Introduction
To foster security, states require expedient relations between the government exercising authority, and the industry supplying the practical means for the state to do so (Devore & Weiss, 2014; Weber et al., 1991). With geopolitics again vital to the formulation and execution of defence policy, such relations are increasingly important to the field of defence studies (Brattberg & Valasek, 2019). Moreover, it has sparked a need for new insights into how governments engage and prioritize in state-defence industry relations (SDIR). Archuleta (2016, p. S51) claims that to gain such insights, defence and security studies should incorporate principles from public policy and administration theory. A cross-discipline approach is needed since policy researchers have not paid sufficient attention to questions of traditional defence and national security policy, leaving scrutiny of the field to international relations and security scholars (Ibid.). While there is abundant work on defence and national security policy, including foreign policy decision-making, research on domestic policy processes remains comparatively thin. The abundance of public policy research methods and theories, meanwhile, offers the potential to increase scholarly knowledge on domestic defence policy processes and SDIR.
This study seeks to apply a cross-discipline approach drawing on the fields of public policy and administration studies and defence and security studies. More specifically, it aims to gain empirical insights into how the Swedish state values SDIR in the field of defence policy. To this end, we present a case study of Swedish government value-prioritization in three recent defence bills, asking how the state balances public values when engaging in policy making related to SDIR.
We approach SDIR from a public policy and administration perspective – that is, attention is paid to policy-making with influence on the security and lives of citizens (Peters, 1999; Head, 2022). SDIR is a form of public-private partnership (PPP) vital for national defence and security. We deal specifically with the wider context in which policy actors operate and the political issues they must engage with to successfully navigate it (Cairney, 2023). In essence, policy-making consists of assessing, selecting and prioritizing different values (Lewin, 2022). Empirically, we select the Swedish case for scrutiny as it shares common denominators with other cases of interest and is thus suitable for exploratory studies and cross-case generalization (Seawright & Geering, 2008). The Swedish case can be understood as typical in relation to other European states, sharing decades of downsizing territorial defence (Matlary & Osterud, 2016). Like several European states, moreover, Sweden has a large defence industry (Government Report, 2022:24). In the years 2016–2020, Sweden was the 15th largest arms-exporting country with a 0.7 percent share of global arms exports (SIPRI, 2020). As such, its theoretical comparability extends beyond small states and shares commonalities with countries such as the Netherlands, Italy, the United Kingdom, Germany and France.
The relative size of the Swedish defence industry and the long history of close SDIR is an artefact of a historic neutrality policy that required self-sufficiency in the production of arms. The state signed agreements with companies whose production of goods and services was vital for executing total defence (Government Report, 2019:51, p. 82), a policy understood as “a whole of society approach to national security intended to deter a potential enemy by raising the cost of aggression and lowering the chances of its success” (Wither 2020, p. 62). In the mid-1990s, a decreased threat perception and anticipation of lasting peace coincided with new economic priorities, shifting global power dynamics and new public management (NPM) prescriptions. These developments put the Swedish defence sector and industry in a tough spot. The Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) transformed from a largely self-reliant territorial defence force aimed at countering Soviet attacks, to a leaner expeditionary force participating in global crisis management (Government Bill 2004, p. 5; Deverell et al., 2015). Meanwhile the government altered SDIR to its core. Distance began to emerge between traditionally close collaborations, partly due to EU regulations fuelling competition (Britz, 2010). National orders dwindled and the defence industry adapted through new and international ownership, mergers and acquisitions, and by looking for new markets, both international (Britz, 2004; Ikegami, 2013; Kurc et al., 2021) and domestic (Larsson, 2019). After years of military downsizing, aggressive Russian security policies pushed Sweden to return to total defence policy.
This study explores the gradual return to total defence by examining official defence policy documents – specifically the defence bills of 2009 (2010–14), 2015 (2016–20) and 2020 (2021–25) and key informant interviews, paying special attention to SDIR. The article sheds light on how the Swedish government prioritizes different values when engaging with the defence industry. Focusing on the three recent bills, the study spans a period beginning with the reverse of military dismantlement and ending with the initial stages of the re-implementation of total defence policy.
From a theoretical perspective, the shift is notable in that it goes beyond politics as usual. The heavy downsizing of the SAF between 1990 and 2015 set the stage for a challenging rebuilding process once territorial defence returned as a major focus. While this challenge encompasses all parts of society, international ownership has altered SDIR in recent decades (Oikonomou, 2008; Britz, 2004), hampering the possibility of reinstating the old total defence policy without significant adaptation. The way relations between state and business are assessed is a vital part of public administration (Casady et al., 2019; Verweij & van Meerkerk, 2021; Wang et al., 2018), and balancing different values is one of the most basic tasks of policymaking. The latter is of special interest in a military context as it tends to be conducted out of the public eye (van der Wal, 2014).
