Table 1
Practices encouraged by the ‘Prime-Vert’ and ALUS program.
| ‘Prime-Vert’ | ALUS | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Hedgerows |
| High ecological value |
|
| Extended riparian strips |
| ||
| Infrastructure favouring Biodiversity |
| Medium ecological value |
|
| Low ecological value |
| ||
Table 2
Components of the institutional statements of the Institutional grammar tool (Sidikki et al. 2012 Carter et al. 2016).
| Institutional statement component | Description | |
|---|---|---|
| A | Attribute | Organization or actors who can/should/must conduct an action |
| B | Object | Organization or actor who receives the action |
| D | Deontic | Verbal mode indicating if an action is permitted, obliged or forbidden. |
| I | Aim | The action, the goal of the action and how it should be conducted |
| C | Conditions | Restrictions and conditions of action, such as the “when”, “where”, “if”, and “unless”. |
| O | Or else | Sanctions or consequences for non-compliance |
Table 3
Description of the rule typology of the IAD and the content analysis questions adapted from Barton el al. 2017.
| Rule Type | Description | Analytical questions |
|---|---|---|
| Position rules | They define the role played by each actor. They determine the minimum or maximum number of actors for a given position (participants, administrators, etc.) |
|
| Boundary rules | They identify the prerequisites (e.g. characteristics, skills, possessions) for individuals to be eligible to hold a particular position. |
|
| Choice rules | They specify the actions an actor should or should not take. Often, such rules also indicate the conditions that affect what an actor must or must not do. |
|
| Aggregation rules | They determine the actions that involve two or more individuals, and set the conditions for collaboration and decision making |
|
| Information rules | They indicate the permitted channels of communication between actors, the manner by which information flows, and what form of information is allowed. |
|
| Pay off rules | They assign rewards and sanctions to specific actors. |
|
| Scope | They identify the outcomes, goals or results of the actions. They may include the parameters, the range or the variables to measure the desired outcome. |
|
Table 4
Number of beneficiaries, number of projects and amounts disbursed by the ‘Prime-Vert’ program (2013–2018).
| Region | Number of farmers | Number of projects | Total funding | Number of farms in the region1 | Percentage of Adoption2 (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Monteregie | 695 | 887 | 3,947,243 | 6,748 | 10.30 |
| Quebec total | 2,132 | 2,903 | 17,089,070 | 28,919 | 7.37 |
[i] Source: MAPAQ, 2017. Data obtained from an access to information request.
1 Number of farms according to the Agricultural Census 2016. Source: Statistiques Canada.
2 This percentage represents the ratio between the number of beneficiaries and of the Volet 1 of the program in the region and the total number of farms.
Table 5
Breakdown of funded projects and financial assistance disbursed by the type of agri-environmental practices from 2013–2018 in Quebec.
| Practice | Number of projects | Funding (CA$) | Percentage of total projects | Percentage of total funding |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Acquisition and improvement of equipment to reduce pesticide risk | 1,738 | 6 589 795,00 $ | 59.87% | 38.56% |
| Soil conservation | 449 | 2 470 708,00 $ | 15.47% | 14.46% |
| Hedgerows | 343 | 1 070 956,00 $ | 11.82% | 6.27% |
| Biodiversity conservation projects | 48 | 220 959,00 $ | 1.65% | 1.29% |
| Expanded riparian strips | 52 | 191 948,00 $ | 1.79% | 1.12% |
| Alternatives installations | 178 | 3 376 700,00 $ | 6,13% | 19,76% |
| Aeration of irrigation ponds | 24 | 43 760,00 $ | 0.83% | 0.26% |
| Management of residual organic matter and liquid effluents from plant production | 46 | 2 134 107,00 $ | 1.58% | 12,49% |
| Alternative installations in Beef Cattle Production | 10 | 108 137,00 $ | 0.34% | 0.63% |
| Manure storage structures for biogas treatment | 15 | 882 000,00 $ | 0.52% | 5.16% |
| Total | 2,903 | 17 089 070,00 $ | 100 | 100 |
[i] Source: MAPAQ, 2017. Data obtained from an access to information request.
Figure 1
Interactions between the governance structure of the public ‘Prime-Vert’ scheme and the private PES (ALUS) as detailed by the rules in use of the IAD framework. In order to increase the participation of farmers for the provision of ecosystem services, ALUS (PES) relies first on the institutions and governance structure of the public scheme (e.g. ‘Prime-Vert’).