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Avoiding the Perfect Storm: Criminal Economies, Spoilers, and the Post-Conflict Phase in Colombia Cover

Avoiding the Perfect Storm: Criminal Economies, Spoilers, and the Post-Conflict Phase in Colombia

Open Access
|Jul 2015

Figures & Tables

Table 1

Typology of relationships between illegal actors and criminal economies. Source: Compiled by the author, based on Lupsha 1996.

Type of relationshipDescriptionActivities
PredatoryAppropriation of existing profits. Theft of legal or illegal products.
In the case of the guerrilla groups, activities are subordinate to political interests.
Theft and extortion of local populations and business people.
ParasiticControl of a series of profit-generating activities, generally through payment of illegal tax in exchange for ‘protection.’ Mediation functions with legal authorities.Charging of ‘taxes’ in exchange for protection.
SymbioticManagement of criminal relationships (influence on connections and transactions). Capacity to create nexus between legal and illegal, as well as formal and informal markets and businesses.
Political groups depend on criminal groups.
Regulation of the illegal market. Management of one or more links in the chain.
Table 2

Typology of relationships between the illegal actor, the criminal economy, and the territory. Source: Written by the author.

Competitive environmentAgreements/ArrangementsControl
PredatoryX
ParasiticX
SymbioticX
Figure 1

Interim Stabilization Measures (ISM). Source: Created by the author.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.fx | Journal eISSN: 2165-2627
Language: English
Published on: Jul 1, 2015
Published by: Department of Peace Studies and International Development, University of Bradford
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services

© 2015 Juan Carlos Garzón-Vergara, published by Department of Peace Studies and International Development, University of Bradford
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.