Convergence method, properties and computational complexity for Lyapunov games
By: Julio Clempner and Alexander Poznyak
Open Access
|Jun 2011References
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Language: English
Page range: 349 - 361
Published on: Jun 22, 2011
Published by: University of Zielona Góra
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 4 issues per year
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© 2011 Julio Clempner, Alexander Poznyak, published by University of Zielona Góra
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons License.