Introduction
The Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) consist of units, schools, and other entities distributed across the country. The units are divided into training units and combat units. Training units include regiments (Army) and flotillas (Air Force and Navy). Combat or operational units are those prepared for deployment in missions both within Sweden and abroad (Försvarsmakten, 2024). In recent years, the security situation in Sweden’s vicinity has changed, prompting the government to decide that the country’s military defence capabilities must be strengthened. Military capability is defined as the availability of both expertise and equipment in sufficient quantities to execute designated tasks under predefined conditions (FOI, 2010).
It has been a considerable period since the Swedish parliament last adopted a defence policy involving the organizational or operational expansion of the SwAF. The Swedish Defence Decision of 2020 introduced key initiatives aimed at strengthening Sweden’s military capabilities. These initiatives include increasing the SwAF’s personnel from 60,000 to 90,000 by 2030 and raising the annual intake of conscripts to 8,000 by 2025 (Regeringen, 2020). To support this expansion, the SwAF must refine its organizational structure by re-establishing additional regiments and flotillas. Decisions have been made to enhance military bases at all regiments locations and flotillas by reinforcing personnel levels and improving logistical and transport resources (Försvarsmakten, 2022a).
The foundation of Sweden’s total defence policy for 2021–2025 was based on the premise that the expansion of new military units would rely heavily on existing equipment (Försvarsmakten, 2023a). The SwAF emphasizes the importance of a holistic approach to capacity growth, balancing operational capability with long-term sustainability (Försvarsmakten, 2022a).
The re-establishment of new regiments requires essential equipment, logistical resources, adequate infrastructure, and personnel to support conscript training and ensure the operational readiness of combat units. This process involves, among other aspects, the procurement of equipment, recruitment of personnel, and development of necessary facilities. In this context, “logistical resources” refer to logistics equipment (e.g., transport equipment, combat vehicles, and material handling equipment) needed for both conscript training and wartime operations, as well as the expertise required for their management and maintenance. Further, adequate facilities must be available for the storage and upkeep of equipment.
Several challenges constrain the expansion of the SwAF, including limited personnel availability, slow decision-making processes, and the requirement of environmental permits for expanded or new operations (Försvarsmakten, 2022a, 2023a). A significant obstacle in establishing new regiments stems from the reduction of the officer corps in the early 21st century, which complicates efforts to recruit experienced officers for newly established regimental locations and increases the demand for officer training (FOI, 2002). Similarly, the re-establishment or expansion of infrastructure requires long-term planning, as permitting processes, procurement procedures, and construction projects typically span several years (Sveriges riksdag, 2019).
An investigation into the SwAF’s long-term material needs (SOU, 2018, p. 7) highlighted that prolonged financial constraints have hindered the ability to adequately maintain existing equipment. As a result, material shortages have been identified within combat units (Sveriges riksdag, 2019). Moreover, ongoing geopolitical crises and military rearmament efforts across Europe have increased pressure on the defence equipment market, leading to extended delivery times (Hellberg & Lundmark, 2025). Consequently, procuring the necessary logistical equipment for new regiments has become a time-intensive process.
Developing new military capabilities through the establishment of new regiments is a complex and time-consuming process. While the general constraints on the expansion of the SwAF are well documented, limited research exists on the internal and external factors that facilitate, constrain, or impede the growth of military logistics capabilities.
Review of Previous Research and Objectives of this Study
Early documentation, such as Graves (1895), underscores the necessity of balancing military requirements with civilian perspectives, political considerations, and financial constraints when establishing new regiments. Despite the strategic significance of new military regiments, academic research on this subject remains limited (Hammond, 2015; Moskos & Burk, 2019), particularly regarding the logistical challenges involved.
Research on military logistics has primarily focused on its role in operational contexts and the consequences of inadequate logistical support (Lis, 2016; Rahman & Hamid, 2019; Loy et al., 2019; Grigore, 2023). From a national economic perspective, studies have examined a country’s ability to sustain its armed forces, including contributions from the private sector (Markowski, Hall, & Wylie, 2010; Kane, 2012; Beaumont, 2015; van Fenema & van Kampen, 2020; Stanley-Lockman, 2020; Serrano et al., 2023).
The logistical requirements for conscript training and wartime operations vary according to the type of unit and the size of the regiment. Studies by Coll (1958), Smith (1993), and Wilson (1998) underscore the significance of ensuring that transport equipment and combat vehicles are appropriately matched to unit size and operational objectives. Efficient transportation is essential for maintaining combat readiness, particularly when operating across varied terrains and under challenging conditions, such as rough terrain and deep snow. Moreover, the suitability of equipment for specific missions, including foreign deployments, remains a key consideration (Giarra, 1997; Willett, 1998; Henry, 2006).
The maintenance of military equipment is another crucial aspect, with extensive literature covering aspects such as servicing, spare parts management, upgrades, preventive maintenance, and life cycle management (Crow & Reichard, 2011; Tuunainen, 2016; Pawelczyk, 2018; Arts, Basten, & van Houtum, 2019).
Despite this body of research, a significant gap remains regarding the logistical challenges associated with establishing new military regiments, likely due to the classified nature of such initiatives. The limited existing literature, including studies on the re-establishment of a combat group on Gotland in 2018, highlights the need for further research (FOI, 2018; Brandt & Nordlund, 2023).
To address this research gap, this study examines the case of the Dal Regiment (I13) in Falun, which is in the process of re-establishing a light mechanized infantry unit responsible for training two independent shooting battalions. The requirements related to the re-establishment of this regiment is valid for most operational units in the Army. The primary objective is to analyse how a regiment manages its logistical capability in relation to necessary infrastructure development, logistics-related equipment, and the supply of technical personnel. A key focus is achieving an operational balance between the availability of essential equipment and the capacity to maintain and utilize it effectively.
This study aims to address the following research question: What are the internal and external factors influencing the operational balance of logistical capability during the re-establishment of a regiment? The term “operational balance of logistical capability” refers to the balance between the capacity to maintain and manage the necessary logistical infrastructure and the skills required to operate the equipment essential for fulfilling the regiment’s military tasks. The findings of this study offer valuable insights for decision-makers and stakeholders engaged in the planning and development of new military regiments and wartime logistical operations.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows.
