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        <title>Phainomenon Feed</title>
        <link>https://sciendo.com/journal/PHAINOMENON</link>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Natorp, Husserl and Gurwitsch: The Problem of the “Pure Ego” in Phenomenology]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0010</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0010</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

There is an ongoing debate concerning the concept of the “pure ego” that begins with Paul Natorp and Edmund Husserl, rooted in the methodological differences stemming from the intellectual legacy of their predecessors. This article aims to demonstrate how the development of this initial debate provides the foundation for a second controversy, internal to the phenomenological tradition itself, in which Aron Gurwitsch – drawing on Natorp’s influence on Husserl – questions the “pure ego” as an element present within the sphere of pure consciousness in Husserl’s transcendental turn.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Lotze, Husserl and the Crisis of European Science]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0011</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0011</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

The crisis of European science is a recurring theme in German philosophy following the failure of idealism. This crisis finds a pivotal expression in the philosophy of Hermann Lotze, an extremely influential author in the second half of the 19th century, who serves as a reference and source of inspiration for Husserl’s reflections in the 1930s.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Introduction: Phenomenology and Scientific Philosophy]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0007</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0007</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Could Philosophy be an Empirical Science? Brentano vs. Wittgenstein]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0008</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0008</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

As is well known, Franz Brentano claimed that “the true method of philosophy is none other than that of the science of nature.” The claim is striking for a number of reasons. For one, philosophy has traditionally dealt with questions that science tends to avoid, such as the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, the problem of evil. Brentano himself insisted both that philosophy’s method should be scientific in the sense of empirical science, and that philosophy should pursue those questions that empirical science typically shuns. Thus he agreed with Auguste Comte in pressing for positive science but disagreed when Comte evicted metaphysics and theology from the positive realm. Among philosophers inspired by work done in the 19th century taking a scientific approach to philosophy, there are to be included not only some of Brentano’s students, such as Husserl, but also the Bertrand Russell of logical atomism, and his student/colleague Ludwig Wittgenstein. In this paper, I propose to examine the question of whether philosophy can be an empirical science, by contrasting Brentano’s view with Wittgenstein’s. The Viennese engineer-turned-philosopher devised a way of thinking about philosophical questions which retained the precision of a science but limited the scope of such questions to the examination of certain grammatical puzzles. By contrast, although he shunned the system-building of Kant, Schelling, and Hegel, Brentano remained mindful of the big picture in a way that Wittgenstein seems to rule out. I first present Brentano’s view that philosophy is a science, as it is contained in his early lecture, “Auguste Comte and Positive Philosophy.” Then I present a reply in the spirit of Wittgenstein. In conclusion I attempt to sort out the truth of the matter.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Wissenschaftliche Philosophie in der Ukraine: Am Beispiel der wissenschaftlichen und pädagogischen Tätigkeiten von Kasimir Twardowski und der von ihm gegründeten Lemberg-Warschau Schule]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0009</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0009</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

The article is dedicated to analyzing the academic and pedagogical activities of Kasimir Twardowski, an important Polish philosopher of the late 19th to the early 20th century. The article presents arguments supporting the claim that the Lviv-Warsaw Philosophical School he founded in 1895 developed in the direction of scientific philosophy. Moreover, the peculiarity and uniqueness of this phenomenon in the context of Ukrainian culture are described, and its possible influence on the future development of philosophy in Ukraine is outlined.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Pathways to Liberation: Paul Ricoeur on Memory, History, and the Dynamics of Forgiveness]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0013</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0013</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

To the question of the origin of the subject, from a strictly phenomenological approach, Paul Ricoeur adds the question of lack and its overcoming, its liberation through forgiveness. For him, the questions of the origin of the subject and the origin of forgiveness are inseparable: the question of identity “who am I?” would lead to the question of forgiveness, “how can I effectively be free?” His theoretical description of the will highlights the structure of human freedom. Freedom is the condition of all human responsibility, upon which guilt will be structured, from which, according to Paul Ricoeur, no man escapes: guilt is freedom reduced to slavery. We find the situation of the guilty one described above, extended to all humanity. Humanity is guilty, so its freedom is inherent. Therefore, it is not destroyed, it becomes a hope for liberation. This is precisely what myths come to tell man: the myth of innocence is desire, courage, and the imaginative experience that supports the eidetic description of the voluntary and the involuntary. Paul Ricoeur’s approach to forgiveness synthesizes memory, history, and forgetting. In other words, it is a resumption of the phenomenological phase of our author which, by the way, has never been set aside, even in its most “hermeneutical” moments.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Reason, Thinking, Geist: Epistemological Concepts in Frege’s Philosophy]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0012</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0012</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

