Introduction
In an increasingly interconnected world, the dynamics of foreign policy extend beyond the traditional sphere of state‑to‑state interactions. As global migration rises, many citizens now reside outside their countries of origin yet remain politically engaged through mechanisms such as external voting. However, while voting from abroad can reinforce democratic participation, it also introduces new complexities, particularly when homeland conflicts are transported to host states. While foreign policy concerns are often secondary to domestic matters in shaping voter preferences, research shows that they may become salient under particular circumstances, such as during international crises or when national security is implicated (Aldrich et al. 2006; Fearon 1998). The intersection of external voting and foreign policy is a matter that potentially affects both diplomatic relations and state sovereignty (Baser & Féron 2021). Host countries may find themselves embroiled in the internal political struggles of another state as their resident diasporas mobilize during election periods. Tensions may arise when transported conflicts—whether ethnic, political, or ideological—spill over into the host country. Such conflicts may not only influence diaspora voting behavior but also amplify political divisions or support for polarized factions. In this article, we investigate if, when, and how foreign policy—understood here as the bilateral diplomatic relations between home and host countries—has the potential to become important for external voting.
Migrants and their descendants are often embedded in multiple contexts (Wackenhut & Orjuela 2023). While having built a livelihood in their current countries of residence, they often remain connected to their countries of origin—a phenomenon conceptualized as ‘multi‑sited embeddedness’ (Horst 2018) or layered transnational citizenship (Yener‑Roderburg & Toivanen 2024: 343–345). Accordingly, we conceptualize diaspora positionality as a layered form of political embeddedness. Individuals may simultaneously inhabit, negotiate, and contest multiple political memberships. Their political subjectivities are therefore not simply reactive to origin‑ or residence‑state dynamics but are constituted within transnational social fields that include community organizations, faith‑based networks, political parties, and media (Adamson & Demetriou 2007). This understanding allows us to move beyond a state‑centric framework and instead analyze diaspora voters as political actors embedded in transnational fields of power, rather than as passive recipients of bilateral diplomatic dynamics. Considering the increasing number of origin countries extending the franchise to nonresident citizens (Jakobson & Umpierrez de Reguero 2023; Østergaard‑Nielsen, Ciornei & Lafleur 2019; Wellman 2021), it is important to investigate how their multi‑sited embeddedness may affect diaspora voting in homeland elections, particularly when foreign policy tensions between the host and origin countries are involved.1
This article explores these complexities in the context of the Turkish‑origin diaspora in Sweden during the Turkish presidential elections in May of 2023 and Sweden’s diplomatic tensions with Turkey over its application to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Since the arrival of the first Turkish guest workers in the 1960s, Sweden has become home to a diverse Turkish‑origin diaspora, including Sunni‑Turks, Kurds, and Assyrians. While far from a perfect mirror image of Turkish society, the diaspora reflects key political and ethnic divisions found in the country (Baser 2013)—thus presenting both a timely and relevant case for further investigation. With this empirical focus, the paper contributes to three interconnected debates: (a) the expanding literature on external voting (Arkilic 2021b; Yener‑Roderburg & Yetiş 2024), (b) scholarship on diasporas and transported conflicts (Baser 2013, 2014; Féron & Baser 2023), and (c) research on the increasingly porous boundaries between domestic and foreign policy (Aggestam, Schierenbeck & Wackenhut 2023; Hill 2013; Tellander & Horst 2019).
In terms of its empirical foundations, the article draws on primary and secondary sources, including 12 semi‑structured interviews with members of the Turkish‑origin diaspora in Sweden who were recruited through purposive and snowball sampling. Interviews were conducted in Swedish and English between 2023 and 2024. Data were analyzed through a combination of inductive and deductive coding and complemented with pertinent Swedish‑ and English‑language media sources, political speeches, and social media entries.
The article proceeds as follows: First, we discuss the relevant literature on external voting and diaspora studies, transported conflicts, and diaspora engagement. Subsequently, we introduce the context of Swedish–Turkish bilateral relations as well as Turkey’s efforts to engage its diaspora, focusing on the Turkish diaspora in Sweden. Finally, we examine how the strained diplomatic relations between Turkey and Sweden factored into the Turkish diaspora voters’ preferences in the 2023 elections, before concluding with a summary of key findings and potential avenues for further research.
Diasporas, Diaspora Engagement, and External Voting
Diasporas and Homeland Conflicts
We now live in an age of global migration (De Haas, Castles & Miller 2019). By some estimates, more than 272 million migrants reside either temporarily or permanently outside their countries of origin (Wellman 2021). They have emigrated for various reasons, including for economic opportunities, education, love, or to flee armed conflicts or persecution (Wackenhut 2022).
