Abstract
This article examines cybercrime law through the theoretical lens of the relational self, as articulated by Jonathan Herring. It argues that understanding harm in technology-facilitated offences requires moving beyond traditional classifications of cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled crimes, which focus on technology as an instrument or target. Instead, a relational perspective reveals that cyberviolence—such as image-based abuse, cyberstalking, and online harassment—inflicts not only physical or economic harm, but also emotional, psychological, and relational harms that affect victims’ autonomy, dignity, and capacity for trust. The analysis demonstrates how existing legal frameworks inadequately capture these harms, leading to misaligned classifications and limited remedies. Drawing on recent European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, the article highlights a growing judicial recognition of the continuity between online and offline violence and of cyberviolence as a structural, relational phenomenon. Integrating the relational self into cybercrime law can thus advance a fairer, human-rights-oriented approach to technological harms, human-rights-oriented approach to technological harms.