Two Originals, One Artwork: On the Ontology of Originals and Improvisations

There is disagreement as to the ontological status of works associated with an original. Some hold that works like paintings are identical to the concrete particular the artist worked on while creating the artwork. Others suggest that works of this sort cannot be instantiated more than once. In this paper, it is argued that, even if artworks like paintings cannot be instantiated in reproductions, they are nevertheless possibly instantiated more than once. Moreover, it is tentatively suggested that the same holds for improvisations in music. Therefore, even the best candidates on offer do not allow for an identification of the work with a particular or for an identification of the work with a type that is instantiated maximally once. The argument rests on thought experiments, and an inference to the ‘best’ explanation. This inference is, of course, defeasible. Four alternatives, three of which are potentially fruitful, will be identified, and it will be argued that, on balance, these alternatives should be dismissed.