However, even after leaving their home countries, migrants and their descendants (Orjuela, Wackenhut & Hirt 2025) are now able to maintain close social, economic, and political ties with their (ancestral) countries of origin. Rather than leaving one context and settling in another, many migrants now remain embedded in multiple contexts (Horst 2018; Wackenhut & Orjuela 2023; Yener‑Roderburg 2022). Still, diasporas tend to be highly diverse—not least in terms of their socio‑economic backgrounds, migration trajectories, and histories. In particular, migrants who were forced to flee because of persecution and violence may continue to be haunted by such conflicts in their countries of settlement. A diverse amount of literature has explored how diasporas engage in homeland conflicts. In the context of the Sri Lankan diaspora, Orjuela (2008) conceptualized diasporans’ diverse roles in terms of being ‘long‑distance warriors’ or ‘long‑distance peacebuilders.’
However, such conflicts not only play out in the respective countries of origin but may spill over into migrants’ current countries of residence (Féron & Baser 2023; Féron & Lefort 2019). Baser (2013, 2014) explored, for instance, how the Turkish–Kurdish conflict has remained a point of contention for Turkish and Kurdish communities living in Sweden. Still, rather than representing direct transplants from one context to the other, such homeland conflicts tend to find localized expressions, which are shaped by local political and social contexts (see also Koinova 2021).
Such layered positionalities complicate assumptions that diaspora voters are simply reactive to origin‑ or residence‑state developments. Instead, they inhabit what Adamson and Demetriou (2007: 497–500) described as deterritorialized identity formations that interact with territorially bounded state institutions. Diaspora voters are therefore political actors embedded in transnational social fields rather than passive extensions of the homeland state.
Diaspora Engagement, External Voting, and the Salience of Foreign Policy
As increasing numbers of citizens emigrate, sending states have recognized the importance of maintaining ties to their nonresident populations—including post‑migration generations. Loyal diasporas may represent an important asset for economic development through remittances and the return of high‑skilled labor, or serve as a source of domestic political legitimation (Tsourapas 2019) and cultural soft power (Aggestam, Schierenbeck & Wackenhut 2023). However, antagonistic diasporas may pose a potential threat to homeland governments (Tsourapas 2020) that warrant selective exclusion (Glasius 2018; Wackenhut & Orjuela 2023) or transnational repression (Adamson 2020; Moss, Michaelsen & Kennedy 2022).
A growing number of origin countries now formulate policies that outline objectives and means for state‑led diaspora engagement. As Gamlen, Cummings and Vaaler (2019) note, more than half of all states have set up special government bodies and agencies tasked with diaspora engagement. While some countries, like Egypt (Talani 2010), China, and India (Ding 2025) have created national level ministries, other diaspora institutions, like in the case of Mexico, are located at the subnational level (Delano 2009).
Extending the franchise to emigrants has become a common feature for these engagement efforts and often even includes post‑migration generations that still maintain the citizenship of their ancestral homeland (Wellman 2021). Still, there is an important difference between the de jure and de facto enfranchisement of nonresident voters (Fliess & Østergaard‑Nielsen 2021; Palop‑García & Pedroza 2019), and a growing body of literature has started to investigate not only when and how diaspora populations are enfranchised (Umpierrez de Reguero 2023; Umpierrez de Reguero, Finn & Peltoniemi 2023; Umpierrez de Reguero, Yener‑Roderburg & Cartagena, 2021) but also how and for whom these new voters cast their ballot (Arkilic 2021b; Jakobson & Umpierrez de Reguero 2023; Yener‑Roderburg & Yetiş 2024).
However, the extent to which foreign policy assumes significance in external voting is largely overlooked in academic scholarship. This gap could be attributed to the conventional view that foreign policy is subordinate to domestic concerns in shaping voter preferences (Aldrich et al. 2006; Jervis 2016). Yet, in the context of diaspora voting, we posit that foreign policy can become salient—particularly when diplomatic relations between host and home countries are strained and become politicized or even securitized.
We conceptualize foreign policy salience in external voting contexts as the degree to which bilateral diplomatic dynamics become constitutive of the political meaning structures within which diaspora voters interpret electoral choice. Drawing on Adamson and Demetriou’s (2007: 491–497) distinction between territorially institutionalized states and deterritorialized identity networks, foreign policy disputes can be understood not merely as state‑level interactions but as moments that potentially reconfigure the relationship between ‘stateness’ and ‘nationness.’ Diasporas, as network‑based and deterritorialized political formations (Adamson & Demetriou 2007: 496–498), mediate this relationship by translating interstate tensions into identity‑infused narratives.
