument
The Lockean theory of IP argues for a natural right in one’s creations by extending John Locke’s theory of physical property (Locke, 1689) into the realm of ideas and their expressions. Locke’s original conception began with the assertion that one owns one’s own body and, therefore, the work that the body does. When work is exerted on unowned objects and something new of value is fashioned, Locke held that the created value rightfully belongs to the laborer, and that state protection of that right is also thereby justifiable. Modern Lockean theorists have argued that intellectual work—creative thought (Moore, 2012) or time and mental energy spent developing new intellectual objects (Himma, 2012)—engenders analogous rights and thus merits similar protections. Historically, the Lockean justification has not had a strong practical impact on legal regimes, though it is typically introduced as a first principle in IP scholarly studies as well as for property theory generally (Merges, 2011). Lockean theory does not inherently suggest particular practical controls; it can be used to advocate for strong controls, as an outgrowth of more general property rights of use and exclusion (Mossoff, 2003), or for relatively limited ones, to allow room for competing claims based in liberty or the avoidance of waste and spoilage (Gordon, 1993). Nevertheless, as Boyle (2008) notes, modern Lockean thinking has tended toward expansive conceptions of the role of IP law.
3.3 Personality‑based argument
The third common foundation of IP is also based in a theory of natural rights, but, rather than focusing on labor, it foregrounds the concepts of personal autonomy and expressive individuality. The modern personality‑based argument begins with ideas about creativity based in French and German enlightenment philosophy, especially the work of Immanuel Kant and G.W.F. Hegel, though the popularization of the idea in the 19th century was accomplished through outspoken defenders in the realms of literature and commentary, such as Victor Hugo and Mark Twain (Kretschmer and Kawohl, 2004). Personality theorists hold that intellectual protections are necessary to allow for the development of each person’s unique creative voice. On this view, authors have inherent rights to communicate their own personalities, emotions, and experiences, which they infuse into the creative works they bring forth. This allows creators to become fully autonomous beings, able to speak for themselves on their own terms and governed by their own will (Joffrain, 2001). This argument is the intellectual basis for the protections known as moral rights, which can include the right to withdraw a work from circulation or the right to object to alteration of a work (Joffrain, 2001; Rajan, 2011). Many continental European IP regimes are justified through personality‑based principles; correspondingly, they have tended historically to afford longer and stronger protections and have afforded creators moral rights that are generally absent in nations that base their IP laws on Anglo‑American models. Rights of publicity, which are external to copyright but which protect individual creators’ personalities vis‑a‑vis commercial uses of artistic works, also tend to be stronger in countries with personality‑based traditions such as France and Germany than in utilitarian‑based ones such as the United States, where there is no federal right of publicity (Juzon, 2024). The theory has faced criticism from observers who note that it assumes a model of creativity that is a poor fit for some types of media (Hughes, 1988), such as most nonfiction, trivial Internet postings, and many works of corporate or collaborative authorship.
4 AI and IP: Examining AI Using the Three Approaches
The standard justifications for IP protection speak more broadly than copyright law per se; they suggest a spectrum of arrangements—social, cultural, economic, and political, in addition to legal—that can be put into play to bring forth a vision of creative activity. AI is now part of that spectrum; its affordances, as well as its limitations and the constraints placed upon it, are reshaping the boundaries of creativity in ways that could act as a nudge (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) or a law‑like structure (Lessig, 2006) toward certain compositional behaviors and outputs, furthering or hampering the ideals of the three justifications. Practical debate about IP and other species of creative control do not always speak directly to first principles; more commonly, a blend of hybrid approaches meets at what Robert Merges calls ‘midlevel agreement,’ offering pragmatic solutions that allow societies to maintain a class of creative professionals (Merges, 2011). Nevertheless, it is instructive to examine the rise of AI tools in the light of each philosophical position, to indicate areas where law, policy, and technological design could play a role in shaping the creative environment for both musicians and audiences.
