Words, Species, and Kinds

J. T. M. Miller

doi:10.5334/met.70

Abstract

It has been widely argued that words are analogous to species such that words, like species, are natural kinds. In this paper, I consider the metaphysics of word-kinds. After arguing against an essentialist approach, I argue that word-kinds are homeostatic property clusters, in line with the dominant approach to other biological and psychological kinds.

References

Anderson, RP and Handley, CO. 2001. A new species of three-toed sloth (Mammalia: Xenarthra) from Panama, with a review of the genus Bradypus. Proceedings of the Biological Society of Washington, 114: 1–33.
Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Boyd, RN. 1990. Realism, approximate truth, and philosophical method. In: Savage, CW (ed.), Scientific theories, 355–391. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Boyd, RN. 1991. Realism, anti-foundationalism and the enthusiasm for natural kinds. Philosophical Studies, 61: 127–148. DOI: 10.1007/BF00385837
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Boyd, RN. 1999a. Kinds, complexity and multiple realization. Philosophical Studies, 95: 67–98. DOI: 10.1023/A:1004511407133
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Boyd, RN. 1999b. Homeostasis, species, and higher taxa. In: Wilson, RA (ed.), Species: New interdisciplinary essays, 141–185. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Boyd, RN. 2000. Kinds as the ‘‘workmanship of men’’: Realism, constructivism, and natural kinds. In: Nida-Rümelin, J (ed.), Rationalitat, Realismus, Revision: Vortra¨ge des 3. Internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft fur Analytische Philosophie, 52–89. Berlin: De Gruyter. DOI: 10.1515/9783110805703.52
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Boyd, RN. 2003a. Finite beings, finite goods: The semantics, metaphysics and ethics of naturalist consequentialism, Part I. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXVI: 505–553. DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00278.x
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Boyd, RN. 2003b. Finite beings, finite goods: The semantics, metaphysics and ethics of naturalist consequentialism, Part II. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXVII: 24–47. DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00024.x
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Brandom, R. 1994. Making It Explicit. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Bromberger, S. 1989. Types and Tokens in Linguistics. In: George, A (ed.), Reflections on Chomsky, 58–89. Basil Blackwell.
Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Burge, T. 1979. Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies In Philosophy, 4: 73–121. DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4975.1979.tb00374.x
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Cappelen, H. 1999. Intentions in Words. Nous, 33(1): 92–102. DOI: 10.1111/0029-4624.00143
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Ereshefsky, M. 2010. What’s Wrong with the New Biological Essentialism. Philosophy of Science, 77: 674–685. DOI: 10.1086/656545
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Ereshefsky, M and Reydon, TAC. 2015. Scientific Kinds. Philosophical Studies, 172: 969–986. DOI: 10.1007/s11098-014-0301-4
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Goodman, N. 1955. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UP.
Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Griffiths, PE. 1997. What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226308760.001.0001
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Irmak, N. 2019. An Ontology of Words. Erkenntnis, 84(5): 1139–1158. DOI: 10.1007/s10670-018-0001-0
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Kaplan, D. 1990. Words. Aristotelian Society Supplementary, 64: 93–119. DOI: 10.1093/aristoteliansupp/64.1.93
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Kaplan, D. 2011. Words on Words. Journal of Philosophy, 108(9): 504–529. DOI: 10.5840/2011108926
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Katz, JJ. 2000. Realistic Rationalism. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Machery, E. 2009. Doing Without Concepts. New York: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306880.001.0001
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Miller, JTM. 2020a. On the Individuation of Words. Inquiry. Online first. DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2018.1562378
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Miller, JTM. 2020b. The Ontology of Words: Realism, Nominalism, and Eliminativism. Philosophy Compass, 15(7): 1–13. DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12691
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Miller, JTM. 2021. A Bundle Theory of Words. Synthese, 198: 5731–5748. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-019-02430-3
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Nefdt, RM. 2019. The ontology of words: A structural approach. Inquiry, 62(8): 877–911. DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2018.1562967
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Peregrin, J. 2008. Inferentialist Approach to Semantics. Philosophy Compass, 3: 1208–1223. DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00179.x
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Putnam, H. 1975. The meaning of ‘meaning’. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 7: 131–193.
Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Rieppel, O. 2010. New Essentialism in Biology. Philosophy of Science, 77(5): 662–673. DOI: 10.1086/656539
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Samuels, R and Ferreira, M. 2010. Why don’t concepts constitute a natural kind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33: 222–223. DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12691
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Szabó, Z. 1999. Expressions and their representations. The Philosophical Quarterly, 49(195): 145–163. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00134
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Taylor, H. 2018. Emotions, concepts and the indeterminacy of natural kinds. Synthese, 197(5): 2073–2093. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-018-1783-y
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Taylor, H. 2019. Whales, fish and Alaskan bears: interest-relative taxonomy and kind pluralism in biology. Synthese, 198(4): 3369–3387. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-019-02284-9
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Wetzel, L. 2006. Types and Tokens. In: Zalta, EN (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition).
Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Wetzel, L. 2009. Types and Tokens: An Essay on Abstract Objects. Boston, MA: MIT Press. DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262013017.001.0001
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article
Wilson, R, Barker, M and Brigandt, I. 2007. When Traditional Essentialism Fails: Biological Natural Kinds. Philosophical Topics, 35(1/2): 189–215. DOI: 10.5840/philtopics2007351/29
Open DOI Search in Google Scholar Back to article

Words, Species, and Kinds

Abstract

Paradigm

My account