The section immediately below presents the concept of military logistics; the section following that outlines the study’s methodology. After this is a section exploring logistical experiences related to the re-establishment of a combat group on Gotland, along with observations from the ongoing establishment of the Dal Regiment. Below this is a section synthesizing insights from the Gotland and Falun cases, highlighting key logistical factors in regiment formation. The final section concludes with conceptual insights and implications for future research.
The Concept of Military Logistics
Military logistics performs three core functions: supporting conscription training, enabling wartime organizational structures (as characterized by the bimodal peace-war paradigm discussed by Loska et al., 2024), and facilitating operations conducted beyond national borders.
A distinction is often made between military logistics, which supports a state’s capacity for military operations, and defence logistics, which primarily serves the needs of national territorial defence. While military logistics entails the ability to deploy personnel and materiel across borders, defence logistics focuses on sustaining forces within national territory. However, this conceptual boundary becomes increasingly blurred for states that emphasize territorial defence while belonging to alliances such as NATO. These states must maintain the logistical capacity to project forces in support of allied commitments, thereby integrating both defence and expeditionary logistics requirements.
NATO defines collective logistics as:
The collective approach undertaken by NATO and nations to plan, generate, synchronize, and prioritize national and NATO logistic capabilities, resources, and activities to deliver logistic support to NATO missions, operations, and exercises, by making use of common processes and organizational structures. (NATO, 2018)
According to NATO (2018) and the SwAF (Försvarsmakten, 2023b), logistics encompasses a comprehensive set of activities across all levels of command involved in the planning and execution of military operations. These activities include:
Design and development, acquisition, storage, transport, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposal of necessities and materiel.
Transport of personnel.
Acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities.
Technical support and materiel maintenance services.
Medical and health service support.
Within the Swedish defence framework, logistics is structured into two principal echelons, forward level and real level (Försvarsmakten, 2021b).
Forward level comprises combat unit-bound resources and operational logistics units. These resources are primarily driven by tactical and operational requirements and must be designed and sized accordingly. Logistics resources at the forward level include the logistics units of task forces, encompassing troop transport capacity and first-line support for combat vehicles, among other functions.1
Rear level encompasses both the SwAFs’ internal resources, including the Armed Forces Logistics (FMLOG), as well as territorially-bound resources and contributions from civil, national, and international partners. Logistics resources at the rear level operate with a higher degree of peacetime rationality, utilizing standardized processes with varying delivery time requirements and capabilities compared to the forward level.
The logistics concept involves LogE (logistics unit) as a key function that ensures availability, serves as a buffer, and acts as the handover point between rear and forward-level logistics functions. When establishing a new regiment, the primary logistics resources are concentrated at the forward level, supported by a functioning LogE.
As illustrated in Figure 1, Brick (2019) offers a conceptual framework for defence logistics (DL), categorizing it into three domains: supplier logistics, operations logistics, and the defence logistics base (DLB). “DL” refers to the provision and management of resources necessary to build and sustain the armed forces across varying operational scenarios. The DLB comprises the personnel, equipment, and technological infrastructure essential for developing and maintaining the military component of national power. Supplier logistics further contributes to reinforcing the industrial base and enhancing national competitiveness (Markowski, Hall, & Wylie, 2010; Lee & Park, 2020; Pukhova, Merkulina, & Bashkov, 2021).
Figure 1
Defence logistics taxonomy (Brick, 2019).
This study draws primarily on Brick’s (2019) conceptualization of operations logistics and the DLB to examine logistics capabilities at the regimental level. At this level, logistics operations must support both peacetime conscript training and the wartime functions of the regiment. Moreover, local logistical efforts must be aligned with the overarching national defence strategy to ensure coherence and operational effectiveness.
Methodology
Given the limited academic literature on the logistics aspects of establishing military regiments, this study adopts an exploratory approach (Richardson, 1990; Overcash, 2003). Exploratory research is particularly suited for underexamined areas (Mansourian, 2008; Josselson, 2010; Ntinda, 2019), as it seeks to identify causal factors and consequences. Within this framework, conversations serve as the suitable method of empirical data collection (Knott et al., 2022).
This study employs a single-case research design centred on the re-establishment of the Dal Regiment in Falun. Additional insights are drawn from supporting institutions, including the Livgardet at Kungsängen, the Army War Staff in Enköping, the SwAF Supply Section in Stockholm, the Armed Forces Technical School (FMTS), and the School of Logistics in Skövde. Representatives from these institutions were interviewed, and site visits were conducted to all except FMTS.
Furthermore, empirical data from the re-establishment of combat group on Gotland serves as a secondary source. While this study does not seek to conduct a comparative analysis between Falun and Gotland, the Gotland case provides contextual background on the logistical aspects associated with new military establishments.
The primary sources of empirical data were conversations and study visits conducted between May 2022 and November 2023. Participant selection followed a strategic snowball sampling method, beginning with an initial conversation in Falun on May 17, 2022. Key informants involved in the early stages of the re-establishment were identified during these discussions.
Since we had no preconceived notions regarding the logistical needs of the Dal Regiment, the initial discussions were exploratory in nature. Instead of employing a traditional interview guide, an open-ended approach was used to address logistical needs and constraints related to achieving the necessary logistics capability. Each conversation lasted between one-and-a-half and three hours. All sessions were audio-recorded and supplemented with notes. To ensure confidentiality, all participants have been anonymized.
The empirical sources include:
Respondent Group 1: On-site conversation with the Dal Regiment management team (Falun, May 17, 2022).
Respondent 1: On-site discussion focusing on communication with the Public Relations officer at the Dal Regiment (Falun, September 6, 2022).
Respondent 2: On-site conversation with the responsible officer for the sponsor unit from Livgardet (Kungsängen, September 20, 2022).
Respondent Group 2: Zoom conversation with members of the Dal Regiment management team, discussing supply security and the re-establishment process (October 28, 2022).
Respondent 3: On-site discussion with the officer responsible for equipment from the SwAF Supply Section (Stockholm, November 16, 2022).
