Hybrid Warfare at Sea? Russia, Svalbard and the Arctic

Introduction

Following the deterioration in relations between NATO/the EU states and Russia after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the terms “hybrid warfare” and “hybrid operations” have increasingly featured in international relations and security studies. Existing in the grey zone between war and peace, such hybrid actions seek to disrupt and disable an opponent’s ability to react to security threats by exploiting national vulnerabilities across the political, military, economic, social, informational and infrastructure (PMESII) spectrum (Cullen & Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2017). Fears about hybrid operations by, or on behalf of, state actors have emerged across the globe – from cyber incursions in the Baltics, to the use of non-military tools to bolster claims in the South China Sea (Giegerich, 2016; Wither, 2016).

Considerable academic consideration has been paid to the combined use of land forces and instruments of influence. After NATO applied the concept to describe Russia’s actions in Ukraine in 2014, analyses of hybrid warfare have featured prominently in academic publications and debates related to Russia and the future of war and warfare. However, the potential for hybrid campaigns in the maritime domain has received limited analytical coverage.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the Arctic has risen on the political agenda due to the rapid climatic, economic and political changes underway in an area that binds three continents together. For Norway, as one of the five Arctic coastal states and historically the only northern NATO member to share a land border with Russia, this poses some challenges.¹ Increased military presence in the region as well as the sabotage of pipelines in the nearby Baltic Sea in 2022 and 2023 have spurred questions regarding the use of non-state actors to perform military operations while retaining some form of plausible deniability.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 thus calls for a re-evaluation of the soft spots in Western–Russian relations in the North – the maritime zones around Svalbard being perhaps the primary example in a Norwegian–Russian security context. Svalbard has emerged as a specific point of concern due to the Russian communities there, and Russia’s general interests associated with this Norwegian archipelago. Several questions have emerged: Could the Russian fishing vessels’ activity around Svalbard be a part of a greater hybrid warfare campaign? Could a dispute over the maritime zone around Svalbard be an arena for hybrid operations – as increasingly portrayed in Western media and by some academics? (Fredriksen et al., 2022; NRK, 2022; Pettersen et al., 2023).

In lieu of these developments, in this article we ask: How can the conceptualization of hybrid activity help better unpack security interests, concerns, and dynamics in specific maritime cases? Given the increasing use of the “hybrid” concept by authorities and academics alike, such an examination is quite clearly relevant for the security literature more broadly.

Empirically, this study draws on the extensive literature that has analysed the legal status of the maritime zones around Svalbard (Churchill & Ulfstein, 2010; Jensen, 2020; Molenaar, 2012; Pedersen, 2008; Pedersen & Henriksen, 2009; Ulfstein, 1995), Russian interests and actions regarding those zones (Hønneland & Jørgensen, 2015; J. H. Jørgensen, 2010; Østhagen et al., 2020; Sennikov, 2014; Todorov, 2020) and interactions between the Norwegian Armed Forces and Russian fishing vessels (Åtland & Bruusgaard, 2009; Fermann & Inderberg, 2015; Østhagen, 2016, 2018). It also presents new insights from studies and frameworks related to hybrid warfare and threats, linking them to documented Russian actions in the waters around Svalbard.

Conceptually, we distinguish between “threats”, “operations”, and “warfare” concerning hybrid activity. Hybrid “activity” we use as a catch-all term for any action that takes on hybrid characteristics, contributing to threat perceptions, operations, or warfare. Here we draw on the literature that has examined recent hybrid activity primarily on land, and – to a lesser extent – at sea, in order to evaluate the concept of hybrid threats/ operations/ warfare at sea. We further distinguish between (1) the use of non-military tools to uphold a legal and political position; (2) the threat of mobilization of military tools in an escalatory situation; and (3) the underlying legal-political justifications. Individually, each of these could constitute a security concern at sea – but it is the combination of all three that constitutes hybrid activity.

The article starts with a short overview of previous literature on hybrid warfare, before embarking on a presentation of the hybrid framework used in this article. After this, the case study is presented. The analysis is divided into three headlines identified in the hybrid framework: the use of non-military tools, mobilization of military tools and legal-political justification. In the following discussion-section, the results are considered and related to previous research, and the article ends with concluding remarks.