In this study, we are interested in certain values specific to politics and administration (Rutgers, 2008). We begin from the assumption that values in the political sphere relate to both administrative and political concerns and processes (cf. Brown et al., 2021; van der Wal, 2016). The policymaking studied in this article is thus assessed against the balancing of politico-administrative values of this kind (Hood, 1991; Hood & Jackson, 1991). These values are referred to as sigma-type values – the prioritizing of efficiency and economy (achieving more for less; frugality and parsimony); theta-type values – a prioritizing of the general values of honesty and fairness through the championing of openness, accountability and independent scrutiny; and lambda-type values – a prioritizing of security and resilience, aiming at adaptable and robust operations (Hood, 1991; Hood & Jackson, 1991; Rutgers, 2008).
Public stakeholders must seek to balance these values – favouring one value over another will affect the fulfilment of those remaining (Jörgensen & Bozeman 2007). For instance, government officers must follow regulations, even if they consider them to be contrary to efficient public governance (van der Wal, 2014, p. 1033). In this case, the actual political balancing examined is made by the holders of political office, administrators and public servants. It is important to note, however, that we do not prioritize any value here, and we do not consider the execution of these values be natural but, rather, contested (Cairney, 2023). With these values as a focal point, the study reveals how the state navigates between values when designing defence policy. We seek to balance this somewhat one-sided consideration through insights from key informant interviews with representatives of the national defence industry and defence authorities.
This study seeks to contribute to the literature of defence policy, public values and public policy in a broad sense. In so doing, we address both Petersson’s (2011) assertion that shifts in defence policy are under-researched, and the need for empirical contributions to the field of public value research noted by Hartley and colleagues (2019a; 2017). The reinstatement of total defence policy is a monumental challenge requiring collaboration between government, authorities, and industry – but how this collaboration is to be conducted and the values guiding it remain less than clear (see Jörgensen & Bozeman 2007). Therefore, this study seeks to add to the literature on public policy – a literature which has not, to date, paid sufficient attention to questions of traditional defence and national security policy. Moreover, by a consideration of defence and security through the lens of public administration theory, the study also seeks to contribute to the field of defence studies (Archuleta, 2016).
The study is organized in the following way. First, the study is contextually situated by a presentation of literature on Swedish defence policy and PPP. A section on public value research then follows, with both a discussion of the utility of the concept for understanding relations between the Swedish state and the defence industry, and a description of the lens of politico-administrative values. A section on materials and methods follows this. In the subsequent analysis, the research question is answered through an analysis of the empirical data in the light of the three politico-administrative values described above. The study then ends with a concluding discussion and suggestions for further research.
Previous Research
Swedish Defence Policy and PPP
Defence policy researchers generally explain changes within national administrations through a realist lens (see Auten, 2008; Liff, 2015; Wieslander, 2022). Scholarship of this kind seeks to account for alterations or stability in matters such as international defence cooperation or defence budgets. Recent research focusing on changes in Swedish defence draws more on interpretivist principles. Addressing Swedish defence policy from 1979 to 2020, Stiglund (2021) emphasizes the conflicting logics of risk and threat; Sebastian Larsson (2021; 2019), meanwhile, describes the process of how societal security policy developed from the total defence policy. Larsson demonstrates the instrumental role played by Swedish defence bills in the transformation of total defence policy and the organization and purpose of the SAF in the post-Cold War years. The dual defence bills of 1995 and 1996 initiated the discontinuation of total defence planning and shifted priorities from territorial defence to the support of society in civil contingencies and disasters (Larsson, 2021). This transformation continued with the 2000 defence bill, which established international expeditionary missions as the SAF’s main task.
Similar organizational reform occurred in other European countries (Petersson, 2011, p. 702). The Russo-Georgian war of 2008 and the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 shifted the situation again, precipitating a restoration of Swedish total defence policy (Government Bill, 2015, p. 2). The stakes were again raised in 2017 when the Defence Committee acknowledged that an armed attack against the country could not be ruled out (Government Report, 2017:66, p. 61). Wither (2020, p. 76), however, claimed that “there appears little political appetite, or indeed perceived need in Nordic states to ready institutions or societies for the privations and sacrifices required for a truly fundamental approach to total defence”.
State-business relations are generally held to be examples of PPP, understood as “cooperative institutional arrangements between public and private sectors” (Wang et al., 2018, p. 293; Hodge & Greve, 2007). PPP is a distinct type of public private arrangement as it requires joint development, financing and sharing of risk (Wang et al., 2018). The concept hails from economic decline and indicates a need for shared risks, costs, benefits, resources, and responsibilities when conducting large public service and infrastructure projects. It is durable, contractual (Koppenjan 2005), and set apart from other more hierarchical and vertical arrangements, such as privatization and outsourcing (Wang et al., 2018). Previous research notes a shortage of studies exploring PPP and SDIR in the field of policy studies (Calcara, 2017; Heidenkamp et al., 2011). Studies on SDIR tend to focus on close ties between the sectors or the decision-making of domestic policymakers, military elites and industrial groups. This research, known as the Military Industrial Complex (MIC) perspective, has been critiqued for being oversimplified and under-theorized (Calcara, 2017, p. 539). One reason is the tendency for collaborative relations to be depicted as dubious networks of ties operating outside of democratic checks and balances (Dunne & Sköns 2014, p. 2).