4.1 Incentives‑based utilitarian
At first glance, AI tools may appear to be a blessing to utilitarian theorists. These new capabilities unlock new avenues for creation; they open up creative activities to people who did not have the ability or skill beforehand; they help unearth new knowledge and reveal creative connections as yet undiscovered by humans. Concerns over how algorithms might distance creators from their creations are largely irrelevant to the utilitarian; the value of the creations’ effects is the primary benchmark (Kaminski, 2017). Whether and how AI will contribute to human flourishing generally—a deeply uncertain question at current—is beyond the scope of our paper; nevertheless, the capacity for the generation of potentially copyrightable works, in music as in other areas, is vastly increased by AI’s rise, suggesting a future in which there is an almost limitless supply of creative output (Desai and Lemley, 2022).
The crucial factors for utilitarians will be AI’s effect on incentives and the positive or negative impact of the works created by means of it. An increase in the quantity of creative works by no means equates to an increase in the quality of creative effort. Artificial creation may flood the marketplace with uninspired, ‘good‑enough’ musical sounds that drive human creators away from innovation, negatively impacting both the ability of composers and performers to make a living and general cultural development. Indeed, it seems almost inevitable that AI will come to supplant musicians for basic functional music needs, like filler music for corporate videos, advertising soundtracks, background music in public spaces, and music for exercising or meditating; these are milieus where composers and performers are likely to be pushed out because the labor cost far outstrips the cost to automatically create generically suitable music. This may result in a serious drain on incentives that threatens entire wings of socially beneficial creative activity.
It is worth noting, however, that musicians and the music industry have been forced to adapt to new technosocial paradigms routinely since the introduction of recording technology in the late 19th century. The commercialization of the phonograph, radio, the long‑playing record and compact disc, music television, file‑sharing, and music streaming have all disrupted and restructured musical creation, but they have also suggested new paths forward for creativity and economic gain (Singer and Rosenblatt, 2023). The music industry as a whole may need to retool to adapt to AI’s coming prominence, and individual musicians may find their work processes changing, but it is far from certain that the ability to receive incentives for music‑making will crumble under the weight of AI. Utilitarian theorists might therefore focus on sculpting the techno‑legal landscape in order to preserve and improve the quality of created content, such as by ensuring factual accuracy and supporting uses that foster greater expressive force.
4.2 Lockean
The Lockean labor‑property theorist may start by noting that there is not much labor in the work of AI; it is, in many cases, a labor‑saving tool, which suggests a prima‑facie argument that it lessens the bond between creator and work and, therefore, undermines the claim to a natural right of property in the artistic objects created. Simply by suggesting a vague idea or topic and a musical style, a user can now have an AI algorithm like Suno or Google’s MusicLM generate entire compositions. How can one argue a natural right in the fruits of labor that requires so little skill, so little intellectual input and expertise?
That said, some AI creativity may require sophistication and pre‑existing mastery of concepts in order to manipulate the AI tools into producing something aesthetically valuable. The practice of ‘prompt engineering,’ for instance, has strong Lockean components to it—it takes intellectual work to fashion prompts so as to get specific artistic results from AI tools (Chang et al., 2023). This reasoning has recently been rejected in the United States (Register of Copyrights, 2025a) because prompt‑writing is a sequence of (uncopyrightable) input ideas, whereas the (potentially copyrightable) expressions—the resulting AI artistry—is not fundamentally determined by the prompter. This points to a second problem for Lockean theorists: the black‑box nature of many AI tools. The processes by which these tools operate are often not known, and the output is not necessarily traceable to its inputs; in fact, outputs can differ dramatically even with little to no change in the inputs (Register of Copyrights, 2025a). The Lockean might therefore remark that the laborer’s investment of intellectual work is not necessarily resulting in a deliberate, directed creation that reflects the laborer’s own intentions. Mere coincidence makes for a weak property claim. Perhaps, however, such creations are akin to gold found on a unified‑estate cattle ranch; the farmer’s possession of the land legitimates the claim to the gold, even though mineral wealth was not the rationale for the establishment of the land title. On this metaphor, the AI‑aided creator could still make a defensible assertion of a property right. Work done by the human after the AI has finished, moreover, may provide stronger claims on behalf of prompters to true Lockean authorship.
