Abstract
This paper responds to Professor Jonathan Herring’s Montesquieu Lecture on ‘Criminal Law and the Relational Self: Rethinking Conceptions of Harm and Responsibility in an Interdependent World’ by reflecting on how the tension between individualised and relational conceptions of the self manifests in contract law. While the principle of freedom of contract and party autonomy might appear to exemplify individualistic legal thinking, this analysis shows that contractual relations are particularly relational in nature throughout their development and performance. The cornerstone principle of contract law – freedom of contract – is inherently relational rather than purely individualistic. While classical liberal thought framed party autonomy as the exercise of independent will, in practice, contractual engagement transforms and limits autonomy into a shared, relational reality structured by mutual dependence, fairness, and care. Through this lens, contractual freedom is not the expression of isolated self-interest but a process embedded in relationships that the law both recognises and regulates. The relational perspective emerges at various stages of the contractual relations and expresses a legal commitment to relational responsibility and the prevention of harm. In considering contract law through the relational self, the paper concludes that contract law should follow a vision of freedom to contract that is grounded in human interdependence and the promotion of caring relationships.