Civil military relations (CMR) is another adjacent and cross-disciplinary field. From a political science perspective, CMR focusses on “relations between political elites and the senior military leadership at the state’s apex” (Brooks, 2019, p. 380), especially on how the civilian part of the state succeeds in controlling the military (Huntington, 1957; Brooks, 2019). This literature has been critiqued for overly emphasizing the unique nature of certain features of the military which are, in actuality, shared with many other policy and professional fields (Christiansson, 2020, p. 45). Recent theoretical developments, moreover, have brought the civilian and military aspects of the MIC together to suggest the concept of a military-civilian-industrial complex (MCIC), which emphasizes the blurring of boundaries between military and civilian industry and governance (Newlove-Eriksson & Eriksson, 2023).
The fact that defence markets differ from other markets calls for careful study of SDIR. Products are developed in response to demand almost entirely constructed by national governments – the only legal subjects authorized to buy material designed for war (Calcara, 2017). Special regulations and national security policy interests affect its functioning and dynamics. This market is not guided by market considerations alone. It has clear connections to national security, strong connections between industry and home countries, and long lead times for product development (Government Report 2022:24, p. 131). Calcara (2017, p. 529) outlines a paradox when claiming that the defence industry prefers national policies protecting domestic markets from foreign competition, while also promoting export (cf. Devore & Weiss, 2014). Government commissions, moreover, have declared that defence market particularities require dialogue and expedient SDIR (Government Report 2022:24, p. 22), and that the old system of close ties in SDIR cannot be reinstated due to impediments such as EU regulations for equal commercial treatment (Government Report 2019:51, p. 14).
Public Value Research
In 1995, Mark Moore published his book on public value as a normative lens for public service and an alternative to the NPM model. Since then, public policy and administration researchers’ interest in the concept has grown (Benington & Moore, 2011; Williams & Shearer, 2011; Bryson et al., 2014, 2017; Hartley et al., 2019a; de Graaf & van der Wal, 2017). Public value research has reinvigorated the debate on the purpose of the public sector and, consequently, of the state (Coffey, 2021). Scholars have even argued that public values form the most important topic in public administration and policy (Jörgensen & Bozeman, 2007, p. 355). There is a theoretical consensus that public values are relatively stable; that they have the potential to affect behaviour; to bring deliberation to change; and that they play a role in the individual’s sense of themselves (Bozeman, 2007; Van der Wal, 2014). Nevertheless, policy scholarship suggests many different values (De Vries et al., 2016; Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015; van der Wal, 2014). Jörgensen & Bozeman (2007, p. 374) reviewed the literature in key journals to identify and categorize 72 values. Their findings indicate that, although government has an important role in upholding them, public values are not exclusively for the government to maintain. Van der Wal (2014) compared the views of senior public managers and ministers on key public values in the Netherlands, the United States and the EU. He pointed out that most studies on public values are quantitative surveys rather than deep qualitative studies of specific values, and that there is a lack of studies devoted to how and why certain values are important.
Hartley and her colleagues (2017; 2019b) proposed three different ways to study public values, one of which conceptualizes them as a contested democratic practice (see also Benington, 2015). In this context, public value is defined as a construct emerging from such contested democratic practices within organizations or partnerships. This perspective offers a conceptual framework for understanding the domain in which public managers create value, particularly in terms of outcomes for society (Hartley et al., 2019b; Brown et al., 2021). Empirically, focus here is on “what the public values” or “what adds value to the public sphere” (Hartley et al., 2019a, p. 672). In this study, we place our understanding of public values in Hartley’s framework, understanding the concept in terms of principles connecting “the contests, debates and dialogues in a democratic society which create and contribute to the public sphere” (Hartley et al., 2019a, p. 672). Public values are thus assumptions or principles underlying ideals of governing. As such, they guide governmental behaviour and decision-making (Bozeman, 2007; Benington, 2011; Brown et al., 2021; van der Wal, 2014).
Politico-Administrative Values as Theoretical Framework
Research in public policy and administration suggests certain core values guide public stakeholders in their work. Such values are typically seen as essential to ensuring effective, ethical, and legitimate public service (Denhart & Denhart, 2015). This study follows Archuleta’s call for cross-discipline scholarship bridging the field of public policy and administration and the field of defence and national security, and van der Wal’s (2014) appeal for studies to concentrate on a few specific public values in detail. Here, our aim is to arrive at better contextual understanding of why and how some values are prioritized. Deriving political values from government documents can also help to make sense of government policy – something especially needed in volatile times.
In selecting a model to structure the given data, we lean on previous research suggesting various such models emphasizing values of importance to public service (Elster, 1988; van der Wal, 2014). Hood (1991) suggested three core sets of politico-administrative values revolving around frugality/parsimony; fairness/honesty; and security/resilience. We choose this prescriptive toolbox for our analysis, believing it to fit the empirical case and context: first, it refers directly to the wave of NPM policy and austerity –an important contextual factor in the case of shifts in Swedish defence policy (see de Graaf & van der Wal, 2017); second, it is appropriate to discussions on security and resilience – matters also central to the case. Table 1 presents the values in brief and outlines the conceptual framework used to structure the data.
