Figure 1
Two-level and three-level games exemplified in relation to the U.S.-Denmark-Greenland negotiations concluded with the Igaliku Agreement in 2004. Here Greenland is not engaging directly with the United States on Level I, and it is clear that Greenland and Denmark must agree internally on Level II, while consulting each of their constituencies on Level III, making it a three-level game. (Source: author).
Figure 3
Interlocking two-level game illustrated in relation to the 2020 agreements between the United States and Greenland. Here, win-sets are reached between the three parties, and the Level I negotiations are conducted bilaterally between Greenland and the United States, with Denmark in a secondary role; thus the dashed line between Greenland and Denmark. (Source: author).
Figure 2
Robert D. Putnam’s figure “Effects of reducing win-set size” (Putnam, 1988, p. 441).