Table 1
Bundle of Rights Model by Schlager & Ostrom (1992).
| COMMUNITY MEMBERS* | OUTSIDE OF COMMUNITY* | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| OWNER | PROPRIETOR | CLAIMANT | AUTHORIZED USER | |
| Access and Withdrawal | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Management | ○ | ○ | ○ | |
| Exclusion | ○ | ○ | ||
| Alienation | ○ | |||
[i] * These distinctions are not in the table of Schlager & Ostrom (1992, p. 252) but have been added by the authors.
Table 2
Bundle of Rights Reversed: The Structure of Property Rights in Japanese Common Property Forests with Multiple Co-owners.
| WITHIN THE COMMUNITY | OUTSIDE THE COMMUNITY | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| OLD VILLAGERS | NEW VILLAGERS | EX-VILLAGERS | DESCENDANTS OF EX-VILLAGERS | |
| Use and Access | ○ | With Conditions | ||
| Burdens of Management | ○ | With Conditions | Rarely | |
| The Right to Exclude | ○ | ○ | ○ | |
| Ownership | ○ | ○ | ○ | |
Table 3
Characteristics of the groups that hold common property forests, N = 12,071, 2000 census.
| REGISTERED NAME | HOLDING AREA(ha) | PROPORTION OF PLANTED AREA (%) | NUMBER OF COMMONERS | N(%) | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MEAN | SD | MEAN | SD | MEAN | SD | ||
| Multiple co-owners | 43.1 | 82.1 | 43.5 | 41.3 | 53.6 | 81.2 | 2684(22.2%) |
| Shrine & temple | 43.6 | 96.4 | 44.9 | 40.5 | 143.5 | 253.9 | 540(4.5%) |
| Cooperatives | 100.7 | 269.9 | 58.7 | 38.7 | 138.4 | 503.8 | 2318(19.2%) |
| Company | 81.2 | 114.4 | 38.3 | 35.8 | 75.6 | 94.2 | 43(0.4%) |
| Territorial unit | 61.3 | 151 | 45.3 | 39.8 | 96.2 | 215.8 | 5216(43.2%) |
| Property district | 218.1 | 1244 | 50.1 | 39.9 | 455.6 | 716 | 1270(10.5%) |
| Total | 80.6 | 437.2 | 47.9 | 40.3 | 134.7 | 374.3 | 12071(100%) |
Table 4
Characteristics of the groups that hold common property forests, N = 1,440, 1975 national survey.
| REGISTERED NAME | HOLDING AREA(ha) | NUMBER OF COMMONERS | CASES THAT HAVE PLANTED FORESTS | N(%) | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MEAN | SD | MEAN | SD | N | % | ||
| Multiple co-owners | 94.1 | 142.0 | 70.7 | 81.8 | 469 | 79.9% | 587(40.8%) |
| Representatives | 85.7 | 158.6 | 83.6 | 95.8 | 168 | 82.4% | 204(14.2%) |
| Shrine & temple | 70.7 | 122.2 | 118.3 | 124.2 | 19 | 73.1% | 26(1.8%) |
| Cooperatives | 119.0 | 212.9 | 153.5 | 152.2 | 50 | 98.0% | 51(3.5%) |
| Company | 129.9 | 124.5 | 203.0 | 199.5 | 29 | 93.5% | 31(2.2%) |
| Territorial unit | 87.8 | 175.5 | 115.6 | 144.8 | 222 | 76.8% | 289(20.1%) |
| Property district | 275.3 | 781.7 | 174.3 | 177.0 | 69 | 83.1% | 83(5.8%) |
| Governments | 175.3 | 281.9 | 124.3 | 158.5 | 115 | 69.3% | 166(11.6%) |
| Total | 112.7 | 258.5 | 99.9 | 125.8 | 1141 | 79.4% | 1437(100%) |
Figure 1
Theoretical framework of the data analysis.
