Delenda Est Castrist Cuba*

The revolutionary laws and the Criminal Code

We have already seen that Cuba was a thriving economy in 1958. It was a major sugar producer, with modern sugar mills and a fairly diversified agricultural sector – given its subtropical climate – capable of exporting to the United States. It had nickel mines with their own processing plant. And a rapidly developing tourism industry. It was the third country with the third-highest per capita income in the whole of the Americas. And it boasted a respected healthcare system, a high standard of education and a first-rate publishing sector.

It had a per capita income of $352, compared with $200 in Spain. Twenty-three per cent of its population were illiterate, compared with 32 per cent in Spain in the year prior to Fidel Castro’s ‘triumph’.

The destruction of Cuban society and the economy took place at a rapid pace between 1959 and 1970.

From an economic perspective, all domestic and foreign companies and all agricultural land exceeding 67 hectares were nationalised and expropriated; although, somewhat later, the crops and prices of what the non-expropriated peasants produced were fixed, and they were integrated into agricultural organisations led by revolutionaries.

The most far-reaching law governing the Cuban economy – which explains the poverty in which Cubans live – was published in 1968.

On 13 March of that year, Fidel stated: “… we must further boost productive effort; we must root out selfishness, individualism and all forms of parasitism and exploitation”. Within a few days, all private industrial and commercial establishments were nationalised; in the words of Fidel Castro, these were “nests of the privileged who live off the labour of others, watching as others work”. All shops, workshops and warehouses were closed. In Havana alone, 13,000 private establishments were closed in March 1968. By April 1968, the private sector had ceased to exist.

That same year, Fidel Castro took direct control of the organisation of sugar production. He set out to produce 10 million tonnes of sugar by 1970. The whole country was brought to a standstill in order to achieve this. It was an utter failure, despite the contribution of Nobel laureates, such as J. P. Sartre, and a host of left-wing leaders from around the world, who came to cut sugar cane in solidarity with Fidel Castro.

All these decisions were not mistakes or accidents; they were a clear reflection of the fact that, for Castro and his henchmen, the crucial thing was that no one—no individual, family or company—should be independent. For all of them, independence and initiative, whether personal or corporate, were enemies of the Revolution, because such freedom, if it resulted in any form of private savings, could give rise to ideological positions incompatible with their ‘revolution’. All Cubans had to live on what the State provided them with. And ‘each person would be given according to the value of their contribution’.

In the words of Fidel Castro from September 1967, published in the *Nouvel Observateur*:‘…I am opposed to material incentives, because I consider them incompatible with socialism… What we want is to demystify money, not to rehabilitate it. We even intend to abolish it entirely… The law of value makes sense in capitalist society, where the economy is based on profit. It has none whatsoever in a socialist society. We, who are in a period of transition to socialism, have no reason to resign ourselves to the economic laws of capitalism, as if our aim were merely to manage the old system more efficiently. We have discussed this point at length and have decided to free ourselves as quickly as possible from the shackles of the market. Our planning must be based on ‘labour value’ and not on misleading calculations of profitability or profit. We are going to abolish all financial accounting in transactions between socialist enterprises.”

During those first eleven years of the Castro regime, Cuba survived by exploiting the resources invested in enterprises, housing and infrastructure by the people who lived in Cuba until 1958. And through the subsidies and aid that the USSR was prepared to provide even in those early years, as proof and an example that the power of the United States was limited and waning. It was the Cold War. The USSR considered itself well rewarded by Castro’s anti-American and socialist propaganda around the world and by his armed interventions.

The destruction of Cuban society is reflected in the Penal Code in force even in those early years. I am referring to the 1963 Code of Social Defence, subsequently amended on numerous occasions – most notably in 1978 – and which remained in force until May 2022, further tightening the sanctions against dissent and private funding from abroad.

On 28 September 1977, Fidel referred to the offences he wished to “combat more resolutely”, emphasising gambling, prostitution, robbery and theft, which he described as “relics of the past”. The Code divides offences into common offences and political offences. He does not refer explicitly to the latter because they are termed ‘anti-social behaviour’.

The Castro regime’s Penal Code explicitly states:

“A person is considered to be a dangerous individual due to anti-social behaviour if they habitually, through acts of violence, or words, or gestures, or by other provocative or threatening means, or through their general behaviour, violate or endanger the rules of socialist coexistence, or flout the rights of others, or frequently disrupt the order of the community”.

Those who do so may be detained without trial. Article 137 states:

“Any person who, with the aim of undermining state security, manufactures, supplies, sells, transports, dispatches, brings into the country or possesses, in any form or place, flammable, explosive, asphyxiating or toxic materials, substances or instruments, or chemical or biological agents, or any other element from the combination of which products of the nature described may be derived, or any other substance or device suitable for carrying out acts of sabotage, shall be liable to a sentence of imprisonment for a term of ten to twenty years or the death penalty”.

Allow me to quote Article 473.1 of Law 1,262 (published in the Official Gazette No. 2 of 1974). These are not provisions of a Criminal Code intended to combat the enemies of the Revolution, but rather to instil fear in anyone who might think outside the bounds of Castro’s socialism.

“Any person who deliberately destroys, alters, damages, impairs, prevents or hinders the normal functioning of the following means, resources, facilities or socio-economic units shall be punished with imprisonment for a term of 5 to 20 years: energy sources, cold stores, depots or warehouses and other facilities intended for the storage of goods for use or consumption, educational establishments, public buildings, shops, hostels, or premises of political, social or recreational organisations. Basic industrial and agricultural equipment and resources, crops, forests, dams, utility poles and livestock; port or aviation facilities, ships or aircraft, supplies, equipment or accessories intended for those services”.

The article I have just quoted refers to all kinds of economic activities taking place in Cuba. To complete the picture of FEAR, another provision is needed: the one relating to common crimes.

Article 159 states: “Anyone who steals movable property belonging to another person, with the intention of making a profit, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term of 3 to 8 years, where the offence is accompanied by any of the following circumstances: entering or leaving the premises by a route not intended for that purpose; the use of a false key, or the use of a genuine key that has been stolen or found, or a lock pick or other similar instruments; breaking through a wall, ceiling or floor, or forcing open doors or windows, or their locks, latches or fastenings; breaking into cupboards and other types of furniture or objects that are locked or sealed, or in any other place, even if the breaking or use of force is not actually carried out; or the use of force on the property itself”. But even more significant, in terms of instilling fear in the population, is the following article, Article 520, which reads as follows:

“The penalty is imprisonment for a term of 10 to 30 years or the death penalty if any of the following circumstances apply to the acts referred to in the preceding article: where the offence is committed in an occupied dwelling; where the offence is carried out whilst the offender is unlawfully wearing the uniform of members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, or of any other armed force of the Republic, or whilst pretending to be a public official, or whilst displaying a false order or warrant from an authority; where the offence is committed by one or more persons acting as members of an organised group or gang; or with the participation of persons under 16 years of age, …where the property stolen is socialist, state or cooperative property, or that of social institutions, or personal property in the care of a state economic entity”.