Previous literature

The Hybrid Framework

From this literature and the associated empirical studies, a few specific aspects related to the maritime domain stand out, offering an initial framework for unpacking our case study. We start by distinguishing between different stages of hybrid activity – something seldom done in works dealing with activity at sea. “Warfare” is the most commonly used descriptor in most hybrid security studies, but warfare entails the act of war or outright conflict (ICRC, 2023). This, we hold, fails to capture the nuances of all the activity in the maritime domain that takes place before an actor engages in hostilities against another actor. We find a three-step scale more suitable when performing an analysis:

First are hybrid threats – as the fear an actor/ state has of hybrid operations being carried out against it. We distinguish between active and passive. Arguably, the former could be said to constitute international relations writ large; the threat of possible hybrid activity is always latent. For our purposes, however, “active” is when such activity is deemed likely or imminent.

Second, hybrid operations refer to the act of engaging in hybrid activity with a limited intention or purpose in and of itself. That purpose might not be related to war or conflict, but concern achieving some economic, political, or legal goal (like establishing/ upholding sovereign rights). We again distinguish between two different modus operandi: limited (one-off) operations, and continuous hybrid operations over an extended period.

Finally, hybrid warfare involves – as per our definition – the use of hybrid activity as part of larger operation with goals beyond the activity itself. Here again, we distinguish between various modes of operation: single events, and the role such activities might play in large-scale military operations where the hybrid warfare activity is often a precursor to outright warfare (e.g., Russia’s activity in Ukraine).² Thus, we conceive of these terms as a three-step gradient, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1

Moreover, we establish some criteria for evaluating activity along these degrees, tailoring general assumptions from the hybrid literature to the maritime domain:

• To avoid the impression of outright military aggression, the use of private vessels (like fishing trawlers or research vessels) may be a preferred type of holistic military response, which still aims to achieve national and international political objectives (Hicks & Metrick, 2018), while maintaining plausible deniability – a crucial point in and of itself.

• An actor uses the risk of escalation itself as a tool for coercive leverage, although the specific campaign remains below the threshold of a military response (Morris et al., 2019). At sea, this entails showcasing military capacity, often regarding the coast guard–navy nexus (Østhagen, 2020), which in itself may entail uncertainty. In this way, military intimidation and political leverage create a deterrent threat.

• A feature of hybrid activity in general, and specifically at sea, is the use of extensive legal and political justifications for actions to create further uncertainty about their legality (Morris et al., 2019). In practice, hybrid operations manoeuvre on the threshold of armed conflicts by creating a legal “grey zone” in which states can exploit the gaps or leeway in the legal environment to justify their actions. In this grey area, “lawfare” can be used as an instrument of hybrid warfare (Dunlap, 2008).

It is the totality of these three dimensions that constitute a possible case of hybrid activity at sea (Figure 2). In and of themselves, each dimension is not sufficient to warrant being termed a hybrid operation. Actions and events in one dimension might constitute a threat, as perceived by another actor. A hybrid operation, however, is different: it requires coordinated action in several (at least two) of the dimensions outlined here. Warfare must be seen as something more holistic and orchestrated than mere limited or continuous operations. Although it need not include all three dimensions outlined, it generally will.

Figure 2

For example, concerning the South China Sea and the role of Chinese fishers, we hold that this activity cannot be conceived as “warfare” even if we add the “hybrid” prefix – at least not at the time of writing. Although provocative for other nearby states like the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia, China’s activities and campaigns are apparently neither intended for a direct conflict involving these states, nor as part of a larger military escalation in the region. Rather, the goal seems to be to establish regional and maritime dominance emanating from specific geographical points (“islands”). Whether the motivation for regional dominance is resource-driven, identity-driven, or security-driven may vary. Leaning on the range of case studies examining these issues (Beckman et al., 2013; Mishra, 2017; Roszko, 2015; Schopmans, 2018; Tønnesson, 2020; Zhang & Bateman, 2017), we find it more instructive to characterise these hybrid activities as “continuous operations” rather than single-event or large-scale “warfare”.

