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Municipal investment expenditures by pork-barrel mayors: evidence from a transition economy Cover

Municipal investment expenditures by pork-barrel mayors: evidence from a transition economy

Open Access
|Apr 2022

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/mgrsd-2022-0004 | Journal eISSN: 2084-6118 | Journal ISSN: 0867-6046
Language: English
Page range: 94 - 100
Submitted on: Oct 5, 2021
Accepted on: Mar 1, 2022
Published on: Apr 29, 2022
Published by: Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies, University of Warsaw
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 4 issues per year

© 2022 Katarzyna Leśniewska-Napierała, Tomasz Napierała, published by Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies, University of Warsaw
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