Success rate of countries running for a seat on the United Nations Security Council for the first time

The UNSC election: The main procedural elements

The election of non-permanent members to the UNSC is governed by two key documents: the United Nations Charter and the Rules of Procedure of the UN General Assembly.

Article 23 of the UN Charter stipulates that 10 of the 15 UNSC members are to be elected by the UNGA for 2-year terms. In practice, these members are referred to as non-permanent, rotating, or elected members. The Charter also states that a retiring member is not eligible for immediate re-election (Art. 23(2)). Therefore, the very concept of non-permanency is secured, and the situation is avoided in which a non-permanent member could become a de facto permanent member by being re-elected multiple times (Reire, 2021). Furthermore, the Charter classifies a UNSC election as an ‘important question,’ which requires a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting (Art. 18). These elections are conducted by secret ballot, ensuring that the outcomes are never predetermined (Malone, 2000).

The UN Charter, Article 23, sets forth three general criteria that member states of the UNGA should consider when electing non-permanent members to the UNSC. First, contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security. Second, contributions to the other purposes of the UN. Third, equitable geographical distribution. Among these, in light of this article, the requirement of equitable geographical distribution merits particular attention. As with many provisions in the Charter, this concept is articulated in broad and general terms, without specifying concrete parameters or mechanisms for implementation (Reire, 2021).

The absence of a clear definition has necessitated interpreting the norms and creating additional procedural mechanisms. To ensure a geographical balance in elections and the distribution of posts, the UN has established a system of regional groups. It guides both electoral processes and the allocation of posts.

The UN recognises five regional groups to elect non-permanent members to the Security Council. These groups vary significantly in size and composition: the African Group and the Asia-Pacific Group each comprise 54 Member States; the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC) includes 33 members; the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) consists of 28 members, with the United States participating as an observer and electoral member; and the Eastern European Group (EEG), the smallest, consists of 23 members (United Nations Department for General Assembly and Conference Management, 2026a).

To ensure equitable representation while accounting for the size disparities among the regional groups, the UNGA established a distribution formula for the 10 non-permanent seats on the UNSC (A/RES/1991(XVIII)). In 1971, the General Assembly adopted a Resolution which formally split the five seats allocated initially to African and Asian States into two distinct regional allocations: three seats for African States and two for Asian States. Additionally, one of these five seats is reserved for an Arab State (A/RES/2847(XXVI). The so-called ‘Arab swing seat’ is not formally codified but is nevertheless maintained in practice. It functions on a rotational basis between the African and Asian groups, thereby facilitating Arab representation in the Security Council through a regionally coordinated mechanism.

Given that five non-permanent members are elected each year for 2-year terms, the electoral cycle is structured accordingly. One African Group’s seat is contested in even-numbered calendar years, while the remaining two are filled in odd-numbered years. Within the Asia-Pacific Group, one seat is filled each odd-numbered calendar year; additionally, the so-called ‘Arab swing seat,’ alternating between the African Group and the Asia-Pacific Group, is also contested in odd-numbered years. GRULAC’s two seats are filled on a staggered basis, with one seat contested each year. The same applies to the WEOG. The EEG’s single seat is filled every odd-numbered year (Security Council Report, 2025).

This article specifically examines the prospects of first-time candidate countries in contested UNSC elections. These scenarios require further procedural clarification, as they differ from elections involving a non-contested election known as a ‘clean slate’. According to the UNGA’s Rules of Procedure, Rule 93, if no candidate secures the required two-thirds majority in the first ballot, a second ballot is taken, which is restricted to the two candidates obtaining the largest number of votes. The balloting is continued until one candidate secures two-thirds of the votes cast. Suppose neither candidate succeeds after three consecutive restricted ballots. In that case, the rules allow a return to an unrestricted ballot, enabling member states to vote for any ‘eligible candidate’, meaning new candidates can join the electoral process. If, after three rounds of such unrestricted voting, no candidate is elected, the process reverts to a restricted ballot between the two leading candidates. This cycle continues until a candidate secures the required two-thirds majority.

Dataset of UNSC election parameters

For this article, the legal analysis provides five main UNSC election variables necessary for testing the hypothesis: (a) the regional electoral group that the candidate country belongs to; (b) the distribution formula for the 10 UNSC non-permanent seats; (c) the number of times a country has presented itself as a candidate; (d) the election result; (e) the type of the election – contested or ‘clean slate’. Based on these main variables, the electoral formula, type, cycle, time, and regional affiliation are reflected in the dataset of 35 election cycles compiled for this study, covering the period from 1991 to 2025 (see Appendix I). The unit of analysis is a candidate-year observation, and there are 203 observations in total. This approach allows for a focus on both the period after the collapse of the international bipolar system and election results across all UN regional groups, while also providing a systemic outlook to test the hypothesis.