Table 1
The politico-administrative public values theoretical framework (drawing on Hood [1991] and Hood & Jackson [1991]).
| SECURITY/RESILIENCE | FAIRNESS/HONESTY | FRUGALITY/PARSIMONY | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Characteristics | Service reliability, robustness, adaptivity. | Accountability, equity, and legitimacy. | Lean economy, resource efficiency, clear target objectives/goals. |
| Input/process | Steadfast in the face of challenges and uncertainties, problem-solving and seeking out creative approaches to public service delivery. | Transparency in decision-making, ensuring accessible services, being responsive to public needs and fair to all members of society. | Achieving objectives efficient-ly, enabling best use of available resources, emphasi-zing lean management and frugal, i.e., responsible and cost-effective aspects of public resource use. |
| Output/results | Navigation in uncertain environments, need for public servants to continuously improve public work and services, paying attention to input, process and risk. | Championing impartiality in public administration and keeping processes rulebound, thus making them legitimate enough to uphold legitimacy. | Focus on cost-cutting, downsizing and prioritizing output in terms of doing more for less. |
Materials and Method
This study draws on two sets of data covering the years 2009–2022. The empirical core of the study is a series of official documents; of these, the 2009, 2015 and 2020 defence bills, and contemporary government reports dealing with SDIR, are central. The most recent government document added to the study was drafted in 2022. The defence bills are government bills drafted by the government in collaboration with defence agencies and decided by parliament every fifth year. They both realise and outline the future development of national defence policy (Government Bill, 2014/15). The selected bills are limited to those launched after Russia’s shift to a more aggressive foreign security policy; here the dividing line was the 2008 Russo-Georgian war.
The 2009 defence bill (Prop. 2008/09) concluded the policy initiated in the mid 1990s outlined by the defence bills of 2000 (Prop. 1999/2000:30) and 2004 (Prop. 2004/05:5). This saw a transformation from a territorial defence force focused on deterrence to an expeditionary force aimed at international missions. The 2015 bill (Prop. 2014/15:109) introduced a shift in attitudes, breaking the trend of decreasing military funding by suggesting, instead, the need to reinstate total defence. The 2020 bill (Prop. 2020/21:30), focusing on the degraded international security situation and Russia’s will to use military means, portrayed a similar perception of threat (Government Bill, 2020, p. 33). Unlike previous bills, however, the 2020 bill acknowledged the risk of armed attacks against Sweden (Government Bill, 2020 p. 26).
To complement the generic view on SDIR delivered in the official documents, interviews with six senior representatives of four significant national defence industry companies and one senior representative of the Swedish Defence Materiel Authority (FMV) were conducted in June of 2021. By adding insights from the industry and authorities, the interviews balance the relatively one-sided view presented in the policy documents. Thus, the interviews were crucial for accessing defence industry and FMV takes on government policy.
The informants were employed as Business Development Director, CEO, Procurement Director, Head of Legal Director Sales and Marketing, Company Lawyer and Senior Advisor Systems Logistics. The FOKUS research project at the Swedish Defence University provided access to the informants. All informants gave their consent before the interviews. Interviews were semi-structured and took place at the researcher’s workplace or remotely. They lasted between 48 and 85 minutes and were recorded and transcribed. The interviews aimed to establish the respondents’ understanding of conditions, obstacles and opportunities for the industry to operate in the field of defence materiel supply and collaboration through SDIR. The informants’ personal names and company names were anonymized to protect their integrity. The interviewees and the interview questions are presented in Appendices 1 and 2.
The empirical study was conducted through a qualitative content analysis of defence bills and interview transcripts. Content analysis is useful for making inferences from selected documents valid and replicable (Krippendorf, 2019). As traditional content analysis risks being superficial and incapable of grasping the more subtle meanings of texts, this study uses the qualitative content analysis method as a middle way between interpretivism and objectivism; here a predefined coding scheme is put to work on selected texts and interpretation is integrated into the analysis process (Kuckartz, 2014, p. 31). The coding scheme was developed deductively from Hood’s (1991) three-part conceptual toolbox constructed according to the values of frugality/parsimony, fairness/honesty and security/resilience as depicted in Table 1. Through these concepts, we built an ideational analytical framework for analysis and interpretation aimed at revealing politico-administrative values in the empirical data. When applied, the framework helped make sense of the data, to unearth its latent meanings, and to categorize it accordingly.
The coding is not a tool for measuring with positivist accuracy the precise frequency that values become evident. We are interested, rather, in both the content of the data and how the values occur in it. In practice, this entailed posing the operationalized questions: “How do the defence bills portray relations between the state and defence industry?” and, more specifically, “How can we derive the values of frugality/parsimony, fairness/honesty, and security/resilience in the government bills?”.
How does the state balance public values when engaging in policy-making related to SDIR?