4.3 Personality‑based
The growth of AI creation is seemingly at the strongest of odds with the personality‑based philosophy. This is art with no art, with no soul, no true human investment or creative spark; it is the exact opposite of what the personality‑based theory tries to safeguard, a nightmarish literalization of the ‘robot pop’ aesthetic adopted by electronic pop pioneers Kraftwerk. From the personality‑based perspective, AI‑shepherded creation seems to stand as a direct threat to the Romantic idea of creative genius or to auteur theory in film, both of which have strong roots in the personality‑based intellectual lineage (Kaminski, 2017; Rajan, 2011). The ability to create unauthorized digital replicas like ‘Heart on My Sleeve’ is particularly noxious to a personality theorist, and even allowing the works of unwilling or unwitting human creators to be used in AI datasets may be objectionable to artists who are committed to the personality‑based position. AI approximation of artists’ general patterns of expression further muddies the already‑murky waters of ‘substantial similarity,’ the legal test for determining when the replication of a creative style bleeds into infringement of specific works (Sobel, 2024). The sheer volume and velocity of AI‑fueled creation (Lemley, 2024) indicates that creators may find it fundamentally difficult to legally defend their unique expressions against imitation products in this new environment.
One possible saving grace, at least for some works, is that AI assistance may be necessary for certain creators to more fully implement personal autonomy. Creators with disabilities, or grand thinkers who seek to make large‑scale multimedia works that stretch beyond the bounds of their narrow expertise, could find in AI a way to fulfill their aesthetic visions. Personality theorists may also advocate for a circumscribing of AI’s reach; perhaps the mass of run‑of‑the‑mill works are suitable for machine‑based creation and transformation, while a subset of works reflecting deep human experience would be walled off from the AI world and given additional protections commensurate with a belief in the works’ inimitable expressive spirit. Carve‑outs in allowances for AI text and data mining have already been proposed, both for economic and personality‑based reasons, in countries such as Canada (Craig, 2025) and the United Kingdom (Kyle, 2025).
5 Designing for an Art Official Age
Because the three philosophical articulations discussed above are used to justify the implementation of IP policies specifically, discussions often ignore the degree to which IP law could be supplemented or supplanted by other social, cultural, or technological arrangements. Many analysts in the law and policy realms have suggested a range of responses to emergent AI issues, such as stronger right of publicity protections (Juzon, 2024; Register of Copyrights, 2025a), copyright in purely algorithmically‑generated works (Hristov, 2017), expanded fair‑use/fair‑dealing protections for use of copyrighted works in AI databases (Lemley and Casey, 2021), database exclusions for certain artists or classes of creative works (Kyle, 2025), and a universal basic income for artists (White, 2019). Systems design can also play a key role in funneling AI toward particular IP‑related goals. Debate both outside and inside the MIR community has stressed the cultural impacts of AI (Berkowitz, 2023; Holzapfel et al., 2018; Morreale, 2021; Rohrmeier, 2022), and we argue that it is paramount to consider AI tool design not merely in current copyright legal contexts, but also with reference to wider conceptions of IP, because these ideas have sociocultural ramifications—they influence how lawmakers, designers, and musicians make decisions about the use and regulation of creative technologies. In order to bridge the gap between discussions of copyright, ethics, and design, we will turn our discussion to another conceptual tack: how design in and around AI systems could impact creation, especially musical creation, for the sake of advancing the goals of the IP philosophies. To achieve this, we introduce a set of design principles for creating AI music tools and systems. These principles aim to harmonize design considerations across domains, especially in MIR applications.
5.1 Incentives‑based utilitarian design
Most current AI tools take implicitly incentives‑based approaches in their design, working within the paradigms of US copyright law with the intention of maximizing creative fruition. Calls for AI design that center around making it easier for people to create (i.e., ‘democratizing’ creation) (Tang et al., 2024), as well as lowering barriers for making use of past works to inspire new creations, align with incentives‑based utilitarian thinking. At the same time, there is apprehension that AI tools may demoralize human creators, especially if AI creation overwhelms the market with low‑quality works (Lovato et al., 2025); an AI‑flooded market could disincentivize people from creating and sharing truly new and innovative works. Design built within the principles of incentives‑based utilitarianism will aim to ensure that the tools encourage users to generate new works and disseminate them widely but also strive to adequately reward creators so as not to deter the creative drive. Tools championing this approach should be built for sharing, collaboration, and compensation.