Importantly, this distinction allows us to distinguish between discursive salience and electoral causality. An issue may be highly salient in public discourse without necessarily functioning as a primary causal determinant of vote switching. In external voting contexts, foreign policy is more likely to operate as a mechanism of political affirmation rather than conversion. It may consolidate pre‑existing alignments, intensify identity boundaries, and structure perceptions of legitimacy without producing large‑scale realignments in aggregate outcomes.
We therefore argue that foreign policy becomes electorally salient in diaspora contexts when three conditions converge: (1) diplomatic tensions are securitized and publicly politicized; (2) they intersect with pre‑existing transported conflicts or identity cleavages; and (3) political actors frame the dispute as morally or symbolically relevant to national dignity, sovereignty, or minority protection. Under these conditions, foreign policy may operate as a boundary‑making device and identity amplifier within transnational political fields rather than as a direct cause of vote‑changing.
The diverse Turkish‑origin diaspora in Sweden offers a compelling example of how foreign policy and transported conflicts may be relevant for external voting. The diplomatic standoff between Sweden and Turkey over Sweden’s NATO accession thrust foreign policy to the forefront of diaspora concerns. This diplomatic impasse—driven largely by Turkey’s objections to Sweden’s stance on Kurdish groups—reflects a broader conflict that has long shaped Turkey’s internal politics. This conflict amplifies the relevance of foreign policy for Turkish‑origin voters in Sweden. In such cases, diaspora voters do not exclusively cast their ballots based on homeland political concerns; their choices are also informed by their lived experiences in the host states that are embroiled in a diplomatic dispute with the homeland. Diaspora voters, such as the Turkish‑origin population in Sweden, find themselves in a hybrid political context where their electoral decisions have implications for both domestic and international politics. They must navigate their political identities as both citizens of the homeland and participants in the political and diplomatic context of their country of residence. This specific positionality suggests that foreign policy can be a driver of electoral behavior under certain circumstances, particularly when transported conflicts from the homeland intensify the stakes of diplomatic relations.
Turkish Engagement with Its Diaspora
While many states have recognized the importance of engaging their diaspora populations, few countries have been as proactive in this space as Turkey (Arkilic 2022; Baser & Öztürk 2020; Mencutek & Baser 2018; Wackenhut 2022), which has markedly intensified efforts to engage with its nonresident population in the wake of the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) rise to power in 2002 (Adamson 2019; Mencutek & Baser 2018). These efforts have broadened in scope, extending beyond just Turkish emigrants to include related communities with historical ties to the former Ottoman Empire. This expansive approach to diaspora engagement is linked to the rising foreign policy ambitions of Turkey—particularly in terms of how it seeks to influence its nonresident populations and manage its relations with host countries. There has not only been a discursive shift towards Turkey being portrayed as a global nation but also tangible changes in the ways in which this engagement happens in institutional, legal, political, and ideological terms (Baser & Böcü 2024; Wackenhut 2022: 378–379).
In this context, the Turkish government’s creation of the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) in 2010—an agency under the roof of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism—has been an important development. The YTB not only cooperates with diaspora organizations abroad but also organizes cultural activities and educational programs, including language courses, summer camps, internship programs, and diaspora conferences to help the young generations maintain a connection to their homeland (Aydin 2014; Böcü & Baser 2024).
Significantly, the Turkish government has taken steps to deepen the political involvement of its diaspora. While nonresident citizens technically have had voting rights since 1987, a requirement to physically travel to Turkey to vote limited participation. This changed in 2012 with reforms that allowed nonresident citizens to vote in their countries of residence, marking a transition from de jure to de facto enfranchisement (Arkilic 2021a; Sevi et al. 2019; Yener‑Roderburg 2024). These initiatives, which link the diaspora to Turkey, have clear foreign policy implications, as they reflect Turkey’s strategy of using its diaspora to project soft power abroad (Şahin‐Mencütek & Erdoğan 2016).
The foreign policy dimension of Turkey’s diaspora engagement becomes particularly apparent in its attempts to campaign abroad. Turkish political parties have tried to win over the diaspora vote by organizing campaign events in the diasporans’ countries of residence (Arkilic 2021b; Yener‑Roderburg & Yetiş 2024). Considering that campaign events on foreign soil can be interpreted as potential infringements on host states’ sovereignty, it should come as little surprise that some of these events have evoked controversies (Baser & Féron 2021). Such events are often seen as extensions of Turkey’s domestic politics into the international arena, blurring the line between domestic and foreign policy. Several planned campaign events in the run‑up to the 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum by primarily AKP politicians stirred up controversy in Germany (DW 2017) and Austria—in part due to the Turkish government’s crackdown on real and perceived political opponents after the attempted coup d’état of 2016.
To conclude, Turkey’s approach to diaspora engagement, particularly through the extension of voting rights and political campaigning abroad, highlights how external voting can quickly become intertwined with foreign policy. The diplomatic controversies arising from Turkey’s efforts to mobilize its diaspora underscore the complex relationship between home and host states, where external voting becomes both a means of internal political mobilization and an issue of international diplomacy.