I analyze three crucial epistemological concepts that appear in isolated passages throughout Frege’s work. First, I argue that the concept of reason should be understood as the faculty which gives sense to objectivity – that is, it makes knowledge possible. Second, after distinguishing thinking from psychological representations, I show how thinking enables the correlation between the spirit (Geist), which I conceive as an ego, and thoughts, which are ontologically independent and objective, but, from an epistemological standpoint, necessarily related to the ego. Third, I examine Frege’s peculiar notion of ‘being given’ and claim that the givenness of thoughts to the ego amounts to giving meaning to objectivity through thinking, for without this, we would be unable even to understand what objectivity is. I conclude that Frege’s fragmentary reflections on these issues can be better comprehended through a transcendental perspective that explains how knowledge functions as a whole, rather than being restricted to logic alone.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Ontology and Structure in Merleau-Ponty: The Ontological Sense of Structure in The Structure of Behavior]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0001</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0001</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[
This paper has two main goals: first, to circumscribe the topic in Merleau-Ponty’s work, focusing especially on his first book, and second, to delimit the question in The Structure of Behavior itself, focusing especially on his description of the perceptual dimension of structure.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The ‘Worlds of Cinema’ and the ‘Cinema of Worlds’: A Heideggerian Phenomenology]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0003</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0003</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[
Within a range of academic disciplines like film studies, philosophy of film, and narratology, scholars talk about ‘worlds.’ In this essay, I present various ‘ontic’ and ‘ontological’ descriptions of ‘world’ according to a Heideggerian phenomenology. My aim is to distinguish between what I call the ‘worlds of cinema,’ which bring about a particular subject-object relationship experienced as absorption, immersion, distraction, or distancing, and the ‘cinema of worlds,’ where film as art unsettles us as an ontological event, disrupting the subject-object dynamic in which we understand the depthlessness of our Being. Where the once familiar webs of meaning that made up our lives to which movies normally appeal, are now made strange to us through an onto-cinematic event. Here the actuality of my world is only known via its possibilities to which the film, as art, now draws my attention.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[O Corpo Revivido: Memórias “Pós”-Covid]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0004</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0004</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

The work is composed of two mutually structuring moments. First, it briefly and critically reconstructs the broader spectrum of the health crisis surrounding Covid-19 that came to light in 2019 and which, in a distant or more recent period, received unique attention in the literary work of Shakespeare and Camus. Second, it provides an account of an experience in which the author, once a victim of the pandemic, retains memories that still have a therapeutic impact on the post-hospital period. Broadly speaking, by looking at this double and mutual record, the text advocates the thesis that such memories are an invitation to permanent reflection without, however, losing sight of another way of life as a possible utopia, whether as a diagnosis or as an antidote to the crisis. From this perspective, Merleau-Ponty’s mature work becomes, in particular, an indispensable guide as a backdrop in this scenario by bringing to light the symptomatically dazzling aspect of the human condition and its ills. The ongoing project of a nouvelle ontologie, in the philosopher’s final itinerary, emblematically circumscribed as “ontological rehabilitation of the sensible,” embraces, in turn, this task and commitment. It is, in short, a philosophy thought from the deepest dimension of our carnality, an experience of thought archaeologically rooted as intertwined with life and, therefore, not indifferent to pain and suffering. It is to this extent that the reflection contains, as a final proposition, the premise that the marks left, in flesh and blood, in the light of the revived experience of the body, greatly prospect a horizon of meaning to be better understood and reconstructed.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A Phenomenological Approach to Conscious and Unconscious Mental Life]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0005</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0005</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[
This article deals with the conscious and unconscious dimensions of mental life. I distinguish the transitive sense of consciousness, being conscious of something, intentionality, from the adjectival or adverbial sense, being conscious or consciously directed towards something. I show that an intentional act can be conscious or unconscious in the second sense and argue that, from this position, we can ask good questions about what consciousness is and its function in mental life. To achieve this result, I begin by framing the topic in the tradition of psychology before Husserl, namely Lipps, and Brentano, and then describe the unconscious dimension from the conceptual apparatus of phenomenology.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Book Review: Mª Carmen López Sáenz e César Moreno Márquez (Eds.). Del tiempo: Perspectivas fenomenológicas. Madrid: Editorial Dykinson. 2024. 273pp.]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0006</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0006</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Phénomènomorphoses Transformations du phénomène chez Gabellieri, Falque et Marion]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0002</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2024-0002</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[
Three of the most recent developments of the “theological turn” in French phenomenology deal explicitly with the question of the form of phenomena. Dealing with the works of Emmanuel Gabellieri, Emmanuel Falque and Jean-Luc Marion, this essay engages into a dialogue with and through French phenomenologists while discussing their philosophical stances – while also incorporating some ideas from authors of the Italian tradition (Sofia Vanni Rovighi, Virgilio Melchiorre and Enzo Melandri). The first part discusses the question of “barriers” and “limits” of phenomenology, followed by a closer examination of how this change in the conception of phenomena (“phenomenomorphosis”) is enacted by the three authors. Considering how the three of them exhibit the signs of what Gabellieri calls a “Christological turn,” the final part before the conclusions addresses the theoretical problem of a theological legitimation of phenomenology.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Idéalisme/réalisme : une distinction métaphysique ?]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2023-0012</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2023-0012</guid>
            <pubDate>Sun, 28 Apr 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