This data includes all UN member states participating in contested elections under examination, along with the results necessary for analysis. The dataset indicates whether the UN member was running for a UNSC seat for the first time (1 – yes; 0 – no); whether it was elected (1 – yes; 0 – no); whether the election was contested (1 – yes; 0 – no); and the regional group the candidate country belongs to. The data also includes instances where multiple voting rounds took place, such as in 2011, when Azerbaijan and Hungary competed in 17 rounds—and where new candidates (i.e., ‘eligible members’) entered the process mid-cycle (A/66/PV.37; A/66/PV.38; A/66/PV.39; A/66/PV.40; A/66/PV.40; Security Council Report (2011)), and in 2006, when Guatemala and Venezuela competed in a record 47 rounds of voting, leading to the election of Panama as a compromise candidate (A/61/PV.32; A/61/PV.33; A/61/PV.34; A/61/PV.35; A/61/PV.36; A/61/PV.37; A/61/PV.40; A/61/PV.44; A/61/PV.49).

This data corpus excludes countries that have joined the election process without aiming to be elected, as reflected in obtaining one or two UNGA votes. Although there is no formal academic definition for this group of states, they can be categorised as ‘non-declared’ or ‘non-voluntary candidates’. These are countries that never submitted a formal candidature but still received votes during the UNSC election. The 2011 election provides an example—Estonia did not submit an official candidature but participated as a ‘non-declared’ candidate in the sixth and seventh rounds. These rounds were unrestricted under the procedure, and Estonia received one vote in each round (A/66/PV.38).

Methodological model

Methodologically, this study combines qualitative and quantitative approaches. Legal analysis is used to define a conceptual framework and determine variables for the development of the data corpus and interpretation of results. Quantitative research design is applied to test the hypothesis and empirically assess whether countries running for a UNSC non-permanent seat for the first time are more likely to be elected.

First, descriptive statistical analysis has been used to provide a general overview of the dataset, highlight key patterns in election results, and compare success rates between first-time and repeat candidates across the five UN regional groups. While descriptive statistics help reveal basic patterns in election outcomes, they do not permit formal hypothesis testing. To address this limitation, the study uses an econometric model. Since the dependent variable is binary, the study employs an LPM regression model to identify the independent effects of first-time candidacy and contested elections and to explore their interaction. LPM is chosen over the logit specification because it provides results that are easy to interpret and also accommodates the inclusion of country and year fixed effects.

The LPM model is structured as follows:

• Elected_it: Indicator for election results (1 = elected, 0 = not elected) for country i in year t,

• Firsttime_it: Indicator for a UN member running the first time in the UNSC elections (1 = yes, 0 = no),

• Contested_it: Indicator for contested election (1 = yes, 0 = no),

• Firsttime × Contested: Interaction term to determine the effect of a first-time runner when the election is contested,

• α_i: Country fixed effects,

• γ_t: Year fixed effects,

• ε_it: Error term.

The regression model includes fixed effects for both country and year, accounting for time-invariant national characteristics and year-specific global dynamics, thereby improving the reliability of the estimates. Country fixed effects (α_i) focus on within-country variation over time, which helps to control factors that are unique to a specific country, and which do not change over time, such as political influence, diplomatic capacity, regional representation quotas, and other factors. Year fixed effects (γ_t) focus on within-time variation between countries, controlling for time-specific factors that may occur over time but do not vary between countries. These include shifts in geopolitical power, global economic recessions, institutional changes in UN procedures, and other developments. Overall, fixed effects enable the model to isolate the effect of variables and their interaction term, independent of country traits or global time trends. Standard errors are clustered in two ways—by country and by year—to account for potential correlations of election outcomes within the same country over time and within the same election year across different countries.

Although it might seem intuitive to run separate regressions by regional groups, most regions have too few observations to support statistically meaningful analysis on their own. In total, the regression is based on 217 candidate-year observations covering 35 election cycles between 1991 and 2025.

Interpretation of the results

The descriptive statistical analysis shows that, overall, first-time candidates win 45% of contested elections. Therefore, the data indicates no advantage for newcomers compared to repeat candidates, who win 58% of contested elections. However, descriptive statistical analysis highlights substantial regional variation in election outcomes.

The UNSC election result data in the WEOG group shows that no candidate has an advantage. There is equally high competition and election opportunities for those running for the first time and those that have already worked in the UNSC previously. There are three subgroups within WEOG: the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg), and CANZ (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). Although CANZ and the Nordic countries usually do not run against each other in their subgroups (Thorhallsson et al., 2022), the WEOG group has historically been famous for the high competition among its members. This approach is being called ‘an open-market approach to elections, which produces regularly contested candidatures’ (Security Council Report, 2024). Competition in this group is described as intense, and campaign organisation is critical (Ekengren et al., 2020; Iwanami, 2018). These factors are also reflected in the results of this study.

