Figure 1
Computer Network Attacks (CNA) as subset of Cyberspace Operations (CO).
Table 1
D F-35 and CNA effects on U.S.-Danish alliance.
| PARAMETER | F-35 | CNA |
|---|---|---|
| Interoperability | Direct benefit to United States => reduce risk of abandonment | Little or no benefit to U.S. => little or no effect on risk of abandonment |
| Economy of scale | Direct benefit to U.S. => reduce risk of abandonment | Little or no benefit to U.S. => little or no effect on risk of abandonment |
| Strengthen NATO capabilities in armed conflict | Direct benefit to U.S. => reduce risk of abandonment | Benefit to U.S., directly within the limited framework of SCEPVA and indirectly from political support of U.S. ability to conduct CNA in NATO ops by SCEPVA => reduce risk of abandonment |
| Potential for prestige through participation in ops | High, according to historical experience from Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya => reduce risk of abandonment. More, lack of Danish caveats has further enhanced prestige, standing out in comparison to allies with caveats. Caveat: should the ops involve high risk of entrapment, participation would, based on past policies, likely be declined or at least conditional. | No historical experience => Impact on risk of abandonment difficult to assess. U.S. official strategy unclear on role of allies, but stress use below threshold of armed conflict. Danish intent on use below threshold of armed conflict undeclared – hence no a priori Danish support for U.S. operations below that threshold. If ops are conducted, prestige is limited to decision-makers with access to knowledge of the likely highly classified operations – and then only if the U.S. is informed of the ops efficacy. |
| Transparency of allocated resources and capability efficacy | Disadvantageously high: U.S. and NATO have good insight into efficacy of capability and if insufficient may press for increased resource allocation. | Advantageously low, at least until called upon to deliver: non-disclosure of resources allocated to and efficacy of CNA capability accepted among allies. |
| Risk from entrapment | Some risk from entrapment. However, historical experience would allow some basis for assessing the risk and provide guidance for the use of the capability to de-escalate a conflict. | Likely relatively higher risk of entrapment due to widespread and increasing use below the threshold of armed conflict: arguably more likely than conventional means to be requested by the U.S. to conduct in-domain punishment to deter opponents such as China and Russia. This risk exacerbated by lack of historical experience with the use of CNA to de-escalate conflict, the ambiguity and clandestine nature of the means, as well as low threshold for opponents to counter-escalate if used. |