Below, the three-part politico-administrative values analytical toolbox is applied to the data. The results show that the bills differ in how they prioritize the values of security/resilience, frugality/parsimony and fairness/honesty depending on the specific security situation. Over time, however, fairness/honesty emerges as the most consistent value in the data.
Balancing Public Values in the 2009 Defence Bill
The value of security is downplayed in the 2009 bill. The significance of the title, “A Useful Defence”, is altered in the text to “A defence in use” (Government Bill, 2009, p. 10) – indicating something contrary to the idea of a defence much stronger than what is required in peacetime, instead downscaling defence into what is used everyday (Government Bill, 2009, p. 34). This is made explicit in the claim, there is “no need for a task organization that can defend Sweden only after mobilization” (Government Bill, 2009, p. 77). The need for domestic security and territorial defence is thus downplayed in favour of flexible defence units ready to execute complex operational missions requested by the government (Government Bill, 2009, p. 35). By increasing the utility of the defence force, the government argues that capacity will increase. Statements interpreted as emphasizing the value of security/resilience include suggestions of giving and receiving military support (Government Bill, 2009, p. 1), specific projects aimed at increasing operability (Government Bill, 2009, p. 57), investments in intelligence and cybersecurity protection (Government Bill, 2009, p. 40), a halt to the closing-down of basic organization units (Government Bill, 2009, p. 12), and active precaution regarding the general security situation with concern over Russia’s growing aggression towards its neighbours (Government Bill, 2009, p. 28).
In the absence of security and resilience as a guiding principle, frugal and parsimonious cutbacks are suggested across the board – from costs for research and development (Government Bill, 2009, p. 97) to decommissioned surplus materiel and stockpiles (Government Bill, 2009, p. 90). At times, priority between frugality and security becomes candid. The bill declares the maintenance of 100 combat aircrafts, while discontinuing the earlier generation “even if it means a temporary decline in operational capability” (Government Bill, 2009, p. 69). Moreover, the bill asserts that:
proposed development towards a more useful and accessible defence can only take place at a rate the economy allows. Resources will have to be freed through changes and rationalizations on personnel, material, logistics supply and other support activities. Increased costs are balanced against rationalizations and reduced ambitions. (Government Bill, 2009, p. 45)
The essence of the bill is that resources are to be freed to create the “new more useable armed forces” (Government Bill, 2009, p. 87), entailing a flexible operational defence, equipped to handle shifting threats (Government Bill, 2009, p. 8). The bill, moreover, engages with the private sector to “purposefully restrict public commitment” (Government Bill, 2009, pp. 104–5). Thus, the bill supports SDIR and collaboration as a means to achieve efficient resource usage. It also underlines the need to “choose maintenance and upgrading of existing equipment/stock before new acquisition” (Government Bill, 2009, p. 87). This, in turn, implies restrictions on new development and acquisitions and on the acquisition of existing materiel (Government Bill, 2009, p. 13). In a similar vein, the bill suggests lowering the SAF’s ambitions on projects requiring close SDIR such as the “network-based defence project”, where ambitions are altered “from leading the development to participating, following and adjusting to international developments” (Government Bill, 2009, p. 56). One of the bill’s goals for defence materiel supply is to reduce long-term financial ties (Government Bill, 2009, p. 87), to the detriment of the industry which aspires to long-term ties for the sake of decreasing uncertainty (Informant 1; Informant 6). Accordingly, companies prefer contractual agreements based on commercial terms, not voluntary arrangements, to make sure they can deliver what the state requires (Informant 4; Informant 6).
Regarding the value of fairness/honesty, the 2009 bill underlines the importance of a fair, transparent and competitive European defence material market with open procurement and refuting offset compensation (Government Bill, 2009, pp. 13, 92–94). This policy can be seen as the government’s way to appease the industry without engaging in earnest with it as a client. It is a complex issue. The defence industry, with its strong international ownership ties, strives for “a level playing field at least in Europe” to be able to compete on equal terms. On the other hand, banning offset is dismissed by one informant as “a tendency for us to always be the best in class” (Informant 2), indicating a paradoxical stance on transparency and competition (see also Calcara, 2017; Devore & Weiss, 2014).
Further efforts relating to fair treatment and impartiality concern the need to clarify SAF personnel’s obligations to participate in international missions. While the bill supports a duty, it acknowledges that it would lead “some individuals to end their service in the Armed Forces earlier than calculated” (Government Bill, 2009, p. 76). The bill also suggests the reform of putting conscription military service on hold (Government Bill, 2009, p. 1). Being motivated by efficiency, this could be seen as an act of frugality (Government Bill, 2009, p. 49). Nevertheless, as the new staffing system demanded additional resources, and as conscription had long been seen as a central institution for public legitimacy and anchoring, reforms relating to conscription are understood as relating to fairness.