Respondent 4: Written responses to follow-up questions from the Dal Regiment management team (December 14, 2022). On-site discussion with the officers responsible for the light mechanized infantry unit from the SwAF Army War Staff (Enköping, February 28, 2023). [Respondent Group 3]
Respondent 5: Conversation with a representative from the FMTS management team (Stockholm, April 12, 2023).
Respondent Group 4 resp. Respondent 6: On-site discussion with representatives from Göta trängregemente i Skövde and the SwAF School of Logistics (Skövde, October 31–November 1, 2023).
Various reports and articles concerning the re-establishment of a combat group on Gotland.
A critical approach was adopted to scrutinize the empirical evidence collected. While informants may present subjective perspectives, the extended data collection period and engagement with multiple stakeholders facilitated the identification of consistent themes. Furthermore, researcher neutrality, ensured by the absence of vested interests in the re-establishment process, enhanced the credibility of the findings.
The Dal Regiment as case study
The Dal Regiment was reinstated 21 years after its disbandment in 2000 (Försvarsmakten, 2021a). It is currently developing a training platform designed to generate two shooting battalions, with the potential to expand into a full brigade. The regiment is characterized by high mobility and flexibility, as its infantry operates with vehicles but engages in combat on foot.
In autumn 2022, the regiment initiated conscript training, with approximately 150 conscripts completing basic training in Falun. The regiment aims to gradually increase conscription, reaching approximately 250 recruits annually by 2028, with full operational capacity expected between 2028 and 2030 (Försvarsmakten, 2021a). Additionally, the Dal Regiment’s Home Guard trains around 100 conscripts annually as of 2021 (Falun, 2021).
To expedite conscript training, the regiment has rented temporary facilities. The site also features a shooting range and practice area.
Responsibility for the regiment’s re-establishment lies with Livgardet (I1), which serves as its “sponsor unit” and provides logistical and administrative support. The Army War Staff in Enköping oversees the development of combat groups, while FMTS is responsible for constructing workshops, with completion targeted for 2028–2030. In the interim, FMTS provides temporary solutions to manage the regiment’s equipment upkeep. This coordinated effort underscores the multifaceted support system underpinning the re-establishment of the Dal Regiment.
Targeted thematic content analysis
This study employs a qualitative approach, utilizing a modified version of targeted thematic content analysis. Qualitative content analysis involves identifying themes within empirical data (Bryman, 2011; Bengtsson, 2016; Bergström & Boréus, 2018). Thematic analysis seeks to uncover common threads in the data to enhance understanding of different statements and observations (Morgan, 1993; Braun & Clarke, 2006; Johannessen, et al., 2018; Mayring, 2023). This process involves coding and categorizing patterns within the data (Patton, 1990). Initial coding in targeted content analysis is informed by prior theories or research. Data that do not fit the original coding scheme are categorized into new themes, thereby enriching existing theoretical frameworks (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Funck & Karlsson, 2021).
One of the most widely used frameworks among planners and analysts for achieving situational awareness and contextual understanding are the PMESII (“political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information”) and ASCOPE (“areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events”) frameworks, which serve to monitor critical factors within the operational environment (CCOE, 2021; Jurevicius, 2024). While these frameworks are valuable in assessing established operational settings, their utility diminishes in contexts characterized by institutional flux or formative development. In the case of the Falu Regiment, currently in the early stages of re-establishment, many conventional operational structures and capabilities are not yet in place. This transitional nature renders PMESII/ASCOPE less effective, as they are tailored to mature mission environments with identifiable and functioning systems.
To address these limitations, the PESTEL model (“political, economic, socio-cultural, technological, environmental, legal”) offers a more appropriate analytical lens. Originally developed for strategic analysis in corporate and policy settings, PESTEL has proven adaptable across a range of sectors due to its emphasis on macro-environmental factors and its capacity to accommodate complexity and uncertainty (Johnson & Scholes, 2008; Basu, 2004; Walsh, 2005; Dare, 2006; Shilei & Yong, 2009; Yüksel, 2012, Rahman & Mishra, 2023). Importantly, the model facilitates the identification and classification of diverse external influences that affect organizational development, making it particularly well-suited to the analysis of transitional institutions such as the Falu Regiment.
Given the foundational role that infrastructure plays in the establishment of military units, this study further extends the model by incorporating a seventh category: infrastructure. The resulting PESTELI framework enables a more holistic and systematic examination of both the external pressures and internal enablers that influence the reconstitution of the regiment. By applying this model to qualitative data drawn from stakeholder discussions and recorded interviews, and categorizing emergent themes within its seven domains, the analysis ensures a robust, multidimensional understanding of the social, political, and logistical dynamics shaping the Falu Regiment’s re-establishment.
While several analytical models – among them SWOT/SOAR/POCC Analysis, Porter’s Five Forces, Value Chain Analysis, BCG Matrix, Ansoff Matrix, VRIO, and the McKinsey 7S Framework – are commonly used in strategic and environmental planning (Buye, 2021), these are primarily designed for business contexts and market-driven strategic decisions.
In contrast to traditional business-oriented models, PESTEL and VUCA (“volatility, uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity”) are more attuned to the analysis of external environments in dynamic and often unpredictable settings. PESTEL facilitates the identification and categorization of specific environmental factors, whereas VUCA captures the broader, systemic challenges that organizations encounter amid uncertainty and rapid change (Taskan et al., 2022). The two frameworks are therefore complementary: PESTEL provides a structured approach to environmental scanning, while VUCA offers a strategic lens for interpreting complexity and instability. Given that the re-establishment of the Falu Regiment is shaped by both political decision-making and societal context, PESTEL emerges as a natural and relevant analytical model for this transitional phase.
Analysis
Logistics-related experience from re-establishing a combat group on Gotland
This section examines the logistics-related experiences documented during the re-establishment of a combat group on Gotland between 2017 and 2018.
Following the Defence Decision of 2015, plans were developed to re-establish a combat group on Gotland. Although military activities had previously been conducted on the island, their scope was limited (Försvarsmakten, 2022b). The Skaraborg Regiment (P4) in Skövde was tasked with both planning and executing the re-establishment. In June 2017, the first convoy of vehicles departed from Skövde. The transition from decision making to operational capability on Gotland was completed in under two years – a notably short period given the typically prolonged planning cycles characteristic of defence organizations (FOI, 2018).