Let us now turn to a case that has received less scrutiny but that seems equally complex: Russia’s activity in the Arctic – specifically in the waters around Svalbard.

An Arctic case study: Russia, Norway and Svalbard

Russia and Svalbard

Despite having a long history of peace and collaboration, concerning natural resources in particular, the Svalbard archipelago has often been mentioned in discussions of worst-case scenarios for the Arctic. Much of the explanation lies in its geographical location close to the strategic nuclear deterrence forces of Russia based on the Kola Peninsula, and the fact that the islands are the sovereign territory of a NATO member state.

The unique legal status of the archipelago has led to additional uncertainty, although the sovereignty issue concerning Svalbard was settled in the “Treaty concerning the status of Spitsbergen”, signed in Paris in February 1920, as part of the post-WWI settlements (Svalbard Treaty, 1920). Norway’s full sovereignty over the archipelago was confirmed by the Treaty, which entered into force in 1925. The Treaty stipulates that Norwegian sovereignty is subject to certain conditions concerning taxation and use of the islands for military purposes, as well as granting equal access to specified economic activities to nationals from the signatory countries. As of 2024, the Treaty has been acceded to more than 40 states (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2024, p. 14).

Diverging views on the geographical scope of the Treaty have persisted. This concerns the status of the maritime zones beyond Svalbard’s territorial sea. As the Treaty predates the law of the sea as codified in the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention from 1982, the Svalbard Treaty does not mention or take into account the area outside Svalbard’s territorial waters (12 nautical miles from the coastline). While some actors argue that the Treaty’s principles should also apply in these maritime areas, others hold it should not (see Churchill & Ulfstein, 2010; Fife, 2021; Jensen, 2020; Molenaar, 2012; Pedersen & Henriksen, 2009). Since Norway is the sovereign of Svalbard, per Law of the Sea the maritime space around Svalbard constitutes an area where Norway has exclusive sovereign rights not limited by the provisions in the Svalbard Treaty (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security 2022, 16; see also Churchill & Ulfstein 2010; Anderson 2009).³

To avoid legal confrontations while ensuring the conservation of marine resources, Norway established a non-discriminatory Fisheries Protection Zone (FPZ) in 1977 (for an analysis, see A.-K. Jørgensen & Østhagen, 2020; Tiller & Nyman, 2017). The FPZ stretches 200 nautical miles around the archipelago; it gave countries with historical fishing activities in the waters the right to continue, but maintains Norway’s right to allocate of fishing quotas and enforce regulations (Utenriksdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 1977) (Figure 3).

Figure 3

The USSR unilaterally recognized Norwegian sovereignty of Svalbard in 1924 and acceded to the Svalbard Treaty in 1935. At the end of WWII, in November 1944, Soviet officials attempted to gain special status on Svalbard, with a proposal made by the USSR’s foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov to Norway’s foreign minister Trygve Lie that the Svalbard Treaty should be scrapped in favour of a bilateral arrangement, and Bjørnøya – a small island halfway between Spitsbergen and the Norwegian mainland – should be Soviet territory (Holtsmark, 1993, pp. 50–76).⁴ This suggestion was eventually rejected in 1947 by Norway, after several years of discussions during the post-WWII turmoil (Arlov, 2003, pp. 394–396).

Today, Russia’s Arctic territorial, cultural, political and security interests converge on Svalbard. The resource-rich waters surrounding the archipelago are closely linked with Russia’s economic ambitions. Fisheries in the FPZ are also, in contrast to the coal mining on the islands, profitable and economically important for Russia (A.-K. Jørgensen, 2022). In fact, more than a quarter of the Russian fishing fleet’s annual catch in the Barents Sea is caught in the waters of Svalbard.