Balancing Public Values in the 2015 Defence Bill
The 2015 bill presents a shift from its predecessors by valuing security/resilience. It suggests an extra 10.2 billion SEK be added to previously confirmed additions to fund military and territorial security (Government Bill, 2015, p. 1) to increase operational defence capability (Government Bill, 2015, pp. 46, 103), and the resumption of total defence planning (Government Bill, 2015, p. 2). Like the previous bill, the 2015 bill suggests new acquisitions for air and naval forces (Government Bill, 2015, p.17), but also increased operational capacity to receive international military support (Government Bill, 2015, p. 58). It further seeks relations be clarified between the SAF and FMV in times of heightened alert (Government Bill, 2015, p. 96). The bill repeats, albeit softens, the strategy of banning new development and acquisitions, by prioritizing the maintenance and upgrading of existing equipment/stock before new acquisitions (Government Bill, 2015, p. 99). Furthermore, it suggests export-supporting activities be used to promote efficient materiel supply (Government Bill, 2015, p. 110). The bill reiterates important aspects of security while claiming parties other than the state may maintain security:
Research and development is important to understand and to be able to adapt military defence for future challenges and threats and to developments in the environment, including a potential adversary’s strengths and weaknesses. However, it does not have to be presided over by the state. (Government Bill, 2015, p. 102)
The government underlines the SAF’s organizational efficiency in the bill, stressing the importance of clarity in steering and evaluation. Further, the bill considers increasing flexibility in material supply and discusses the possibility of more efficient resource utilization through higher allocation credit for material investments (Government Bill, 2015, pp. 116–118).
Concerning the value of fairness, the government declares that voluntariness should remain a basis of SAF’s staff system. Meanwhile, the obligation to undergo conscription was still on hold; it would apply only if the government found conscription necessary on the grounds of security concerns (Government Bill, 2015, pp. 86–87). The bill, moreover, suggests a commission into a sustainable SAF HR-system, taking into account the importance of “public anchoring” (Government Bill, 2015, p. 89). Finally, it presents a discussion on combat aircraft and underwater capability as “essential security interests” (ESI) entailing exceptions from procurement regulations in line with Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Government Bill, 2015, p. 100). The government thus designates those areas to be more critical than other areas of the SAF, the industry and total defence.
Balancing Public Values in the 2020 Defence Bill
The 2020 defence bill puts more emphasis on security/resilience than previous bills, assuring substantially increased defence funds to finance security investments including increases in battleship and anti-aircraft weapon logistics and materiel (Government Bill, 2020, p. 30), and additional preparedness against multifaceted and hybrid threats such as information influence and cyberattacks (Government Bill, 2020, p. 62f). Top priorities, however, are strengthening total defence capabilities and deepening bi- and multilateral defence cooperation (Government Bill, 2020, pp. 67–68). The bill is clear in its priorities, if not in regard to their implementation. It speaks of the importance of continued transformation focusing on national tasks, an increase in resilience to armed attack, a return to total defence planning (Government Bill, 2020, p. 86), preparedness for security crises over three months (Government Bill, 2020, p. 128), the reinstatement of six previously discontinued regiments (Government Bill, 2020, p. 115), and the importance of making sure production critical to the SAF can continue under a state of heightened alert (Government Bill, 2020, p. 119). Overall, the bill acknowledges that the SAF needs support from industry in times of heightened alert, and that preparation for such support should begin in peacetime (Government Bill, 2020, p. 123).
Regarding the value of frugality, while the bill reiterates the basic stance on prioritizing existing materiel as opposed to new development and acquisitions, it tones down the phrasing by merely suggesting an order of priorities (Government Bill, 2020, p. 119). The bill argues for a sharing of defence risks and costs. An overarching claim is that “threats against the peace and Sweden’s security are best averted through cooperation with other countries” (Government Bill, 2020, p. 68). This claim can be understood as an argument for frugality through efficient resource usage, the need to pool resources, and the distribution of defence costs among various states and actors. Included here is the belief in an augmented role for the EU as a security policy actor and the strengthening of cooperation with NATO (Government Bill, 2020, p. 78).
While the 2009 defence bill regulated defence budget costs by decreasing territorial defence ambitions and increasing international expeditionary missions, the 2020 defence bill does the opposite. Regarding international military operations, the bill underlines:
In every case, careful assessments should be made of costs, including costs for personnel, restoration and re-acquisition of material, as well as combined consequences for the Armed Forces’ national capability and potential for implementing planned growth. (Government Bill, 2020, p. 79)
Nonetheless, the bill promises an overall bolstering of defence policy ambitions while underlining the importance of using public funds effectively (Government Bill, 2020, p. 98). That said, one informant representing FMV, acknowledged that frugality affects long-term efficiency in materiel supply: “It’s a problem throughout the organization. There are too few resources. It’s anorexic. And issues are constantly deprioritized for new issues” (Informant 7).
The value of fairness is noted in the 2020 bill in relation to the underlining of conscription as a prerequisite for the development of fully trained forces (Government Bill, 2020, p. 110). Conscription became gender neutral in 2017 and in that regard, the bill stressed the importance of recruiting women for reasons of both legitimacy and performance (Government Bill, 2020, p. 112). Moreover, the government again singled out areas of the SAF as essential security interests (ESI), emphasizing the importance of combat aircraft, submarines and integrity-critical parts of command and control such as sensors, telewarfare and cryptographic systems and technologies (Government Bill, 2020, p. 119). According to the bill, the state has particularly great needs for national technical skills and a defence industrial base in those areas. The bill further acknowledges that the industry needs long-term preconditions for this work (Government Bill, 2020, p. 119).
