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            <title><![CDATA[Erratum to: Introduction: The Problem of Givenness]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2025-0008</link>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Introduction: The Problem of Givenness]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2025-0001</link>
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            <pubDate>Sat, 06 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[In the Lifeworld with Others in Community]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2025-0004</link>
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            <pubDate>Sat, 06 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Husserl proposes a theory of intersubjectivity that begins with transcendental consciousness embedded in the lifeworld alongside others, and in which the community is founded upon a structure of essences. The lifeworld is given and shared by all consciousnesses; it is a condition for empirical and eidetic intuitions, epoché, and eidetic and transcendental reductions. In this world, there are real objects along with other subjects that are recognised through empathy, constituting a community of selves. Even so, how to share their experiences? The experiences can be different, but there is a limit to variations, a limit given by the essences. Thus, the collective constitution of the world and its objects is in permanent progress. It is always possible to give them new meanings, within the limits of their essence. It is the communal constitution of the world.]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Not Doctrinal, Not Theological An Empirical-Pragmatic Approach to the Concept of an Afterlife in Reference to China]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2025-0006</link>
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            <pubDate>Sat, 06 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Contrary to the philosophical purism of academic depictions of religious doctrines, syncretism is not a random event that might or might not happen to traditions but a consistent and nearly inevitable anthropological process whereby beliefs and doctrinal concepts are assimilated under the objective pressure of spiritual experience. As recent research presents indigenous traditions according to their original meaning, filtering colonial perspectives out of the analysis, anti-Western biases prove equally inadequate to revealing what these traditions actually mean. Scholarly understanding of afterlife conceptions in China suffered from the excessive emphasis on the tension between Westernized and anti-Western approaches, demanding not only a revaluation of original cultural meanings in the humanistic sense but also philosophical and scientific attempts to scrutinize objective experiential patterns. Through the exemplary Chinese case, this paper proposes that a more empirical and pragmatic approach to afterlife conceptions could be more fruitful for the philosophy of religion than more humanistic analyses based solely on cultural interpretation.]]></description>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Dance of Life Buytendijk and the Phenomenology of the Encounter1]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2025-0007</link>
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            <pubDate>Sat, 06 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[In his original study, Phénoménologie de la Rencontre, F. J. Buytendijk develops one of the most admirable phenomenological descriptions around the experience of the encounter. Moving away from all causal explicative models, Buytendijk interrogates the ultimate sense of this manifestation, such as it appears, aiming at its most originary and therefore authentic, essence. The encounter is transfigured as a phenomenon sui generis: it is the expression of our “being” or our “becoming world” by the unity of my body and the other in a single plot or perceptual event.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Quando a Imagem Se Dá: Ídolo, Ícone e o Excesso da Pintura When the Image Is Given: Idol, Icon, and the Excess in Painting]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2025-0005</link>
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            <pubDate>Sat, 06 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The notions of idol and icon, historically shaped at the intersection of theology, culture, and philosophy, acquire a specific status within the phenomenology of givenness as particular modes of receiving the phenomenal appearing of the world. From the perspective of Jean-Luc Marion, these categories – along with flesh and historical event – are understood as saturated phenomena, expressing the central paradoxes of givenness. This article aims to investigate such paradoxes in light of the phenomenology of givenness and to explore their possible connections with the visual language of painting. The objective is to outline new hermeneutical parameters capable of sustaining a phenomenological description of the pictorial image as a gift that imposes itself through its own givenness. The experience of painting, conceived as an encounter of gazes – between the self and the other – is thus reborn as a phenomenon of excessive visibility, traversed by the invisibility inherent in the act of giving.]]></description>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Between Phenomenology and Realism The Problem of Givenness in Jocelyn Benoist]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2025-0002</link>
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            <pubDate>Sat, 06 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[In Jocelyn Benoist’s work, phenomenology occupies a central place, serving as the foundation of his philosophical investigations and, ultimately, of his most current theoretical propositions and criticisms. It is curious that phenomenology gradually changes within his thought without ever ceasing to occupy a central place in it. From methodological principle, it becomes a quite strong target of their criticisms. In this paper, we will reconstruct these criticisms that, on one hand, demonstrate the fertility that phenomenology has in philosophy and, on the other hand, the resistance it offers to continue the investigations of the relation between perception and reality (on what we called the Benoist vicious circle of intentionality). While Benoist questions phenomenology in its conceptual framework, it is phenomenology that imposes a very arduous challenge to the philosopher so that he may, after all, understand our relationship with the world in other terms, so important and renewed to him.]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Primacy of the Giving of Facts Around the Problem of Apriorism in Max Scheler]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2025-0003</link>