Build for Sharing. An important aspect of the incentives approach includes the ability for one’s work to be used and consumed by others. In order to do this, systems should be built such that they not only allow but encourage the sharing of AI creations—both during and after the creative process. This complements a shift from the view of art as a solitary act to one embedded in networks of creative use (Chung et al., 2022). Designers could support specific modes of sharing by modeling the types of informal information‑sharing practices that communities employ and integrating them into the interaction capabilities of the tools (Chung et al., 2022; Shneiderman, 2008). This can help creative ideas proliferate from the ground up and hasten the process of mutual inspiration. Current AI tools often already have sharing features; Midjourney’s Explore page and Suno’s library page offer possible models for dissemination.
Build for Collaborative Creativity. Tools that support cross‑collaboration among different AI functions and multiple human creators could spur inventive new creative uses. When artists can use technology to influence and expand each other’s efforts beyond their individual abilities, new and exciting creative outcomes may result (Amabile, 2018). AI tools can be built to promote serendipitous creations and iteration (Andersen and Knees, 2016; Huang et al., 2020), especially creations beyond a musician’s familiar creative territory (e.g., composition in disparate musical styles or with unusual instrumentation).
Literature related to collaborative creativity and music creation frequently notes the desire to be able to iterate through ideas. This may come in the form of conversation‑based interaction (Choi et al., 2025) allowing users to create a dialogue with AI systems, AI chatbots playing a mediating role in interactions between human collaborators, or in the construction of AI systems capable of simulating personas and roles taken within the creative process (Fu et al., 2025).
Taking into account communities of practice during the design process can also serve to support collaboration. AI tools that are crafted to accommodate more niche creative networks can encourage the use and sharing not only of the content of AI but also of creative processes and reasoning as well. The integration of AI tools into already existing workflows in communities (Morris et al., 2025) can help those communities reach their artistic goals, which tracks broadly with utilitarian commitments to creative progress.
Build for Compensation. Exploring ways to adequately compensate people who are contributing to a dataset will be important to preserving incentives to create. While the nature of generative AI makes item‑level attribution challenging, a financial model could be adopted to compensate artists whose work contributes meaningfully to datasets or creative output. At the same time, such tools, consistent with utilitarian principles, could be designed to identify and support fair‑use/fair‑dealing usages of copyrighted material, such as for critical commentary or satire.
Furthermore, in the realm of MIR, ensuring compensation through design will necessitate tools that can accurately identify infringement. Current copyright evaluation systems, such as YouTube’s Content ID and Facebook’s Rights Manager, still lack the nuance needed to detect copyright infringement on platforms; despite longstanding criticism, they continue to misidentify copyrighted material, are poorly equipped to evaluate fair use, and flag works clearly in the public domain (Berkowitz, 2023). More comprehensive approaches for dealing with the increasingly complicated task of identifying AI‑generated work are needed, such as better algorithmic transparency for ID and compensation systems (Berkowitz, 2023), improved metadata/linked‑data management and processing capabilities, (Berkowitz, 2023), more sophisticated feature‑extraction techniques (Cros Vila et al., 2025), and expert human intervention for special or difficult cases (Berkowitz, 2023). Also, supporting other interpretations of compensation, such as gratitude or knowledge sharing (Knearem et al., 2019), may provide additional incentives for creatives who are less interested in economic remuneration.
5.2 Lockean design
Lockean theory could be supportive or circumspect regarding AI tools, depending on how they are designed and implemented. AI could make it easier to expend intellectual labor and create new species of creative property; conversely, it could also facilitate the exploitation of other people’s creations without permission, attribution, or compensation. In addition, the tools could also result in creations with minimal input from human creators, which does not provide strong justification for property ownership. Tools championing the Lockean approach should be built for version control, transparency, and with an eye toward the commons.
Build for Version Control. Version control is a strategy that could acknowledge and document how human efforts factor into the creations of the AI tool. Traceability would make it easier for Lockean‑minded creators to assert legitimacy in rights over creative works and to be able to demonstrate the extent of their contributions. For example, designing to capture the histories of an AI model’s probability statistics (Huang et al., 2025) could support users’ authorship claims by allowing them to better examine how the model’s output corresponds to authorial intent. In addition, clarifying whether and how versioning is carried out in generative contexts—e.g., defining the degree to which a system supports more intuitive creation or stricter record‑keeping, or allowing users to switch between automatic and user‑initiated versioning (Manesh et al., 2024) where versioning control is adaptable to a position in the creative process (Sterman et al., 2022)—permits creators to assert how much granular detail they may need in order to demonstrate a property claim on the completed creative work.