The planning process focused on current logistical requirements, including infrastructure for equipment maintenance and personnel accommodation. Workflows were streamlined to ensure a logical sequence of activities, such as refuelling, washing, and post-exercise procedures. A key observation was that many operational aspects, often assumed to be routine in established regiments, required ongoing adaptation in this new context. New challenges emerged daily, necessitating continuous adjustments (Pettersson, 2017).
The Swedish Fortifications Agency (FortV), responsible for providing the necessary infrastructure, faced the unique challenge of working on an island with no pre-existing military facilities (Fortifikationsverket, 2021). Lessons learned from the Gotland re-establishment offer several key insights:
The involvement of P4 as sponsor unit during the design phase was critical, particularly in facilitating the equipment loans.
Local conditions posed unpredictable challenges that were not fully anticipated.
The construction of infrastructure required numerous official decisions, making the process time-consuming.
Collaboration with local businesses was essential in creating temporary accommodations for personnel and equipment.
Partnerships with local schools, particularly for training vehicle mechanics, played a crucial role in recruitment efforts.
The complexity of the project underscored the necessity for multi-stakeholder cooperation. No single entity bore sole responsibility for its implementation; rather, the success of the project depended on coordinated efforts across various stakeholders. While the logistical aspects of the Gotland re-establishment were not always explicitly detailed, equipment and personnel were sourced from both P4 and the Norrbottens Regiment (I19; see Försvarsmakten, 2022c). Interim solutions were implemented for maintenance areas, garages, and storage facilities while new infrastructure was under construction.
Logistics related experience from the re-establishment of the Dal Regiment
This section presents the findings structured according to the PESTELI framework, which was employed to identify and categorise key external and contextual factors influencing the re-establishment of the Falu Regiment. While the framework served as a guiding structure for data collection and thematic coding, it is important to note that the volume and depth of data varied across the different PESTELI dimensions. Limited information was obtained on certain factors, such as legal considerations. This disparity may reflect the perceived relevance of these domains among the informants themselves, and it has implications for the comprehensiveness of the analysis. Nonetheless, the inclusion of all seven categories remains analytically valuable, as it highlights both the areas emphasized in stakeholder discourse and those that may require further exploration in future research or planning efforts.
Issues that do not align neatly with this framework are categorized under “Internal Organizational Conditions.” Instead of providing verbatim quotes, we present a synthesized perspective of respondents’ views, supported by relevant sources.
Political, economic, sociocultural and environmental factors
The re-establishment of the Dal Regiment has received strong political support, with advocacy from both Falun Municipality and the Dalarna County Governor. The Swedish Parliament’s decision was met with enthusiasm (Respondent Group 1). In line with the Swedish Defence Decision of 2020, which mandates the strengthening of national defence, a financial framework has been established. However, challenges have arisen as the scale of planned activities and geographical considerations have become evident (Respondent 2).
Key partners in infrastructure planning include Falun Municipality and the County Administrative Board (Respondent 1). Swift political action has been observed, exemplified by the Municipality’s approval of a new road within 14 days (Respondent 2).
The FMTS has initiated discussions with the municipalities of Falun to align technical high school programs with defence sector needs (Respondent 5).
Personnel availability remains a critical issue, particularly when it comes to recruiting officers and technical specialists to Falun. There is a limited supply of both categories, and attracting them to the region requires additional incentives. Furthermore, the certification process for technical personnel has been hindered by capacity constraints within the SwAF’s technical training institutions (Respondent 6). Recruitment difficulties are further compounded by high housing costs, which have prompted the Falun Municipality to assist in securing accommodation for incoming staff (Respondent Group 1; Respondent 2). In response, recruitment efforts have been expanded to include candidates from related sectors, such as the Swedish Transport Administration, as well as former military personnel (Respondent Group 1; Respondent 2).
Opposition to the re-establishment has emerged due to concerns regarding construction, traffic congestion, noise from the shooting range, and environmental impacts (Respondent 1). In response, the Dal Regiment has prioritized transparent communication to address these concerns.
The validity of existing environmental permits for shooting range operations provides a strategic advantage (Respondent 4). Falun benefits from established training areas and Home Guard operations, distinguishing it from other locations that lack such infrastructure (Respondent Group 1; Respondent 2). Efforts are underway to balance military and civilian activities in Falun, including collaborative road planning with the Municipality (Respondents 2, 3).
Summary from a logistical perspective
Although the re-establishment of the Dal Regiment in Falun has been well received, challenges remain, particularly in recruiting officers and technical personnel. Effective coordination between military and civilian infrastructure planning is essential. While the validity of existing environmental permits provides an advantage, expanded military activities will require renewed approvals.
Technological factors
The technological challenges faced by the Dal Regiment primarily stem from the distinction between existing and newly introduced equipment. The introduction of new equipment necessitates adjustments in handling procedures, spare parts management, maintenance, and training.
Currently, the regiment borrows equipment, such as tracked vehicles, from the Livgardet and requires the acquisition of wheeled vehicles for operations over larger areas (Respondent Group 1). The acquisition of approximately 30 vehicles is expected over the next five years. New equipment will require additional training for drivers, mechanics, and logistics personnel, with the FMTS providing technical services for maintenance (Respondents 2, 6).
Regiments do not own their equipment; instead, it is allocated annually based on an “equipment distribution order” determined by operational needs. While the current supply is sufficient for training 150 conscripts, additional resources will be necessary as the regiment expands (Respondents 2, 3, 4).
Summary from a logistical perspective
Due to the limited availability of equipment within the SwAF, annual allocations are made based on regimental requests and defence branch priorities. As a result, the Dal Regiment initially relies on borrowed equipment that may not be fully suited to its needs. As newly procured equipment is introduced, maintenance capabilities, storage facilities, and garage capacity must be adapted accordingly.
Legal factors
Legal complexities arise during both the interim and planning phases. A range of legal considerations must be addressed in the establishment of facilities such as garages, access routes, and transport flows, as well as in securing environmental permits for workshop operations and training grounds. The infrastructure planning process within the SwAF and the FortV is extensive, requiring a nuanced approach that balances varying priorities and involves multiple stakeholders (Respondent Group 2; Respondent 4).