Nothing escapes the Criminal Code, neither homosexuals (until 1997, when Article 303 of the Criminal Code was amended), nor farmers. Specifically, Article 529 states: “Any person who, without prior authorisation from the state body specifically empowered to do so, or outside legally established abattoirs or places authorised for slaughter, slaughters cattle, whether for sale or for personal consumption, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term of 2 to 5 years.”

With regard to political prisoners, on 20 October 1977, Fidel Castro declared: “We have a distinction between political prisoners and counter-revolutionary prisoners. A political prisoner is someone who is arrested and convicted for seeking to improve society, fighting for the good of humanity and for the progress of society. We do not hold the same view of those who fight to set society back. We refer to them as counter-revolutionary prisoners, who are imprisoned for committing crimes – specifically, serious crimes.” He continues: “80 per cent of the individuals we had imprisoned for counter-revolutionary offences are now free. Therefore, those who remain – there may be some new arrivals, I do not deny it, I do not deny it! – will be released through this programme (referring to political re-education programmes) and, in some cases, will be released once they have served their sentences.”

Fidel Castro’s ‘Guevarism’ is leading Cuba straight towards default and domestic inflation, as public deficits are covered by the National Bank of Cuba issuing banknotes, which in turn leads to the devaluation of the Cuban peso, which is trading on the black market at a rate of 3 to 1 against the official rate. This was the first of the major devaluations of the Cuban peso, a reflection of the hyperinflation that would henceforth never cease to affect Cubans.

In fact, the first suspension of payments had occurred in 1960, when the Castro regime repudiated the payment of all external and internal debts. No debts were recognised as legitimate. Furthermore, following the nationalisation of US assets through expropriations without financial compensation in 1962, this marked the inception of the US trade embargo against Cuba, which prohibits trade with Cuba and extends to most South American countries.

Based on the reliable data available, we know that in 1962, three years after the establishment of the Castro regime, Cuba’s GDP had fallen by 25 per cent compared with the figure recorded in 1958. There are no reliable statistics for the period between that year and 1970. According to official figures, GDP in 1970 stood at 5,690 million pesos. If we take into account the devaluation of the Cuban peso on the black market, in dollar terms this could amount to 1,896 million dollars, compared with 2,600 million dollars in 1958.

Nor is there any data on public deficits since 1962, as annual public budgets ceased to be drawn up. What is available are public expenditure figures covering government administration and the management of production by public enterprises across all economic sectors, as well as revenue from the sale of goods produced by the new public enterprise sector – with virtually none of the typical sources of revenue, as personal and corporation taxes had been abolished. In effect, the vast ‘State Enterprise of Cuba’ had been created. The other major item of expenditure, which appears in 1962, is that relating to the ration cards for the entire population, through which Cubans purchase goods at subsidised prices; these prices represent, directly, public expenditure in the amount of the subsidy.

Balance of payments deficits are covered by Soviet loans, which begin to accumulate in excess of the subsidies.

On 20 May 1970, Fidel Castro admitted, visibly moved, that the target of 10 million tonnes of sugar would not be met. His self-criticism became more pronounced in his speeches on 26 July and 28 September of that year. Castro announced that he would step down from the leadership of the country to be replaced by more capable people. But ‘the people’ opposed this. A resignation that never took place. In 2024, Pedro Sánchez threatened to do the same. The only difference is that Castro considered resigning because of his failure as a leader, whilst Pedro Sánchez did so for love.

Planning

But let us return to the world of planning. Cuban bureaucrats, content in their isolation from the rest of the non-Soviet world, never tire of explaining how the new economic system works and the difficulties it poses for them.

The planners’ first problem is how to set the prices of each and every good that is produced, traded and sold, both to Cubans and to buyers abroad. Law 1312 of 23 August 1976 stipulated that, from 1 January 1977, the prices in force on 31 March 1976 would apply. This involved more than 1 million official prices and tariffs.

To ensure that all company managers and heads of administrative bodies knew which prices to use, 29 volumes were printed, each containing over 300 pages. There were many products with different prices. How could they ensure that every person in charge applied the correct ones? A print run of 200 copies was produced and distributed to municipalities, provinces, ministries and other official bodies. There is no record of anyone consulting these prices or of any doubts regarding which prices to use being resolved.

An example of how these prices were at odds with reality can be seen in relation to Cuba’s most important product at the time: sugar.

In an official publication, without mincing words or holding back, the planning officials explain their difficulties: “We find ourselves in a situation where, for example, imported goods sold on the domestic market are still priced at 1968 levels. This is the case, for instance, with fuel and oil, to name but one.” “Well, we could start raising the prices of those products, because that phenomenon is occurring (…referring to inflation). But by raising the prices of those products – for companies in the sugar and other sectors… if we now increase the cost of their production inputs because they are imported, and we raise them for agriculture too – because fertiliser, pesticides and a range of other products are in a similar situation – then agriculture and the sugar industry, which are already unprofitable under current price conditions, would become even less profitable… Now, what should be done about this price problem? Can certain steps be taken before 1979 or 1980, or should we wait until those years to take action (referring to the New Fortnightly Plan)? These are matters yet to be decided…” In the best-case scenario, the prices of these products, including sugar, would remain frozen for another four years.

Nothing was ever decided. There were never any realistic prices. Everything was rigged. In reality, in order to function, quantities were adjusted. Each manager knew the amount of electricity, oil, glass, paper, steel… they needed to produce whatever it was. And they reached agreements on quantities to produce and to sell. A system, a practice, that could not cope with change. Nor were improvements possible if they involved changes to the quantities. Impossible. The consequence was the inability to improve or make adjustments. This was the ultimate reason for the failure of the USSR and its satellite states. Anecdotally, the most ‘troubling’ aspect is what happened to the East German economy. Western economists had taken East German statistics at face value; they believed it to be a fairly developed country, which perhaps encouraged Chancellor Kohl – alongside electoral considerations – to swap East German marks for West German marks at a rate of one to one, when on the black market the exchange rate was eight to one.

The second suspension of payments (1986) and those that followed

Finally, Cuba – a country under a blockade, according to the Cuban government and its staunch supporters around the world – suspended payments to Western countries in April 1986. Negotiations between the creditor countries – with Spain being the hardest hit – dragged on throughout the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. It was not until 2015 that the Paris Club decided to write off 8,500 million dollars in interest. A further 2,400 million owed to Spain and another 2,600 million owed to the remaining 13 members of the Paris Club were still outstanding, to be paid in instalments until 2033. Default on these new terms began again in 2019 and, for the third time, in 2021, Cuba suspended payments. Another suspension occurred in 2024, the penultimate one in 2025, and the last one took place in February 2026. This brings the total to six payment suspensions.

Cuba leased its army to the USSR

However, despite the suspension of payments in convertible currency, Cuba maintained its planned economy with the expected results. This was of no concern to either Fidel Castro or the senior Soviet officials. A new form of financing, independent of the conventional economy, had emerged – a new category of services in the balance of payments. Cuba sold the labour of its military personnel, and later that of doctors and teachers, and the USSR paid whatever had been agreed.