Table 5
Descriptive statistics for explained variables: the groups that hold common property forest, N = 12,071, 2000 census.
| VARIABLES | MEAN | SD |
|---|---|---|
| Area size where forestry activities were carried out (ha) | 2.53 | 8.58 |
| Area size contracted out to others (ha) | 4.08 | 53.47 |
| NUMBER | % | |
| Cases in which any forestry activities were done | 4581 | 38.0% |
| Cases that contract out a certain area to others *a | 906 | 7.5% |
| Cases in which the commission of forestry activities was done*b | 1878 | 15.6% |
| Cases that utilize others’ forces for forest management (either a or b) | 2482 | 20.6% |
Table 6
Correlation coefficients between scale variables, N = 12,071, 2000 census.
| AREA | PLANTED AREA | COMMONERS | CONTRACTED | FORESTRY ACTIVITIES | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Area size of holding forest | – | ||||
| Rate of planted area | –.050** | ||||
| Number of commoners | .111** | .035** | |||
| Area size contracted out to others | .135** | .001 | .062** | ||
| Area size where forestry activities were done | .097** | .142** | .172** | .070** | – |
[i] **: p < .001
Figure 2
Categories of the rights of ex-villagers by registered names, N = 1,440, 1975 national survey.
Cramer’s V = .196.
Figure 3
Categories of the rights of ex-villagers by registered names, N = 12,071, 2000 census.
Cramer’s V = .308.
Table 7
Comparison of average proportions of planted area as per the rights of ex-villagers, N = 12,071, 2000 census.
| RULE | MEAN | MEDIAN | SD |
|---|---|---|---|
| Keeping rights (n = 3,865) | 45.6% | 37.0% | 41.3 |
| Out of rights (n = 8,196) | 49.0% | 46.4% | 39.9 |
Table 8
Rates of forestry activities and utilization of others’ forces by area size and registered names, N = 12,071, 2000 census.
| ANY FORESTRY ACTIVITIES | UTILIZATION OF OTHERS’ FORCE | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AREA SIZE | REGISTERED NAME | DONE | NOT DONE | CRAMER’S V & P VALUE | DONE | NOT DONE | CRAMER’S V & P VALUE |
| 10~30ha | Multiple co-owners(n = 1725) | 23.0% | 77.0% | Cramer’s V = .149 p < .001 | 11.4% | 88.6% | Cramer’s V =.118 p < .001 |
| Shrine & temple(n = 378) | 32.5% | 67.5% | 17.2% | 82.8% | |||
| Cooperatives(n = 918) | 44.1% | 55.9% | 21.6% | 78.4% | |||
| Company(n = 15) | 53.3% | 46.7% | 26.7% | 73.3% | |||
| Territorial unit(n = 2758) | 29.7% | 70.3% | 12.3% | 87.7% | |||
| Property district(n = 372) | 36.3% | 63.7% | 22.8% | 77.2% | |||
| Total (n = 6166) | 30.6% | 69.4% | 14.4% | 85.6% | |||
| 30~100ha | Multiple co-owners(n = 445) | 27.2% | 72.8% | Cramer’s V = .186 p < .001 | 13.7% | 86.3% | Cramer’s V = .156 p < .001 |
| Shrine & temple(n = 76) | 32.9% | 67.1% | 25.0% | 75.0% | |||
| Cooperatives(n = 395) | 54.9% | 45.1% | 27.3% | 72.7% | |||
| Company(n = 8) | 50.0% | 50.0% | 37.5% | 62.5% | |||
| Territorial unit(n = 939) | 37.3% | 62.7% | 14.8% | 85.2% | |||
| Property district(n = 188) | 39.3% | 60.6% | 27.7% | 72.3% | |||
| Total(n = 2051) | 38.6% | 61.4% | 18.6% | 81.4% | |||