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            <pubDate>Sat, 06 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The discussion revolves around the thesis that “in no case does apriorism lead to idealism”, taken as a fulcrum around which two movements are made. Firstly, this thesis is explained and then, in the second movement, reasons are given for thinking about the meaning of apriorism from the immanence of phenomenological experience, by grounding the problem in the essential and immediate intuition of knowledge-data. Consequently, the primary meaning of a priori is determined from the eidetic correlation between what is given in an absolute and evident way, in the sphere of facts, and the intuitive vision. This clarifies the meaning of the material character of the self-giving of facts, without naively identifying materiality with the mere sensible content of empirical observations. In the last movement, starting with the indication of the meaning and essence of knowing as (lovingly) partaking in the object of knowledge, the meaning of apriority in the sciences is discussed, tracing the emergence of formalism back to a certain type of reduction that artificially constructs the object. In this procedure, the prejudice against the sensible operates by relegating it to data deprived of original forms, justifying the need to mold them into forms exclusive to the understanding. Scheler’s intention to remove the problem of apriorism from the hermeneutic horizon of modernity is thus evident, because its tendency, rooted in “hatred of the world” and hostility to the “chaos” of the sensible, consists of functionalizing the spirit’s forms of thought and intuition by admitting them as a formative activity and synthetic force typical of reason.]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Natorp, Husserl and Gurwitsch: The Problem of the “Pure Ego” in Phenomenology]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0010</link>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[There is an ongoing debate concerning the concept of the “pure ego” that begins with Paul Natorp and Edmund Husserl, rooted in the methodological differences stemming from the intellectual legacy of their predecessors. This article aims to demonstrate how the development of this initial debate provides the foundation for a second controversy, internal to the phenomenological tradition itself, in which Aron Gurwitsch – drawing on Natorp’s influence on Husserl – questions the “pure ego” as an element present within the sphere of pure consciousness in Husserl’s transcendental turn.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Pathways to Liberation: Paul Ricoeur on Memory, History, and the Dynamics of Forgiveness]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0013</link>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[To the question of the origin of the subject, from a strictly phenomenological approach, Paul Ricoeur adds the question of lack and its overcoming, its liberation through forgiveness. For him, the questions of the origin of the subject and the origin of forgiveness are inseparable: the question of identity “who am I?” would lead to the question of forgiveness, “how can I effectively be free?” His theoretical description of the will highlights the structure of human freedom. Freedom is the condition of all human responsibility, upon which guilt will be structured, from which, according to Paul Ricoeur, no man escapes: guilt is freedom reduced to slavery. We find the situation of the guilty one described above, extended to all humanity. Humanity is guilty, so its freedom is inherent. Therefore, it is not destroyed, it becomes a hope for liberation. This is precisely what myths come to tell man: the myth of innocence is desire, courage, and the imaginative experience that supports the eidetic description of the voluntary and the involuntary. Paul Ricoeur’s approach to forgiveness synthesizes memory, history, and forgetting. In other words, it is a resumption of the phenomenological phase of our author which, by the way, has never been set aside, even in its most “hermeneutical” moments.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Introduction: Phenomenology and Scientific Philosophy]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0007</link>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Could Philosophy be an Empirical Science? Brentano vs. Wittgenstein]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0008</link>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[As is well known, Franz Brentano claimed that “the true method of philosophy is none other than that of the science of nature.” The claim is striking for a number of reasons. For one, philosophy has traditionally dealt with questions that science tends to avoid, such as the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, the problem of evil. Brentano himself insisted both that philosophy’s method should be scientific in the sense of empirical science, and that philosophy should pursue those questions that empirical science typically shuns. Thus he agreed with Auguste Comte in pressing for positive science but disagreed when Comte evicted metaphysics and theology from the positive realm. Among philosophers inspired by work done in the 19th century taking a scientific approach to philosophy, there are to be included not only some of Brentano’s students, such as Husserl, but also the Bertrand Russell of logical atomism, and his student/colleague Ludwig Wittgenstein. In this paper, I propose to examine the question of whether philosophy can be an empirical science, by contrasting Brentano’s view with Wittgenstein’s. The Viennese engineer-turned-philosopher devised a way of thinking about philosophical questions which retained the precision of a science but limited the scope of such questions to the examination of certain grammatical puzzles. By contrast, although he shunned the system-building of Kant, Schelling, and Hegel, Brentano remained mindful of the big picture in a way that Wittgenstein seems to rule out. I first present Brentano’s view that philosophy is a science, as it is contained in his early lecture, “Auguste Comte and Positive Philosophy.” Then I present a reply in the spirit of Wittgenstein. In conclusion I attempt to sort out the truth of the matter.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Lotze, Husserl and the Crisis of European Science]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0011</link>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The crisis of European science is a recurring theme in German philosophy following the failure of idealism. This crisis finds a pivotal expression in the philosophy of Hermann Lotze, an extremely influential author in the second half of the 19th century, who serves as a reference and source of inspiration for Husserl’s reflections in the 1930s.