Cuba became the armed wing of Fidel Castro, the USSR and the most belligerent countries of Eastern Europe. In 1975, Cuba intervened in the Angolan war, which did not end until 1991. More than 400,000 Cuban soldiers and over 50,000 medical professionals and educators fought and collaborated with the Angolan Marxist regime. The Cuban army’s intervention was not limited to Angola. It played a decisive role in other countries, such as Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea and Oman, and was also present in the conflicts with Israel, supporting the Palestinians. Meanwhile, in 1973, Fidel Castro was touring Chile, demanding a coup d’état should Salvador Allende lose the forthcoming elections. He was also collaborating with Alvarado’s Marxists in Peru.

The cost of weapons and military logistics – apart from personnel costs – was paid directly by the USSR without going through the balance of payments.

It is estimated that, from the time the USSR replaced the United States as Cuba’s main trading and economic partner, the Cuban economy received enormous annual subsidies, amounting to around 25 per cent of GDP. In the case of sugar, the system mirrored that of the United States, purchasing a quota of tonnes at prices far higher than those on the international market. Likewise, it sold its oil to Cuba at prices well below international market rates and even allowed Cuba to sell any oil it had not used domestically on the international market. The same system was used for the purchase of Cuban nickel and for Cuban imports of foodstuffs, industrial goods and capital goods.

Venezuela’s system of subsidies to Cuba, which we shall examine later, mirrors that of the USSR for its oil, including the possible resale on the international market. When the USSR collapsed, it emerged that, in addition to these annual subsidies, the USSR’s trade credits to Cuba were several times greater than Cuba’s GDP in 1989. Gorbachev’s USSR began to demand repayment of the debt in 1989.

Fidel Castro’s disregard for figures and for the Cuban people

I can illustrate Fidel Castro’s disregard for the domestic economic situation with two incidents that occurred whilst I was head of the Trade Office in Havana. Spanish exports to Cuba in the 1970s were made on FOB terms, on Cuban-flagged vessels. In 1975, for at least four months, Spanish goods bound for Cuba were piling up on the quays of Spanish ports, whilst Spanish companies were unable to collect payment. The Cuban ships failed to turn up. The Cuban authorities insisted that their ships would arrive soon. Faced with this impasse, and together with the then Under-Secretary of State for Trade, Eduardo Peña, we persuaded the minister to publish a prominent advertisement in Madrid’s *Hoja del Lunes*, urging Spanish companies to lodge a protest so that they could claim compensation from the Cuban government. Fifteen days later, the ships turned up. We later learnt that the entire Cuban fleet was occupied with transporting weapons and fighters for the war in Angola. And so it continued throughout the year.

The Cuban economy ground to a halt that year. But it didn’t matter; the Russians paid willingly and the Cubans put up with it as best they could.

A second example of Fidel Castro’s disregard for the economy. In September 1978, Adolfo Suárez visited Cuba for two days. One of the planned events was a visit to a large cement plant in Mariel that had been supplied and built by a Spanish company. At the last minute, the visit was cancelled. Together with the Spanish businessmen, I travelled to Mariel to find out what had happened. The factory manager replied, looking dejected, that the plant was not operating because some of the electrical equipment had been sent to Angola and he had not been told when it would be replaced.

Speaking of contracts between Spanish companies and the relevant Cuban ministries, I must mention a clause that appeared in all contracts for all exporters, regardless of nationality. It expressly stated that it was ‘strictly forbidden to burn banknotes issued by the National Bank of Cuba’. It so happened that foreign workers, who were paid a portion of their wages in non-convertible Cuban pesos, were in the habit of burning all their surplus banknotes, as they could buy nothing with them and they were not convertible once their contracts had ended.

Control of emigration and the development of tourism

The new demands made by Soviet planners—which Fidel Castro reluctantly accepted in order to facilitate Cuba’s financing in convertible currency and its own economic growth—were the development of tourism and the control of emigration among professionals and university graduates.

The most important thing was to halt the emigration of Cuban professionals and university graduates. This is what was done. And this caused great unrest amongst those who wanted to flee the Cuban ‘paradise’. An incident involving six Cuban nationals who sneaked into the grounds of the Peruvian embassy on a bus, and the refusal of the Peruvian representatives to hand them over to the Cuban authorities, provoked the wrath of Fidel Castro, who decided to withdraw police protection from the Peruvian embassy. A stunned Fidel Castro was forced to watch as, within a few hours, more than 12,000 Cubans sought refuge on the embassy grounds. The crisis caused by this gathering of Cubans desperate to flee at any cost ended with Fidel Castro, in another fit of rage, authorising anyone who wished to leave to do so from the port of Mariel. Thousands of boats arrived from Florida. The exodus totalled 150,000 people. Fidel Castro took the opportunity to force the captains of these vessels to take on board a large number of prisoners convicted of common crimes and patients from psychiatric hospitals. This event is explored by Leonardo Padura in his latest book, *Morir en la arena*.

The desperation of the Cuban people was once again on public display in 1994 with the ‘rafters’ crisis. More than 35,000 Cubans were picked up by vessels from Florida.

Neither the Soviet bureaucrats nor the most ardent Castro supporters could ever have imagined that the one million Cubans who managed to leave Cuba between 1970 and 2018 – following the departure of the first 600,000 between 1959 and 1965 and the other group, of between one million and 1.5 million who left the island between 2020 and 2025, would become a source of convertible foreign currency for the perpetually bankrupt Castroist Republic of Cuba. The figures are not as opaque as they usually are, as transfers from the United States and other countries, such as Spain, have been made through banking and financial channels outside Cuba. The total figures, which we shall analyse later, far exceed the value of Cuba’s exports of goods, which remain the same as in 1959, except that sugar has now disappeared: nickel, cobalt, other minerals, tobacco, rum, some sugar and a few pharmaceutical products.

A second initiative was to allow the development of tourism. To this end, foreign capital was permitted to enter the country, enabling hotels to be built and operated whilst the government retained a majority stake, without recognising the right to ownership of the properties. Tourism gradually became a source of convertible foreign currency.

The sale of services abroad: the Cuban army

In 1975, the Cuban army arrived in Angola to defend the Marxist government. In 1978, the military intervention gave way to a more ambitious project; drawing in part on what they had learnt in Angola, Fidel Castro decided to embark on a new venture: the sale of medical, educational, security and military services to countries that had the foreign exchange to pay for them and whose ideology aligned with Castroism; in short, to dictatorships similar to Cuba’s.

In September 1978, during one of the official meetings between Fidel Castro and some of his ministers and President Adolfo Suárez—who was on a two-day official visit to Cuba, accompanied by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Marcelino Oreja, and the Under-Secretary for Trade, Carlos Bustelo, as well as Ambassador Suárez de Puga and some members of the Spanish embassy, among whom I was present— President Suárez informed Fidel Castro that, despite the efforts of Hispanoil – at that time the only Spanish oil company – little oil had been found in Cuban territorial waters, and what had been found was of poor quality and not easily extractable. Castro did not take long to reply: ‘It doesn’t matter’; ‘We don’t have oil, but we will earn the same foreign currency by graduating five thousand doctors a year and selling their services abroad’. Carlos Bustelo asked him what they would do with the doctors once they returned to Cuba after serving abroad. He did not reply. For Fidel Castro, it was clear that most of the doctors would never return to Cuba, for if they wanted to support their families, they would have no choice but to sell their services – paid for in convertible foreign currency by the government, and in Cuban pesos by the doctors themselves – in one of the many friendly countries that sought their services.

