Table 1
Summary and description of potential conditions.
| CONDITION | DESCRIPTION | |
|---|---|---|
| Organisational governance (GOV) | ||
| 1 | The CLT is independent (IND) | |
| This condition refers to the effective operation of formal mechanisms enabling the CLT to determine the extent of the property rights related to their shared resource. To satisfy the condition, the rule-making rights of community members must be respected by outside authorities, and the CLT has the ability to determine what the rights to the resource are, who has those rights and how they can be used. Independence also implies accountability and formal systems for monitoring behaviour, aligning with principles of effective governing in the commons (Ostrom, 1990). | ||
| 2 | Seat(s) on the CLT’s board have been reserved for external stakeholder(s) (RS) | |
| Across CLTs, a tripartite governance model is prominent though not ubiquitous, where influence through the CLT’s board is divided between: CLT residents and members; representatives from the wider community unconnected to the CLT; and external stakeholders, whose primary occupation is separate. Some US studies challenge this route to securing community control (Lowe & Thaden, 2015); describing the tripartite governance structure as ‘merely necessary but not sufficient’ (DeFilippis et al., 2018, pp. 759). Variance within governance models included not reserving seats for external stakeholders. | ||
| Wider mobilisation and engagement (COMM) | ||
| 3 | At its inception, the CLT was supported by an active civil society (CS) | |
| As CLTs expand in number and under conditions of urgency, such as housing shortage or gentrification, active support from civil society may be absent. CLTs may instead rely upon a core group of committed volunteers or be kick-started by an external interest, such as a housing association, local government or private organisation (Moore & McKee, 2012). | ||
| 4 | The CLT sustains community engagement (SCE) | |
| This condition relates to the CLT’s contribution to local civic life through sustained engagement with the wider community (those individuals or organised groups who are not residents or members of the CLT, but who have a vested interest, for example by living locally). Participation and inclusion have been identified as success conditions for institutional governance arrangements for managing the commons (Barnett et al., 2020). For CLTs whose inception was not supported by an active civil society, such engagement may only be fostered over the longer-term. Equally, sustaining such engagement ‘may be hard to guarantee’ (Midheme & Moulaert, 2013, pp. 73). | ||
| Portfolio (PORT) | ||
| 5 | The CLT has expanded its portfolio (EP) | |
| This condition considers the expansion of the CLT’s portfolio of resources beyond those present at inception; for example, through additional housing units. Despite a growing tendency towards expansion, the understanding of CLTs as empowering a specific place-based community, remains influential (Williams, 2018). Expansion of a CLT may indicate a changing scale rather than a changing mission, but some commentators argue that expansion to ‘out run’ gentrification or ensure organisational survival, can reduce a CLTs ability to represent place-based populations, undermining community control (DeFilippis et al., 2018). | ||
| 6 | The CLT has diversified its revenue stream (DP) | |
| This condition considers the diversification of the CLT’s portfolio beyond its initial focus; for example, into other commercial ventures. Diversification can indicate alignment with community control, for example showing responsiveness to community demand; but such logics may also mitigate against community control and sustainability. | ||
| Support and professional capacity (EXT) | ||
| 7 | The CLT received significant external support (ES) | |
| The value of external support, such as political influence, technical advice and financing, to acquiring properties over the long-term, has been long-acknowledged (Williams, 2018). Yet, partnering with local government, housing associations or other agencies can also dilute the foundational intentions of securing community control, and potentially disconnect CLTs from the communities they seek to empower (DeFilippis et al., 2018). | ||
| 8 | The CLT directly employs professional capacity (PC) | |
| Whilst CLTs rely on volunteering, the complex nature of purchasing and developing land, and managing assets, has meant that professional capacity is also recognised as enabling CLTs to survive and retain community control (Moore & McKee, 2012). This condition focuses on the CLT’s capacity to employ people whose primary occupation is stewardship of the CLT. Some CLTs are merging or partnering with established bodies such as housing associations1 to access this professional capacity (Moore and Northcott, 2010; Moore & McKee, 2012). Yet the professionalisation of the CLT is claimed to present a trade-off with community control (DeFilippis et al., 2018, Westerink et al., 2020), and introduces the risk of capture by larger voluntary organisations or local government that may crowd out more radical propositions for the CLT (Robinson, 2020). | ||
[i] 1 Non-profit organisations that manage and rent housing to people often on low incomes or with particular needs.
Table 2
‘Truth table’ of community land trusts (CLTs) by ‘logical types’.
| LOGICAL TYPE # | GOV | COMM | PORT | EXT | CASE | N | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. IND | 2. RS | 3.CS | 4. SCE | 5. EP | 6. DP | 7. ES | 8. PC | |||
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | Anchorage | 1 |
| 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Athens | 1 |
| 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Cashes Green | 1 |
| 4 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Champlain, Foundation East, Rondo | 3 |
| 5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | Chicago | 1 |
| 6 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Christow, Corry Valley, Powerstock & District, Upper Culm | 4 |
| 7 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | City of Lakes, London, San Francisco | 3 |
| 8 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Cooper Square | 1 |
| 9 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | Cornwall | 1 |
| 10 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Dudley Street, Granby Four Streets, Homebaked | 3 |
| 11 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Durham | 1 |
| 12 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Holy Island | 1 |
| 13 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Lopez | 1 |
| 14 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | Lyvennet, Norton-sub-Hamdon | 2 |
| 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Northern California, Thistle | 2 |
| 16 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | Proud Ground | 1 |
| 17 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | Queen Camel | 1 |
| 18 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Toller Porcorum | 1 |
Table 3
Conceptual typology of community land trusts.
| TYPE | HOUSING PROVISION AS A MEANS TO | PROPENSITY FOR COMMUNITY CONTROL | ORGANISATIONAL GOVERNANCE | CONNECTION TO COMMUNITY | EXPANSION AND DIVERSIFICATION | EXTERNAL AND PROFESSIONAL SUPPORT | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Urban activist | Enrich community politics | Greater | CLTs are independent, and may or may not have reserved board seats for external stakeholders | Civil society mobilised for inception. Community engagement is sustained. | CLTs do expand, but may or may not diversify. | CLTs may or may not receive external support at inception/employ professional capacity. |
| 2 | Hyper-local rural | Conserve community life | Greater | CLTs are independent, and do not have reserved board seats for external stakeholders | Civil society may or may not be mobilised for inception. Community engagement is sustained | CLTs may expand, but remain very small and highly local. Diversification where present is often to preserve core local infrastructure. | CLTs do receive external support at inception and do not employ professional capacity. |
| 3 | Partnered | Create participatory governance | Varied | CLTs may or may not be independent, and may or may not have reserved board seats for external stakeholders | Civil society may or may not be mobilised for inception. Community engagement may or may not be sustained. | CLTs do expand and diversify. | CLTs do receive external support at inception and may or may not employ professional capacity, which may be provided by the partner organisation. |
| 4 | Social enterprise | Contribute to the social economy | Lesser | CLTs are not independent, and do not have reserved board seats for external stakeholders | Civil society is not mobilised and community is not engaged. | CLTs at risk of over-expansion and diversification. | CLTs do receive external support at inception and employ professional capacity. |
| 5 | Asset-lock | Secure an asset-lock for wider provision of affordable housing | Lesser | CLTs are not independent, and do have reserved board seats for external stakeholders | CLTs do expand and diversify. | ||