The Turkish Diaspora in Sweden
The Turkish‑origin diaspora in Sweden consists of multiple groups with diverse migration histories and trajectories as well as varied attitudes towards the shared country of origin (Baser 2013, 2014). Scholarship highlights how migrants’ descendants negotiate identity across multiple legal and symbolic orders and that these negotiations are shaped, for instance, by ethnic, religious, and generational cleavages (Yener‑Roderburg & Toivanen 2024). Ethnic Turks, Kurds, and Assyrians form three of the most important groups that have settled in Sweden. Especially in the late 1960s, labor migration formed an important part of Turkish migration to Sweden. Following the coup d’état of 1980, the intensifying political repression and subsequent escalation of the Turkish–Kurdish conflict, a growing number of Kurds arrived in Sweden. Subsequently, skilled labor migration and students came to represent yet another important type of Turkish‑origin immigrants. In 2016, following the failed coup attempt, this pattern changed once again, when a greater number of people fleeing political repression made their way to Sweden. This latest wave included intellectuals, academics, and journalists as well as supporters of the now outlawed Gülen movement, which has been blamed publicly by Turkish authorities for the coup attempt (Wackenhut 2022).
Considering these varied backgrounds, it is not surprising that the Turkish‑origin diaspora in Sweden is far from a perfect mirror image of Turkish demographics. Compared to the country of origin, one may argue that Assyrians and especially Kurds are somewhat overrepresented. Diasporans and their descendants have, like in many other countries of residence, founded numerous civil society organizations, which include the whole gamut of local hometown associations, professional or specialist associations, youth associations, and sports clubs where the shared heritage fulfills a unifying role. These diaspora organizations can function as infrastructures of political socialization and mobilization, shaping political narratives, coordinating electoral logistics, and reinforcing partisan alignments (Yener‑Roderburg & Yetis 2024).
However, civic and political engagement is not strictly limited to this sphere. Members of the Turkish‑origin diaspora are, in some cases, in prominent roles, active in most of the established Swedish political parties (Aggestam et al. 2023). Many individuals with Kurdish roots have found their political home in left (Vänsterpartiet) or center‑left (Socialdemokraterna) parties, while other diasporans have gravitated to some of the more conservative parties. In recent years, a new political party Nyans (Nuance) has emerged on the Swedish political landscape. Among its founding members was a Swedish–Turkish dual citizen who had been expelled from Centerpartiet (Center Party) in 2018 in the wake of allegations of having ties to the Turkish ultra‑nationalist group Grey Wolves (grå vargarna) (Centerpartiet 2018).
Swedish–Turkish Bilateral Relations Before and During the NATO Accession Process
Bilateral relations between Sweden and Turkey have undergone significant fluctuations over the past two decades as successive Swedish governments sought to strike a delicate balance between supporting Turkey in its pursuit of EU membership while also voicing critique of Turkey’s autocratization and human rights violations (Aggestam et al. 2023: 2377). A particularly contentious issue in this relationship has been the supportive stance by the Swedish government and several political parties to Kurdish and Assyrian demands for minority rights and self‑determination. As the Turkish government gravitated toward populism and autocracy, Sweden became a symbolic target in Turkey’s broader critique of Western liberalism; a sentiment that peaked during the controversial Quran‑burnings in 2023 (c.f. SVT Nyheter 2023).
When the Swedish government abandoned its longstanding policy of nonalignment on May 15, 2022, and applied for NATO membership in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it was expected to result in swift acceptance of Sweden into the Alliance. However, the Turkish government quickly opposed this move, insisting that the Swedish government address security concerns primarily related to Kurdish activists and members or supporters of the now‑outlawed Gülen movement before Turkey would endorse the application. In a June 2022 article, published in The Economist, President Erdoğan emphasized that:
Turkey maintains that the admission of Sweden and Finland entails risks for its own security and the organisation’s future. We have every right to expect those countries, which will expect NATO’s second‑largest army to come to their defence under Article 5, to prevent the recruitment, fundraising and propaganda activities of the PKK, which the European Union and America consider a terrorist entity. Turkey wants the candidate countries to curb the activities of all terrorist organisations and extradite the members of these organisations (The Economist 2022).
Erdoğan reiterated this demand in the context of a joint press conference with Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson held in November 2022, and noted that:
[…] terrorist organizations should definitely be prevented from exploiting the democratic environment in Sweden (DoC 2022a).