Russia’s Svalbard interests are also inherently linked to Moscow’s strategic security concerns, and the country is sensitive to any perceptions that its northern frontier is fragile or susceptible to intrusion (Åtland & Pedersen, 2009; Boulègue, 2019; Sacks et al., 2021) – although some have argued that the strategic significance of the archipelago itself is somewhat overstated (see Holtsmark, 1993; Tamnes, 2020). Still, due to Svalbard’s proximity to the Kola Peninsula, which is the crux of Russia’s military establishment in the western Arctic, the waters south of the archipelago are considered to be of military-strategic significance (Åtland & Pedersen, 2009; Goretsky et al., 2021; Melino et al., 2020; Østhagen et al., 2020). For Russia’s Northern Fleet to reach the Atlantic Ocean, an area of strategic significance in view of growing Russia–NATO tension, the Fleet’s vessels need to pass through potential naval chokepoints relatively close to Svalbard (J. A. Olsen, 2017; Todorov, 2020) – especially the “Bear-gap”, named for Bear Island (Forsvarskommisjonen av 2021, 2023, p. 146).

Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that Russia has made use of the Svalbard Treaty to argue against Norway’s right to establish any form of maritime jurisdiction in this domain, and that Russia should have been consulted about any such regime. This was the position of the USSR when Norway established the FPZ in 1977; it remains Russia’s position today, reiterated by Russian legal scholars, who argue that Norway has no legitimate right to enforce regulations on fisheries around Svalbard (A.-K. Jørgensen & Østhagen, 2020). From the Russian point of view, any such establishment of a zone should have been done in dialogue with Russia, and rules and regulations in that area today should be enforced solely by the flag state, in this case Russia (Pedersen, 2008; Vylegzhanin & Zilanov, 2007). Thus, while acknowledging Norwegian sovereignty of Svalbard, Russia contests Norwegian jurisdiction in the FPZ. The basis of the controversies between Norway and Russia lies in the two states’ diverging interpretations of the Treaty and its integration with UNCLOS.

When Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Svalbard received a new surge in attention from Norwegian and international media, as a focal point for interest in Arctic security concerns. The Norwegian public broadcaster NRK has presented a stream of stories highlighting the particularities and conflict potential concerning the archipelago (Finnset et al., 2022; Fredriksen et al., 2022; Pettersen et al., 2023; Wormdal, 2022), while international broadcasters like the BBC (BBC News, 2023), The Guardian (Bryant, 2023), Le Parisien (Brugeron, 2022), USA Today (2023), Deutsche Welle (Nahmen, 2023), and Al Jazeera (2022) have published lengthy feature-stories about Svalbard and its role in international politics.

In much of this coverage, fears of hybrid activity or hybrid operations loom large. Although escalation when interacting with fishing vessels is the primary concern, questions are increasingly being asked about the activities of Russian vessels at large in Norwegian waters, including around Svalbard (Kibar et al., 2021). For example, in January 2022, one of the two subsea cables crucial for information technology on Svalbard was found to have been cut after Russian fishing vessels had been operating in the area. Although Norwegian authorities have not issued any conclusions as to on the perpetrator, some have speculated on linkages to Russian intelligence gathering and hybrid operations in the Norwegian Arctic (Fredriksen et al., 2022; Østhagen, 2023). With the sabotage of the North Stream gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea in September 2022, this issue acquired new urgency in the Norwegian security and defence debate (T. Olsen et al., 2022).

What has made Svalbard’s waters particularly sensitive in recent years is Russia’s refusal to acknowledge the FPZ as waters where Norway has jurisdiction. Asserting that Norway has no right to inspect or arrest Russian vessels could give Russia an excuse to claim that Norway is exceeding its jurisdiction if any inspection and subsequent arrest of a vessel should escalate out of control. In turn, Russia could respond by threatening to use military force, as was already apparent in the early 2000s when Russian fishing vessels were arrested in the FPZ by the Norwegian Coast Guard (Østhagen, 2020, pp. 52–53). It should, however, be noted that on a day-to-day basis, the Norwegian Coast Guard regularly inspects Russian fishing vessels without any incidents or escalation; Russia accepts Norwegian jurisdiction, in practice, even if the captains of the vessels refuse to sign the inspection document afterwards (Østhagen, 2018).

