References
- Gersbach, H. (2005). Designing Democracy: Ideas for Better Rules. Springer.
- Gersbach, H. (2012). Contractual Democracy. Review of Law & Economics, 8(3), 823–851.
- Gersbach, H. (2017). Redesigning democracy: More ideas for better rules. Springer.
- Gersbach, H. (2020). History-bound reelections. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 12(3), 33–75.
- Gersbach, H., Mamageishvili, A. & Tejada, O. (2021). The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting. Journal of Economic Theory, 195.
- Gersbach, H., Jackson, M., Muller, P. & Tejada, O. (2023). Electoral competition with costly policy changes: A Dynamic Perspective. Journal of Economic Theory, 214.
- Gersbach, H. (2024). Forms of new democracy. Social Choice and Welfare, 62(4), 799–837.
- Gersbach, H. & Tejada, O. (2024). Semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision. Social Choice and Welfare, 63(3-4), 677–715.
- Gersbach, H. (2025). Schuldensensitive Mehrheitsregeln als Schuldenbremse. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 26(2), 234–241.
- Gersbach, H. & Blieske, P. (2025). Debt-sensitive majority rule as stabilization mechanism, CEPR Discussion Papers, 20266.