In this article, I intend to show, first of all, that the metaphysical neutrality of the Logical Investigations leads to untenable consequences and even threatens the coherence of Husserl's project. In truth, Husserl's distinction between phenomenology and metaphysics and its corollary, the pure and simple exclusion of metaphysical problems - such as that of the reality of the so-called external world - from the field of nascent phenomenology, make it impossible to give a satisfactory form to a problem as central to this new discipline as that of perception. However, my final word will not be on the indis-soluble link between the problems that phenomenology poses for itself and those that Husserl would like to be able to "purify" it from the outset. However permeable the boundaries between these two general directions of research may be, phenomenology and metaphysics are not equivalent. Phenomenology can even be said to contribute to formulating and solving certain metaphysical problems, starting with the idealism/realism antithesis. It is to this contribution that I will devote the second part of these reflections.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Idealism/realism: A metaphysical distinction?]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2023-0013</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2023-0013</guid>
            <pubDate>Sun, 28 Apr 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

In this article, I intend to show, first of all, that the metaphysical neutrality of the Logical Investigations leads to untenable consequences and even threatens the coherence of Husserl's project. In truth, Husserl's distinction between phenomenology and metaphysics and its corollary, the pure and simple exclusion of metaphysical problems - such as that of the reality of the so-called external world - from the field of nascent phenomenology, make it impossible to give a satisfactory form to a problem as central to this new discipline as that of perception. However, my final word will not be on the indissoluble link between the problems that phenomenology poses for itself and those that Husserl would like to be able to “purify” it from the outset. However permeable the boundaries between these two general research directions may be, phenomenology and metaphysics are not equivalent. Phenomenology can even be said to contribute to formulating and solving certain metaphysical problems, starting with the idealism/realism antithesis. It is to this contribution that I will devote the second part of these reflections.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[O absoluto fenomenológico]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2023-0008</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2023-0008</guid>
            <pubDate>Sun, 28 Apr 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

The same subjectivity that makes the world appear belongs, as an integral part, to that which it makes appear, so that there is no alternative between the phenomenological involvement of the world by subjectivity and the ontological involvement of subjectivity by the world. These are the two faces, already abstract, of a fundamental and original situation, in other words, a primitive fact or an archifact. We have thus transported the correlation to the terrain of the world in the form of a double position of the subject, which I have further formulated metaphorically through the distinction between being before and being within. So, what does it mean to belong to the world, or rather, what are the senses of belonging implied by the fundamental situation we have just described?
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Book Review: Jocelyn Benoist. Von der Phänomenologie zum Realismus. Die Grenzen des Sinns. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 2022, 177 S.]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2023-0014</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2023-0014</guid>
            <pubDate>Sun, 28 Apr 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[La phénoménologie française ou résistances de la métaphysique]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2023-0010</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2023-0010</guid>
            <pubDate>Sun, 28 Apr 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

Starting again from Descartes' philosophy, our intention in this article is not to leave phenomenology, but to return to it in order to shed new light on how it encounters metaphysics and revives it. It is a question of inscribing French phenomenology in another history of metaphysics, one that is underground and unofficial and which lives, in truth, from that very thing that completes the other or which the other completes. Initially, we will focus on Jean-Luc Marion's reading of Descartes from the paradigm offered by Heidegger. Secondly, we would like to replay the confrontation between Descartes and Pascal. Only in the third stage, then, will we be able to return to how metaphysics, most often assumed as such from its Cartesian configuration, has worked under the surface of the phenomenology its French representatives received from Husserl and Heidegger. Levinas can often serve as an exemplary figure.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[French Phenomenology of Art and Metaphysics]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2023-0009</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2023-0009</guid>
            <pubDate>Sun, 28 Apr 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

This article examines the relationship between French phenomenology of art and metaphysics. More specifically, it highlights four points. Firstly, French phenomenological aesthetics is characterized by a certain ignorance of the renewal of artistic questioning initiated by Anglo-Saxon aesthetics. Secondly, French phenomenology of art is a metaphysics of art, which considers that works of art contain an ontological (cosmophanic or theophanic) revelation. Thirdly, French phenomenology of art is part of the “theological turn of French phenomenology”. Authors tend towards theology or “cosmotheology”. Fourthly, French phenomenology of art, which is a metaphysics of the sensible, possesses the theoretical means to think philosophically about conceptual art.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Introduction : La phénoménologie française vers la métaphysique]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2023-0007</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/phainomenon-2023-0007</guid>
            <pubDate>Sun, 28 Apr 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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