Speaking of visits by Spanish government officials, I would be remiss if I did not recount what happened to me personally when Nemesio Fernández Cuesta, a minister in the Arias Navarro government, arrived in late 1974, at a time when Franco was still the Head of State of Spain. It was the first visit by a Spanish minister to Cuba since independence in 1898. The purpose of the visit was to sign a new protocol under which Cuba undertook to sell Spain a large quantity of sugar at an agreed price at a time of severe shortage, whilst Spain granted loans for the sale of capital goods. As was his custom, Fidel Castro asked that the entire Spanish delegation, of which I was a part, be taken to a ‘protocol house’ run by the Cuban Government to meet the Spanish Minister for Trade. Aside from Castro’s thanks to Franco for having always kept trade and communications between Spain and Cuba open, despite pressure from the Americans, Castro turned up at three in the morning – another of his habits. At one point during the meeting, he asked for some Spanish wine to be brought to him. That was impossible at the time. However, as my house was just 100 metres from the protocol house, I offered to bring wine for everyone. With great difficulty, clutching six bottles of Cune red wine in both hands, I carried them to the aforementioned protocol house. His gigantic bodyguards took the six bottles from me. Meanwhile, Castro kept asking for his Spanish wine. It so happened that I suddenly came across a waiter who presented me with six glasses of wine, insisting that I try them all. I refused. I told the waiter that I would only try one. The head of security didn’t bat an eyelid. I drank one glass, the head of security another, a third was drunk by Cuba’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, a fourth by the Minister for Trade, and I cannot recall who drank the other two. And afterwards we all waited for at least half an hour to be sure that no one had been poisoned. Nothing happened, and Fidel Castro, without even saying thank you, single-handedly polished off a bottle in a matter of minutes.

Fidel Castro, the Soviet coup leader

Since 1986, Fidel Castro had made it clear that he did not agree with Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost. He reiterated time and again in his speeches that those policies would only serve to weaken his Revolution. In Cuba, between 1986 and 1991, there were no reforms whatsoever. Castro, drawing on his prestige as an anti-American leader, supported, members of the almost defunct USSR and the KGB who spent those years plotting against Gorbachev.

Gorbachev survived the coup, granted freedom to the countries of Eastern Europe and allowed member states of the USSR to secede if they so wished. Among those that seceded were Belarus and Ukraine, much to the despair of Putin, who at that time was a mid-level operative in East Germany. And it brought an end to the USSR’s special relationship with Cuba, mainly as punishment for its support of the coup, partly because Russia could no longer sustain Cuba economically, and, finally, because the Cold War had ended and they no longer needed an armed proxy to confront the United States around the world.

In July 1989, Fidel Castro ordered the execution by firing squad of General Ochoa – the most prestigious general in the Cuban army – and three of his most senior officers, accused of drug trafficking. The reason behind this decision has never been clear, although Fidel Castro’s track record – from his university days through to the elimination of all his political opponents both before and after 1959 – suggests that he was preparing to seize absolute power, not merely over the Communist Party but, specifically, over the army.

What is beyond doubt is that Cuba was trafficking in drugs. This would have been a further incentive for the agreement with the Venezuelan narco-state. It is impossible to believe that the Cuban army and security forces, which bolstered the Venezuelan dictatorship for 25 years, were not key players in that trafficking.

The inevitable consequence of the policy of military intervention in countless countries was the strengthening of the army. The army became the backbone of the Castro regime. By 1991, the era of the Guevarist revolutionaries, the Communist Party and its five-year plans had come to an end. It was the army’s time; from that moment on, it has controlled – and collected – revenue from tourism and remittances from Cubans abroad (until 2024) through GAESA, a company controlled by the generals closest to Fidel Castro. We shall look in more detail later at the way GAESA (Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A.) operates.

Taking stock of the economy

It was time to take stock of an economy that had adapted to Marxist–Leninist principles and Soviet-style five-year planning. An economy that, in four years, from 1991 to 1994, contracted by 36 per cent. A crisis in which Cubans suffered significant reductions in their ration cards. The vast majority went even hungrier. They continue to do so today.

Cuban agriculture was unable to supply even a minimum of the essential foodstuffs required to fulfil the entitlements on the ration cards.

The agricultural sector

He was the hardest hit from the very outset by Fidel Castro’s victory in 1959. Just as had happened with the Russian and Chinese Revolutions. Fidel Castro branded all peasant landowners with holdings above a minimum size (67 hectares in the case of Cuba) as counter-revolutionaries. They all lost their land, which became the property of the State.

Agricultural holdings were organised into state-run enterprises, state farms and cooperatives. Even those who had retained their land were forced to join cooperatives which dictated what they should produce, what they should buy and what they should sell - and at what price.

The result was a catastrophe, mitigated, in part, by the statistically recognised higher productivity of landowning farmers.

And, incredible as it may seem, the reforms needed since 1991 were implemented slowly and with major limitations. Instead of following the policies of Deng Xiaoping—whose first act was to dissolve state-run farms and cooperatives and give farmers the freedom to produce whatever they wished at market prices—they followed those of the new Russian Federation, which took three years to recognise private ownership in the agricultural sector.

The only part of the Cuban agricultural sector that was functioning in 1991 was the tobacco sector, which Fidel Castro respected for propaganda purposes and because it was capable of generating foreign exchange.

And the sector in the worst state was that dedicated to sugar cane cultivation. Castro’s obsession with sugar partly explains the nationalisation of the countryside, along with the expropriation of the 161 sugar mills that were in operation in 1959. Castro’s incompetence was such that he believed the countryside and the sugar mills would be capable of producing 10 million tonnes of sugar annually on a permanent basis, and that this output would give him control of the international sugar market. This folly became apparent during the 1970 harvest, which produced a mere 8.1 million tonnes at the cost of bringing the entire country to a standstill to achieve it. From 1991 onwards, sugar production began to decline. It was clear that it was not a viable industry without modern machinery, which Cuba lacked. Today, there are barely a dozen sugar mills left. The target for the most recent harvest, that of 2024/2025, was 265,000 tonnes. Actual production was only 150,000 tonnes. Cuba has started importing sugar.

The decline in sugarcane cultivation has not had the effect one might expect from its replacement by other crops. The Cuban countryside remains state-controlled, although concessions are granted to farmers who own or have usufruct rights over public land, allowing them to produce and sell their produce on the open market. Both sectors, however – public and private – have been subject since 1991 to restrictions that prevent them from improving. They have had no access to permits to purchase machinery, fertilisers, pesticides or fuel, all of which are, essentially, imported. This is an unresolved problem during this extremely long ‘special period’ that has become permanent, because there have never been sufficient foreign currency reserves to purchase the essentials. To such an extent that today food imports constitute the largest category of the ever-limited imports.

