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Making Nations Great Again: National Narcissism and the Left, the Right, and the Extreme in the European Context Cover

Making Nations Great Again: National Narcissism and the Left, the Right, and the Extreme in the European Context

Open Access
|Feb 2024

References

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/irsp.844 | Journal eISSN: 2397-8570
Language: English
Submitted on: Jun 29, 2023
Accepted on: Jan 23, 2024
Published on: Feb 12, 2024
Published by: Ubiquity Press
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 1 issue per year

© 2024 Marina Maglić, Tomislav Pavlović, Renata Franc, published by Ubiquity Press
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.