Representatives of the industry criticise this way of determining certain areas to be more important than others. One representative of a defence company that does not produce products at the time designated as ESIs stated: “There’s a lot of dominance and discussions about these, submarines, aircraft, and radar” (Informant 5). In later reports, the government found singling out components of national defence as more critical than others to be problematic, suggesting that: “The ability to, individually and in cooperation with others, both within and outside the country, defend Sweden against armed attacks, constitutes a fundamental security interest for Sweden” (Government Report 2022:24, p. 199). In a similar vein, the 2020 bill emphasizes that predictability, responsibility, and control within the defence economy are needed to implement reinforcements of the war organization (Government Bill, 2020, p. 90), thus prioritizing the value of honesty/fairness and related values such as legitimacy and impartiality. On that note, the bill was transparent in its appraisal of the state of the SAF:
Today’s war organization is not designed to meet an armed attack including acts of war on Swedish territory. The overall war organization is undersized, as the number of units is not large enough to sustainably face an armed attack. (Government Bill, 2020, p. 99)
Shortcomings are thus noticed, and for reasons of legitimacy the government paints a fair picture of the situation. Regarding the pace of rearmament, interview data point to a brimming sense of frustration in the industry. As one informant lamented: “People don’t know what they want. They want something, but they can’t quite specify it” (Informant 2).
Discussion
The case of state-defence industry relations in Swedish defence policy is in many ways typical (Seawright & Geering, 2008). As such, it can provide illustrative insights into how Western states can rebuild defence resilience in times of uncertainty, shedding light on the status of these relations in the process. Along with shifts in international security, the state and public administration have undergone significant changes. When government started downscaling territorial defence, there was no immediate need for the state to uphold strong relations to the defence industry – an assessment clear in the 2009 bill, where the values composing contemporary SDIR were dominantly those of frugality. As the international context altered, the state set out to rebuild collaboration. The SAF is highly dependent on industry for upholding national defence capabilities (Government Report 2019:51, p. 80) and seamless collaboration between government and industry is needed to restore total defence (Government Report 2019:51, p. 93).
While the government put more emphasis on security than frugality in the 2015 and 2020 bills, there was no real intent to rebuild the old model with close ties between industry, FMV and the SAF. There is, however, a need for a long-term strategy (Informant 2; Informant 5). Reduced ambitions and financial ties between the state and industry as fulfilled by the 2009 bill generated the challenge of rebuilding a strong national defence in the context of austerity and growing volatility in international security. As these insights took root in the government, the need to prioritize between frugality and security remained. Meanwhile, sudden changes in defence transformation and security of supply affected the industry’s trust in the government, its objectives, authorities and competencies (Informant 1; Informant 2). This process demonstrates the dangers of sudden large-scale change. It is easier to make cuts in times of austerity than it is to scale up at a later stage. As SDIR is both a fundamental part of statehood and a national security concern, it is reasonable to assume that stability should benefit such relations. Despite the explicit intention to rebuild total defence in later defence bills, voices from the industry recorded in the analysis indicate the existence of doubts on the actual practical assessments of the government (Informant 1; Informant 2; Informant 7).
Notwithstanding the actual intentions, the defence bills in the aftermath of the dismantling of Swedish total defence did not necessarily support stronger SDIR. Rather, they supported collaboration as a means to achieve an efficient use of resources and to restrict public commitment, claiming the need for parties other than the state to maintain security through investment in for instance research and development. This development is in line with PPP demands of risk- and cost-sharing (Koppenjan, 2005; Wang et al., 2018). In later developments, as outlined in the 2020 bill, however, risk-sharing is mentioned in relation to international alliances rather than to PPP.
The empirical value analysis presented the debate on essential security interests (ESI) as an issue pitting the values of security against frugality and fairness. The policy favours certain areas of the SAF and, more importantly, certain parts of the industry that produce highly complex products. Here the state has assessed more complex and technology-intensive parts of the industry higher than other parts which, in the event of war, could also be critical to national security. It should be noted, however, that this conflict in values has been noticed by the state, paving the way for more impartial policy based on a broader understanding of the concept of ESI. Nonetheless, the issue of ESI is challenging for the state, requiring a consistent and fair policy to balance the demand for technical know-how and relations with the defence industrial base.
Policy change is a long-term affair and business is notably action-oriented. While the government is transparent in communicating that there will be “long lead times for procurement”, taking at least a decade to rebuild the new war organization (Government Bill, 2020, p. 99), there seems to be frustration in the industry regarding the pace of reform (Informant 2; Informant 7). Regarding the state’s assessment of which value should be prioritized in the volatile security situation, this analysis shows how honesty/fairness is the most stable of the values balanced throughout the period. Consequently, if we are seeking to define the Swedish state’s priorities, honesty/fairness is more helpful to us than frugality or security, even in the field of military security (see Bozeman, 2007; van der Wal, 2014). Taken together, the empirical analysis also suggests an increase in the government’s valuing of security and resilience, which spills over into an increased valuing of SDIR. This finding is supported by statements made by company representatives indicating a growing interest in upholding relations and working together to increase national defence capacity (Informant 3; Informant 2).