Complicating the matter for Norway is the fact that both fishing vessels and research vessels from Russia have access rights to Norwegian waters that are difficult to curtail. The right to fish in all of the Barents Sea regardless of zonal boundaries constitutes a core pillar of the successful co-management scheme of fisheries cooperation between Norway and Russia (Hønneland, 2014; Hønneland & Jørgensen, 2015; A.-K. Jørgensen, 2022; Stokke, 2022). Norwegian politicians have been wary of disrupting this regime, even after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (Oma Vyvial, 2023). Research vessels’ access to the Norwegian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the FPZ, and the shelf rests on UNCLOS Article 246, according to which “the coastal State should normally grant its consent”, except in a few specific circumstances (Woker et al., 2020, p. 2). Thus, the burden of proof concerning Russian vessels suspected of conducting illegal activities in Norwegian waters, including in the FPZ, lies with Norwegian authorities.

In sum, the Svalbard FPZ has been the scene of several small-scale confrontations between Russia and Norway – repeatedly noted by Russia when discussing the bilateral relationship. Despite new measures to address incidents at sea (Bjur et al., 2020), the potential for escalation of a fisheries incident has increased in tandem with Russia’s increasingly belligerent behaviour, not least in the European Arctic/ High North. As of 2024, none of these incidents have spiralled out of control, although some have taken on state-to-state dimensions (see Østhagen, 2018). On the other hand, neither Norway nor Russia seems to exclude the possibility of such an escalation in the event of an unacceptable infringement on national sovereignty or sovereign rights.

Analysis: Unpacking hybrid activity at sea

The above account of Norwegian-Russian interactions provides an empirical background from which to analyse to the framework of hybrid threat, activity and operations in a maritime context.

Discussion: Hybrid warfare, or exaggerated fears?

As seen in campaigns in Eastern Europe (especially Ukraine), hybrid operations and warfare have become one of Moscow’s preferred operational tactics (Council of Foreign Relations, 2022; Dayspring, 2015). This includes the use of irregular instruments in favour of, or in combination with, conventional means of power. Based on the three characteristics as shown in Figure 2 – the incorporation of non-state actors, the combined use of military and non-military tools to create coercive leverage, and the use of judicial ambiguity – the suggested use of primarily Russian fishing vessels for strategic purposes can be placed within the concept of hybrid activities.

A distinction can be made between a hybrid threat concerning the possibility of a military escalation, and threats regarding jurisdiction, where the purpose may be to maintain a geostrategic position and create “strategic uncertainty’. The fear and uncertainty created by the confrontations in the FPZ and periodic statements of hostile intent emanating from Russia’s government and media make the discussion of hybrid means relevant. Hybrid threat perceptions are evident in descriptions in the Norwegian media, by scholars and even government officials. And Russian officials seem intent on ensuring that this is an “active” threat, by continuing to ensure Russian fishers do not sign inspection papers, by regularly criticising Norway for establishing the FPZ, and occasionally showcasing military force in the same domain.

However, this does not necessarily mean ongoing “hybrid operations”. The definition of hybrid operations includes the synchronous application of hybrid means. Thus, the application of one single hybrid instrument does not invoke the use of the term “hybrid operation” unless other hybrid means are employed simultaneously or against the same target over a longer or shorter timeframe. The effects of Russia’s known actions in the FPZ can hardly be considered independently when viewed through the lens of hybrid concepts. In terms of hybrid operations, the picture is less clear. There are indications that Russia has engaged in, and perhaps continues to engage in, both specific and limited operations in some areas, and continuous operations in others. Possible examples range from the cutting of the Svalbard fibre cable (Fredriksen et al., 2022; Gulldahl & Eriksen, 2024), to suspect movement patterns of Russian research vessels (Kibar et al., 2021; T. Olsen et al., 2022), and radio equipment onboard Russian trawlers (NRK, 2022).

The problem is that direct evidence for these activities is hard to come by, and the Norwegian authorities have not confirmed outright operations, nor accused Russia – as for example was done after a cyber-attack on the Norwegian Parliament in 2020 (Johansen, 2020). This is, in turn, perhaps the point of such hybrid operations. Given the amount of evidence and the obvious activity along all three dimensions described above – apparently scaled up by Russia since 2014 – hybrid operations have probably been taking place at various intervals.