As an aside, it is worth noting that the current price of sugar on the international market is around 15 US cents per pound. Since 1970, with the exception of the years 1974 to 1976, the price of sugar has been around 21 cents per pound. More than fifty years later.

In the primary sector, the only areas that have been successful are nickel and cobalt mining, along with small-scale production of zinc, gold, silver, chromium and iron. Cuba’s nickel and cobalt mines are operated by the Canadian company Sherrit, which exports the ore for processing at its plants in Canada. Nickel and cobalt are Cuba’s leading export commodities.

Cuba now produces oil and natural gas in quantities insufficient to meet its domestic demand. In 2025, 40,000 barrels per day of crude oil equivalent ( ) were produced. This is a heavy oil with a high sulphur content, which makes it difficult to refine; it is used solely for electricity generation in the country’s thermal power stations. Cuba’s requirements are in the region of 100,000 barrels a day.

Industry

Cuba’s industrial sector in 1991 was in a state of disarray, as its performance was, and continues to be, increasingly poor due to a lack of investment. Loans from the USSR modernised a significant part of the basic industry; although it must be remembered once again that these loans came to an end in 1989 and that, until 2014, there was not even a refinancing agreement. The basic industry has, and had, seven power stations, most of which were built in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Six cement plants, the most recent of which date from the 1970s, are capable of producing 1.5 million tonnes – the same today as in 1991; currently, a single modern, medium-sized plant produces that same 1.5 million tonnes. It has four refineries, one of which dates from before 1960, with a refining capacity of 120,000 barrels per day. A steel industry comprising a single steel production plant, which was modernised in 2023 with an investment of 100 million dollars, funded by a loan from Putin’s Russia. A sum that Cuban politicians regard as enormous. And a multitude of workshops and small businesses that consistently produce less than the bare minimum.

In 1991, Cuba’s main industry was sugar production, as already mentioned. For decades, it has absorbed the country’s meagre economic resources, despite the fact that planners – and the authors of the five-year plans of the 1980s and 1990s – knew full well that these enterprises were unprofitable. Since 1991, their number has been steadily declining, with most being cannibalised to sustain the few that remain today. This is a problem common to all planned socialist economies, which are able to identify the least efficient sectors but are incapable of driving the development of other industrial sectors due to the lack of a market-based pricing system. The impetus for new industries has always been political in nature. Fidel Castro’s visionary projects are legion, amply demonstrating that he was an arrogant fool and that all his projects, after draining Cuba’s scarce economic resources, have ultimately come to nothing.

On the whole, the industrial sector is very outdated, inefficient, small in scale and characterised by a disproportionate consumption of electricity and fuel.

In 1991, the construction sector, like every other sector, suffered from a lack of machinery and the necessary supplies. Official statistics show that almost 2 million homes were built between 1959 and 2024. This figure is an exaggeration and classifies as ‘homes’ the conversion of any structure to which it has been possible to add a roof, walls and a floor. During the 66 years that the Castro regime has lasted so far, the population has risen from 6,500,000 in 1959 to the current 9 million, having previously stood at almost 11 million. The vast majority of the homes in which Cubans live are those abandoned or confiscated from Cubans who have left the country. The scarce reliable data available suggests that, up until 1990, 22,000 homes were built each year, with this figure falling substantially between 1991 and 2000, before rising again to 20,000 per year from that date until 2020, after which construction has once again stagnated.

The service sector

By 1991, the service sector had absorbed all the labour that had not found employment in agriculture or industry. Unemployment in Cuba was impossible—, both theoretically and ideologically. Once again, by decision of Fidel Castro, an army had been created to operate worldwide, and the number of doctors, nurses and teachers had been increased with the same objective. From 1991 onwards, the size of the army had to be reduced, but the education sector was maintained as a potential source of convertible foreign currency. We do not know the number of people who make up the security services. We do know that repression has never had any difficulty in financing itself because a regime of terror requires many operatives and many assistants.

Foreign debt

Another poisoned legacy facing Cuba during the ‘permanent special period’ of 1991 was its external debt, incurred both in convertible currencies with market-economy countries and in roubles – which were apparently also convertible into dollars.

In April 1986, as we had anticipated, Cuba suspended payments in convertible currency. Negotiations to resolve the crisis would drag on until 2015. In that year, capitalising on the momentum of Barack Obama’s policy of opening up towards Cuba, the Paris Club – comprising 13 of the largest market-economy countries – reached an agreement on a foreign debt of 12,500 million dollars, as the principal of the debt – around 4,500 million – had to be increased by the interest accrued over more than 30 years of non-payment.

What Fidel Castro did not expect was that first the USSR, and later the Russian Federation, would demand repayment of the principal of the trade debt that had accumulated up to that year (loans granted in addition to the enormous subsidies received by the Castro regime for acting as the implementing arm of Soviet expansionist delusions). The debt at the end of 2014, without distinguishing between principal and interest, totalled 35,000 million dollars that year.

Cuba’s external debt to other countries such as Japan, China and others, added to that owed to the Russian Federation and the Paris Club, totalled 54,000 million dollars, of which at least 8,500 million was interest on defaults from those years.

Putin’s Russia had reached an agreement with Cuba in 2014 under which 90 per cent of the debt was written off. The remaining $3.5 billion was to be paid off over 10 years, with the money being invested in Cuba itself in Russian-Cuban joint ventures. This has, to some extent, been carried out.

Agreements were also reached with the so-called London Club, which brought together private banks and supplier companies with outstanding debt. China had reached a debt write-off agreement for 600 million in 2011, and Mexico had written off a further 300 million in 2013.

The outstanding debt, following debt relief from all creditor countries, stood at 15,000 million dollars in 2015. The Castro government had committed to repaying this in instalments up to 2034 and beyond. In reality, apart from token payments, nothing has been paid.

To understand the scale of the $54,000 million external debt, it must be compared with Cuba’s GDP. In 1991, this stood at $24,000 million at current prices. By 1993, GDP had fallen to $17.3 billion at current prices. This meant that the debt accumulated from 1959 to 1991 – the $54 billion – amounted to 225 per cent of 1991’s GDP and 312 per cent of 1993’s GDP.

This enormous level of debt meant that, until 2015, Cuba was unable to secure financing to cover its balance of payments deficits, apart from the subsidies and payments it received from Chávez’s Venezuela from 2000 onwards – which we shall examine later – and from tourism and remittances from emigrants, the total income from which served to stabilise the economy. Never to invest or improve it.

The public deficit

The IMF has estimated that the public deficit in 1990 stood at 10 per cent of GDP and that by 1993 it had reached 30 per cent of GDP. The entire public deficit was monetised (just as it is now) by printing legal tender banknotes in Cuba, which, in turn, produced (as it does now) rampant inflation that affected the exchange rate of the Cuban peso, disrupting and confusing the prices used internally to draw up the relevant economic plans. Apart from eroding Cubans’ standard of living, as the burden of inflation has always been borne through wage and pension increases that were far lower than the rise in prices of the goods and services they had to purchase from the ‘State Enterprise Cuba’.

