Figure 1
The CAC Formula.
Figure 2
A flowchart of the theoretical model used in the article.
Table 1
CAC Approach Definitions.
| CONDITION/APPROACH | DEFINITION | EXAMPLES |
|---|---|---|
| National limitations | Quantified, specific limitations of a military capability across an entire state’s inventory and territory. | Prohibition of submarines; numerical limit on tanks, combat aircraft, artillery, battleships, and other equipment. |
| Mutual demilitarization | A situation where all parties agree to limit military capabilities in a certain location, with generally equal effect for all parties. | Buffer zones along both sides of a border or line of contact, limitation of military capabilities on a contested land mass such as an island or waterway. |
| Discriminatory demilitarization | A situation where only one side is obligated to respect limitations on military capabilities in a certain geographic area. | Limitation on the number of soldiers along only one side of a border; prohibition on one state from operating naval vessels in a specified area; prohibition on only one party from erecting fortifications. |
Table 2
Explanation of the Political/Military Relationship.
| POLITICAL/MILITARY RELATIONSHIP | EXPLANATION | EXAMPLE |
|---|---|---|
| Superior/inferior peace (SIP) | All sides agree that one party is militarily superior and the other militarily inferior. The agreement is made when the parties are at peace. | 1920 Finnish-Russian Dorpat/Tartu Treaty. |
| Superior/ Inferior Conflict (SIC) | Both sides agree that one party is militarily superior and the other militarily inferior. The agreement is made when the parties are in armed conflict with one another, or have recently been in conflict (i.e., the agreement is closely linked to terminating the conflict. | World War One and World War Two peace treaties. |
| Parity Conflict (PC) | Both sides agree that neither is clearly superior, and the conflict is more-or-less stalemated. There is no certainty that one side or the other will prevail, to include uncertainty of foreign intervention which increases the uncertainty of any given conflict. | 1964/1974 Cyprus ceasefires; 2015 Minsk Agreements. |
| Parity Peace (PP) | No side is decisively more powerful across their military capabilities (not just in the area of the treaty’s TLE), and either every side recognizes parity or one party is not universally recognized as superior. The sides are at peace. | 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty; 1923/1928 Tangiers Treaty; 1990 CFE Treaty. |
Table 3
CAC Agreement Predicted and Actual Form.
| AGREEMENT | YEAR | PREDICTED PATHWAY | ACTUAL | PREDICTED? (YES/NO) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Germany (Versailles) | 1919 | SIC; GB; D2, NL, D2/NL | NL, D2 | Yes |
| Austria (St-Germain-en-Laye) | 1919 | SIC; GB; D2, NL, D2/NL | NL | Yes |
| Bulgaria (Neuilly-sur-Seine) | 1919 | SIC; GB; D2, NL, D2/NL | NL | Yes |
| Hungary (Trianon) | 1920 | SIC; GB; D2, NL, D2/NL | NL, D1 | No |
| The Svalbard (Spitsbergen) Treaty | 1920 | PP; GN; D1 | D1 | Yes |
| Dorpat/Tartu Russo-Finnish Helsinki Agreement | 1920 | SIP; GN; D1, D2, D1/2 | D1, D2 | Yes |
| Åland Island Convention | 1921 | PP; GN; D1 | D1 | Yes |
| Washington Naval Treaty | 1922 | PP; GB; NL; NL/D1 | NL, D1 | Yes |
| Russia-Finland Frontier Convention (Helsinki) | 1922 | SIP; GN; D1, D2, D1/2 | D1 | Yes |
| Lausanne Convention for the Straits | 1923 | PP; GN; D1 | D1 | Yes |
| Statute of the Tangiers Zone | 1923/1928 | PP; GN; D1 | D1 | Yes |
| Thrace Convention | 1923 | PC; GN; D1 | D1 | Yes |
| First London Naval Treaty | 1930 | PP; GB; NL; NL/D1 | NL | Yes |
| Anglo-German Naval Treaty | 1935 | PP; GB; NL; NL/D1 | NL | Yes |
| Second London Naval Treaty | 1936 | PP; GB; NL; NL/D1 | NL | Yes |
| Montreux Convention of the Straits | 1936 | PP; GN; D1 | D1 | Yes |
| The Moscow Treaty (Finland and Russia) of 1940 | 1940 | SIC; GN; D2, NL, NL/D2 | D2 | Yes |
| Franco-Italian Armistice | 1940 | SIC; GB; D2, NL, D2/NL | NL, D2 | Yes |
| Franco-German Armistice | 1940 | SIC; GB; D2, NL, D2/NL | NL | Yes |
| Italy (including Dodecanese) | 1943–1947 | SIC; GB; D2, NL, D2/NL | NL, D1, D2 | No |
| Romania | 1944–1947 | SIC; GB; D2, NL, D2/NL | NL | Yes |
| Finland | 1944–1948 | SIC; GB; D2, NL, D2/NL | NL, D1 | No |
| Hungary | 1945–1947 | SIC; GB; D2, NL, D2/NL | NL | Yes |
| Bulgaria | 1944–1947 | SIC; GB; D2, NL, D2/NL | NL, D2 | Yes |
| Western European Union/Agency for the Control of Armaments | 1954 | SIC; GB; D2, NL, D2/NL | NL | Yes |
| Austria State Treaty | 1955 | SIC; GB; D2, NL, D2/NL | NL | Yes |
| Cyprus (UN Security Zone Establishment) | 1964/1974 | PC; GN; D1 | D1 | Yes |
| Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty | 1987 | PP; GB; NL; NL/D1 | NL | Yes |
| Final Settlement with Germany | 1990 | SIC; GB; D2, NL, D2/NLPP; GN; D1 | NL, D1 | Yes |
| Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty | 1990 | PP; GB; NL; NL/D1 | NL, D1 | Yes |
| Moldova/Transdnistria | 1992 | PC; GN; D1 | D1 | Yes |
| Bishkek Protocol (Armenia-Azerbaijan) | 1994 | SIC; GN; D2, NL, NL/D2 | D1 | No |
| Sub-Regional Arms Control (Balkans) | 1996 | PC; GN; D1 | NL | No |
| Belfast Agreement | 1998 | PC; GN; D1 | D1 | Yes |
| Adapted CFE Treaty | 1999 | PP; GB; NL; NL/D1 | NL, D1 | Yes |
| Kumanovo/Kosovo | 1999 | SIC; GN; D2, NL, NL/D2 | D2 | Yes |
| Georgia Six-Point Peace Plan | 2008 | SIC; GN; D2, NL, NL/D2 | D1 | No |
| Minsk Agreements | 2015 | PC; GN; D1 | D1 | Yes |
| Azerbaijan-Armenia Ceasefire | 2020 | SIC; GN; D2, NL, NL/D2 | D1 | No |
[i] Note. Highlighted rows emphasize when the predict approach differed from that of the final agreement.