Although the term hybrid warfare may be applied to the orchestrated multidimensionality of Russian techniques designed to achieve national and international strategic objectives, however, it may not be suitable for describing what is currently happening in the FPZ. Furthermore, we should distinguish between low-level disputes (such as the issues between Russian trawlers and Norwegian authorities) and “high-level” disputes that threaten the state itself as well as the regional or global order. Given our separation of operations and warfare, let us take a closer look at Russian interests as to fishers – as independent agents – and Russia’s interests concerning both fisheries and Svalbard writ large.

While the Russian trawlers’ violation of Norwegian jurisdiction has sometimes challenged Norwegian sovereign rights in the FPZ, none of these incidents have spiralled out of control. Mutual interest in preserving aspects of the bilateral cooperation in the FPZ may be a reason for this. As noted by Moe and Jensen (2020), Soviet and later Russian policies regarding Svalbard have been relatively stable in the post-war period, marked by the search to achieve a special status on the islands as well as in the FPZ. Although the rhetoric and intensity have varied, Russia recognises Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard and has refrained from undermining Norwegian jurisdiction to such an extent that the Treaty would be challenged (Moe & Jensen, 2020).

Referring to the example of the Chinese fishing militia, the attempt to link fishers to the country’s strategic and political motives has some important shortcomings. The fishing militia narrative considers fishers as passive agents under full control of the authorities. This does not hold up under scrutiny here, however, as it during the Elektron incident and in the ensuing discussion of FPZ issues, where we can note a distinction between a dialogue-oriented central power and a conflict-oriented regional actor in Murmansk (A.-K. Jørgensen & Østhagen, 2020).

Moreover, although fluctuating at times, continuous dialogue has led to resolution of disagreements between the Norwegian Coast Guard and Russian fishing vessels without resort to military solutions. Demonstrating the cooperative sector gains in periods of geopolitical tension has been the Russo–Norwegian coast guard cooperation on fisheries – the sole bilateral military connection that remained untouched in Norway’s sanctions against Russia in response to the annexation of Crimea in 2014. As the only other state with communities on Svalbard, and with significant interests in various economic activity ranging from coal mining to tourism and fisheries, Russia has arguably been served with maintaining the status quo (Østhagen et al., 2020; Todorov, 2020). The current situation on Svalbard favours Russian economic interests, as well as the broader desire to ensure that regional relations in the Barents Sea remain politically stable.

Together with Russia’s known economic interests in the area and the institutionalized annual negotiations on fishing quotas, this indicates that, in practice, Moscow accepts Norwegian jurisdiction and exercise of control in the FPZ. Despite some opacity, the Russian stance on the FPZ has remained consistent. Russia’s objections to Norwegian inspections and the refusal to recognise Norwegian authority in the FPZ is therefore not a surprise to Norwegian policymakers. Most experts have concluded that such factors are unlikely to undermine the Svalbard regime at large, or threaten the Treaty itself (Hønneland & Jørgensen, 2015; Østhagen et al., 2020; Todorov, 2020). These conclusions have not changed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, although security relations in the North have become more tense.

Thus, although Russia regularly reiterates its disapproval of specific Norwegian policies, it seems relatively satisfied with the current status quo in the FPZ, as reflected in its national security and financial interests in the region. Moreover, opening what Todorov (2020) refers to as “Pandora’s box” in the form of multilateral discussions on the geographical application of the Treaty might entail significant risks of losing what Russia has already achieved in terms of fisheries management. By officially challenging – yet maintaining – the existing balance in matters related to the legal regime of the zone, the status quo could provide a certain level of stability – although it might also serve as a springboard from which to engage in conflict in the future should the need arise.