Build for Transparency. A Lockean approach could involve building processes that retain, and make easily accessible, data about AI’s role in ideation and the generation of content throughout (and beyond) the entire life‑cycle of creation. This comports with concepts discussed in human–AI collaboration (Walmsley, 2021; Xu et al., 2019; Zhou et al., 2022), fulfilling the desire of Lockean‑orientated users to maintain control. Transparency in AI creation that clearly shows how AI suggestions were incorporated into the creator’s own ideas would help other creators and audiences understand the boundaries of the creative property that can be rightfully attributed to human ingenuity.
Build for the Commons. Lockean theory, while providing a basis for property rights, also contains caveats against waste or spoilage of resources. Modern Lockeans have sought to balance IP claims with commitments to free speech and a healthy commons of ideas and works open to all (Gordon, 1993). Building out access to freely available intellectual objects within the AI system—for instance, making it easier for creators to access and transform public‑domain or creative‑commons works—can help creatives see value in, and contribute to, the intellectual commons. As AI usage grows, long‑term support for the idea of the commons will require trustworthy labeling and attribution systems, especially for co‑created works (He et al., 2025). This will ensure that authorship for works in the commons can be traced and that AI‑derived elements of works are clear to future generations.
5.3 Personality‑based design
Arguments with implicit personality‑based roots have been some of the strongest critics of runaway AI creation, and it is hard to envision AI systems that would assuage concerns that AI tools will lose the human in the human–AI creation process. However, novice users, disabled users, or creators exploring new artistic genres might recognize the value of AI as a catalyst to bring out their creative voices (Louie et al., 2020). Tools championing this approach should be built for intention, creative control, and idea generation.
Build for Intention. AI tools that help check and confirm the creator’s intention during the creation process would be meaningful for the personality‑based approach. This may be important for novice users who may not have a solid idea of what they want to create, or who lack the domain knowledge to clearly express their intention; in this way, the tool may help them articulate an individual vision in addition to aiding in the expression of that vision. A tool that better retains the information from prior interactions may be able to provide outcomes that are more closely aligned with the creator’s broader vision or direction beyond the creation of a single piece of music (Fu et al., 2025).
In addition, tools supporting intention should be mindful of the ways that artistic goals can fluctuate and adjust over the course of the creative process. Providing tools that allow users to control systems when their creative goals are vaguely defined or flexible (Chung, 2022) and implementing tools that can illuminate the cognitive mechanisms behind creative thinking (Gero et al., 2023; Newman et al., 2023; O’Toole and Horvát, 2024) could better help artists establish, build, or change their authorial voice.
Build for Creative Control. Another viable feature could be the implementation of hard on–off switches and compartmentalization capabilities for how AI is used on a creator’s own works. Creatives who seek a high degree of control may want the ability to turn AI on only for specific, well‑defined usages and to be able to shut AI off when that usage is completed (or if it fails to realize the creative vision). Features that permit specific, bounded, and limited use of AI would afford personality‑based advocates the ability to create on their own terms (Gelineck and Serafin, 2009).
Similarly, creators may wish to shut off certain paths in the creation process rather than simply conducting a series of prompting and selecting. Previous research in MIR has shown that expert users have specific preferences for how AI should be integrated, as well as clear boundaries for where it should not be used (Gero et al., 2023; Krol et al., 2025; Newman et al., 2023). Since much creativity does not follow a linear path, a feature that helps creators better understand and express themselves in non‑linear ways, rather than being confined to predetermined pathways bounded by AI‑suggested samples, would support user control Deruty et al. (2022). Recent work has also surfaced wishes for a more iterative experience in music creation with AI (Choi et al., 2025; Fu et al., 2025), which could be accomplished by supporting easier backtracking in the creation process so that users can revisit past drafts of music pieces and shift the creative course. This process has been shown to be particularly useful in early stages of creative processes, when creators test and prototype ideas through iteration (Fu et al., 2025; Hammad et al., 2025; Newman et al., 2023; Siddiqui et al., 2025).
Build for Idea Generation. Current AI applications are great for creating things fast that are good enough, but not necessarily great for creating things carefully that strive to be profound or excellent. It would be useful to think about crafting the role of AI tools to become partners for idea generation, facilitated by a longer extensive dialogue between the human creator and AI where the creator tries to communicate goals and the AI suggests creative directions (Guo et al., 2024). For those creators who seek it, AI could become closer to a true collaborator or authorial partner rather than simply offering the human a choice of successively refined outcomes.