The dispute had profound implications for the Turkish‑origin diaspora in Sweden, thrusting them into the whirlwind of foreign policy and high politics. As Turkey demanded that the Swedish government address what it considered security threats posed by Kurdish groups, the diaspora itself became an important player in shaping Swedish–Turkish relations. These groups effectively mobilized their members, employing a range of strategies, including lobbying politicians, speaking out in the media, and organizing public demonstrations to capture the attention of the government and shape Swedish public opinion (Interview #11). These activities demonstrated how a foreign policy issue became highly salient and mobilized various communities in Sweden—effectively ‘domesticating’ foreign policy (Aggestam et al. 2023: 2382). This phenomenon suggests that foreign policy issues, exemplified in this case by diplomatic tensions between Turkey and Sweden, may also have held salience for external voting in the 2023 Turkish election.
The 2023 Turkish Elections in Sweden in the Context of Bilateral Tensions
In total, an estimated 64 million voters were deemed eligible to cast their ballots during the 2023 Turkish Presidential elections. This included more than 3.4 million Turkish citizens living abroad (YSK 2023). The election was essentially a contest between four candidates: sitting President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP); Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leading opposition candidate belonging to the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP); Muharrem İnce, a member of the Homeland Party (Memleket Partisi – MP) who withdrew his candidacy prior to the election but still appeared on the ballots for the first round; and Sinan Oğan, a former member of the Turkish parliament (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – MHP) who ran as an independent candidate. Since neither candidate managed to obtain the required majority in the first round on May 14, 2023, the second round turned into a run‑off between the two leading candidates, Erdoğan and Kılıçdaroğlu, on May 28, 2023. Eventually, the incumbent candidate Erdoğan emerged victorious by winning 52.18% of the vote in an election that has been described as free but not fair by international election observers (see OSCE 2023).
In Sweden, almost 43,000 individuals were eligible to vote in the elections. However, only 14,169 people eventually cast their ballots, which translated into a turnout of approximately 33% (YSK 2023)—a figure markedly below the overall turnout of 84.15% for the second round, but still in line with the turnout in previous elections such as the 2018 parliamentary elections (Sevi et al. 2019; Wackenhut 2022). In the following, we will discuss (a) how the Turkish election campaign manifested itself in Sweden, (b) the role of the NATO question and the tensions in Swedish–Turkish bilateral relations in the campaign, and (c) how we may conceptualize the role of this issue in this pivotal election cycle.
Reflections on the 2023 Turkish Election Vampaign in Sweden
The elections were a hotly debated topic in the diaspora, and most significant Turkish political parties campaigned or organized events in Sweden.2 However, these events did not take on the form of the large‑scale gatherings in, for instance, Germany or the Netherlands surrounding the 2017 referendum. Multiple diaspora associations, like the Union of International Democrats (UID), encouraged members to make use of their voting right3 or invited Turkish politicians to speak at local events. Activists campaigned in the physical world as well as online through various social media platforms.4 Supporters of sitting President Erdoğan canvassed for him and the ruling AKP in Stockholm suburbs like Botkyrka (Interview #4), and, like in many other countries (Yener‑Roderburg & Toivanen 2024) different diaspora organizations sought to ‘get out the vote’ by either arranging minibuses or pick‑up services to take voters to the polling station (Interviews #2, #4, and #5).
A young and politically active Kurd noted how everyone in his social circle sought to mobilize people to vote in the election. Since it was deemed so important, ‘everyone became an activist’ (Interview #1). He considered the election to be of critical importance not only due to the ways in which Kurds in Sweden may be affected by the NATO question but also because this was the first presidential election since the constitutional referendum, which had marked a shift from a primarily parliamentary to a presidential system. The interviewee feared that a victory for Erdoğan may further cement a political system that empowers the president at the expense of parliament—a move considered to accelerate Turkey’s descent into an electoral autocracy (Interview #1).
The earthquake that had hit Turkey in early February 2023 also featured as an important issue, not only due to perceptions of the Turkish government having botched the initial disaster response but also because of the significant toll the disaster had taken in terms of the human lives (up to 50,000 fatalities) and due to the economic strain that recovery efforts would put on the Turkish economy (Interview #2; New York Times 2023).
Unsurprisingly, the Turkish–Kurdish conflict also featured in candidates’ efforts to sway voters. While each of the two main candidates’ parties devoted space to their visions for the resolution of the ‘Kurdish question’ in their respective party programs, the AKP (2023) seemed to propose a resolution of the protracted conflict mostly based on current policies. The CHP (2023), on the other hand, advocated for a more profound shift in line with a comprehensive conflict transformation approach.
The Role of the NATO Qestion in the Election Campaign
Our interlocutors recalled the debate surrounding Sweden’s accession to NATO becoming a prominent topic in the lead‑up to the presidential and parliamentary elections (Interviews #1, #2, #3, #4, #9, #10, and #11). However, the geostrategic implications of Sweden joining the alliance played a negligible role compared to other issues arising from the actual application process. These concerns were leveraged by various actors and included: (1) Turkish national security, (2) political rights and civil liberties in Sweden, (3) political and international leadership, and (4) the protection of Islamic values.