Moreover, the continuous flow of statements from Russia regarding Svalbard more generally also seem to support an underlying policy of maintaining a form of strategic uncertainty concerning the challenges to Norwegian rules and regulations on Svalbard, and the legal position concerning the maritime zones around it. It seems that, although Moscow prefers to continue to pressure Norwegian authorities on Svalbard issues, it is not interested in instigating further regional instability and tension – unless the security situation should deteriorate further. In other words, how Norway and its allies manage potential mishaps, misunderstandings and miscalculations, alongside potential provocations, also matters in avoiding conflict escalation in this part of the world. This is undoubtedly also what spurred the Norwegian government to further emphasise the need for national control over the archipelago in its latest iteration of its Svalbard white paper from May 2024.⁶

Taking a step back and looking at the wider security environment in the Arctic, we can see that Moscow’s rhetoric towards Western encroachment in the Arctic region has become more outspoken along with Russia’s increased military presence. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has further exacerbated the increasingly tense security situation in the Arctic, especially the European Arctic (the High North). Although a Russian-initiated military encounter remains unlikely due to the likelihood of such belligerent actions escalating into a kinetic war that Russia could not win, Moscow could employ a range of conventional and unconventional tactics short of formalized state-level aggression. The goal is presumably to maintain some form of plausible deniability, while causing disruption, stress and uncertainty.

Indeed, as showcased here, although the incidents we have highlighted in the FPZ challenge – to some extent – Norwegian jurisdiction, they do not concern only the management of fisheries. By contradicting national jurisdiction, the vessels are also involved in the larger context of legal ambiguity and Russia’s geopolitical interests in the region. Contesting aspects of the Svalbard Treaty through hybrid means may also create a dual opportunity for Russia. First, these actions continue to uphold access to vital marine resources. Second, Russia’s de facto presence could prevent full recognition of Norway’s sovereign rights in the zone, which Russia – at least rhetorically – has highlighted as relevant in a possible NATO–Russia conflict in the North (A.-K. Jørgensen & Østhagen, 2020). Viewed from a broader geopolitical perspective, Russia can challenge norms of conduct and contest in the regional and global structures of alliances to achieve its greater political objectives without crossing economic and political thresholds or engaging in a kinetic war.

The was Russian war in Ukraine begun in 2022 further underscores this relevance of conceiving how Russia might use a fishing or research vessel in the FPZ as a pretext for military escalation, albeit still under the threshold of outright warfare. The unstable security situation calls for consideration of possible intended escalation by Russia in the FPZ in order to achieve larger strategic goals such as testing Norwegian response capacities, NATO cohesion in the matter of Svalbard’s FPZ, or focusing NATO-attention away from crisis-scenarios elsewhere.

Beyond the specific interests of Russia concerning Svalbard as highlighted above, it is also essential to recognise Russian military activity and posturing in the FPZ and the Barents Sea writ large as part of its “bastion” defence concept of ensuring the relevance of its nuclear capacities located on, or emanating from, the Kola Peninsula. Thus, military activity and “strategic uncertainty” in these waters are also ways of signalling to NATO (or the United States) – often thought to be the primary goal for Russian strategic military activity in the North Atlantic and Arctic (Wilhelmsen & Gjerde, 2018).

However, ambitious economic and development projects require transnational collaboration and, perhaps more importantly, a stable security environment. Judging from Russia’s official strategies and the uncertain political landscape characterized by renewed strategic competition, it is in this grey zone, between multilateral collaboration and competition, that Russia may engage in campaigns of simultaneously applied conventional and unconventional means (Devyatkin, 2023; Pedersen & Steinveg, 2024).

Conclusions

This article has asked how the hybrid concept in contemporary security analysis can be employed to unpack interests, concerns, and dynamics in a specific maritime case study. By examining the ideas of hybrid activity in the maritime domain, we have sought to contribute to a broader understanding of the current dynamics in the contested FPZ and the complexities of such activities in contemporary maritime disputes, adding a level of understanding to an ongoing dispute between Norway and Russia – while also contributing to the growing literature on hybrid operations and the maritime domain.

Through conceptualizations of threat, operations and warfare, we conclude that the threat is there, and previous and current Russian actions and statements continue to uphold this as an active threat. In terms of hybrid operations, the picture is less clear. There are indications that Russia has engaged in, and perhaps continues to engage in, both specific and limited operations in some areas, and continuous operations in others, although direct evidence for these activities is hard to come by. However, we hold that hybrid warfare is not what is currently taking place in this part of the Arctic. Our analysis has sought to provide a more fine-grained interpretation of this specific case – of relevance to both Norway and NATO writ large – and the general understanding of grey zone or hybrid activities in contemporary maritime disputes.

