Figure 1
Institutional foundations of behaviour.
Figure 2
Transaction system of mining licensing and intertransactional linkages.
Table 1
Example institutional statements.
| Actor | Institutional statement | Implied transaction system attributes |
|---|---|---|
| Public | No one [at the local community] understands geology […] Because of that it is the easiest to shout about the environment. It’s very important to conduct the EIA.1 It’s a legal requirement. That’s why we always tell the company, conduct an EIA […] Otherwise, the company will be blamed for everything. | Highly complex and human asset specific transaction system; capacity not prevalent at the local level Low measurability/observability which can be increased by EIA; low de facto legitimacy of EIA, hence the need to underline the need to conduct it Low jointness of the focal transaction |
| Private | Government in Bishkek grants you the license and then you arrive in the village, as if it is a completely different government. | Distance between partners highly influential; increases uncertainty of the transaction system Focal transaction has low de facto legitimacy |
| Non-profit | Incompetent people work in the inspection and [there is] corruption: if only […the company] were to be blamed, mine would have been shut down long ago and not been able to dump waste rock on glacier. Someone issued the permission. | Condition of high human asset specificity not fulfilled by state actors High functional interdependence of the transaction system with corruption and weak law enforcement |
Figure 3
Regularities of behaviour as shades of conflict.