The FortV owns the land and properties, and while new facilities are under development, they are also responsible for leasing temporary premises. This ownership structure complicates military and public collaboration, as it creates logistical and administrative challenges in coordinating shared use of infrastructure.
Infrastructure factors
During the interim period, the Dal Regiment has rented facilities from external sources to meet operational needs, many of which are inadequate for the regiment’s requirements (Respondent Group 1). Immediate infrastructure needs include barracks, offices, equipment storage, mobilization storage, workshops for vehicles and weapons, and shooting ranges with valid environmental permits (Respondent Group 2). The FortV plays a central role in infrastructure design and construction, necessitating close coordination with the regiment. To address infrastructure and training challenges, coordination between the Home Guard and the regiment is currently being explored (Respondent 4).
Limited storage capacity and restricted access to repair shops represent major bottlenecks, hindering operational expansion. At present, the regiment relies on logistical support and equipment from the Livgardet, but the long-term objective is to establish independent logistics operations in Falun (Respondent Group 2).
Simultaneously, the development of a combat organization, alongside conscription training and infrastructure expansion, requires the establishment of staging areas, command centres, and supply chains. Future infrastructure planning will require strategic decisions regarding the location of mobilization facilities and service points to optimize operational efficiency (Respondent 2). These planning efforts remain classified due to their sensitive nature (Respondent Group 3).
Summary from a logistical perspective
In the short term, the regiment addresses infrastructure challenges by renting facilities. However, storage capacity and workshop access remain critical bottlenecks. Long-term infrastructure planning focuses on constructing permanent facilities and expanding logistical capabilities to support independent operations. The regiment remains dependent on the FortV capacity for infrastructure development and facility management.
Internal organizational conditions
The recruitment of officers and technically skilled personnel remains challenging due to the limited availability of officers, high housing costs, and the constrained capacity of the SwAF’s technical schools, which provide essential certification for technical personnel (Respondent 6).
Sponsorship from other regiments has been crucial during the early stages of re-establishment. Currently, Falun receives logistical support from the Logistics Unit (LogE) at the Livgardet while operating its own service point. The overall logistical flow is managed by the Livgardet’s LogE, with supplies originating from both Livgardet and the central warehouse in Arboga. Although the existing service point primarily supports ongoing Home Guard operations, efforts are underway to expand its capacity to meet the increasing logistical demands associated with conscript training and combat groups in Falun (Respondent 2).
As Falun’s operations expand over a larger geographical area, a shift in logistics practices is required. Rather than having equipment collected from LogE, the logistics model will transition to direct delivery to specific locations. This transition necessitates a revised logistics concept and may require the reintroduction of maintenance units. As activities increase, establishing independent logistical operations separate from Stockholm-based services is anticipated (Respondent 2).
The geographical placement of local warehouses must align with the revised logistics concept and the broader operational context. Equipment is categorized according to its designated wartime tasks, and storage locations are selected to ensure proximity to units for rapid mobilization (Respondent Group 2). To support training efficiently, efforts are being made to minimize the set-up time required for collecting and returning equipment and weapons from decentralized rented warehouses. Ensuring the security of these facilities remains a top priority, and developing a robust logistical infrastructure capable of reliably supplying necessary equipment is a key strategic objective (Respondent Group 2).
Summary from a logistical perspective
Sponsorship from other regiments has been pivotal for Falun’s re-establishment, with current logistical support provided by the Livgardet’s LogE. As the regiment expands over a wider area, its logistics system must evolve from a centralized collection model to direct delivery, which may involve revising logistics concepts and reintroducing maintenance units. Additionally, strategic placement and security of local mobilization storage are emphasized to ensure rapid mobilization and efficient training support, with the goal of developing an independent and robust logistical infrastructure.
Summary of the experience from the re-establishment of the Dal Regiment
Following is the PESTELI framework analysis, providing a comprehensive overview of the external and contextual factors influencing the re-establishment of the Dal Regiment.
First, political and economic factors played a supportive role in the re-establishment, with strong backing from national and local authorities, as well as financial commitments guided by the 2020 Defence Decision. However, logistical planning has been challenged by geographical and organizational complexities.
Second, sociocultural and environmental factors highlighted the need for public engagement and transparent communication, especially in response to local concerns about construction, noise, and environmental impact. The availability of existing permits and infrastructure in Falun offers clear advantages.
Third, technological factors revealed challenges in adapting to new equipment, requiring updates in maintenance routines, training, and logistics. The regiment currently relies on borrowed vehicles, with long-term plans for acquisition and integration of new assets.
Fourth, legal factors were discussed to a lesser extent. Where addressed, complexities in ownership and coordination between the SwAF and the FortV emerged, underscoring administrative and procedural hurdles.
Fifth, infrastructure factors were critical. Temporary rented facilities are in use, but they fall short of long-term needs. The regiment remains dependent on the FortV for infrastructure development, and bottlenecks in storage and workshop access pose operational risks.
Sixth, it was essential to internal organizational conditions – even if they were not part of the original PESTELI categories. Staffing, training capacity, and logistical sponsorship from other regiments significantly influenced early development. As operations expand, the regiment must transition to a more autonomous logistics model, requiring conceptual and structural adjustments.
Finally, the integration of infrastructure as an additional PESTELI category helped capture the material and logistical realities central to establishing operational capacity. Coordination with civilian authorities and careful planning for future growth remain vital.
This structured analysis underscores the complexity of re-establishing a military unit and highlights both the supportive conditions and operational gaps that shape its development.
Discussion
Experience with the re-establishment of the Dal Regiment
The re-establishment of the Dal Regiment required extensive coordination and adaptation across staffing, logistical equipment, infrastructure, and logistical support operations. A key priority for the regiment was achieving an operational balance between the availability of essential equipment and the capacity to maintain and effectively utilize it.
To successfully conduct conscription training and equip wartime units, it is crucial to have logistical equipment suited for the intended purpose. Without the necessary storage and service facilities, as well as sufficient personnel to manage and maintain the equipment, acquiring additional resources becomes ineffective and unsustainable.