Assuming that Russia is seeking to avoid further economic, political and military tension in the Arctic, an overt campaign to challenge Norwegian jurisdiction in the FPZ would not support Russia’s financial and cooperative aims, potentially provoking a direct confrontation with NATO. Ensuring military and legal presence through covert and asymmetrical means serves these strategic purposes. At the same time, as shown in this article, leaning on the concept of hybrid “warfare” entails the risk in interpreting every Russian act of aggression as warfare – or more specifically, based on previous experience in the Baltics, as hybrid warfare. It may be misleading to describe Russia’s broader aims and methods simply as a form of strategic coercion; indeed, that holds true for all levels of international relations, including the bilateral relations in the Arctic.

Moreover, labeling the incidents in the FPZ as a “hybrid operation” may risk creating implications for the management of the disagreements in this maritime domain and for the development of an effective fisheries management regime at sea. It can be argued that the prevailing narrative of a fishing militia can contribute to the “securitization” of fishing activity at large.⁷ Therefore, although it is important to examine this issue given the tense geopolitical climate in the Arctic, it is prudent to ensure that the incidents in the FPZ do not serve as a further obstacle to conflict and resource management, and Arctic diplomacy writ large.

On the other hand, international uncertainty, the increase in military exercises, and operations and the construction of security infrastructure across the region do little to engender a sense of optimism regarding Arctic security. Therefore, while the possibility of an armed conflict in Svalbard’s waters may be deemed low, one misplaced fishing trawler might serve as a dangerous trigger if seized by another party, even if the intention is to create a sense of symbolic presence and uncertainty – underscoring the importance of unpacking how and what these hybrid or cross-sectoral challenges look like also in the Arctic.

Concerning hybrid activity at sea more generally, in this article we have done two things. First, we have outlined a simple structure from which to analyse cases of hybrid challenges and activities at sea. The three-degree gradient is a helpful tool, alongside the conceptualization of hybrid activity taking place along three different dimensions.

The framework provided here also helps further specific measures to specific hybrid challenges. Dealing with the first dimension – non-state actors – requires enhancing maritime domain awareness through integrated surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence-sharing. This involves coordination among naval forces, intelligence agencies, and international partners. The second dimension – threat of military force – is countered at sea through presence. Coast guard capabilities might provide the ultimate guarantee for stability and sovereignty enforcement, with its often multi-purpose, multi-hatted role (Østhagen, 2020).

However, managing challenges that derive from the third dimension – legal-political ambiguity – is a different task. That requires international cooperation and the development of norms and rules through various Law of the Sea-processes to address unconventional challenges (Lott, 2022). Collaborative efforts among maritime nations can help to establish a collective response to hybrid threats, and/or further strengthen and specify specific provisions under the Law of the Sea-framework.

Moreover, we highlight the importance of taking a closer look at the maritime domain itself. As legal scholars have done with analysis of how the Law of the Sea can grapple with hybrid or non-traditional threats (Kraska & Pedrozo, 2013; Lott, 2022), so must security-oriented scholars examine the political, legal and physical changes underway in the maritime domain and how these impact hybrid activity and interrelated analysis. We note how the preoccupation of states and state leaders with marine resources and the general strategic value of extended maritime space, together with technological developments that enable greater control over the maritime domain (coast guard vessels, satellites, drones, subsea installations, etc.) will not render disputes over the same space any less relevant.

What this means is that we need to recognise and study how hybrid activity in the maritime domain can be utilized in order to achieve domain-specific goals – such as upholding sovereign rights or underscoring a legal position. This activity does not necessarily have to be placed in the larger context of conflict escalation and possible “warfare”. But distinguishing and delineating various goals and purposes should be a highly relevant task for analysts and academics going forward.

Funding Information

This article was funded by a grant from the Norwegian Ministry of Defence’s programme for financing research on security and defence policy. It was also partly enabled by Norwegian Research Council grants “OCEANGOV” # 315163 and “JOINTFISH” #342924.

Competing Interests

The authors have no competing interests to declare.