References
- Ayer, A. J. (1954). Philosophical Essays. London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin’s Press.
- Boyle, M., & Lavin, D. (2008). Problems of Reflexive Determinism. Philosophical Studies, 141(2), 219-246.
- Chmielecki, A. (2001). Między mózgiem i świadomością. Próba rozwiązania problemu psychofizycznego. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Instytutu Filozofii i Socjologii PAN.
- Dittrich, T. (2015). The concept of information in physics: an interdisciplinary topical lecture. European Journal of Physics, 36, 015010.
- Frankfurt, H. G. (1969). Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Philosophy, 66(23), 829-839.
- Hartmann, N. (1932). Ethics (3 Vols.). Translated by Stanton Coit. George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
- Hartmann, N. (1953). New Ways of Ontology. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company.
- Huemer, M. (2000). Van Inwagen’s onsequence Argument. Philosophical Review, 109(4), 525-544. https://doi.org/10.2307/2693648
- Sartre, J.-P. (1946). Existentialism Is a Humanism. Lecture given in 1946. In W. Kaufman (Ed.), Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre (1989). Meridian Publishing Company. First published by World Publishing Company in 1956. Translated by Philip Mairet. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/sartre/works/exist/sartre.htm
- Searle, J. R. (2007). Neuroscience, intentionality and free will: Reply to Habermas. Philosophical Explorations, 10(1), 69-76. https://doi.org/10.1080/13869790601170169
- Snell, M. B. (2009). Do you have free will? In: California Magazine. Available at: https://alumni.berkeley.edu/california-magazine/march-april-2008-mind-matters/do-you-have-free-will/.
- van Inwagen, P. (1975). The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism. Philosophical Studies, 27(3), 185-199.
- Williams, T. (2022). John Duns Scotus. In E. N. Zalta & U. Nodelman (Eds.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2022 Edition). Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/duns-scotus/.