Staffing challenges
Due to the limited availability of qualified candidates, high housing costs, and Falun’s relatively remote location, the recruitment of experienced officers and technical personnel proved a serious challenge. The shortage of officer training slots and placements at the SwAF’s School of Logistics created significant bottlenecks, highlighting broader systemic issues within the SwAF’s personnel development system. These inefficiencies were further exacerbated by the interdependence between certification programs and the availability of qualified instructors, adding strain to both recruitment and training efforts (Respondent 6; Respondent Group 4).
The SwAF cannot recruit as freely from the general labour market as other employers can, and must rely heavily on the capacity of its own professional training system. While some occupational categories do not require completed military training, all positions demand Swedish citizenship and a security clearance. Collectively, these factors contribute to longer lead times in building up the necessary staffing capacity.
Infrastructure and logistical challenges
In the initial phase, operations were supported by temporarily rented facilities, which ultimately proved inadequate. Limited storage and workshop capacity led to significant logistical bottlenecks (Respondent Group 2). Although logistical support was provided by the Livgardet, establishing independent logistical operations in Falun remains a key priority.
However, the SwAF are heavily dependent on FortV, which acts as the state’s property manager and owner representative for defence infrastructure. FortV is tasked by the government with ensuring that the SwAF have access to functional and purpose-built facilities, premises, and land necessary for their operations. For infrastructure to be realized, either through leasing arrangements or through land acquisition and new construction, the armed forces rely on FortV’s capacity and capabilities. Although this is not an internal dependency within the Armed Forces, it constitutes a structural inter-agency reliance, as the SwAF cannot engage alternative providers to deliver critical infrastructure such as garages, storage facilities, service halls, and workshops.
Borrowing logistical equipment from other regiments has proven suboptimal, as operations planned for the units in Falun involve transportation over extended distances. This creates a greater need for wheeled vehicles rather than tracked ones. The maintenance and upgrading of logistical equipment are the responsibility of the FMTS. Once again, this highlights the interdependence between the Falu Regiment and the capacity of FMTS to support its operational needs.
Adaptability and initiative
A key takeaway from the re-establishment process was the critical role of adaptability. Constant adjustments were necessary due to shifting conditions, including staff turnover and evolving infrastructure needs. The high time pressure and operational demands created an environment that required considerable flexibility and resilience from all involved teams (Respondent Group 1).
While the central SwAF provided overarching support, the Dal Regiment played a crucial role in addressing local challenges. By leveraging its understanding of regional conditions, the regiment was able to develop tailored solutions that facilitated a smoother re-establishment process (Respondent 4).
Lessons learned
One of the key insights from the re-establishment of the regiment is that the process was not driven by any single individual or centralized authority. While the SwAF offered structural and institutional support, much of the initiative and adaptation took place locally. The Dal Regiment demonstrated a notable degree of autonomy, adjusting its approach in response to specific regional conditions and needs (Respondent 4). This decentralized flexibility proved to be a significant strength.
However, the broader picture reveals persistent constraints, particularly in terms of equipment availability. The distribution of limited resources across multiple newly established regiments has made it more difficult to maintain and upgrade existing materiel. Regiments are expected to align their equipment usage not only with operational demands, but also with their training capacities, technical competencies, and the availability of suitable facilities. Balancing all these factors simultaneously has proven complex and often resource-intensive (Respondent Group 2, 3; Respondent 2, 3, 5).
The expansion of regimental presence in several locations has further intensified logistical demands. Without carefully coordinated planning, particularly around equipment allocation and long-term servicing, operational readiness may suffer (Respondent Group 2; Respondent 3). These challenges highlight the need for a more integrated logistical strategy across the force.
Yet despite these systemic pressures, the Dal Regiment’s ability to adapt to its local context stands out as a critical success factor. By leveraging local knowledge and tailoring its approach to the specific conditions in Falun, the regiment was able to overcome many of the practical obstacles that typically accompany re-establishment efforts (Respondent 4). This underscores the value of granting operational flexibility at the local level while maintaining strategic coherence at the national level.
Common experiences from the re-establishment of regiments on Gotland and in Falun
Common experiences from the re-establishments on Gotland and in Falun underscore key logistical factors influencing the process. Both initiatives were propelled by strong political commitment, with the SwAF allocating budgets and designating responsibilities to units such as P 18 on Gotland and I 13 in Falun. No single entity or individual managed the entire process; rather, successful outcomes necessitated extensive coordination among multiple agencies, including the FortV, FMTS, FMLOG, municipalities, regional boards, and SwAF educational institutions.
Prior research has demonstrated that military regiments require extensive, long-term planning due to the need for residential structures, auxiliary facilities, and training areas (Graves, 1895; Eldridge et al., 1987; Parker, 1990; Allen, 2007; Sergiyuk, 2016). The re-establishment of these regiments thus necessitates active engagement with local communities.
Support from established regiments, such as the Skaraborg Regiment (P 4) and the Livgardet (I 1), was instrumental in both cases, providing critical knowledge, experience, and equipment loans.
Both regiments transitioned rapidly from the decision-making stage to initial military activities. A key distinction between the two was that the Dal Regiment assumed conscript training responsibilities, a role not assigned to the Gotland regiment. Initially, both units operated in temporary facilities while permanent structures were being planned. FMTS provided interim solutions, particularly for workshop needs, until permanent facilities were completed. In Gotland, appeals delayed construction, whereas in Falun, the process has not yet reached that stage.
Effective short- and long-term planning was essential, as immediate decisions significantly influenced future outcomes. The new regiments, in collaboration with FMTS, FortV and existing LogE, implemented short-term measures while simultaneously developing long-term infrastructure. Planning for future infrastructure and materiel allocation while addressing current needs proved to be a challenging endeavour.
Interdependencies within the SwAF were particularly evident, with the School of Logistics playing a crucial role in developing organizational capabilities. However, capacity limitations within the School of Logistics restricted its ability to fully meet the growing demand for logistical personnel. This interdependence reflects broader organizational dynamics and may manifest in various forms, including system, personnel, cultural, and decision-making interdependencies (Aiken & Hage, 1968; Albert et al., 2015; Mackenzie, 2018).
