Figure 1
Annualized average CPA implementation rate.
Figure 2
One-sided violence in the post-CPA periods.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
| Variable | Obs. | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min. | Max. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CPA Implementation Rate | 323 | 63.47 | 22.14 | 2.22 | 100 |
| CPA Implementation Rate t–1 | 288 | 62.60 | 21.96 | 2.22 | 100 |
| All Actor One-Sided Violence | 323 | 74.73 | 287.27 | 0 | 3426 |
| All Actor One-Sided violence t–1 | 288 | 77.91 | 298.24 | 0 | 3426 |
| One-Sided Violence State | 323 | 20.96 | 203.01 | 0 | 3426 |
| One-Sided Violence State t–1 | 288 | 22.30 | 214.68 | 0 | 3426 |
| One-Sided Violence Rebels | 323 | 22.99 | 97.10 | 0 | 980 |
| One-Sided Violence Rebels t–1 | 288 | 22.08 | 87.05 | 0 | 980 |
| One-Sided Violence Non-State Actors | 323 | 30.78 | 158.78 | 0 | 2127 |
| One-Sided Violence Non-State Actors t–1 | 288 | 33.53 | 167.32 | 0 | 2127 |
| Conflict Type t–1 | 288 | 0.46 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Post-Accord Direct Violence t–1 | 288 | 162.25 | 436.68 | 0 | 3974 |
| Polity2 t–1 | 296 | 3.30 | 4.99 | –7 | 10 |
| GDP Growth Rate t–1 | 274 | 4.95 | 9.20 | –50.25 | 88.96 |
| Dispute Resolution Mechanism (0–3) t–1 | 288 | 1.36 | 1.39 | 0 | 3 |
| Power-sharing Government (0–3) t–1 | 288 | 1.08 | 1.30 | 0 | 3 |
| Verification Mechanism (0–3) t–1 | 288 | 1.99 | 1.30 | 0 | 3 |
| Donor Support (0–3) t–1 | 288 | 1.26 | 1.33 | 0 | 3 |
| United Nations Peacekeeping (0–3) t–1 | 288 | 0.95 | 1.37 | 0 | 3 |
Table 2
Effect of one-sided violence on CPA implementation.
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| All actors | Other non-state | Rebel | State | |
| One-Sided Violence | –0.106* | –0.334* | –0.376* | –0.158* |
| (0.038) | (0.169) | (0.180) | (0.078) | |
| Post-Accord Direct Violence t–1 | 0.005 | 0.016 | 0.031* | –0.011 |
| (0.007) | (0.010) | (0.013) | (0.012) | |
| Dispute Resolution Mechanism (0–3) t–1 | 8.343 | 7.200 | 9.386 | 8.260 |
| (6.743) | (9.305) | (5.998) | (8.651) | |
| Power-sharing Government (0–3) t–1 | 0.215 | –10.082 | –0.637 | 5.309 |
| (4.186) | (7.680) | (3.706) | (5.994) | |
| Verification Mechanism (0–3) t–1 | 12.514* | 22.771* | 17.868* | 5.251 |
| (6.297) | (10.234) | (6.214) | (8.754) | |
| Donor Support (0–3) t–1 | 10.406* | 10.642* | 5.815* | 11.348* |
| (3.368) | (4.684) | (3.126) | (4.477) | |
| United Nations Peacekeeping (0–3) t–1 | 3.483 | 11.279 | 17.977* | –5.748 |
| (7.663) | (11.050) | (9.254) | (11.107) | |
| Constant | 19.498 | 3.689 | –2.757 | 34.583 |
| (14.987) | (21.390) | (15.758) | (21.374) | |
| Observations | 256 | 256 | 256 | 256 |
| Number of Panels | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 |
| Wald chi2 | 1542.29 | 810.18 | 1970.13 | 936.07 |
| Prob>chi2 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Overall R2 | 0.254 | 0. 117 | 0.219 | 0.142 |
| VIF | 2.08 | 2.06 | 2.18 | 2.06 |
| Sargan-Hansen statistic (p-value) | 0.691 | 0.953 | 0.131 | 0.878 |
[i] Two tail tests, * p < .05. One-sided violence is an instrumented variable. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Figure 3
Marginal effects with 95% confidence interval.