The results of the statistical analysis in the GRULAC group are entirely different. Specifically, no country that has run for a non-permanent seat on the UNSC has been elected during the 35 election cycles under review. Only in two cases did the group countries run for the first time but were not elected—the Dominican Republic in 2001 and Guatemala in 2006—while in four cases, the countries ran for the first time for an elected seat on the UNSC and were elected in uncontested elections. Thus, across the 35 UNSC election cycles, GRULAC countries that have run for the first time in contested elections have never been elected, and their success score is 0%. Historically, the GRULAC group, with some exceptions, has often been able to reach consensus on ‘clean slates’ (Security Council Report, 2024), but not in contested elections.

Very low success rates are also observed for newcomers from the Asia-Pacific group, where only 20% of countries running for a non-permanent seat on the UNSC are elected. The reason for this is that the Asia-Pacific group has a dual-track nomination system, with clear differences between its Arab and non-Arab subgroups (Iwanami, 2018). The Arab subgroup follows a structured rotation system; selection is mainly based on years spent outside the UNSC, and it uses a more formalised turn-taking approach. Just in contrast, the non-Arab subgroup relies on competitive contests driven by high expectations of winning. This division within the Asia-Pacific group illustrates how existing group practices influence nominations differently, even within the same regional group.

The EEG group and the Africa group are closest to the hypothesis assumption in the context of descriptive statistical analysis. Specifically, in contested African group elections, newcomers are elected 67% of the time, while repeat candidates are elected 55% of the time. A centralised and coordinated endorsement practice within the group can explain this. The African Union (AU) coordinates on international positions and finalises endorsements for bodies such as the UNSC (see African Union, 2022). For example, in 2021, the AU endorsed Sierra Leone and Nigeria for the 2024–2025 UNSC term, emphasising the need for regional consensus and coordinated advice to the UN’s Africa Group in New York (see African Union, 2021).

In the EEG group, 56% of countries running for a UNSC seat for the first time in contested elections have been elected. In contrast, among repeat candidates, the competition has been tougher, and they have succeeded in only 33% of their attempts. Although the EEG electoral practices are understudied and may require additional academic scrutiny, one of the possible explanations lies in the historical and geopolitical characteristics of the group. Before 1991, the core of the regional group consisted of the USSR, along with the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which, despite being occupied by the USSR and not being sovereign countries, were admitted as founding members of the UN. Later, during the Cold War, the bloc and the UN regional group included the Warsaw Pact countries (see Member States). After the collapse of the bipolar international system, new nations that gained independence (for example, through the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia) or regained independence after the Soviet Union’s occupation have joined the UN and the EEG. However, given the long process of democratisation, economic and social development, and capacity building of foreign policy that these EEG members had to go through, they started focusing on the UNSC relatively late. That includes Lithuania, which served on the UNSC in 2013–2014; Estonia in 2020–2022; and Latvia, which began working on the UNSC in 2026. The gradual readiness of the EEG members since 1991 to engage in global peace and security has led to lower competition and a higher success rate for first-timers in UNSC elections.

Therefore, the results of descriptive statistical analysis across all five UN regional groups do not confirm a general practice of the UNGA being more accommodating towards newcomers seeking to become a UNSC member.

The results from the LPM regression also do not support the hypothesis. The economic regression analysis of 35 UNSC election cycles across five regional electoral groups shows that in uncontested elections, the coefficient for first-time candidacy is positive (β ≈ 0.337). Although the model shows a positive coefficient, this reflects the way the regression is estimated rather than an actual effect. The positive coefficient on first-time candidacy in uncontested races should not be taken as evidence of a genuine newcomer advantage, since in these elections the single candidate—whether new or repeat—always wins by default.

The significant regression results are from contested elections. The coefficient for contested UNSC elections is negative (β ≈ −0.391), indicating that contested races are linked to a much lower chance of winning compared to uncontested ones, all while keeping first-time status constant. This suggests that introducing competition in the UNSC elections greatly decreases the likelihood of winning.

To analyse data in a way that directly relates to the working hypothesis about how the effect of being a first-time runner changes in contested elections, the interaction term was included and estimated. It helps assess the combined effect of being a first-time candidate in a contested election. The coefficient for this interaction term is negative (−0.496) and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that any apparent advantage for newcomers in uncontested elections vanishes when there is competition.

Therefore, the results of both descriptive statistical analysis and the LPM regression do not support the hypothesis and show that contested elections are difficult to win, and there is no evidence that the general UNGA’s practice is more accommodating towards first-time candidates. The assumption of the UNGA’s positive attitude towards newcomers is false, and it cannot be considered a strategic factor in UNSC election campaigns. It also suggests that UN electoral practices do not involve special treatment or sympathy towards newcomers to ensure fair, equitable, and democratic representation in the UNSC.

However, statistical patterns show positive trends in two geographic groups—the African group and the EEG—by indicating higher chances for first-time candidates. Considering this, further research may be needed to examine long-term trends within these two regional groups. To address the limitations of regression analysis, a more extended UNSC election period should be analysed. This approach would, on the one hand, allow for conducting separate regressions with enough observations to support meaningful statistical analysis, while, on the other hand, allow for working with comparable data that account for the increased number of elected UNSC members after 1965.