| 100ha~ | Multiple co-owners(n = 514) | 34.2% | 65.8% | Cramer’s V = .232, p < .001 | 19.3% | 80.7% | Cramer’s V = .207 p < .001 |
| Shrine & temple(n = 86) | 31.4% | 68.6% | 23.3% | 76.7% | |||
| Cooperatives(n = 1005) | 64.5% | 35.5% | 39.5% | 60.5% | |||
| Company(n = 20) | 65.0% | 35.0% | 60.0% | 40.0% | |||
| Territorial unit(n = 1519) | 41.6% | 58.4% | 24.4% | 75.6% | |||
| Property district(n = 710) | 57.5% | 42.5% | 44.2% | 55.8% | |||
| Total(n = 3854) | 49.4% | 50.6% | 31.4% | 68.6% | |||
| All | Multiple co-owners(n = 2684) | 25.8% | 74.2% | Cramer’s V = .213 p < .001 | 13.3% | 86.7% | Cramer’s V = .197 p < .001 |
| Shrine & temple(n = 540) | 32.4% | 67.6% | 19.3% | 80.7% | |||
| Cooperatives(n = 2318) | 54.8% | 45.2% | 30.3% | 69.7% | |||
| Company(n = 43) | 58.1% | 41.9% | 44.2% | 55.8% | |||
| Territorial unit(n = 5216) | 34.5% | 65.5% | 16.3% | 83.7% | |||
| Property district(n = 1270) | 48.6% | 51.4% | 35.5% | 64.5% | |||
| Total(n = 12071) | 38.0% | 62.0% | 20.6% | 79.4% | |||
Table 9
Logistic regression analysis (mixed effects model) with any forestry activities done as the explained variable, N = 12,071, 2000 census.
| MODEL 1 | MODEL 2 | MODEL 3 | MODEL 4 | MODEL 5 | MODEL 6 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (Intercept) | 0.505*** | 0.576*** | 0.592*** | 0.640*** | 0.632*** | 0.556*** |
| Area size*a | 1.237*** | 1.191*** | 1.221*** | 1.186*** | 1.186*** | 1.201*** |
| Rate of planted forest*b | 1.650*** | 1.635*** | 1.641*** | 1.631*** | 1.629*** | 1.627*** |
| Number of commoners | 1.211*** | 1.165*** | 1.165*** | 1.138*** | 1.140*** | 1.172*** |
| Title: Multiple co-owners | 0.532*** | 0.582*** | 0.638*** | |||
| Rule: Keeping the rights | 0.626*** | 0.692*** | 0.727*** | |||
| Multiple co-owners ∧ Keeping the rights | 0.815* | 0.437*** | ||||
| AIC | 14935.722 | 14789.889 | 14829.495 | 14728.88 | 14727.193 | 14786.125 |
| BIC | 14972.715 | 14834.28 | 14873.886 | 14780.67 | 14786.382 | 14830.516 |
| Log Likelihood | –7462.861 | –7388.945 | –7408.747 | –7357.44 | –7355.597 | –7387.063 |
| Num. obs. | 12071 | 12071 | 12071 | 12071 | 12071 | 12071 |
| Num. groups: Prefectures | 47 | 47 | 47 | 47 | 47 | 47 |
| Var: Prefectures*c (Intercept) | 0.232 | 0.224 | 0.21 | 0.211 | 0.211 | 0.22 |
[i] *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
a, b We standardized these variables before the regression.
c We used this variable to measure the impact of prefectural policies on forests.
Figure 4
The rate of forestry activities done with ex-villagers keeping rights, N = 12,041, 2000 census.
φ = .122, p < .001.
Figure 5
The rate of utilization of others’ forces with ex-villagers keeping their rights, N = 12,041, 2000 census.
φ = .083, p < .001.
Figure 6
The rate of forestry activities done with registered names and ex-villagers keeping their rights, N = 12,041, 2000 census.
Cramer’s V = .235, p < .001.
Figure 7
The rate of utilization of others’ forces done with registered names and ex-villagers keeping their rights, N = 12,041, 2000 census.
Cramer’s V = .208, p < .001.