The AKP’s party program did not directly address Sweden’s application but did emphasize NATO’s role in combatting terrorism—stressing that this required a joint effort from the entire alliance:
Turkey will also enhance its cooperation with NATO in the fight against terrorism, which is a common threat to all member states. The fight against terrorism will be conducted with a comprehensive approach, taking into account the root causes of terrorism and ensuring that the rights and freedoms of citizens are respected. Our party believes that a strong and effective NATO is essential for maintaining peace and stability in the region and the world (AKP 2023: 74).
In the foreign and security policy chapter, the CHP’s party program similarly emphasized the fight against terrorism (see e.g., CHP 2023: 113) but seemed more positive towards accepting new NATO members:
The CHP also believes that NATO, with the inclusion of new members, should contribute more significantly to ensuring international security and stability. To this end, it is of the opinion that achieving complete harmony, solidarity, and cooperation among NATO members will contribute to the alliance performing its duties most effectively (CHP 2023: 120).
As noted above, the Turkish government had demanded from Sweden the extradition of individuals who were considered suspected criminals or Kurdish nationalist terrorists just days after the NATO application had been submitted. Turkey emphasized that Swedish counter‑terrorism legislation was insufficient and enabled PKK supporters to mobilize material support for their cause—efforts that directly put at risk the lives of Turkish citizens (see e.g., DoC 2022b; SVT 2022). Echoing these concerns, one interviewee stressed:
[…] In Sweden, there is the PKK that collects money from here and there, and sends it to these terrorist groups in Iraq, in Syria, and Iran. That’s why Turkey didn’t sign (Interview #8).
Similar sentiments were expressed on social media platforms such as X—focusing not only on supposed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) activities in Sweden, but also taking aim at suspected members of the Gülen movement.5 Just a few days after Kurdish activists publicly displayed a doll symbolizing President Erdoğan hanging upside down in front of Stockholm’s city hall in January 2023 (see DN 2023),6 the Turkish Presidency’s Director of Communications, Fahrettin Altun, linked these issues, and remarked that:
We condemn in the strongest possible terms this heinous act carried out very clearly and unequivocally by the members of this bloody terrorist organisation there, and we urge the Swedish authorities once again. We urge the Swedish authorities to take necessary steps against terrorist groups without further delay and fulfil the demands that we have expressed very concretely at this point! (DoC 2023a).
The Turkish demands were framed as a matter of national security—one that Erdoğan and his government were determined to take seriously (DoC 2023b). Echoing this sentiment, one interviewee emphasized that: ‘[T]his is the foreign policy that Erdoğan has been following a few years; now he is actually praised in Turkey because of it’ (Interview #1).
The NATO question was hotly debated among Kurdish respondents. However, they focused on the consequences of Swedish concessions for supporters of the Kurdish independence movement and the broader Swedish political system. The question was not if Sweden should become a NATO member but the government’s (un)willingness to curtail foundational rights such as the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of assembly and freedom of expression. A representative of a Kurdish diaspora association noted:
[…] Why do we have law then? When you say this (extraditing Swedish citizens or permanent residents) is not legal, okay? […] What makes it legal then? The policy, the relations (to Turkey), the politics is dominating the justice system, you know? This is the question! Can the politics between Sweden and Turkey become so powerful that it just bypasses the (Swedish) constitution? How can you bypass the constitution? (Interview #5).
In short, the potential consequences of NATO membership were a highly salient issue but framed less in terms of voters’ choices at the ballot box and more about broader implications for Sweden’s democracy; a finding that illustrates the complexities of deterritorialized citizenship and multi‑sited embeddedness and political belonging among diasporans (c.f. Yener‑Roderburg & Toivanen 2024).
Others emphasized how the issue was instrumentalized, not least in Turkish media outlets, to portray Erdoğan as an effective player on the international stage (Interviews #2 and #3). One interviewee recalled Erdoğan being framed as a strong leader able to bend a ‘humanitarian superpower like Sweden to his will’ (Interview #1). Similarly, another interviewee, a first‑generation Turkish emigree who settled in Sweden decades ago, recalled how:
Looking at the NATO question, […] he is still running on (the) populist thing, right? To show that: ‘I have influence in the world, […] and I am an important leader!’ That is, that is the message he has sent to the people who have voted for him, right? (Interview #2).