The situation was so desperate that Cuba had to allow the Cuban convertible peso and the US dollar to circulate until 2021, when a new Cuban peso was once again authorised in place of the convertible peso and the US dollar, establishing an official exchange rate of 1 new peso to 24 convertible pesos.

Exports and imports since 1991

It seems to me that the only possible way to analyse how the Cuban economy has evolved since 1989 is to look at how exports and imports of goods and services have fared. These are, in this case, figures known to international organisations and to the credit agencies of countries that trade with Cuba, expressed in dollars.

Exports. ‘Oil for services’

Let us begin with exports. In 1989, exports totalled 5,400 million dollars. By 1993, they had fallen to 1,200 million dollars a year.

That year, sales were almost the same as in 1958: a small amount of sugar (compared with the large quantities sold in 1959, when over 400 million was exported to the United States), nickel and cobalt, tobacco and some pharmaceutical products.

Between 2000 and February 2026, an agreement with Venezuela, known as ‘Oil for Services’, was in force, which enabled Cuba to receive payments from Venezuela totalling 63,000 million dollars from 2000 to 2025; these appear in the statistics as exports of services from Cuba to Venezuela, (data from the ‘Miranda Centre for Democracy’ contained in the report ‘Oil for Repression’, presented at Florida International University and corroborated by the US Government). An average of 2,520 million dollars per year over those 25 years. This amount exceeds the average value of all Cuba’s exports of goods during the same period.

The figure for exports of goods has also risen because Cuba began exporting its own low-quality oil whilst refining that from Venezuela or reselling Venezuelan oil at market prices. The services Cuba has provided to Venezuela consist of organisational and personnel support to ensure security services, the functioning of the army, and the personal services of doctors, nurses, teachers and lecturers who replaced the Venezuelan professionals who had left their country.

As we shall see later, Venezuela has paid those 63,000 million dollars in Venezuelan oil sold at prices below international market rates, thereby also subsidising Castro’s Cuba.

Tourism

Among service exports, the next most significant item consists of payments received from Venezuela, as already mentioned. Revenue from other services, which continued to grow until, once again, the year 2020, was generated by tourism. In 1989, revenue stood at 200 million dollars. In 1991, revenue reached 400 million, with around 400,000 visitors. Despite its reluctance towards the presence of foreigners and exploitative capitalists, the Cuban government permits capital investment, which has resulted in the construction and refurbishment of 336 hotels with a total of 83,000 rooms. Revenue rose to 1,000 million in 1995 and continued to increase in subsequent years, reaching 2,000 million in 2000 and remaining at similar levels until 2019. In 2020, the pandemic reduced revenue to 900 million dollars, but it has since recovered to reach 1,600 million in 2024. A very rough estimate puts gross tourism revenue at 75,000 million from 1991 to 2024. Net revenue is unclear, as limitations in agriculture and industry mean that many of the goods required for tourism services have to be imported.

Imports

Imports and the size of the balance of payments deficit are what determine the economy’s potential for growth. In a country with such inefficient productive sectors, imports are not only decisive factors in economic growth or recession, but are also essential for ensuring a minimum level of provision under the rationing system, the functioning of industry, and the essential inputs for the agricultural sector.

The breakdown of Cuba’s imports is bleak. The most significant are purchases of food and medicines – which have been made primarily from the United States since Bush lifted the embargo on those sectors. Next come oil and all kinds of refined products that Cuba does not produce, or could produce only at an exorbitant cost. Following these are fertilisers, pesticides and consumer goods., only minimal quantities of capital goods are imported. It should be remembered that from 1986 until the 2015 agreements on external debt, Cuba was unable to secure long-term loans, which are the only means of financing the purchase of capital goods. In any case, from that year onwards there has been no scope for importing capital goods either.

The trend in import figures provides a clearer picture of the economic landscape. In 1989, Cuba imported 8,100 million dollars, with the USSR being the main supplier, primarily of oil. By 1993, the crisis had reduced imports to $2,000 million. Subsequently, with the support of tourism – and remittances from Cubans abroad, which we shall analyse later – imports rose to $5,200 million in 2000. As we have seen, support from Venezuela enabled imports to grow to 7,000 million in 2005, 11,700 million in 2015, and a total of 12,300 million in 2018. The 2020 pandemic forced a reduction in imports to 7,300 million that year, with a subsequent recovery to 10,000 million in 2023, followed by a further decline to 8,000 million in 2024. These figures will be examined later using official data from the Cuban government.

Remittances from Cubans abroad

But that is not the end of the story. The current account balance of payments includes both the balance of payments for goods and services and that resulting from payments transferred by emigrants living abroad, which are referred to as remittances in accounting jargon.

Remittances from Cubans living abroad are more significant than revenue from tourism. Cubans who fled as best they could from 1959 onwards and were at the centre of events such as the Mariel exodus in 1980 and the rafters’ exodus in 1994 have gone from being labelled ‘worms’ as labelled by the Castro regime to being actively encouraged to leave their country in order to reduce expenditure on their ration cards, in the hope that they will send foreign currency to support their families in Cuba. The Castro regime has shifted from exercising maximum control over the emigration of its citizens—on the grounds that Cuba could not afford to let its best professionals leave, as was the case between 1970 and 1989—to allowing them to leave freely since 2013, a decision taken by Raúl Castro whilst Fidel was on his deathbed. They have gone from losing their homes to Raúl’s Castro regime – not Fidel’s – allowing them to keep them, even if they do not live in Cuba.

In figures, remittances stood at 200 million in 1993, growing year on year until they reached 843 million in 2000. In the years that followed, they continued to grow, reaching 1,300 million in 2005. Peak figures were recorded between 2015 and 2018 – also as a result of US government authorisations – with figures of 3,354 million in 2015 and 3,700 million in 2018. In 2020, the pandemic also affected remittances, which fell to 2,300 million and have stood at around 2,000 million annually ever since.

All these transfers amount to around 50,000 million dollars from 1993 to 2025. Cuban democratic organisations estimate the value of shipments of consumer goods and medicines over the same period at a further 50,000 million. In total, more than 100,000 million dollars. Those 50,000 million worth of goods, which do not appear on any balance sheet, are, quite simply, the income that has enabled the families who have received them to survive much better than those who have not.

For Cubans living abroad who support their families, the costs of these transfers are even higher. Money transfers incur exorbitant financial charges. Transfers of goods, whether sent from abroad or delivered in person, are exempt up to 30 kilos. Above 300 dollars, a 100 per cent duty is payable, and up to an authorised maximum of 1,000 dollars, the duty rises to 200 per cent.

The Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA)

But what is GAESA? The following paragraphs summarise the study entitled ‘GAESA: The Thieving State’, published by Cuba Siglo XXI and authored by Emilio Morales:

“Under the guise of socialism, a military oligarchy controls (or, at any rate, has been controlling for the past few years) more than 70 per cent of the economy and 95 per cent of the national finances, whilst the civilian government acts as a mere puppet. Miguel Díaz Canel’s government has, in practice, no control over the country’s finances. The Central Bank of Cuba… is completely subordinate to and subject to the interests of GAESA… if one were to identify the main party responsible for the inflationary debacle plaguing the country, all the evidence would undoubtedly point to GAESA. The opportunism and control that this entity exercises over the country’s finances and economy prevent the implementation of reforms that… would transform the economic model and pull the country out of the crisis… in which it finds itself mired …Measures such as the creation of shops that accept freely convertible currencies, the implementation of the regulation known as the Monetary Reorganisation Programme, the ban on depositing physical dollars into the country’s bank accounts, and the launch of the new foreign exchange market triggered, upon their introduction, an inflationary spiral which the government is now unable to halt…Likewise, the appalling management of investments…carried out to suit the convenience and lucrative interests of the GAESA oligarchs, has been another major factor in the country’s inflationary crisis. This has left the State itself without resources, as it has watched its most iconic industries and sectors crumble in recent years… due to a lack of financial resources and the absence of an investment policy consistent with the country’s true needs and strategic priorities. To this fact, which demonstrates the Cuban government’s subservience to GAESA… must be added the lack of transparency and the absence of institutional mechanisms to monitor and oversee GAESA’s operations.”

In addition to all this, GAESA has been controlling a large proportion of the country’s foreign currency finances; its revenues have exceeded those of the state budget, operating in parallel with the state and paying virtually no taxes; and, even more strikingly, it has been reported that GAESA holds international assets in its own accounts, outside the control of the Central Bank of Cuba and at the disposal of the Castro-led military commanders who control the company.

The data on remittances comes from a wide range of sources: The Havana Consulting Group, “Cuba Siglo XXI”, and international organisations such as ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) and the IOM (International Organisation for Migration).

The Cuban government was forced to intervene in 2025 to encourage the flow of dollars into Cuba by authorising payments through new intermediaries. The reason for these new interventions relates to the ban imposed by the United States on transactions under Cuban military control.

The large sums from 1991 to 2024

The total value of all imports of goods and services during those years amounts to approximately 267,000 million dollars. These purchases have been financed by revenue from exports of goods and services (commodities, tourism and the sale of specialised services such as those provided to Venezuela), which have reached 185,000 million dollars. The deficit, therefore, has been 82,000 million dollars. This has been covered, in part, by the 50,000 million dollars in remittances from emigrants. The remainder, around 32,000 million, accounts for the growth in external debt, which has once again risen following the pandemic crisis. Exports of ‘services’ to Venezuela during this period amounted to $63,000 million.

Without the agreements with Venezuela, the accumulated deficit would not be 32,000 million, but 95,000 million. It is therefore almost impossible for the Castro regime to function without Venezuela, even if Cuba were to obtain oil from Russia or any other country willing to sell it.

The Balance of Payments

But when it comes to foreign trade, which is recorded in the balance of payments for goods and services, a new deficit arises. Revenue from sugar sales declines, and sales of agricultural products that were previously sold in the United States disappear. And revenue from foreign tourism also disappears because Fidel Castro does not like tourists.

A balance of payments deficit arises, which cannot be monetised. To cover this deficit, a country or company outside Cuba must grant loans. This is what the USSR has been doing since 1960. Such loans constitute external debt, which must be repaid within the established timeframes (in theory, of course).

With an economy such as the one Fidel Castro has sought to create, balance of payments deficits – external deficits – are inevitable. It would prove impossible for Cuba to generate new exports with an agricultural and industrial sector such as the one described above. In fact, Cuba’s exports in 2026 are the same as in 1958, except that it no longer exports sugar because it does not even have enough to meet its domestic needs.

Restrictions on imports. Investment

And the inevitable happens: imports are restricted to just oil, food, medicines, fertilisers and pesticides, and essential consumer goods. And for a few years, until 1986 and 1989, capital goods. But there is never enough foreign currency to modernise industrial plants or to increase agricultural production. What disappears is investment.

The USSR went so far as to buy all the sugar that Cuba was able to export at above-market prices and to sell Cuba oil, food and industrial goods at below-market prices. However, apart from raw materials, the other products supplied by the USSR were not the most suitable for Cuban industry.

Furthermore, as we have seen, the USSR granted the foreign loans necessary to cover the external deficit arising from trade with Cuba, which became Cuba’s external debt that the USSR demanded repayment of from 1991 onwards.

What the USSR does not do is transfer convertible currency to Cuba, because neither the USSR nor the other COMECON members have any to spare. In fact, they face enormous difficulties in achieving growth because they are unable to export anything else. Today, Russia sells the same goods abroad as it did 70 years ago: oil, gas, gold and diamonds, which provide the foreign-exchange earnings essential for making the imports needed to keep the economy functioning, albeit at a very slow pace.

What they cannot do is improve their agricultural and industrial production because they lack entrepreneurs and managers, as well as the imports needed to modernise their economy. Above all, they lack investment.

The reforms, some of which we have already mentioned, have been aimed at reducing the size of the ‘State-Owned Cuba’.

Private ownership of a main residence and a second home is now permitted. These may be sold or transferred by gift or will to legitimate descendants. In 2008, a Land Registry was re-established, in which properties are gradually being registered.

From 1997 onwards, the Central Bank of Cuba was separated from the National Bank of Cuba, which became a commercial bank responsible for recording external debt. Furthermore, three other commercial banks were established, and in 2023, Banco Corporativo was founded. The private banking sector fulfilled its role of granting loans and accepting deposits when the monetary system was reformed in 2021.

In the agricultural sector, there are now farmers with usufruct rights who own their land – subject to area restrictions – and who grow whatever they wish – or are able to – and can sell their produce at market prices in open markets.

The reforms were – finally –- accelerated with the effective departure of Fidel Castro in 2013 and his replacement by Raúl Castro. In 2013, Cubans were authorised to leave Cuba freely provided they held a visa for whichever country they were travelling to. For Raúl Castro, emigration means lower public expenditure, more available housing and more remittances from emigrants.

The pandemic crisis

In 2020, the pandemic crisis began, a crisis which, for Cuba, was similar to that of 1991 to 1993.

The 2020 crisis affected Cuba more severely than other countries. The external accounts, whilst still in deficit, were in a state of relative equilibrium. That equilibrium was disrupted by the decline in tourism. Remittances from Cubans abroad also fell. Exports of goods also suffered. All of this led to a wider public deficit and, more importantly, to an external deficit from which Cuba has been unable to recover.

As in previous periods, the damage caused by import restrictions affects domestic production of goods and services. Inflation and external debt soar, and the Cuban peso is immediately devalued; domestic prices are adjusted unevenly, with wages and pensions rising at a slower rate than other prices in the economy. Ultimately, this imbalance is intended to reduce the public deficit and imports. This, of course, has a severe impact on the standard of living and real per capita income.

