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Silencing Boko Haram: Mobile Phone Blackout and Counterinsurgency in Nigeria’s Northeast region Cover

Silencing Boko Haram: Mobile Phone Blackout and Counterinsurgency in Nigeria’s Northeast region

Open Access
|Mar 2015

Figures & Tables

Figure 1

ICT Access in Northeast Nigeria. Source: Nigeria Bureau of Statistics.

Figure 2

Comparative Expenditures on Average Monthly Non-Food Items in Households in Northeast Nigeria (in Naira, 2013). Source: Nigerian Bureau of Statistics & African Development Bank.

Table 1

List of Engagement Activities.

1.Have a mobile phone and use it consistently.
2.Have been a resident continually in their community in Adamawa state for the past one year (including the period of the mobile phone disruption).
3.Attended a political rally, speech, or organized protest of any kind.
4.Been an active member of any group that seeks to influence public policy or government.
5.Held or ran for political office.
6.Been a member of the Adamawa Peace Initiative or attended a public meeting on community peace-building or reconciliation matters.
7.Served on a committee for a local organization.
8.Met secretly or openly with other members of their network to seek the interests of the community.
Figure 3

Boko Haram incidences before, during and after the mobile phone shutdown in Northeast Nigeria. Source: Nigerian Military & CFR.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.ey | Journal eISSN: 2165-2627
Language: English
Published on: Mar 4, 2015
Published by: Department of Peace Studies and International Development, University of Bradford
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services

© 2015 Jacob Udo-Udo Jacob, Idorenyin Akpan, published by Department of Peace Studies and International Development, University of Bradford
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.