The establishment of new regiments requires intricate coordination, political decision-making, and regional collaboration. While short-term actions enable rapid implementation, long-term planning is essential for ensuring sustainable solutions. Key stakeholders such as FMTS and the FortV play critical roles, and strategies such as resource transfers and external recruitment help mitigate personnel shortages during critical phases. However, a significant challenge is that the re-establishment of new units temporarily depletes existing regiments of both equipment and personnel.
Summary of key experiences
Collaborative decision-making: development decisions require close collaboration, with local initiatives complementing central directives.
Adaptability and flexibility: the ability to address short-term operational needs without conflicting with long-term plans is essential. Frequent adjustments are necessary to meet evolving operational demands.
Equipment distribution and maintenance: effective coordination within the SwAF is crucial, as regiments do not always receive the equipment required or best suited for their missions. Being able to temporarily borrow essential logistical equipment from sponsor regiments was crucial for quickly initiating operations.
Staffing and recruitment challenges: the availability of qualified officers remains limited, and obtaining certification for technical personnel poses significant constraints.
Infrastructure limitations: the availability of purpose-built infrastructure is a bottleneck for expanding logistical capabilities.
Logistical support and mobility: to operate effectively within the regiment’s area of operations, a dedicated logistical supply concept and strategically located mobilization facilities are necessary.
Conclusion
The Pursuit of Operational Balance
The limited availability of equipment within the SwAF for both conscript training and wartime organization offers a key insight. Due to prolonged procurement lead times, the SwAF relies on an annual equipment distribution order to optimize resource allocation. However, this approach frequently leads to equipment shortages for existing units when new regiments are re-established.
New regiments cannot be equipped without the necessary infrastructure (storage facilities, workshops), and skilled personnel to maintain the equipment. As new equipment is introduced, personnel must acquire additional skills for maintenance, which requires upgrades to both expertise and infrastructure. Equipment must also be maintainable, which may require developing local expertise, service agreements with private entities, or returning equipment to the vendor for maintenance.
The logistical aspects and functional requirements of re-establishing new regiments can be summarized through three key considerations. First, the utilization of existing equipment is managed through an annual equipment distribution order, which allocates resources based on identified needs. However, the integration of new regiments diminishes the share of available resources for existing units. This necessitates adequate maintenance, proper storage facilities, and skilled personnel to maintain operational balance at the regimental level.
Second, there is a clear requirement for additional equipment to support both training and wartime functions. Procuring this equipment is often a lengthy process, hindered by budgetary limitations and pressures on the defence market. Furthermore, the introduction of new equipment entails modifications in training programs, maintenance procedures, and technical expertise.
Third, the increased operational activity brought about by new regiments calls for an enhancement of joint logistics capabilities. This includes a reassessment of logistics functions, such as those managed by LogE, and the roles of joint logistics units like FMLOG and FMTS. It is essential that logistical operations achieve an effective balance between cost-efficiency and operational flexibility to support the expanded defence structure.
The distribution of existing equipment among multiple regiments can reduce availability and increase maintenance complexity. New regiments require additional equipment to meet their operational needs, which involves infrastructure upgrades and enhanced maintenance capabilities. Furthermore, personnel supply, particularly of officers and technical specialists, remains a critical factor in operational success.
Figure 2 illustrates the mutual dependence within the SwAF in terms of both equipment and personnel resources, as well as the reliance on external authorities for a regiment to expand and effectively fulfil its duties. It does not show the war organization.
Figure 2
The pursuit of operational balance within the interdependence of the SwAF.
The SwAF resource pool, depicted as the central left-hand circle (blue) in Figure 2, comprises officers, specialist officers, equipment, and shared logistical functions such as FMLOG and LogE.
° The two arrows pointing toward the resource pool represent the inflow of trained personnel and newly procured equipment.
° The outward-facing arrows pointing left (brown) indicate reductions in personnel due to retirements and natural attrition.
° The upward-facing arrows (green) illustrate the withdrawal of obsolete or donated equipment from the system.
° The rectangles in the central right-hand section of the figure (grey) represent regiments responsible for training conscripts who will be integrated into the wartime organization.
SwAF regiments receive allocations from the resource pool in the form of military personnel and equipment, depicted by two arrows leading from the central circle to the rectangles (green and brown), as well as access to shared logistical functions (represented by the blue arrow).
In addition, agencies such as FortV and institutions like FMTS provide support to the regiments, as shown by arrows descending from the top of the figure to the rectangles. Regiments are also staffed with conscripts and civilian personnel, indicated by two lower arrows pointing toward the rectangles.
Upon completion of their training, conscripts are integrated into the wartime organization. A portion of these conscripts are identified as potential officer candidates, which is illustrated by a dashed line (blue) leading to various SwAF military academies.
This system highlights the interdependencies within SwAF, particularly regarding the availability of equipment and the training of officers and specialist officers.
The internal factors influencing the operational balance of logistical capability include the limitations in available and appropriately adapted logistical equipment allocated annually to various regiments, as well as the internal process of training new officers and technical personnel.
The external factors affecting the operational balance of logistical capability include the availability of temporary storage facilities and service locations, as well as the capacity of external authorities (such as the FortV and municipalities) to develop necessary infrastructure. Additionally, the broader societal perception of the regiment and its activities plays a crucial role, as local support for its establishment and operations, rather than opposition, can significantly impact its successful integration.
Some practical conclusions and implications can be drawn from the re-establishment. The re-establishment of new regiments highlights, for example, the necessity of aligning infrastructure development and personnel recruitment with the introduction of equipment. Without adequate facilities for storage and maintenance, or skilled personnel to operate and service complex systems, newly allocated equipment cannot be effectively utilized. As such, infrastructure and training investments must be prioritized early in the planning phase to avoid downstream operational inefficiencies. This implies a need for close coordination between the SwAF, FortV, and local municipalities.
The scaling of the SwAF’s regimental structure places increasing demands on shared logistical functions such as FMLOG and FMTS. These entities must not only support day-to-day operations but also accommodate long-term capacity-building, training, and equipment servicing across geographically dispersed units. Ensuring the flexibility and resilience of joint logistics operations is essential to maintain operational balance in an expanded and interdependent force structure.
Practical Conclusions and Implications
The findings of this study offer certain practical implications.