We must not forget that in 1958, one Cuban peso was freely exchangeable for one US dollar. The latest official figure of 455 pesos to the dollar illustrates better than anything else the deterioration of an economy with no prospect of recovery.

Whatever the nominal GDP in US dollars for 2020 may be, there are relevant official figures for the key indicators that explain the situation up to 2024 or 2025.

GDP in 2020 fell by 11 per cent; between 2021 and 2023 it stabilises, before falling sharply again in 2024 and 2025. The Castro government estimated a GDP of 90,000 million dollars for 2024, applying the official exchange rate of 1 dollar to 24 pesos. In 2022, the exchange rate was set at 120 pesos to the dollar. In December 2025, the offic n exchange rate was adjusted and set at one dollar to 455 Cuban pesos. It is clear that such a devaluation could not have taken place in just four years. However, the informal exchange rate at that time was even worse, standing at one dollar to 510 Cuban pesos.

Using this official exchange rate, ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) has calculated that Cuba’s GDP in 2024 dollars stands at just 12,924 million dollars.

Public deficits and the balance of payments

The Castro government puts the public deficit for 2020 at 17.7 per cent of GDP; for 2021 at 11.7 per cent of that year’s GDP; for 2022 at 11.1 per cent of GDP; for 2023 at 20 per cent of GDP; and for 2024 at 6.5 per cent of that year’s GDP. Whatever the annual GDP figures may be, whether in pesos or dollars.

Cuba’s trade balance for the years 2020 to 2025, based on official Cuban figures (National Office of Statistics and Information) and estimates from international organisations, is as follows:

The balance of services, according to official Cuban data for those years, shows the following results:

The Balance of Payments for Goods and Services under the Current Account shows the following (official) figures:

The Balance of Payments for Services includes revenue from tourism and payments from Venezuela, and, naturally, from other countries that purchased Cuba’s military and security services. This official Cuban data has not been verified by international organisations.

The figures for remittances from Cubans abroad shown in the current account balance are much lower than those obtained by other, far more reliable official bodies. The discrepancies are undoubtedly attributable to GAESA.

Even if we accept all this information at face value, the Balance of Payments for Goods and Services would consistently show deficits due to remittances from emigrants, despite the adjustments made by the Castro government during those years to ration cards and the modest increase in wages and pensions relative to the rise in other prices.

Public deficits on the scale of those we have seen above have been partly monetised and partly covered by issues of government bonds which Cuban banks have been obliged to purchase, a process which merely delays monetisation.

The pandemic crisis and the exhaustion of a productive system in which there has been almost no investment since 1991 have resulted in the public deficits we saw earlier.

Returning to the question of what Cuba’s true GDP is in US dollars, the adjustment made by ECLAC seems excessive. However, there is insufficient data to calculate it in any other way.

Just as public deficits have turned into inflation, balance of payments deficits have not disappeared; rather, they have been transformed into external debt denominated in convertible currency. In 2020, external debt stood at 18,900 million dollars; in 2021 – with payments to the Paris Club suspended – it stood at 19,700 million; in 2022 it was 20,500 million; in 2023 it reached 23,000 million; in 2024 it reached 25,000 million; and in 2026 it has reached 28,000 million.

The 28,000 million in external debt in 2025, compared with a GDP in dollars for that year (at an exchange rate of 455 pesos to 1 dollar) of 12,924 million dollars, brings external debt up to 216 per cent of GDP in 2025.

Per capita income

As regards per capita income, the calculation varies significantly depending on whether GDP is higher or lower than the 12,924 million used in ECLAC’s calculation.

All that remains to be determined is Cuba’s population. But here we encounter another statistical discrepancy. The Castro government has maintained, until recently, that Cuba has a population of almost 11 million. In reality, according to demographic experts, the actual figure could be between 9 and 8.5 million. The government has finally acknowledged that Cuba’s population at the end of 2024 stood at 9,748,000.

If we take into account that, apparently, between 200,000 and 250,000 people are leaving Cuba each year from 2020 to 2025, the population could in fact be lower than that figure, at around 9 million. On this basis, a GDP of 12,924 million would result in a per capita income of 1,380 dollars. If GDP had been, for example, 28,000 million, per capita income would have stood at 3,111 dollars.

Another way of analysing per capita income is to examine how the quantities and prices of the products included in the ration book have changed. The ration book – ‘la libreta’, as Cubans call it - still features subsidised prices, but quantities have been reduced, and essential products such as meat and eggs have disappeared from it. In response to protests by Cubans over inflation and changes to the ration cards, decisions have once again been taken that break with the 2021 policy of monetary transparency. Consequently, maximum prices have been capped for the most important foodstuffs in both official and free agricultural markets.

From 2020 to 2025, Cuba’s GDP, according to official statistics and those of ECLAC, has fallen by between 15% and 20% in real terms. GDP since 2020, in current pesos, has continued to grow, however, because inflation has stood at around 30% per annum.

In 2024, the Cuban government’s National Office of Statistics and Information (ONEI) reported that the GDP for that year in constant terms (excluding inflation) stood at 50,693 million Cuban pesos. That year, the official exchange rate was 120 pesos to 1 US dollar.

We do not yet have official figures for 2025. However, a real fall of 5 per cent in GDP has been reported. On that basis, Cuba’s official GDP would have been 47,500 million constant pesos. But in December 2025, the government had to adjust the official exchange rate to 455 pesos to the US dollar. Obviously, at the unofficial exchange rate for March 2026, which now stands at 515 pesos to 1 US dollar, both GDP and per capita income are even lower.

For anyone who wants to know more about Cuba’s per capita income, I recommend Leonardo Padura’s book, *Death in the Sand*. It is a novel that weaves in the history of the Castro regime. A drama centring on three families and a few friends during the years of the Castro regime. There is not a single reference to Cuba’s domestic or foreign policy, nor to its economic policy, political repression or dissidents. It merely recounts the hardships faced by these three families, whose grandparents were socialists or Castro supporters, but whose parents eke out a meagre living as doctors, teachers, writers, civil servants or santeros. What they do, however, is describe how Fidel Castro’s major decisions – whom, I believe, is mentioned only once – have affected them since the revolutionary offensive of 1968, with the nationalisation of even the smallest general stores, the ‘10-million-tonne sugar harvest’, the war in Angola, the alliance with the communist countries of Europe, the exodus of Cubans, and the break with Gorbachev. *De Mariel* recounts how every Cuban who wanted to leave – having paid an unimaginable sum - was forced to take four criminals or mentally unstable individuals aboard their boat. All of Fidel Castro’s major decisions are described as absurd and harmful. Two of the families in * * survive thanks to remittances from their daughters – one lives in Florida and the other in Barcelona. The third lives in abundance because their son is a *santero* who predicts the future and thereby makes a fortune. The education system is not spared either, where only those loyal to the regime succeed. The only praise Leonardo Padura offers for the Castro regime is the elimination of racism. His example is a black man, a friend of the families, who is a nuclear physicist but now ekes out a living as a gardener for the fortune-teller’s family. Most members of these families and their friends find solace for their sorrows only in love, sex when they can find it, and alcohol, when they can get hold of it.