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Fiabilismo Robusto De Virtudes Colectivas

CUADERNOS SALMANTINOS DE FILOSOFÍA

Volume 53 (2026): Issue 1 (June 2026)

By: Dani Pino

Open Access

|Apr 2026

Abstract

En la epistemología contemporánea, dos influyentes corrientes han evolucionado en paralelo: el fiabilismo de virtudes y la epistemología colectiva o de grupos. Pese a los intentos por integrar ambas (Carter, 2022; Đorđević y Berber, 2025; Greco, 2021; Harris, 2025; Jarczewski, 2024; Jarczewski y Riggs, 2025; Palermos, 2022; Palermos y Pritchard, 2016), la versión más robusta del fiabilismo de virtudes (Sosa, 1991, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2015, 2021), ofrece una doble resistencia a dicho proyecto. Por un lado, niega su compatibilidad con la epistemología colectiva (Sosa, 2007, pp. 94-95); por otro, reduce esta última a un caso marginal dentro del propio marco sosiano (Kallestrup, 2020). Este artículo analiza las condiciones que sustentan ambas estrategias—identificadas como Incompatibilidad y Excepcionalidad— para someterlas a revisión crítica desde una alternativa positiva, Compatibilidad, que busca mostrar cómo la noción de virtud epistémica puede extenderse de manera coherente a agentes irreductiblemente colectivos. El resultado es una propuesta de fiabilismo de virtudes colectivas robusto, capaz de reconciliar la normatividad individual y la grupal sin sacrificar el realismo epistémico propio del modelo de Sosa.

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Articles in this issue

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36576/2660-955X.53.169 | Journal eISSN: 2660-9509 | Journal ISSN: 0210-4857

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Language: Spanish

Page range: 169 - 202

Submitted on: Feb 19, 2025

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Accepted on: Feb 16, 2026

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Published on: Apr 30, 2026

Published by: Pontifical University of Salamanca

In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services

Keywords:

Agencia Epistémica,

Epistemología,

Epistemología Colectiva,

Epistemología de Grupos,

Epistemología Social,

Fiabilismo de Virtudes

Related subjects:

History of philosophy,

History of philosophy, other,

Metaphysics, ontology,

Philosophy of religion

© 2026 Dani Pino, published by Pontifical University of Salamanca
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

Volume 53 (2026): Issue 1 (June 2026)

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