This was echoed by yet another interviewee, a journalist who had left Turkey after the 2016 coup attempt. He noted how the NATO issue represented an opportunity for Erdoğan and the AKP to create a ‘us versus them’ binary, which enabled them to portray themselves as protectors of the nation and to use Sweden as a target that represents everything that is wrong about Western culture, i.e., harboring terrorists and disrespecting religion (Interview #4). This dynamic became especially pronounced following the controversial Quran‑burning incidents in Sweden that occurred in early 2023. Here, Erdoğan was depicted as a strong leader and a protector of the faith, standing against a country that openly disrespects Islam (Interview #4). Elaborating on the effects of the Quran‑burning incidents and the strong stance taken by Erdoğan in this matter, one interviewee noted:
This is one step too far […]. It might have had an effect on people who were in the middle: like maybe switching to the to the opposition but then saying like: ‘No wait! This is not right. We have to protect ourselves, and Erdoğan is doing a great job on foreign policy’ (Interview #1).
This interviewee described how the issue was used to further legitimate the current leadership—especially when confronted with a hostile international environment.
Thus, while the Swedish accession to NATO was much discussed during the run‑up to the 2023 elections, it was quickly transformed into a canvas for many other questions ranging from national security concerns and the Kurdish independence struggle to international, cultural, and religious leadership.
Understanding Diaspora Voting in Times of Vilateral Tensions
Having discussed how the NATO‑related diplomatic crisis between Sweden and Turkey featured in or was politicized during the campaign, this section explores the broader gamut of factors that may have factored into diaspora voters’ electoral decision‑making calculus.
The voter turnout in Sweden was relatively low when compared to the overall turnout but in line with previous elections such as the 2018 presidential elections (Sevi et al. 2019; Wackenhut 2022: 379). While one interviewee described this election ‘as the most important election in Turkish history’ (Interview #1), another cautioned how ‘every election is the most important election in history’ for some people (Interview #3) but also acknowledged that this election was important in cementing the shift to a presidential system in the country. In the future, he argued, politicians would be hesitant to go back to the old parliamentary system as soon as there would be a change in government (Interview #3).
Another interviewee, a representative for a Kurdish association in Sweden, stressed that—at least for people in his social circle—there seemed to be no good alternatives in this round. Even if one of the leading candidates may have been an advocate for Kurdish rights, many of his coalition or alliance partners were still part of a regime that they deemed as essentially illegitimate and responsible for much of the suffering for the Kurdish minorities in Turkey, Syria, and Northern Iraq:
Why should I think that these are better people? They didn’t have any clear program for how to solve the Kurdish question. It was more like background talk. ‘OK, help us to come to the power. We are going to—someway—going to work with you […]. Then we can discuss the Kurdish question.’ This was more like background talk. It was not public. Because of this mistrust, of election fraud, and Erdoğan was controlling a lot of the media and in the campaign, they were saying: ‘We have no trust, why should we go out and vote?’ (Interview #4).
In addition to the well‑established finding that nonresident voters tend to be less likely to cast their ballot than resident voters (Itzigsohn & Villacrés 2008), this lack of trust in the political system, especially among parts of the Kurdish community, may help explain the comparatively low voter turnout rates.7 Experiences with or a fear of transnational repression may be another factor. To register as a voter, it would have been necessary to provide Turkish authorities with a valid home address. Especially individuals who had been previously targeted seemed unwilling to potentially expose themselves or their families to additional risks by disclosing this information and therefore abstained from completing the registration process (Interviews #4 and #6).
In terms of overall results, the opposition candidate, Kılıçdaroğlu, managed to win more votes from diaspora voters in Sweden than the incumbent in either of the election rounds—thereby outperforming his opponent in this arena whilst still losing the election on an aggregate level. A similar picture emerged in other countries with a comparatively large diaspora of Turkish‑origin Kurds, like in the United Kingdom (Yener‑Roderburg & Yetiş 2024). However, in host countries with a differently composed diaspora, such as Germany or the Netherlands, the election yielded results that favored Erdoğan (see Table 1).
Table 1
Total number of votes for candidates in round one of the 2023 presidential elections by country.
| COUNTRY | ERDOğAN | İNCE | KİLİçDAROğLU | OğAN |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sweden | 5.993 (44.2%) | 109 (0.8%) | 7.244 (54.4%) | 207 (1.5%) |
| Germany | 475.593 (65.5%) | 5.086 (0.7%) | 236.126 (32.5%) | 9.348 (1.3%) |
| Netherlands | 98.265 (68.4%) | 1.091 (0.8%) | 41.436 (28.8%) | 2.855 (2%) |
| United Kingdom | 11.619 (18.3%) | 890 (1.4%) | 50.318 (79%) | 831 (1.3%) |
Source: YSK 2023.