5.4 Designing across conceptions of IP
Copyright, and IP concepts more generally, are deeply rooted in cultural contexts. Adopting a single approach to design may overlook other important perspectives and practices, and our aim is not to emphasize one to the exclusion of the others. Instead, it is to offer approaches that support an overarching goal of IP practice: to strike a balance between personal creative expression and public creative production. Each philosophy approaches this tension differently, and designers should consider how their systems may favor one side over the other. AI systems that facilitate transitions between IP perspectives can both empower users to navigate these complexities and help foster Merges (2011)’s ‘midlevel agreement’ on IP practice even in the face of competing fundamental principles.
More broadly, we argue that much of the existing research in the AI–MIR space tends to narrowly focus on practical or technical concerns, often at the expense of deeper conceptual engagement, such as critically reflecting on how AI will impact creation from a more human‑centered perspective. In the MIR field, technical development frequently dominates the academic discourse, leaving little room for reflection on the underlying philosophical, legal, and cultural assumptions that influence design decisions. Acknowledging the value of interdisciplinarity and engaging more intentionally with disciplines such as philosophy, law, and cultural studies could help enrich these discussions (Kanhov et al., 2024) and lead to more holistic and reflective system design.
Lastly, we emphasize the importance of studying human–AI interaction beyond short‑term, transactional use. Simply observing users interacting with a system in an experimental setting and collecting immediate feedback does not guarantee meaningful or lasting impact, such as a stronger sense of creative agency or continued motivation to use the system that leads to long‑term adoption. Paying more attention to broader contexts of creation and to the people whose practices are impacted by these tools is important for discerning the real implications of AI systems in creative domains.
6 Limitations and Future Work
This paper primarily examines the philosophical foundations of IP grounded in Western culture, in particular focusing on North America and Europe. Creativity is strongly emphasized in this context, but this emphasis is not universally shared across different cultural contexts. Nevertheless, we believe this variation does not undermine the core discussion exploring what motivates creators and why societies value creative works.
This paper presents an argument evaluating how AI music tools can be understood philosophically and how they could be designed to maximize adherence to ideals of creativity and artistic production, drawing from three distinct philosophical foundations of IP. In future studies, we plan to build on this work by empirically investigating how creators, music listeners, and developers of AI music tools interpret and apply these philosophical perspectives in practice.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine how three major philosophical foundations underlying IP law would interpret the impact of AI tools on music creation, influencing assumptions about authorship, ownership, and the meanings attached to the act of creation itself. Each of the foundations highlights different potential risks such as diminished incentives for creators, weakened links between labor and reward, and erosion of capabilities for personal expression. We argue that a deeper reflection incorporating these different perspectives can help guide the design of AI tools to support human creators by centering their needs, rather than allowing them to be overshadowed by focusing narrowly on technological advancement.
In 2014, Prince released an album entitled Art Official Age, its title gesturing toward longstanding aesthetic ambivalences about art and artifice as well as toward modern preoccupations with the creep of computer‑mediated and algorithmic technologies into culture, politics, and daily life. The album’s first track, ‘Art Official Cage,’ depicts art as a great force for freedom in the future—a reflection of widely shared aspirations among contemporary creators. Will AI tools—Art Official Intelligence, extending the metaphor—lead us, as Prince hoped, into a new Art Official Age, or shackle us, as he feared, in an Art Official Cage? As AI rushes headlong into common use and law and policy struggle to keep pace, a return to bedrock principles offers an opportunity to step back and consider whether and how AI implementation can be adjusted, circumscribed, and/or redesigned in ways that might help bring forth a better creative future. Explicitly designing toward those principles, with attention and intention, could aid in minimizing the likelihood that Art Official Intelligence turns the coming age into a creative cage for artists and audiences.
Competing Interests
The authors have no competing interests to declare.
Authors’ Contributions
Author contributions are provided according to the CRediT (Contributor Role Taxonomy). CH contributed to conceptualization, investigation, methodology, resources, and writing—original draft preparation. MN contributed to the investigation, methodology, resources, and writing—review & editing. JHL contributed to conceptualization, supervision, and writing—review & editing. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