The establishment of new military regiments involves navigating complex interdependencies, managing limited resources, and balancing immediate operational needs with long-term strategic goals, for example, while the re-establishment of regiments highlights the critical importance of aligning infrastructure development and personnel recruitment with the introduction of logistical equipment. More, without adequate facilities for storage, maintenance, and operations, as well as skilled personnel to operate and service complex systems, newly allocated equipment cannot be effectively deployed; to prevent inefficiencies and delays, meanwhile, investments in infrastructure and training must be prioritized early in the planning process. This underscores the need for sustained and coordinated collaboration between the SwAF, FortV, and local municipalities.
Furthermore, the expansion of the SwAF’s regimental structure places increasing pressure on shared logistical functions, particularly FMLOG and FMTS. These organizations are responsible not only for supporting daily operations but also for enabling long-term capacity-building, technical training, and sustainable equipment maintenance across a geographically dispersed force. Maintaining operational balance within this expanded and interdependent structure will depend on the adaptability, scalability, and resilience of joint logistics systems.
Ultimately, this reflects a structural catch-22: for new regiments to grow and achieve operational readiness, other supporting functions must first deliver the necessary capabilities. This circular dependency underscores the inherent difficulty of rapidly reconstituting national defence capabilities in a resource-constrained and strategically complex environment. As a result, the rate of development is likely to be uneven and slower than anticipated, as progress in one area, such as equipment deployment or personnel recruitment, is often contingent upon advancements in others, such as infrastructure development or the availability of joint logistical support. Recognizing and addressing these interdependencies early is crucial to mitigating delays and ensuring coherent and sustainable force expansion.
During the build-up phase, it is essential to geographically consolidate key infrastructure within the regiment to minimize transition times and enhance operational efficiency. Standardizing certain elements across the region, such as adopting a common truck brand, offers additional advantages. This approach supports the development of localized technical expertise, facilitates maintenance operations within FMTS workshops, and streamlines collaboration with private-sector partners through service agreements. Furthermore, as new equipment is introduced on a continuous basis, infrastructure must be designed with sufficient flexibility to accommodate vehicles of varying sizes and specifications.
Theoretical conclusions
The findings align with established theories in organizational studies, resource dependency, and dynamic capabilities, emphasizing the critical role of flexibility and regional collaboration in ensuring operational effectiveness.
The establishment of new regiments demonstrates a high level of interdependence within military organizations, reflecting broader principles from organizational theory. Success in this process depends on effective coordination across multiple agencies and sectors, supported by theories of systemic and personnel interdependencies (e.g., Aiken & Hage, 1968; Albert, Kreutzer & Lechner, 2015; Mackenzie, 2018). The necessity for synchronized efforts across different military and civilian institutions underscores the intricate dependencies that shape military capability development.
A key insight from this research is the inherent tension between resource allocation for new and existing regiments. The introduction of new regiments within the SwAF inevitably redistributes limited resources, potentially leading to operational imbalances. This finding is consistent with resource dependency theory (e.g., Pfeffer & Salancik, 2015), which posits that organizations must carefully manage scarce resources and make trade-offs in their distribution.
Additionally, resource-matching theory offers a useful framework for understanding the operational balance within the SwAF. This approach emphasizes aligning operational requirements (e.g., equipment, personnel) with available resources (e.g., trained personnel, storage facilities, service infrastructure). Optimized resource allocation minimizes inefficiencies and ensures that operational demands are met effectively. As supported by resource allocation theories (e.g., Katkalo, Pitelis & Teece, 2010), effective resource matching necessitates careful coordination between supply (personnel, facilities) and demand (equipment needs) to prevent bottlenecks, enhance readiness, and sustain operational efficiency.
The study also highlights the ongoing tension between short-term logistical actions and long-term strategic planning. Organizational theory suggests that balancing immediate operational needs with future strategic objectives is essential for maintaining institutional stability (e.g., Mintzberg, 1997). Within the SwAF, decisions made to address immediate logistical, and equipment needs, such as establishing temporary workshops and reallocating resources, carry significant long-term implications for the sustainability of regimental operations.
The necessity for rapid logistical adaptation, particularly through temporary solutions and phased development, underscores the importance of flexibility in military logistics. Theoretical frameworks on dynamic capabilities (e.g., Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 2005; Zhang et al., 2023) highlight the need for organizations to remain agile and adaptive in response to evolving operational demands. This flexibility enables the SwAF to effectively navigate the challenges of establishing new regiments while ensuring that long-term objectives remain attainable.
Figure 3 illustrates the interrelationships between the key thematic areas discussed above: interdependencies and systemic complexity; resource allocation and organizational trade-offs; and logistical adaptation and flexibility.
Figure 3
The interplay between internal organizational interdependence, resource allocation, and logistical capability in the re-establishment of military regiments.
The arrows in the figure represent the interconnectedness of coordination, resource alignment, and dynamic capabilities. Together, these elements reflect the multifaceted nature of organizational development in a defence context and demonstrate how they collectively reinforce the theoretical conclusions presented in this section.
Research limitations
This study is subject to certain limitations. Its primary focus on a Swedish context restricts the generalizability of the findings. However, nations with similar authority structures may find the results applicable to their own armed forces growth.
The study relies on qualitative analysis of empirical data, making the results susceptible to subjective interpretation. Although internal workshops were conducted to minimize individual biases, different researchers may draw alternative conclusions.
Further research
Building on the theoretical conclusions drawn from this study, several areas for further research emerge that could deepen our understanding of logistical challenges and organizational dynamics in military contexts. These suggestions focus on expanding knowledge regarding interdependencies, resource allocation, logistical adaptability, and the balance between short-term and long-term planning. Understanding these dynamics is critical for improving military planning, resource allocation, and operational flexibility, ultimately enhancing the effectiveness of new and existing regiments.
Building on this research, further studies could explore how logistics are managed in other branches of the military and whether solutions can be transferred between branches. Additionally, the potential impact of NATO membership on the identified logistical aspects would provide valuable insights.
Given the limited literature on logistics related to military expansion, future research could examine how the armed forces of Norway and Finland address similar logistical challenges, if feasible.
Notes
Competing Interests
The authors have no competing interests to declare.