Although the NATO dispute was discursively prominent, it did not function as a primary causal determinant of vote choice. Consistent with other findings on homeland political mobilization (Jakobson et al. 2023: 284–287), foreign policy operated as a narrative resource through which existing partisan identities were reinforced. For pro‑government voters, Erdoğan’s stance during the NATO negotiations confirmed his role as defender of national sovereignty. For opposition‑leaning and Kurdish respondents, the dispute deepened concerns regarding democratic erosion and minority rights. In this sense, foreign policy salience manifested as reaffirmation rather than realignment.
Considering the internal diversity and polarization within the Turkish‑origin diaspora in Sweden, other and somewhat more traditional factors are likely to have played a larger role in individual‑level decision‑making processes. Aside from obvious factors, like prospective voters’ ethnic background, which lies at the very heart of the Turkish–Kurdish conflict (Interview #5), other issues like the voters’ socio‑economic background—understood here in terms of income, education, or social position—might be comparatively more important in terms of determining whether or not a particular candidate gets a vote (Yener‑Roderburg & Yetiş 2024; Interview #3). Here, even the cause of the initial emigration decision may play an indirect role (Yener‑Roderburg 2022). Turkish migrants who initially came to Sweden as labor migrants in the 1960s and 1970s often originated from rural and more conservative areas and arrived with comparatively lower levels of education than many of the migrants who arrived in the 1980s in the wake of the coup d’état and the resulting wave of political repression. While the former group, which coincidentally represents much of the Turkish‑origin diaspora in Germany or the Netherlands, might overwhelmingly support President Erdoğan and the AKP, those who fled Turkey and found a safe harbor in Sweden may, not least due to their often comparatively higher levels of educational achievement, be more likely to vote for opposition candidates.
Conclusion
Taking its point of departure in current debates on external voting, diasporas, and transported conflicts, along with research on the increasingly porous boundaries between domestic and foreign policy, the present article sought to explore external voting in the context of bilateral tensions between diaspora voters’ countries of origin and country of residence. Conceptually, we advance the literature by distinguishing between foreign policy as discursive salience and foreign policy as an electoral determinant in external voting contexts.
Empirically, we explored a highly salient case: the ways in which diplomatic tensions between Sweden and Turkey that emerged in the wake of Sweden’s application to become a full member in NATO may have factored into diaspora voters’ electoral choices during the 2023 Turkish presidential elections, which ultimately resulted in victory for President Erdogan. Drawing, on a combination of primary and secondary sources, it was shown that the NATO question was a highly salient issue during the campaign and was used and politicized by different political actors to mobilize prospective voters. The Swedish case illustrates how diaspora voters, embedded in layered transnational citizenship regimes, interpret bilateral tensions through organizational, ethnic, and ideological lenses. Rather than producing large‑scale electoral shifts, the NATO dispute amplified existing political identities and reinforced polarization. These findings resonate well with earlier research on the role of foreign policy issues in national elections and represent a valuable addition to the rapidly growing literature on external voting, which has so far paid scant attention to matters concerning diplomatic relations and foreign.
Considering diasporans’ multi‑sited embeddedness in at least two contexts, it may be fruitful for future research to comparatively explore dual citizens’ voting behaviors both in their country of origin and their current country of residence—especially in times of diplomatic tensions between these two countries. Such contexts offer a critical lens for analyzing how transnational citizenship shapes electoral choice, political loyalty, and the intersection of domestic party competition with foreign policy conflict.
Notes
[1] This article does not seek to provide a statistically significant or necessarily generalizable picture of how the bilateral tensions affected voter preferences and voting behaviors but to explore the question more in line with a qualitative in‑depth case study approach that focuses on understanding rather than explaining.
[2] Here, Sweden was no exception. See Yener‑Roderburg (2024) for a recent account of the ways in which homeland parties rallied voters in the election cycle.
[3] See UID Sweden (2023‑05‑06). ‘Oylarını kullanmak isteyen vatandaşlarımız şuan bekleme sırası yoktur. Seçim alanına gelince direk kullanabilirsiniz,’ available at: https://www.facebook.com/uid.sweden [last accessed: 2024‑12‑04].
[5] See https://x.com/MikailPNyuksel/status/1656747162301001735 or https://x.com/MikailPNyuksel/status/1657098511706382376.
[6] See Rojavakommittéerna (2023), ‘Erdogan, avgå nu!’ (Erdogan, step down now!) available at: https://www.rojavakommitteerna.com/nyheter/erdogan-avga-nu/ [last accessed: 2024‑12‑04].
Funding statement
The author received financial support for the research, writing and publication of this article from the Swedish Research Council [Vetenskapsrådet, grant number: 2021‑01‑011].
Ethics statement
The project was approved by the Swedish Ethical Review Authority [Etikprövningsmyndigheten, Dnr 2022‑07149‑01].
Competing Interests
The authors have no competing interests to declare.