Abstract
The content of a mental act- a pivotal element of a theory of intentionality- has a threefold meaning: as a logical concept, is the ideal signification, as a psychological concept, is the core of a noema (i.e., the instantiation of an ideal and as an ontological concept, is the object (real or unreal) intented by the nucleus.
We can make a parallel between this Husserlian threefold distinction and the Fregean sense/”reference” distinction, reducing it to the sense/object distinction. This paralleism is not to force the Husserl’s thought to Frege’s, but, on the contrary, to show the structure of the triple meaning of content: Husserl mtroduces the difference between ideal signification and instantiated signification, so the pure and Simple signification and the noematic sense are species of the genus sense. Husserl’s theory of intentionality and his philosophy of language does not go Frege, but beyond. The recognition of that allows us to see the error of Føesdal’s mterpretation, as while as those of Sartre and Gurwitsch.
The Fregean sense/”reference” distinction is subsumed by the Husserlian conceptual trio ideal signification/noematic sense/object. This triad of concepts houses not only a semantic theory (as Frege’s pair), but also a theory of a theory of perception. Husserl integrates its semantics in a theory of of consciousness that overcomes the intentio doctrines ofBrentano, Twardowsk1 and the medievals.