References
- Alesina, A. und A. Drazen (1991), Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review, 81, 1170-1188.
- Balderston, T. (1989), War Finance and Inflation in Britain and Germany, 1914-1918, Economic History Review, 62, 222-244.
- Besley, T. and T. Persson (2009), The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics, American Economic Review, 99, 1218-1244.
- Ferguson, N. (1996), Constraints and Room for Manoeuvre in the German Inflation of the 1920s, Economic History Review, 49, 635-666.
- Holtfrerich, C.-L. (1980), Die deutsche Inflation 1914-1923. Ursachen und Folgen in internationaler Perspektive, de Gruyter.
- Ritschl, A. (2005), The Pity of Peace: Germany‘s War Economy, 1914-1918 and Beyond, in S. N. Broadberry und M. Harrison (Hrsg.), The Economics of World War I, Cambridge University Press.
- Sargent, T. (1982), The End of Four Big Inflations, in T. Sargent (Hrsg.), Rational Expectations and Inflation, Harper & Row.
- Schuker, S. (1976), The End of French Predominance in Europe, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press.
- Seghezza, E. und P. Morelli (2020), Was a Sudden Stop at the Origin of German Hyperinflation?, Financial History Review, 27, 161-186.
- Webb, S. B. (1985), Government Debt and Inflationary Expectations as Determinants of the Money Supply in Germany, 1919-23, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 17, 479-492.