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Wissenschaftliche Philosophie in der Ukraine: Am Beispiel der wissenschaftlichen und pädagogischen Tätigkeiten von Kasimir Twardowski und der von ihm gegründeten Lemberg-Warschau Schule]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0009</link>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The article is dedicated to analyzing the academic and pedagogical activities of Kasimir Twardowski, an important Polish philosopher of the late 19th to the early 20th century. The article presents arguments supporting the claim that the Lviv-Warsaw Philosophical School he founded in 1895 developed in the direction of scientific philosophy. Moreover, the peculiarity and uniqueness of this phenomenon in the context of Ukrainian culture are described, and its possible influence on the future development of philosophy in Ukraine is outlined.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Reason, Thinking, Geist: Epistemological Concepts in Frege’s Philosophy]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0012</link>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[I analyze three crucial epistemological concepts that appear in isolated passages throughout Frege’s work. First, I argue that the concept of reason should be understood as the faculty which gives sense to objectivity – that is, it makes knowledge possible. Second, after distinguishing thinking from psychological representations, I show how thinking enables the correlation between the spirit (Geist), which I conceive as an ego, and thoughts, which are ontologically independent and objective, but, from an epistemological standpoint, necessarily related to the ego. Third, I examine Frege’s peculiar notion of ‘being given’ and claim that the givenness of thoughts to the ego amounts to giving meaning to objectivity through thinking, for without this, we would be unable even to understand what objectivity is. I conclude that Frege’s fragmentary reflections on these issues can be better comprehended through a transcendental perspective that explains how knowledge functions as a whole, rather than being restricted to logic alone.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Book Review: Mª Carmen López Sáenz e César Moreno Márquez (Eds.). Del tiempo: Perspectivas fenomenológicas. Madrid: Editorial Dykinson. 2024. 273pp.]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0006</link>
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            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The ‘Worlds of Cinema’ and the ‘Cinema of Worlds’: A Heideggerian Phenomenology]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0003</link>
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            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Within a range of academic disciplines like film studies, philosophy of film, and narratology, scholars talk about ‘worlds.’ In this essay, I present various ‘ontic’ and ‘ontological’ descriptions of ‘world’ according to a Heideggerian phenomenology. My aim is to distinguish between what I call the ‘worlds of cinema,’ which bring about a particular subject-object relationship experienced as absorption, immersion, distraction, or distancing, and the ‘cinema of worlds,’ where film as art unsettles us as an ontological event, disrupting the subject-object dynamic in which we understand the depthlessness of our Being. Where the once familiar webs of meaning that made up our lives to which movies normally appeal, are now made strange to us through an onto-cinematic event. Here the actuality of my world is only known via its possibilities to which the film, as art, now draws my attention.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Ontology and Structure in Merleau-Ponty: The Ontological Sense of Structure in The Structure of Behavior]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0001</link>
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            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[This paper has two main goals: first, to circumscribe the topic in Merleau-Ponty’s work, focusing especially on his first book, and second, to delimit the question in The Structure of Behavior itself, focusing especially on his description of the perceptual dimension of structure.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[O Corpo Revivido: Memórias “Pós”-Covid]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0004</link>
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            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The work is composed of two mutually structuring moments. First, it briefly and critically reconstructs the broader spectrum of the health crisis surrounding Covid-19 that came to light in 2019 and which, in a distant or more recent period, received unique attention in the literary work of Shakespeare and Camus. Second, it provides an account of an experience in which the author, once a victim of the pandemic, retains memories that still have a therapeutic impact on the post-hospital period. Broadly speaking, by looking at this double and mutual record, the text advocates the thesis that such memories are an invitation to permanent reflection without, however, losing sight of another way of life as a possible utopia, whether as a diagnosis or as an antidote to the crisis. From this perspective, Merleau-Ponty’s mature work becomes, in particular, an indispensable guide as a backdrop in this scenario by bringing to light the symptomatically dazzling aspect of the human condition and its ills. The ongoing project of a nouvelle ontologie, in the philosopher’s final itinerary, emblematically circumscribed as “ontological rehabilitation of the sensible,” embraces, in turn, this task and commitment. It is, in short, a philosophy thought from the deepest dimension of our carnality, an experience of thought archaeologically rooted as intertwined with life and, therefore, not indifferent to pain and suffering. It is to this extent that the reflection contains, as a final proposition, the premise that the marks left, in flesh and blood, in the light of the revived experience of the body, greatly prospect a horizon of meaning to be better understood and reconstructed.]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Phenomenological Approach to Conscious and Unconscious Mental Life]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0005</link>
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            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[This article deals with the conscious and unconscious dimensions of mental life. I distinguish the transitive sense of consciousness, being conscious of something, intentionality, from the adjectival or adverbial sense, being conscious or consciously directed towards something. I show that an intentional act can be conscious or unconscious in the second sense and argue that, from this position, we can ask good questions about what consciousness is and its function in mental life. To achieve this result, I begin by framing the topic in the tradition of psychology before Husserl, namely Lipps, and Brentano, and then describe the unconscious dimension from the conceptual apparatus of phenomenology.]]></description>
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