Conclusions
This study aims to contribute to knowledge lacking in the underexplored overlap between public administration, policy, and defence and security studies. Specifically, it seeks to provide empirical insights into how the Swedish state values SDIR in defence policy. We approached this issue through a content analysis of policy documents including the 2009, 2015 and 2020 defence bills. Key informant interviews were then used to broaden the perspective.
The analysis examined how the texts reflected the state’s priorities in the core public values of security/resilience, honesty/fairness and frugality/parsimony, and, in turn, how it values SDIR. The findings suggest that the state has prioritized the values of frugality, fairness and security differently over time. In times of austerity and low international security threat there is an increased focus on frugality; in times of security policy uncertainty, the focus shifts more to security/resilience. The value most consistently addressed over the studied period, however, was that of fairness. This can be seen as somewhat surprising given that the most obvious value conflict in the period was that between frugality and security. It should be acknowledged, however, that fairness/honesty is neither inherently nor exclusively contradictory to the other core values in the way that frugality/parsimony and security/resilience, which tend to be pitted against each other, are.
According to this logic, it is more understandable that fairness should have become a more consistently obvious value than frugality and security in Swedish defence transformation. These findings underscore the importance of harmony and stability in SDIR. On a theoretical level, the study shows how traditional public administrative values resist pressure for change. Fairness is both the most consistently addressed value in the study and the most stable value over time.
Key administrative values appear to be enduringly robust despite shocks and disturbances. During the period covered in this study, the field of territorial defence was marked by turbulence; pressure for change led to excessive cutbacks, some of which are challenging, if not practically unfeasible, to reverse to respond to the new security environment. These experiences underline the importance of keeping key public values such as honesty/fairness stable, also, in times of turbulence.
This study’s findings, underlining the importance of consistency in public administrative values, serve to question previous research in which the field of defence policy is held to be qualitatively unique (Agamben, 2005; Bigo, 2008; Buzan et al., 1998). Rather, and in line with more recent defence policy studies (Christiansson, 2020; Neal, 2019), this study shows defence policy to have much in common with those areas of policy and administration where traditional public administration principles apply.
This case study of SDIR in Swedish defence policy can be used as a base for discussions contributing to broader theoretical knowledge. Archuleta (2016) claimed that traditional defence and national security policy issues have rarely been analysed through public policy and administration lenses. In taking on the call made by Archuleta (2016) for cross-discipline scholarship bridging the field of public policy and administration and the field of defence and national security, this study contributes by applying conceptualizations and models of public value, central to the study of public administration (Rutgers 2008, p. 109), to defence and security scholarship. This study’s contribution, entailing a twin-consideration of a case-study of SDIR and public value, thus brings the issue of ethics and value to the study of SDIR. This is necessary for a comprehensive understanding of the interactions between public and private players in the field.
When moving from theoretical contributions and retrospective analysis to a more forward-looking perspective, the implications of this study’s findings can be used to chart a way forward for SDIR. In short, the study demonstrates the positive properties of harmony and stability in relations SDIR. Sudden shifts in how the defence industry’s role in national defence policy is valued clearly run the risk of affecting the industry’s confidence in the state, in a fashion likely to be detrimental to future trust and collaboration. In the Swedish case, the conditions appear to be more conducive to stable and expedient SDIR than they have been for years. In terms of resources and outreach, state power and influence has diminished in latter decades. Moreover, the return to a geopolitical orientation and the uncertainty of regional security in the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has altered the power dynamics between the state and the defence industry considerably.
The Russo-Ukrainian war has turned the buyer’s market into a seller’s market, serving to further equalize the power dynamics between the parties. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, one might truthfully assert that the Swedish state needs the domestic defence industry more than the domestic defence industry needs the Swedish state. Such alterations in SDIR power dynamics should be advantageous for collaboration built on voluntariness, cost reciprocity and long-term trustful dialogue, as emphasized by previous research on PPP. In short, companies need long-term and contractual commitments to reduce uncertainty (Koppenjan, 2005; Wang et al., 2018) and the security policy development speaks in favour of such commitment.
In practice, the field of SDIR is in a state of constant flux, especially since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This study has presented a retrospective view of SDIR in Sweden. With this in mind, further research on SDIR should, with historical context in mind, further examine the possible consequences current events may bring to bear on relations. Another issue worthy of further research is the degree of discretion for government and industry representatives. What is the level of discretion for central players? How are these levels of discretion regulated by law? And how are they restricted by mindset?
Additional Files
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Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Per Skoglund, Petter Narby, David Sprängare, and two anonymous reviewers for constructive feedback that helped improve the manuscript.
Competing Interests
The author has no competing interests to declare.